



DS478
B18
4



Division SCD
Section 1289
v. 4

Charles Ball

History of the Indian mutiny

IV



THE GREAT HALL OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1834. THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AS APPEARED IN THE YEAR 1834. BY G. H. PHILIPPS. THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AS APPEARED IN THE YEAR 1834. BY G. H. PHILIPPS.

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AS APPEARED IN THE YEAR 1834.



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2016

THE MOUNTAIN MEN OF THE GREAT WESTERN PLAINS





THE MEN OF THE MOUNTAINS OF SYRIA AND PALESTINE

THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN, SEPTEMBER 1, 1862







THE CAMP OF THE 1ST BATTALION OF THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION IN INDIA



MARCHING BAND OF THE 100th REGIMENT, NEW YORK INFANTRY

THE ENGRAVER'S NAME IS AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PAGE





THE 15th LANCERS AT THE BATTLE OF ALMA, 25th SEPTEMBER 1854.

THE 15th LANCERS AT THE BATTLE OF ALMA, 25th SEPTEMBER 1854.



THE KING OF THE SOUTH SEAS



VIEW OF CALCUTTA, INDIA, FROM THE RIVER, 1800. BY J. H. B. & CO. ENGRAVERS, 15, N. B. ST. LONDON.



VIEW OF THE BAY OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, FROM THE BAY

THE BAY OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, FROM THE BAY

LIBRARY OF PRINCETON
MAY 1918
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

loading his pistol, eyeing me, I thought I'd bolt and tell the brigadier.

"I galloped up, and meeting B—— at the brigadier's gate, told him, and that the only chance of our saving our troop was his proceeding down there immediately. He said, 'The brigadier has ordered me not; but never mind, come along.' We went down, intending to go to the stables; but as we passed the men's houses some rushed out, and said, 'Come in here, Sahibs; come in here.' We went in, and found some six men with a native officer, who said that all the rest had gone, and that if we did not go into their house we should be killed immediately. B—— returned to inform the brigadier, while I stayed some minutes longer. In the meantime I heard shots fired right and left; and the few men remaining not seeming much inclined to protect me, I thought it time to go too. I was then mounted on a troop-horse with my parade saddle. I galloped back to my bungalow, to try to get some powder to load my revolver from B——'s servants, having none of my own; but they said it was all locked up. I found a few grains in an old flask of mine, and loaded one of the chambers. I then went to join the brigadier, but he had already gone down to the fort in the city. I followed, and met one of his servants, who was crying and wringing his hands, saying, 'They are killing the brigadier.' I asked which way he had gone, and, putting spurs to my horse, dashed after him. About half-way between fort and cantonments, I saw six troopers drawn up on the side of the road. I drew my revolver, though of no use, and there being no other escape, proposed to run the gauntlet with my horse at full speed. I came opposite the first, who fired his pistol; the rest did likewise as I came opposite them, but without effect. The last gave chase, drawing his second pistol. I covered him with my revolver, which kept him off for some time; but suddenly closing within two yards, he took a steady aim at my head and fired. I felt as if I had been hit a severe blow with a stick on the right arm, having covered myself as well as possible with it. He gave a shout and closed; I thought it was all up with me; but finding I could draw my sword, began to feel rather jolly again. When he came alongside, I rammed it into him; but having no strength, could only get it in about two inches into his side. He knocked it out

with his pistol. I struck him again, but with like effect. He then shot ahead. I put spurs to my nag, and, as I came up, banged at him. He bent forward to avoid, and I only got about one inch into him; but he almost lost his seat, and pulled up. I had almost done so too; but pushed along, and he fell behind. I now thought I should reach the fort, but was disappointed. Seeing some more men ahead of me, I turned to the right, and took a pull at my horse. I now saw that my wound was bleeding, and having lost my shako, must have been a pretty figure. I went across the khets for some half a mile, to get rid of the city, when I came upon a road. I asked a villager where it went to? He said to Lahore; but it turned out to be to Wuzeerabad. I pushed along at a hand-gallop some five miles, when, the sun getting warm, I pulled up. I tried to persuade some one to give me a turban; they all said they had but one, and were not fools enough to give it to me, so I pushed along again. On passing a village, an old man rushed out, and began potting at me with a pellet-bow. I did not mind this; but on looking back, thought I saw two troopers coming after me. This was rather a nuisance, as my right arm was now quite stiff, utterly useless, and painful. So having been sparing of my horse, I put him out again, and did not draw rein for some eight miles. I then went on more slowly, all pursuit having stopped. Some sixteen miles from Sealkote, coming on a police thanah, pulled up to get water, and have my wound looked at, as it was now very painful. I got off, and the men mustered round me, and were as kind as could be. I found, now, the bullet had entered about two inches below, and gone about an inch above the elbow-joint. How it escaped the bone I don't know. Having been bound up as well as it could be, and having drank some water and washed my horse's mouth out, I went on to Wuzeerabad, accompanied by the headman, who had made me a sling, and given me a turban. I pushed along, and, after a good deal of pain, managed to reach Wuzeerabad at 11 A.M., having started from Sealkote at half-past four. My nag was completely done up, having come a good thirty miles. I went into the dāk bungalow (travelling station), and sent for the native tehseeldar (there being no European), to consult with him what to do. I drank four cups of tea,

and some brandy and water, and felt pretty well. He (the *tehseeldar*) brought with him the banker, who offered me his buggy and horse, and any amount of money. I took twenty rupees; and after about an hour's rest, started for Goojraucowla in his buggy, with two bottles of soda-water. After an awfully hot drive of twenty miles, I got in here about five o'clock. My wound at this time hurt me very much. Here I found three officers of the 46th native infantry, and M—— and the assistant-commissioner (Mr. Blackall), who received me most kindly. I lay down and had my jacket cut off, when I found I had had a most narrow escape, a pistol bullet having ripped open my jacket just over my spine. A doctor looked at my wound, and told me that it was only a flesh one, and that I should be all right in a month. Not a week has passed, and I am able to get about. Everybody here has been most kind; and I had no idea that there were so many Miss Nightingales in the world. I am clothed from head to foot by Blackall, and don't know how to thank him. I am going into Lahore to-night. Everything I have has been plundered, and I am beginning again with a sword, and a jacket cut up the back; even my revolver I dropped on the road. I am not able to write, but shall be, I hope, by the next mail. You will be pleased to hear that I have not suffered in the least in health. Beyond my wound, I am as well as ever I was."

An officer of the 46th regiment writes thus from Sealkote on the 15th:—"My regiment (the 46th native infantry) has mutinied, but I got off safe, thanks to hard riding. I have lost everything I possessed. I have nothing in the world now but a night-shirt, pair of trowsers, hat, one pair of socks, and a pair of old boots; one sword, one pistol. Everything was plundered, and my house destroyed by the mutineers. I have not a *pice* (penny) in the world. I saved one horse and saddle and bridle; but I rode him so hard for forty miles that I nearly killed him, and he will never be of much use again. Pray send me some clothes of any sort. I have nothing in the world; my rings, studs, watch, &c., all gone. I barely got off with my life. I will give you a short account. About 4 o'clock A.M. I was awakened by a servant, who told me there was a great disturbance in the lines among the sepoys. I got up immediately, and put on the first clothes that came to hand. I

went towards the lines, and before I got clear of my compound a cavalry sowar came out of our lines. Boyle immediately pursued him. I galloped after Boyle till I stopped him, for we were both unarmed. On looking round I saw three more sowars, one of whom chased me. I galloped back to my bungalow, seized my sword and pistol, and went down to the quarter-guard of my regiment. In a short time I was joined by some more officers and the colonel. We tried to reassure the men, and gave them the order to take their arms and fire on the cavalry; instead of firing on the cavalry, they fired on us. A sepoy of my regiment seized the bridle of a brother-officer's (Smith's) horse, and led him under shelter, telling him to gallop for his life; he started off immediately, followed by Horsford, another of ours, and I came last. In passing a side street I was fired at, but most providentially missed; the ball passed close to my nose. We three then made our way across country, swimming and wading rivers, &c., for about forty miles, till we got to another station in safety; one lady escaped with me; she was very ill—her husband drove her in his buggy with us. There were seven people killed—Brigadier Brind, Captain Bishop, 46th native infantry; Dr. Graham, and Dr. Graham, jun.; and a Rev. Mr. Hunter, wife and child. Everybody else escaped to the fort at Sealkote, and I came back from Goojeranwalla (where I had escaped to) yesterday, and am now in the fort, living in a stable in the very hottest season without a change of clothes. The whole station is plundered; our mess, in which we had about 8,000 rupees' worth of plate, is sacked; some of the plate has been found strewn over the country, in ditches, &c. Not one of my things has been recovered. The officers of my regiment will have to pay among us the mess debts—a very large sum; and it will go a long way towards entirely ruining us, for we have none of us a single thing in the world but the clothes on our backs. I am thankful to say that the villains of my regiment and the 9th cavalry, who mutinied at the same time, have been nearly destroyed; they have been pursued and cut up by the 52nd, and twelve guns, and I most sincerely hope none have escaped. My boxes were all broken to pieces, and my clothes torn up and strewn about the country; books all destroyed. No city was ever more completely sacked than the station of Sealkote."

Again we extract from a letter of a cavalry officer, who writes from Lahore on the 19th. He says—"On the morning of the 9th I was fast asleep in my house at Sealkote, when I was awoke by a woman running in screaming. This was the wife of our sergeant-major, who was followed shortly after by her husband, with a wound in his forehead. He said that he had five or six shots fired at him by our men. By the time I had dressed and got my pistols and sword on, the havildar-major came and said that early that morning the Mussulmans of the 1st troop began saddling their horses, and as there was no parade ordered, he asked them what they were doing, when they told him to mind his own business. I rode to the brigadier's, and in a short time he came out with Chambers, the joint magistrate. Balmain just then rode up, and said that when he went down to the lines the Hindoos told him to go and remain in his house, or he would certainly be killed. We heard, too, that some of our men had ridden to the 46th native infantry lines to raise them, and then we knew it was all up with Sealkote, for so many instances have occurred of the cavalry riding down to the infantry lines; and the latter invariably join them. Brigadier Briund, Balmain, Chambers, and I rode out of the compound, and then we perceived a large body of our men posted so as to cut us off from the fort in the city, who, immediately they saw us, commenced chasing and firing at us. We first of all made straight for the cantonments, so as to bring them after us, and then on a sudden we turned off to the right, and rode for a bridge which was between the cantonments and the city. By this manœuvre I found myself leading, and being mounted on a good horse I could have gone off without coming into collision with the rascals again. As I was nearing the bridge, Balmain, who was close behind me, called out, 'Stop and make a stand, or the brigadier is lost!' We both turned on the bridge, and I then saw the brigadier trying to get across the nullah, with a number of our men after him. The foremost of them, who was a little in advance of the others, as soon as he saw me stop, turned from following the brigadier, and came at us. I had just time to draw and cock my pistol, when down he came on me at full gallop, with carbine levelled. I could have almost touched him when he fired, and the bullet whizzed past me. At the same moment I fired; but, owing to the pace he

was coming, I missed. I was perfectly cool, and made up my mind not to fire until he had done so and was close on me. If I had used my sword instead of my pistol I must have killed him. Balmain had two shots at him, but also missed. All this did not take half a minute; but it gave time for the brigadier to cross the nullah, and we then rode on to the fort without interruption. It was not till we got there that I discovered that the brigadier had been wounded badly, and it was with great difficulty he got along; but he bore up bravely; he has since, I am sorry to say, died of his wounds. I thought it best to trust to my horse, so I rode on to Goojeranwalla, a distance of thirty miles, where I arrived at about 9 A.M., more dead than alive. My horse could hardly walk in the last five miles, and once dropped with me. In an hour or two more two infantry officers came in who had made a long detour across country. This was the account they gave: four of our men rode down to their lines and began exciting the men to mutiny; most of the officers were at parade at the time. The men asked permission to get to their arms to keep our troopers off. As soon as they obtained it they rushed to their lines, instead of to the places where the arms are usually kept, and then came out and began firing at their officers. Those that were mounted made off at once. The whole business was evidently preconcerted, although we were quite unprepared for it. Besides the brigadier, the following people are known to be killed:—Captain Bishop, 46th native infantry; Dr. Graham, superintending surgeon; Dr. Graham, junior, medical store-keeper; and a missionary and his wife. Bushby is supposed to be in the hands of the mutineers; and Prinsep, after running the gauntlet of six or seven of our men, escaped with a shot in his arm. The mutineers, after plundering and burning the whole station, made off at 2 P.M. in the direction of Goordnapore; besides which, they let all the prisoners out of the gaol; so you may guess the condition of the place. On the evening of the 9th I came on here by mail-cart; and as I was crossing the bridge over the Ravee, I met three gentlemen in a buggy, one of whom, Mr. Roberts, the commissioner of Lahore, on hearing that I knew no one here, offered me a room in his house. He is, indeed, most kind, as I am a perfect stranger to him."

An officer in the civil service gives more

circumstantial details in the following passages, from Sealkote, July 23rd:—

“The mutiny broke out by some of the cavalry riding into the infantry lines, about half-past four in the morning. The row then began, and the troopers behaved most murderously, pursuing every European they saw, even up to the walls of the fort, where Captain Bishop, one of the infantry officers, was pistolled. They also killed several natives, against whom they had a spite. The escapes that people had are past romance. Captain Saunders, Dr. Butler, and Dr. Garrad, with thirteen of their children, and their wives, lay hid in a coal-hole a few feet square, from 5 A.M. till 6 P.M. This hole was one of three adjoining outhouses, two of which the murderers broke open as they went about the compound looking for them. They had to gag their children to prevent noise. The heat nearly killed them, and we all gave them up till they came down to the fort in the evening. The troopers asking where they were, one man, who peeped in at the keyhole, they shot with a revolver through the head. A signal-gun had been left in the station; this the wretches got hold of, and mounted on a carriage drawn by sixteen bullocks, and coolly fired it at twelve o'clock, just as if nothing had happened. When the row began, the grenadier company took their captain (Caulfield) and the colonel of the regiment (Farquharson), and pushed them into one of their native huts, and stood guard over the door, talking to them, and promising to protect them and take them to the fort in the evening. After some time, nearly the whole regiment got about them, and asked them to lead them, promising them respectively 2,000 and 1,000 rupees per month; promising to march to pleasant stations, and to go to the hills in the hot weather. This one fact ought to be enough for those who lay the blame of these affairs on the officers; no one does out here. The cause is to be found in the annexation of Oude, which set all the high Mussulman families bitterly against us, in certain small grievances about pensions, the introduction of Ghoorkas and Sikhs, &c., into our regiments, and the general antipathy which exists more or less among the higher orders against a white face.

“In the fort we mustered a pretty large number of Europeans, with loads of ladies and children. For aid we had some of our foot police corps and 300 new Sikh levies.

We threw up an earthwork on the approach to the gate, to prevent its being blown open by the guns; served out muskets and ammunition, and manned the bastions; no time to eat, and a burning sun over us. We then awaited anything the rebels might please to do. Presently we saw detachments of infantry and cavalry release 350 ruffians from the gaol, who immediately set to work plundering and murdering, commencing their operations by setting fire to our beautiful Cutcherry, which is destroyed, with all the valuable documents there were in it. Then they plundered our treasury of 14,000 rupees, the mounted police-guards in the place readily joining them. The native commanders of the horse and foot had both been talked over. The troops next divided out 32,000 rupees which had been committed to them to keep, then burnt down the market-place and town, blew up two large magazines, and finally set to work plundering houses. At 4 P.M. they got all the horses, buggies, and carriages they could find, and put their plunder into them, and moved slowly off, marching about nine miles that night towards the Ravee river. We kept watch all night, being told-off to each bastion. I was not the least affected by the sleeping in the open air and watch, beyond a little cold; indeed, the relief of having the thing over, and the removal of the suspense, made me feel wonderfully well. When the troops went, villagers poured by thousands into cantonments, and destroyed or plundered everything that had been left. The damage done to this beautiful station is inconceivable. Next day a party of our levies marched up, and bayoneted and shot fourteen or fifteen on the spot, and drove the rest out. The mischief, however, had been done. We did not relax our guarding measures, as they might return at any moment; and 200 men from the Jhelum district were known to have escaped. They are now imprisoned—caught by Gholab Sing's people in Cashmere. He thus far seems to stand with us. Our foot police stood by us all through the affair, except the wretch in command of them. The mounted police all went bad, and instead of aiding to escort us to the fort, helped to plunder, and did not strike a blow.”

Another gentleman, belonging to the civil service at Sealkote, after describing some of the preceding events, says—“Myself and Lieutenant M'Mahon, my

fellow-assistant-commissioner, were staying at Moncton's house, where we lived and messed together during these times of disturbance and trouble. On the 8th, we had invited a clergyman here from cantonments, fearing what was coming, and made him stay the night. We had, as a guard for the house, about thirty or thirty-five of our new levies, and something over thirty mounted police. On the morning of the 9th, I was on watch from four to six (we had taken turns about), and fell asleep at my post. At half-past five, M'Mahon came into my room, saying, 'There's a row at the gaol.' I offered to go down with him; but he said, 'Do not trouble.' Two minutes after, he came in, saying, 'Well, J—, it has come at last.' Forty troopers were now at the gate of the gaol, trying to get the prisoners out; and, though we could not see it, a wing of the native infantry was there too. I jumped up, already half-dressed, got my pistol, and looking out, we saw other cavalry galloping up towards the house. We went outside, gave the alarm, and our foot-guard turned out very nimbly. Mr. Boyle and Mr. Moncton were to go down under the guard of the thirty mounted police, whom we expected out every moment, taking up Mr. Hunter, his wife and child, on their way to the fort. They, however, had gone before, and were all murdered on their way to the fort. I and M'Mahon walked off at the head of our raw recruits, going slowly for the rest to come up; and then having to stop and make them load, and see that they did it well, as it was the first time many of them had put a cartridge into a musket. We then went slowly across the plain, till two or three cavalry rode up very close, calling to our men to come with them; and, at first, taken in by the *ruse*, they moved a few paces towards them. We told them they were mutineers, who wanted to take away their bread from them; and, patting one or two of them, told them that this was a time when we and they were going to be brothers. They then marched on as pluckily as possible, laughing and joking with us, though we felt in anything but a laughing humour. Twice, as we moved along, bodies of cavalry came very near. We made our men face round to them; and telling them that Punjabees were not to be alarmed at the sight of such cowards, they showed so bold a front, that the wretches went off, though they might with

ease have cut us all up. Our horses were led after us; but we thought it best not to mount, lest it might discourage our men. After getting past the gaol, we found no difficulty in reaching the fort, where we found numbers of officers had preceded us. We then got in a few provisions, and prepared for an assault. The mutineers, however, did not try us; but they blew up the magazines, plundered houses, let out 350 prisoners, burnt the Cutcherry with all its records, and took 14,000 rupees from the Cutcherry treasury. After ruining every house in the cantonments, they left in buggies, carriages, &c., which they had taken. The cavalry broke out first, and went shooting every European they saw. The brigadier is dead of his wounds; Dr. Graham was pistolled in his carriage with his daughter sitting by him. One officer had his brains blown out, and several others were pursued and wounded. The only redeeming point was, that the women and children were not attacked."

On the departure of the insurgents from Sealkote, Captain Lawrence was deputed to that station, with full powers, as assistant-commissioner, to arrest and bring to trial the miscreants of the town, who, in concert with the mutinous sepoys, had plundered and destroyed it. Captain Cripps, an Indian officer of great experience, was associated with him in the commission; and, after a very brief inquiry, the work of retribution commenced by hanging the *darogah* (superintendent of the gaol), and the commanders of the horse and foot police. The affair was attended with some hazard, as the three offenders were Sikhs, and the only troops then at the station were a portion of the Sikh levies. Great alarm was occasioned during the execution, through the breaking of the ropes by which the prisoners were suspended; in consequence of which the Sikh guards were ordered to shoot the half-hung men! Three or four volleys of musketry were discharged, and the Europeans at a distance immediately conjectured that the guard had broken into revolt, and that the destruction of all at the station was the least evil to be expected. The accidental disturbance was, however, soon explained, and the alarm subsided. Eventually a large proportion of the plunder from Sealkote was recovered, and a fine of 7,500 rupees was imposed on the surrounding villages, to reimburse in some measure the sufferers in the town.

CHAPTER XXV.

STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION AT CALCUTTA ; UNPOPULARITY OF LORD CANNING ; LAW FOR RESTRICTING THE PRESS ; EFFECT OF THE MEASURE ON SOCIETY : SPECIMEN OF NATIVE JOURNALISM ; FIRST WARNINGS AND PROSECUTIONS UNDER THE ACT ; IMPROVED TONE OF THE NATIVE REGIMENTS ; PETITION OF THE 32ND ; SERIOUS APPREHENSIONS AT CALCUTTA ; A VOLUNTEER FORCE ORGANISED ; NATIVE REGIMENTS DISARMED AT BARRACKPORE ; A PANIC ; ALLEGED TREASON AND ARREST OF THE KING OF OUDE ; CAPTURE OF SUSPECTED INDIVIDUALS IN CALCUTTA ; ARRIVAL OF SIR PATRICK GRANT, ACTING COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ; CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL ; PRESENTMENT OF THE GRAND JURY ; CONDITION OF THE PRESIDENCY OF BENGAL ; PETITION TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL ; REWARDS OFFERED FOR MUTINEERS AND DESERTERS ; ARRIVAL OF EUROPEAN TROOPS ; INSTRUCTIONS TO THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES FOR THE TREATMENT OF REBELS ; UNFAVOURABLE IMPRESSION ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF BENGAL ; PETITIONS TO THE QUEEN AND TO PARLIAMENT ; AN INDIAN REFORM LEAGUE FOUNDED IN CALCUTTA ; ARRIVAL OF SIR COLIN CAMPBELL ; HIS ADDRESS TO THE ARMY ; DELAY IN RECOGNISING HIM BY THE GOVERNMENT ; NOTIFICATION BY THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL ; REMARKS OF THE PRESS ; STATE OF THE PRESIDENCIES OF MADRAS AND BOMBAY ; MUTINY OF THE 3RD MADRAS LIGHT CAVALRY.

AFTER the promulgation of the special act of the legislative council for punishment of offenders against the state,* Calcutta enjoyed for a short time a state of comparative tranquillity, although misgivings were occasionally entertained of impending mischief in consequence of the approaching festival of the Mohurrum, usually a period of great excitement among the Mohammedan population of India ; but as precautions were openly taken to repress any efforts to create disturbance in the capital, European society generally felt assured that no serious cause for alarm really existed. A better tone of feeling, as it was supposed, on the part of the native troops, was also apparent in the reports that daily reached the seat of government from many of the distant stations, and it was hoped that, by the adoption of a conciliatory yet firm tone on the part of the authorities, the disorders that had given so rude a shock to society would speedily disappear. Unfortunately, however, there were at this time in active operation, other and more insidious elements of popular disquiet than the mere spirit of military insubordination, as it was developed in remote localities ; and amongst the most influential and dangerous of those agencies, was the tone adopted by a large portion of the native and English press of Bengal. The popularity of Lord Canning, at this juncture, was not of a description at all satisfactory to those who desired to support his administration upon personal grounds, and it became yet more seriously affected in general opinion through the measure he found it expedient to adopt in regard to the

newspaper press, by a portion of which the policy and acts of his government were criticised with unsparing license, while the *prestige* of his administration was sought to be damaged by an unceasing torrent of vituperation and calumny. It had at length become imperative, for the conservation of social order and the efficiency of the executive government, that a curb should be placed upon the unseemly latitude indulged in by the conductors of the press ; and the means by which it was sought to accomplish the necessary and wholesome restraint, were explained by the governor-general at a sitting of the legislative council for India, on the 13th of June, 1857, in the following language :—“ Before the council proceeds to the orders of the day, I ask permission to bring before it a subject of pressing and paramount importance. Those whom I have the honour to address are well acquainted with the present aspect of public affairs in the northern parts of India. The general disaffection of the Bengal army in the North-Western Provinces ; the lawlessness and violence of the evil-minded part of the population, to which this disaffection has given opportunity and encouragement ; the reckless pillage, the heartrending sacrifice of life, and the uprooting of all order in that part of the country, are painfully notorious. I will not dwell upon them. Neither will I trace the causes which have led to these calamitous results, or describe the means by which the government is meeting and repressing them. But there is one quarter to which I desire to direct the attention of the council—a quarter from which the evil influences which now pervade so many

* See *ante*, p. 161.

minds have been industriously put in motion, and to which a large portion of the discontent instilled into our troops and our ordinary harmless and peaceable community, is attributable. I doubt whether it is fully understood, or known, to what an audacious extent sedition has been poured into the hearts of the native population of India within the last few weeks, under the guise of intelligence supplied to them by the native newspapers. It has been done sedulously, cleverly, artfully. Facts have been grossly misrepresented—so grossly, that with educated and informed minds, the very extravagance of the misrepresentations must compel discredit. But to native readers of all classes scattered through the country, imperfectly acquainted with the proceedings of the government, and not well instructed as to what is passing even immediately around them, these misrepresentations come uncontradicted, and are readily credited.

“In addition to perversion of facts, there are constant vilifications of the government, false assertions of its purposes, and unceasing attempts to sow discontent and hatred between it and its subjects.

“Again, opportunities have been taken to parade before the eyes of the inhabitants of the capital, and of our soldiery and subjects elsewhere, a traitorous proclamation, put forth by those who are in arms against the government in the North-Western Provinces, crying for the blood of Europeans, offering rewards for rebellion, and denouncing all who shall continue faithful to the government.

“I am speaking to a body whose members have more experience of the native character, and of the working of the native mind, than I possess; but it needs little of this to see, that it is impossible that all this mischief can be a-foot and unrestrained, without producing wide-spread disaffection, lamentable outbreaks, and permanent injury to the authority of government.

“Against such poisoned weapons I now ask the legislative council to give to the executive government the means of protecting itself, its army, and its subjects; and I know no means by which this can be effectually accomplished, other than a law which shall give to the executive government a more absolute and summary control over the press than it now has in its hands. With this view I propose to introduce a bill this day; and, as a preliminary step, I move

that the standing orders be suspended, in order that the bill may be carried through its several stages, and passed forthwith.

“The several provisions of the bill will be read *in extenso* by the clerk of the council. The measure is framed upon the principle that no press shall exist without a licence from the government; that the licence shall be granted by the governor-general in council, under such conditions as he may think fit: on the infraction of any of those conditions, it shall be in the power of the governor-general in council, and, in distant parts of the empire, of local governments to whom he may delegate the authority, to withhold such licence, or, if one has been already granted, to recall it.

“One of the sections provides that the bill shall have effect for one year, and for one year only. At the end of that period, the subject will again be submitted to the legislative council, and the legislative council will know how to deal with it according to the circumstances of the moment.

“It is also provided, that the bill shall be applicable not only to Bengal, but to all India. The question involved is one which, in my opinion, deserves not only at the present juncture, but at all times, to be treated as an imperial one. It is a question in regard to which India should be ruled by one authority. I also propose that the act shall extend to all periodical and other publications, European as well as native, whatever their condition or character.

“The remarks which I have taken occasion to make with reference to the native press, I do not direct to the European press. But I see no solid standing-ground upon which a line can be drawn marking off one from the other, when the question is to prevent matter calculated to work mischief at a crisis like this. For, whilst I am glad to give credit to the conductors of the European press for the loyalty and intelligence which mark their labours, I am bound in sincerity to say, that I have seen passages in some of the papers under their management, which, though perfectly innocuous so far as European readers are concerned, may, in times like the present, be turned to the most mischievous purposes in the hands of persons capable of dressing them up for the native ear. I am glad to admit that the bill is not specially levelled at the European press; but I do not see any reason, nor do I consider it possible in justice, to draw a line of demarcation be-

tween European and native publications. The bill, accordingly, applies to every kind of publication, whatever the language in which it may be printed, or the nation of the persons who are responsible for what is put forth in it.

“I cannot conceal from the council that I have proposed this measure with extreme reluctance. It is one which no man, bred in the atmosphere of English public life, can propose to those who are vested with the high authority of legislating for English dominions, without some feelings of compunction and hesitation. But there are times in the existence of every state, in which something of the liberties and rights which it jealously cherishes, and scrupulously guards in ordinary seasons, must be sacrificed for the public welfare. Such is the state of India at this moment. Such a time has come upon us. The liberty of the press is no exception. And now, upon my responsibility at the head of the government of India, and with the unanimous support of the colleagues with whom I have the honour and satisfaction to act, I ask the legislative council to strengthen the hand of the executive government, by investing it with the powers which will be given by the bill which I here lay on the table.”

The bill so introduced consisted of eleven clauses; it was immediately carried through the several stages, and became a law at one sitting of the council. By it, the use of any printing or lithographic press was prohibited without licence from the government. Full powers were vested in the magistrates and justices of the peace of every jurisdiction, to issue warrants for the search and suppression of clandestine presses; and no licences were to be issued without the sanction of the executive government. All licensed publications, such as books, papers, or the like, were to be forwarded to the magistrates; and power was given to the executive to prohibit the circulation of such as might be disapproved, and to revoke all licences as well. The penalties for possession of unlicensed presses, neglect in forwarding copies of publications, or publication after prohibition, were fine and imprisonment.

By the act, it was further declared that power should be given to each of the presidencies to enforce the several clauses; and that it should be at the option of all the governments to prohibit the importation or circulation of any newspaper, book, or

other printed paper, whether printed within the English territories or elsewhere. This provision was designed to exclude obnoxious publications printed at Goa and Pondicherry—the Portuguese and French settlements in India: it also had the effect of giving a discretionary power that could be extended to the stoppage of English or other European papers or books in the ports of India; and thus the voice of the press of Europe, as well as that of India, could be effectually silenced in that part of the British dominions.

Upon the adoption of the above measure by the legislative council, the governor-general, under the authority of the new law, declared that the conditions upon which licences to keep or use any printing-press or types, or other materials or articles for printing, would be granted, were as follows:—

“1. That no book, pamphlet, or newspaper, or other work printed at such press, or with such materials or articles, shall contain any observations or statements *impugning the motives or designs of the British government*, either in England or in India, or in any way tending to bring the said government into hatred or contempt, to excite disaffection or unlawful resistance to its orders, or to weaken its lawful authority, or the lawful authority of its civil or military servants. 2. That no such book, pamphlet, newspaper, or other work shall contain observations or statements having a tendency to create alarm or suspicion among the native population, of any intended interference by government with their religious opinions and observances. 3. That no such book, pamphlet, newspaper, or other work, shall contain observations having a tendency to weaken the friendship towards the British government of native princes, chiefs, or states in dependence upon or alliance with it.

“The above conditions apply equally to original matter and to matter copied from other publications. His lordship in council resolves, that a copy of every book, pamphlet, newspaper, or other work printed or published, shall be immediately forwarded to the commissioner of police, by whom all such copies will be immediately transmitted to the chief secretary to government.”

The announcement of the restrictions upon the liberty of the press, as proposed by the governor-general, and sanctioned by the unanimous voice of the legislative

council, brought down upon the executive government a perfect hurricane of indignant remonstrance and severe rebuke. The government was, however, firm in its purpose; and it was hoped, that by compelling a more guarded tone of expression amongst those who desired to influence and guide public opinion through the media of the press, much of the suggestive evil that had hitherto agitated the native mind, and imperilled society, would be prevented. That the European portion of the press of India was not ignorant of the dangerous propensity of native journalists to excite disaffection, is evident from the fact, that for some months previous to the actual outbreak of the revolt, many of the English newspapers in the three presidencies had repeatedly and earnestly discussed the question of a necessity for suppressing the vernacular press of India, on the ground that it was deliberately and continuously seeking to inflame the minds of the native troops, and to incite them to rebellion.* To a certain extent, therefore, the obnoxious measure may be considered to have originated from suggestions of the press itself; and a necessity for restriction once admitted, exceptions in favour of a class or country were out of the question.

The act, it will be seen, passed into a law on the 13th of June, and its restrictive powers did not long lie dormant, although their first application was directed to a quarter altogether unexpected. On the

* The subjoined extract from the *Bombay Telegraph*, contains a specimen of the tone and spirit of a portion of the native press at this crisis. The passage is headed "Native Treason in India," and proceeds thus:—"We have just seen a translation of one of the most infamous articles against the British raj, that we have yet had published. It is a tissue of treason and blasphemy from beginning to end, and should be dealt with summarily. The article we allude to is one which appeared in the *Parsee Reformer*, edited by a Parsee, named Sorabjee Dorabjee. Government will not be doing their duty should they neglect to proceed against the miscreant criminally. It breathes treason in every line; and the writer, with a sort of demoniac howl, points to the ruthless deeds perpetrated at Delhi and Meerut, with a ferocity which is only eclipsed by that of the actual assassins. Alluding to the mutinies, the writer blasphemously apostrophises the Almighty in these words:—"Oh! Lord, the English have now seen a specimen of thy power! To-day they were in a state of high command; to-morrow they wrapped themselves in blood, and began to fly. Notwithstanding that their forces were about three lacs strong in India, they began to yield up life like cowards. Forgetting their palanquins and carriages, they fled to the jungles without either boots or hats. Leaving their houses, they asked shelter from

25th of the same month, an article entitled "The Centenary of Plassy" appeared in *The Friend of India*—a paper which had been long recognised as the demi-official organ of the government. Of this article, the "two last paragraphs" were, in the judgment of the governor-general in council, "fraught with mischief, and calculated at the present time to spread disaffection towards the British government, both among its native subjects and among dependent and allied states." The publisher of the newspaper was therefore *warned*, that a repetition of remarks of such dangerous tendency would be followed by the withdrawal of his licence.

As the ostensible cause of the first blow aimed at the liberty of the press in the Anglo-Indian empire, the article referred to becomes a matter of history, and will not be out of place in a record of incidents connected with the rebellion of 1857. The following is a transcript of the whole production:—

"*The Centenary of Plassy*.—We have glided into the second centenary of English rule in India, and Hindoos and Mussulmans who study the mysteries of fate are well nigh in despair. The stars and scriptures told them that on Monday last we had completed our allotted term of mastership, when the strength which had hitherto been resistless, the courage that never faltered, would pass away, and we should become in turn the easy prey of our vassals.

the meanest of men, and, abandoning their power, they fell into the hands of marauders.' He then again appeals to the Deity, and winds up his wretched fulmination in the following strain:—"O! Englishmen, you little dreamt that the present king would ever mount the throne of Delhi with all the pomp of Nadir Shah, Baber, or Tamerlane!" If this is not an *To Pean* over our anticipated downfall we do not know what is. It ought also to be remembered, that the article is written, not by a fanatic Mussulman, not by a high-caste Hindoo sepoy brooding over fancied wrongs, but by a Parsee, who, were it not for our power, our vigilance, and the *prestige* of our bravery, would at the present moment be himself a hewer of wood and drawer of water, and the female members of his family probably the inmates of a Moslem harem. The article is not only blasphemous and treasonable, as we have before stated, but it is filled with the basest ingratitude. It is, moreover, a gross libel upon the Parsee character in general; and we are quite sure that there is not a single member of that community who will not join with us in demanding that this disgrace to their caste be at once brought to justice. In any other place but India, and at a crisis like the present, the traitor would have long ago been hanging to a lamp-post."—With such language as that quoted, interference was unavoidable.

The favour of the gods is not a perpetual gift; and though sire and son have witnessed so often what must to them appear supernatural results, it was but reasonable to suppose that our store of miracles would be exhausted at last. We share with them the belief in hidden influences; only what they look upon as being natural and common-place is to us the domain of the marvellous. It is easy to understand how we gained power, and wealth, and glory at the commencement of the cycle; but hard, beyond measure, to find out how we have lost all three at its close. When you can succeed in realising to the imagination the most foolish thing, the most improbable thing, and the most timid thing; and have blended all these together, and multiplied them, and worked them into what is called a policy, you may perhaps get some clue to the solution of the problem.

“The qualities of mind which enable a man to accumulate wealth are often those which hinder him from making a proper use of it. It was necessary for the conquest of Hindostan that the East India Company should exist; for it is only the intense greediness of traders that could have won for us the sovereignty of the country. The enemies of the Company’s rule assert that they made and broke treaties, planned and fought battles, for the mere love of gain. Whatever degree of interference with private or public rights was needful for the purpose of collecting revenue, received instant and eager sanction; whatever concerned merely the welfare of Asiatic souls, or the social interests of the great body of Englishmen and Hindoos, was either coldly ignored, or bitterly assailed. They imported for their own use the might of civilisation; but never cared to exhibit to the nations its beneficent features. Wealth embodied all the attributes of their good deity, to whom was rendered with cheerful devotion the homage of heart and brain. The evil principle was symbolised by power; and where they failed to vanquish, they fell down and worshipped. Without a spark of patriotic feeling, they set on the brow of England a gem of priceless value; without care for Christianity, they paved the way for the overthrow of idolatry. Be it so; but the evil which they wrought has well nigh passed away; the good, of which they have been the not unconscious instruments, will go on multiplying for ever.

“A hundred years is but a small point in the lifetime of a nation. It may be a period of sowing or of reaping the harvest, of giant labours, such as shall influence the destiny of remote generations, or of utter folding of the hands to sleep. We found India destitute of invention and enterprise; ignorant of liberty, and of the blessings of peace. We have placed her face to face with the forces of our civilisation, and have yet to see if there are no subtle invigorating influences that can be transmitted through her aged frame. We have given her liberty such as she has not enjoyed for centuries, and never, save by brief and long interrupted snatches. The Hindoo stands upon the same platform with the Englishman, shares equal privileges with him, and challenges for himself as great a measure of the protection and immunities accorded by the state. He has no political enemies, and his grievances are all social. There is much to be remedied within; but without all is quiet and secure. If he has a new part to play in the world’s history, the stage is clear for him, and there is an audience ready to sympathise and applaud. Whatever he has in him of creative ability may find easy vent and ready acceptance. We have swept away the obstacles which stood in the path of intellect and courage; it rests only with Nature and himself whether he achieves success or otherwise. A second Sevajee is happily impossible; but another Luther would find an easier task than that which was imposed upon the monk of Wittenberg. The inventor, the author, the man of science will meet ready welcome and sure reward. We spread out before the dormant Asiatic soul, all the mental treasures of the West, and feel only too happy in being allowed to distribute them.

“It is a great crime, in some instances, to trample out a nationality; to strangle in infancy what might have grown up to be one of the fairest births of time; but except in the case of the Sikhs, there is no example of the kind to be alleged against our countrymen. The Mussulman power was effete long before the battle of Plassy, and such as Clive found the Mohammedans in the days of Surajah Dowlah, we encounter them in the time of the deposed king of Oude. Cruel, sensual, and intolerant, they are unfit to rule and unwilling to serve. Claiming to exercise sway as of divine right, and yet destitute of every

gift with which Nature has endowed the races meant by destiny to dominate over the world, they fell by necessity under the power of a nation replete with energy and resolution, and loathe with all the bitterness of hate the infidels who have subdued them. They will never tolerate our gifts or forgive our supremacy. We may load them with blessings, but the reward will be curses. We stand between them and a fancied earthly paradise, and are not classed in their list of good angels.

"The Mahrattas have none of the elements of greatness in their character; and speaking in the interests of the dusky millions, we do not regret Assaye, Deeg, and Maharajpore; but it is otherwise with regard to the Sikhs, who, had they flourished as we have seen them two centuries back, or never come in contact with the might of England, would perhaps have uprooted the tenets of Hindoo and Mussulman, and breathed a new spirit into the followers of Mohammed and Brahma. Humanity, however, will be content with their overthrow. The Bible is a better book than the Grunth, and Christianity is superior to the Khalsa. Regenerated Hindooism might have obtained a new lease of existence, but it would have gained nothing in morals, and effected but little for human happiness. Its sole gain would have been power, and the example of universal destruction."

The following are the two paragraphs upon which the necessity for "the first warning" was grounded:—"It may also be alleged against us that we have deposed the kings and ruined the nobles of India; but why should the world sigh over that result? Monarchs who always took the wages, but seldom performed the work of government, and aristocrats who looked upon authority as a personal right, and have never been able to comprehend what is meant by the sovereignty of the people, are surely better out of the way. No Englishman in these days deploras the wars of the Roses, and would like to see the Cliffords and Warwicks restored again to life. France bears with calmness the loss of her old nobility; Europe at large makes steady contributions to the list of kings out of employment. Had princes and rajahs in Hindostan been worth conserving, they would have retained their titles and power. The class speedily die out in the natural course of mortality, and it is not for the benefit of society that it should be renewed.

"Array the evil against the acknowledged good; weigh the broken pledges, the ruined families, the impoverished ryots, the imperfect justice, against the missionary and the schoolmaster, the railway and the steam-engine, the abolition of suttee, and the destruction of the Thugs, and declare in which scale the balance lies! For every anna that we have taken from the noble we have returned a rupee to the trader. We have saved more lives in peace than we have sacrificed in war. We have committed many blunders and crimes; wrought evil by premeditation, and good by instinct; but when all is summed up, the award must be in our favour. And with the passing away of the present cloud, there will dawn a brighter day both for England and India. We shall strengthen at the same time our hold upon the soil and upon the hearts of the people; tighten the bonds of conquest and of mutual interest. The land must be thrown open to the capital and enterprise of Europe; the ryot lifted by degrees out of his misery, and made to feel that he is a man if not a brother, and everywhere heaven's gifts of climate and circumstance made the most of. The first centenary of Plassy was ushered in by the revolt of the native army; the second may be celebrated in Bengal by a respected government and a Christian population."

It must be confessed, that had we to seek a pretext for interference with the press, on the score of the sentiments expressed in the above article, we should more readily have found it, if anywhere, in the *second* paragraph, than in those specially indicated as offensive and dangerous. A second warning to the *Friend of India* was speedily followed by the suspension of the licence of the *Hurkaru*, the oldest and not the least able or respectable of the Calcutta journals, and by the prosecution of the editors of four native papers—the *Bhaskhur*, the *Sultuni ul Akhbar*, the *Dhoorbin*, and the *Sundurchar Soodarbhassur*, for treasonable publications. A fifth journal, entitled the *Hindoo Intelligencer*, was altogether suppressed.

The *Hurkaru*, in some remarks consequent upon the interference with its privileges of free discussion, expressed itself thus:—"It is a curious fact, that the two papers which, until the arrival of Lord Canning, were always supposed to represent more or less the views and wishes of the government—the *Friend of India* and the

Hurkaru—have been the first to feel the iron heel of despotic and irresponsible authority. For ourselves, we frankly confess, that we considered the press-gagging act virtually as a breach of contract between one estate and another; we thought it unfair, impolitic, and uncalled-for; and we did not hesitate, in consequence, to express our opinion of men and measures in language which we did not care to guard. We had that confidence in our countrymen, that we believed no body of Englishmen—men born in the land of free discussion, and educated with the same liberal ideas as ourselves—would ever combine to stop the free expression of opinion. We can only now admit that we were mistaken; and although our sentiments regarding the great line of policy to be maintained at the present crisis remain unchanged, and are, humanly speaking, unchangeable, we shall in future, of necessity, guard against the use of any expression that might be converted into an engine against ourselves.” The licence of the *Hurkaru* was restored after a suspension of six days’ duration.

The “gagging act,” as it was now indignantly termed, certainly did not tend to increase the popularity of Lord Canning, or to improve the loyalty of such portion of the native or European populations as had been accustomed to look to the impassioned language of the persecuted journals for inspiration and guidance. Comparisons by no means flattering to the statesmanship of the individual, were freely made between the governor-general and those of his predecessors by whom the press of India was first liberated from its bondage. The policy initiated by Lord William Bentinck, and consummated by his immediate successor, Sir Charles Metcalfe, during his brief interval of government in 1835,* became a popular theme for discussion among all classes of society, and the deductions were far from advantageous to the present government; but it is only fair to observe, the fact was kept out of sight—that between the circumstances that influenced Sir Charles Metcalfe in 1835, and those which pressed upon Lord Canning in 1857, there was no analogy; and that the *liberty* of the one

period had expanded into dangerous *license* in the other.

While dissatisfaction was thus acquiring strength in the capital, there were not unfrequent indications of an improved tone of military feeling at many of the stations of the presidency, and petitions were occasionally transmitted to government from the men of native corps, protesting unshaken loyalty and attachment, and praying to be allowed to prove their fidelity by active service against their rebellious brethren in arms. To most of these applications, favourable but evasive replies were given, it being deemed more politic to temporise, than to meet such offers with positive denial, although compliance would have been an act of madness. Among other petitions of the kind, that of the sepoys of the 32nd regiment may be cited as an example.

This document, addressed to Colonel Burney, the commandant, is stated to be “the respectful petition of the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and sepoys of the 32nd regiment of native infantry;” and the petitioners enter into details respecting their tried fidelity, their attachment to their European officers, and their perfect willingness to use the new cartridges. They refer to an offer previously made through their havildar-major, to serve the government against the insurgents; and then proceed to say—“We have also heard that several European regiments are about to be sent to Delhi, and other places, in order to quell the disturbances. We the commissioned, non-commissioned officers and sepoys of the 32nd regiment of native infantry, are solicitous to accompany the European troops, and with them fight against the mutineers, and manifest our bravery and loyalty, and establish a good name as faithful soldiers, and prove to government who are really good soldiers. From the time of our entering the service, we have implored our God to give us an opportunity of showing our faith and bravery to our masters; and we therefore trust you will attend to our petition, and make us pleased and contented by forwarding the same for the consideration of

* Lord William Bentinck, having been compelled to resign the viceroyalty of India in 1835, on account of ill-health, was temporarily succeeded in office by Sir Charles Metcalfe, who administered the government of the three presidencies, until relieved in the course of the same year by the appointment of Lord Auckland as governor-general. According to Montgomery Martin, the historian of India,

who has specially referred to the subject, “the brief provisional sway of Sir Charles Metcalfe was distinguished by a measure which procured him much exaggerated applause, and equally indiscriminate censure. This act was the removal of the restrictions on the public press of India, which, though rarely enforced, were still in existence.”—(Martin’s *History of India*, p. 431.)

the governor-general in council, whom we petition for some notice in reply." The petition was dated "Camp, Bowsec, June 8th, 1857," and was signed by the whole of the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, on behalf of the regiment. The loyal document was forwarded, by Colonel Burney, for submission to the governor-general, on the 9th of June; and, on the 27th of the same month, Major-general Lloyd, commanding the division in which the regiment was stationed, was requested to convey to the officers and men of the corps, an assurance of the confidence of the government in their fidelity, and the thanks of the governor-general in council for their loyal expression of the same. (The 32nd regiment proved its fidelity and attachment, on the 9th of the following October, by rising in mutiny and murdering its European officers at Deoghur, in the Sonthal district.)

Notwithstanding occasional gleams of sunshine from isolated military stations, the progress of revolt had now become sufficiently serious to awaken well-grounded fears for the safety of Calcutta itself, in the event of any sudden outbreak in its vicinity; and the European residents, undeterred by their previous failures, once more pressed upon the government an offer of their services as a volunteer corps, to assist in the preservation of order and the protection of the capital; and at length, in reply to the reiterated loyal offer, the following notification, by order of the governor-general, was issued on the 12th of June, 1857:—

"The governor-general in council has received from the inhabitants of Calcutta many offers to serve as volunteers, in aid of the authority of government, and for the preservation of the security and order of the city should any attempt at disturbance take place therein.

"The governor-general in council accepts these offers; and in doing so, he desires to express the warm acknowledgments of the government to those who have so zealously tendered to it their support.

"Accordingly, all persons willing to serve in the corps of volunteer guards of Cal-

* See *ante*, p. 156.

† It is worthy of remark, that on the 5th of the same month, the men of the 70th regiment had submitted the following petition to their commanding officer, Colonel Kennedy, for presentation to the governor-general:—

"Barrackpore, June 5th, 1857.

"From the day on which his lordship, the gov-

ernor-general, condescended to come in person to answer our petition [*see* p. 160], on which occasion General Harsey translated to us his address, and which was fully explained to us by our colonel, interpreter, adjutant, and all the other officers of the regiment, our honour and name have been raised amongst our countrymen. We have thought over the subject; and as we are now going up country,

cutta, either as horsemen or on foot, and to place themselves as members of that force at the disposal of the government, are hereby invited to enrol their names and places of residence at the office of the town major, in Fort William.

"The governor in council has been pleased to appoint Lieutenant-colonel Orfeur Cavenagh to the command of the volunteer guards. Arms, accoutrements, and a plain uniform will be provided for each person enrolled.—R. J. H. BIRCH, Colonel,

"Secretary to the Government of India."

This notification was responded to with much alacrity and spirit by the English and other European residents of Calcutta, who were formed into regiments of horse and foot volunteers, the former consisting of 200 well-mounted cavaliers, and the latter numbering between seven and eight hundred persons, armed with fusils and bayonets. The duties assigned to this valuable auxiliary to the regular force, consisted in nightly patrolling the streets of the capital by the cavalry, while the infantry was employed as pickets, and kept ready to act upon any emergency, and at any point. A compulsory enrolment of the native Christians, as a military force, was also contemplated; but it met with such strenuous objection from the classes intended to be affected by it, that the expediency of the measure became questionable, either as a means to prevent disorder, or as a protection from threatened danger.

It may be remembered, that on the 25th of May, little more than a fortnight previous to the events last referred to, the chief secretary to the government had been instructed to inform the French residents at Calcutta, in reply to an offer of their services in aid of the state, "that the mischief caused by a passing and groundless panic had been arrested, and that tranquillity was about to be restored:* but it happened that, on the night of Saturday, the 13th of June, the inhabitants of Serampore (a fashionable suburb of Calcutta, on the opposite side of the Hooghly) were warned that the 70th† and 2nd native regiments, with the portions of the 34th and

ernor-general, condescended to come in person to answer our petition [*see* p. 160], on which occasion General Harsey translated to us his address, and which was fully explained to us by our colonel, interpreter, adjutant, and all the other officers of the regiment, our honour and name have been raised amongst our countrymen. We have thought over the subject; and as we are now going up country,

43rd regiments brigaded at Barrackpore, were to rise at 4 A.M. of the 14th, and murder their officers, and then proceed to Calcutta for the purpose of massacring all the Europeans, and plundering the town. An express was instantly forwarded to Major-general Hearsey, in command at Barrackpore, who determined upon disarming the whole of the native troops without a moment's delay; and the opportune arrival of her majesty's 78th highland regiment enabled him to accomplish his purpose. On the morning of the 14th, a strong detachment of highlanders marched into the cantonments at Barrackpore, weary and footsore from having been purposely led four miles out of their road by a treacherous guide. Something had occurred to prevent the outbreak at the hour originally appointed, or the troops would only have been in time to avenge a massacre instead of to prevent it. As it was, the conspirators found they had been suspected, and resolved to wait another opportunity. The chance, however, was not allowed them. At four o'clock in the afternoon the native troops were suddenly warned for parade. Her majesty's 78th and 35th loaded their muskets before leaving their quarters, and, in a few minutes, the suspected sepoys found themselves drawn up in the centre of a square, with six 12-pounders, loaded with grape, in their front, and the Queen's two regiments on each flank, every man of whom was audibly praying that they might offer resistance. But here, as on the battlefield, when face to face with the dreaded English, the heart of the sepoy failed him, and the order to pile arms was silently obeyed. The guards meanwhile were relieved and disarmed; and, in a little more than an hour, the muskets of the whole native brigade were on the way to Calcutta, which at the time was in a state of intense consternation, it having been reported that mutiny and murder were triumphant at

Barrackpore and the neighbouring stations; and, moreover, that a strong body of the rebel force was marching towards the city from Delhi. The infection of terror pervaded all ranks of society, and Chowringhee and Garden-reach (the European quarters of Calcutta) were abandoned for the vessels in the river and the fort. The shipping was literally crowded with fugitives; and in houses which were not likely to be attacked, hundreds of people gladly thronged together to share the feeling of security which the locality imparted. The public buildings and hotels were fortified; bands of armed sailors marched joyously through the streets, anticipating the possible pleasure of a fight, and the certain assurance of a double allowance of grog. Every group of natives was scanned with suspicion, and required to disperse. The churches and the course were alike abandoned; and a rising of Hindoos or Mussulmans, or perhaps of both, was looked upon as certain to occur in the course of the night. From Chander-nagore (another suburb) the whole body of European and East Indian inhabitants emigrated into Calcutta; the *personnel* of government, the staff of the army—all, in short, who had anything to lose, prepared to risk its loss rather than stay to encounter the unknown danger. The night of Sunday, the 14th of June, 1857, was one of painful anxiety to the inhabitants of Calcutta; and years will pass away before the excitement of that night can be forgotten. The alarm was not altogether groundless; for, in the course of subsequent investigations, a map of the city was discovered, on which the place was divided into sections for massacre and pillage by bands of Mohammedan insurgents, under specified leaders. The rising was fixed for the 23rd of June, in commemoration of the battle of Plassy; and it was resolved, that if it should be successful, no Feringhee should be alive in Calcutta on the following day.*

we beg that the new rifles, about which there has been so much said in the army and all over the country, may be served out to us. By using them in its service, we hope to prove beyond a doubt our fidelity to government; and we will explain to all we meet that there is nothing objectionable in them; otherwise why should we have taken them? Are we not as careful of our caste and religion as any of them?" The petition was signed, on behalf of the regiment, by the subahdar-major, five subahdars, and six jemadars. The application, fortunately, was not acceded to, on account of the very small supply of the new rifles that had yet arrived. The 43rd and

34th regiments, also at Barrackpore, made similar applications, and with a similar result.

* At that time, however, if the plot had not been previously discovered, and the rising had actually occurred, the chance of success would have been very problematical, and under no circumstances could it have been achieved without a tremendous struggle. Many of the European residents would, doubtless, have been murdered in their sleep at the first onset; but the English troops upon the spot were then amply sufficient, in numerical strength, to trample down the entire Mohammedan population; as, independent of the armed sailors on the river,

As soon as it became known that the native regiments at Barrackpore were to be deprived of their arms, several of the European officers belonging to the 70th regiment, who still entertained a very decided opinion as to the loyalty of their men, were solicitous to obtain for them an exemption from the disgraceful ordeal; and on the morning of the 14th of June, a few hours previous to the order being carried into effect, Captain Greene, a veteran officer of the corps, addressed the major-general commanding the presidency division thus:—

“My dear General,—Is it any use my interceding with you on behalf of my old corps, which for nigh twenty-five years has been my pride and my home? I cannot express to you the pain with which I have just heard that they are this evening to be subjected to the indignity of being disarmed. Had the men misbehaved, I should have felt no sympathy for them; but they have not committed themselves in any way; and surely, after the governor-general’s laudatory order and expression of confidence, it would not be too much to expect that a fair test of their sincerity should be afforded them. I know you will not be angry with me for speaking my mind so plainly; but having passed the greater part of my life in the regiment, and knowing the men thoroughly, as I do, I feel it a sacred duty to come forward and say, that I have the fullest trust in the fidelity and loyalty of the men, and that I am perfectly satisfied they do not contemplate any act of violence, either against myself or against any European officer, whether in or out of the regiment.

“Moreover, I firmly believe, that had a disturbance taken place last night, you would have found our men in direct antagonism to the mutineers, and doing their duty as good soldiers to the state. In giving expression to these sentiments, and in making known to you the sorrow for the measure in contemplation, it is a pleasure to myself (and may perhaps have some weight with you) to reflect, that I simply enunciate the opinions and feelings of the European officers of the corps generally: if, therefore, you could stay proceedings, we should all appreciate the kindness and justice of the act.—Believe me, &c.,

“GEORGE N. GREENE.”

the fort was occupied by her majesty’s 53rd regiment, 900 strong; 500 men of the 37th regiment were encamped on the glacis; an immense park of

On the following day, Captain Greene further wrote as follows:—

“June 15th, 1857.

“My dear General,—In the absence of the commanding officer, perhaps it is only right that I should tell you that I have just returned from our lines, where (together with some other officers) I have been for upwards of an hour, endeavouring to allay the excited feelings of our men, who were in such a state of depression, that many were crying bitterly, and none could cook their food. Some, too, had sold their cooking utensils for a mere trifle in the bazaar; and a large number were, I was informed, about to desert to-night. The banyans had, in some instances, refused to give them further credit; and an impression had seized them that they were retained only for a short time, when they were to be paid up and discharged altogether. Some scoundrels in the bazaar had also been working on their feelings by telling them that handcuffs and manacles had been sent for. The proceeding, on the whole, was a most painful one to officers and men. I explained to them that yesterday’s measure was simply a precautionary one, and not intended to bring disgrace upon them; but I had a difficult argument to sustain, and conviction, I fear, has not reached the minds of many. I told them that in you they had a firm and staunch friend; that this morning you had spoken favourably of them to me (in addition to what you had yourself said to them on parade last evening), and that you would see them all righted without any delay. They promised, at my earnest request, to await for a few days the result of my assurances; but yesterday’s blow fell so heavily and unexpectedly upon them, that in my opinion, unless something be speedily done to reassure them, the influence of their European officers will cease to exist, and a good regiment will crumble away before hopelessness and desertion.

“All of us, black and white, would be so thankful to you if you would get us back our arms and sent away from this at once.—Yours, &c.—GEORGE N. GREENE.

“P.S.—On the 9th, a sepoy (Mussulman) of the regiment came to see me, and in course of conversation said, there was one thing he particularly wanted to tell me—

artillery was at hand; and a strong volunteer corps of Europeans, mustering nearly 1,000 rank and file, had advanced far towards efficiency.

‘Whatever you do, do not take your lady with you.’ I asked him why? He said, ‘Because the mind of the natives, *kala admi* (soldiers), was now in a state of inquietude, and it would be better to let the lady remain here till everything was settled in the country, as there was no knowing what might happen.’ On my asking him if he had any reason to doubt the loyalty of the regiment, he replied, ‘Who can tell the hearts of a thousand men?’ He said that he believed the greater portion of the men of the regiment were sound and in favour of our rule; but that a few evil men might persuade a number of good men to do an evil deed.

“I then asked him the meaning of all this about the cartridges: he said, ‘That when first the report was spread about, it was generally believed by the men; but that subsequently it had been a well-understood thing that the cartridge question was merely raised for the sake of exciting the men, with the view of getting the whole army to mutiny, and thereby upset the English government; that they argued, that as we were turned out of Cabul, and had never returned to that place, so, if once we were entirely turned out of India, our rule would cease, and we should never return.’ Such is the opinion of a great bulk of the people. A native officer also warned me, that it would be better not to take up Mr. ——. He said, that if I went, he would sleep by my bed, and protect me with his own life. Several have individually said they would do all they could to protect me in case of need. I was also told, that the Mussulmans generally, in all regiments, were in the habit of talking to the effect that their ‘raj’ was coming round again; but this I was told by a Hindoo.”

The above notes were at once forwarded by Major-general Hearsey to the secretary to the government of India, with the subjoined letter.

“Barrackpore, June, 15th, 1857.

“My dear Birch,—I have just received the inclosed notes from Captain Greene, 70th native infantry. He solemnly states, that the 70th is true to its salt, and ready to go anywhere; that the speech about, ‘Let us go beyond Pultah, and then you will hear what we will do,’ as reported to me by Colonel Kennedy, must have been made by some budmash. But if so, why do not they find him out, and give him up for punishment?”

584

“Captain Greene and officers declare that Colonel Kennedy, who is new to the regiment, does not and cannot know the real and devoted sentiments of the native officers and men with respect to their fealty. I spoke very, very kindly to them, when I deprived them of their arms. Captain Greene says, all the officers would be only too happy to proceed with the regiment up country, and would willingly risk their lives, that this disgrace (as they persist in calling it) might be wiped from them. If government should think it proper, especially as Lord Canning in person spoke to them, they could be sent up river in country boats round by the Sonderbunds, and that would give plenty of time for us to have news from the north-west, and more troops to come from Singapore, &c., so that their hoormut would be saved, and we should be rid of them. They harp upon Lord Canning’s word, that they should be sent up the country.—Ever yours, &c.,

“J. B. HEARSEY.

“P.S.—Please send an early reply to this question regarding the 70th native infantry. You could serve out the Enfield rifles, and tell them the ammunition for it would be sent by steamers after them, and this could be done when they had got to Monghir, or beyond that place. Time would be gained.—J. B. H.”

The reply to this application was transmitted by the secretary to the government as follows:—

“Fort William, June 19th, 1857.

“Sir,—I am desired to acknowledge the receipt of your demi-official letter of the 15th instant, enclosing two notes from Captain Greene, of the 70th regiment native infantry, expressing, on behalf of himself and the European officers of that corps, their perfect confidence in the loyalty and fidelity of their men, the great pain which the disarming of the regiment has caused them, and their earnest solicitation that the men may receive back their arms, and be sent away from Barrackpore. In reply, I am desired to observe, that independently of the causes which more immediately led to the disarming of the brigade at Barrackpore, government have been credibly informed, that very respectable men of the 70th regiment have been heard to allude to the unquiet state of mind of the native soldiery, and that there was no knowing what might happen; and they have earnestly recommended that ladies be not allowed to

accompany the corps on its march. These men were heard to say that the greater portion of the regiment was sound, and in favour of the British rule; but that a few evil men might persuade a number of good men to do an evil deed; and that the Mussulmans generally in the 70th, as well as in other corps, were in the habit of talking to the effect, that their 'raj' was coming round again. It was also stated by the same men of this regiment, that when the report was first spread about the cartridges, it was generally believed; but that, subsequently, it was a well-understood thing that the cartridge question was merely raised to excite the men, in order to induce the whole army to mutiny, and thereby upset the British government.

"Captain Greene also states, that the remark, 'Let us go beyond Pultah, and then you will hear what we will do, &c.,' must have been made by a '*budmash*,' or man of bad character. Upon this, the governor-general in council observes, that if the 70th regiment are really and truly loyal, they will give up the men who, in their ranks, utter these mutinous expressions. Under these circumstances, the governor-general in council sees no reason to make any distinction as regards that corps, and his lordship in council is unable, therefore, to accede to the solicitations made.—I am, &c.,

"R. J. H. BIRCH, Colonel."

Contemporaneously with the progress of the measures thus resorted to by government for the safety of the capital, intelligence had accidentally reached the authorities, which seriously implicated the king of Oude (who then resided at Garden-reach, in the vicinity of Calcutta) in the treasonable designs of the revolted soldiery. From an early period of the outbreak, popular opinion had connected the deposed ruler with the purposes of the leaders of the movement. It was notorious that the bulk of the sepoy element in the army of Bengal, was supplied by, and recruited from, Oude, where, under native monarchs, the Brahmin or Mohammedan soldiers enjoyed privileges which, since the annexation of the kingdom, had been totally denied them. Their *status* as soldiers in the service of the then independent power, gave them an importance which they did not fail to avail themselves of whenever they had a law-suit on hand, or chose to press claims on the notice of their superiors. Their relatives were spread over the country

in the ranks of the king's army, or otherwise in his employment; and thus almost every sepoy had a direct interest in the maintenance of the ancient order of things; but still, in the face of these facts, the authorities at Calcutta persistently opposed themselves to the theory, that either the deposed king their pensioner, his courtiers, or his father-in-law and chief adviser, the Nawab Alee Knuckce Khan, could have any interest in common with the mutinous sepoys of the Bengal army, and they consequently permitted him to reside in semi-regal state and perfect liberty, with a retinue of about 1,000 armed followers, within a stone's-cast of the seat of government. At length, however, under the following circumstances, their eyes were opened.

In the course of Saturday, the 13th of June, a sepoy of the 43rd regiment quartered at Fort William, informed the European officer of his company, that a Brahmin, in the service of the king of Oude, had been talking with the sepoys on duty, and had endeavoured to prevail upon them to admit some of the armed retainers of that personage into the fort, and to assist them in some subsequent operations, the nature of which were to be divulged at the proper time: the informant stated himself to be one of the men so applied to, and that the emissary from Garden-reach had promised to return on the following night, and bring with him further information, and a reward for such as should fall in with his project. The soldier, as yet "true to his salt," lost no time before he revealed the transaction to his officer, and measures were at once quietly taken, as well for the security of the fort, as for the apprehension of the Brahmin when he again presented himself. He came, as he had promised, and was arrested; and from the revelations made by him while under fear of immediate death, it was considered prudent to resort to instant and decisive action in reference to his royal master. Accordingly, at day-break on the morning of the 15th of June, a detachment of her majesty's 37th regiment, which had just arrived from Ceylon, was marched down to Garden-reach, and, before its approach was observed, had surrounded the residence of the king. The officer in command then presented himself to his majesty, and announced his mission, at the same time delivering an autograph from the governor-general, couched in the following terms:—

“Fort William, June 15th.

“Sir,—It is with pain that I find myself compelled to require that your majesty’s person should for a season be removed to within the precincts of Fort William. The name of your majesty, and the authority of your court, are used by persons who seek to excite resistance to the British government, and it is necessary that this should cease. Your majesty knows that from the day when it pleased you to fix your residence near Calcutta, to the present time, yourself, and those about your majesty, have been entirely free and uncontrolled. Your majesty may be assured, then, that it is not the desire of the governor-general in council to interfere needlessly with your movements and actions. Your majesty may be equally certain, that the respect due to your majesty’s high position will never be forgotten by the government or its officers, and that every possible provision will be made for your majesty’s convenience and comfort.—CANNING.”

The officer further announced, that he had orders to conduct his majesty to the fort, with a limited number of his immediate personal attendants. The surprise was so perfect, and the object so quietly accomplished, that not the slightest effort at resistance was offered; and at seven in the morning, the king, accompanied by two commissioned officers, was safely conveyed a prisoner to Fort William.* A rigorous search was then made at the royal residence for papers and correspondence, and some documents of importance were found which left little doubt of the fact that the king was aware of a meditated revolt against the English government, although, with the exception of an unusual quantity of arms of all descriptions, that had been secretly conveyed to his residence, no evidence appeared to show that he had personally engaged in the conspiracy, or expected to benefit by its results if successful.

In Calcutta, numerous arrests followed the excitement of the 14th of June, and the government thereby became possessed of most important information connected

* The authority under which this arrest was made, is given by Regulation III. of the province of Bengal; which sets forth, that “whereas reasons of state, embracing the due maintenance of the alliances formed by the British government with foreign powers, the preservation of tranquillity in the territories of native princes entitled to its protection, and the security of the British dominions from

with the intended outbreak on the 23rd. Among other implicated individuals, afterwards secured and lodged in Fort William, was a moonshee, named Gholam Hossain Khan, who, it was alleged, was one of the most active and influential of the conspirators against the state, but who had contrived to escape from the city when the king of Oude was transferred to the fort, and had proceeded to Lucknow, where it was known his presence had infused courage and determination among the rebels. He had again returned secretly to Calcutta, to prosecute his dangerous mission, and after many successful efforts to avoid capture, he was at last found at the residence of a wealthy Mohammedan in Wellesley-square, in the disguise of a burkandaze. After securing the moonshee, the *zenana* of the master of the house was rigorously searched for papers, and several important documents were obtained, the agent employed for the search being a European woman, that the prejudices of the native females might not be offended by the intrusion of male police. Other arrests also were made at Entelly and at Garden-reach; and in the first named place, the secretary to a club of conspirators was secured, with all his papers. At the last-mentioned, the person arrested was a eunuch belonging to the establishment of the king of Oude, charged with complicity in the alleged design of his master to overthrow the British government in India, and to re-establish a Mohammedan empire upon its ruins. From documents that came into the possession of the authorities through these arrests, it appeared that the labour of arousing the country, and organising forces in the different provinces of Hindostan, was shared by two executive native councils; Calcutta being the seat of one, to which the organisation of the revolt in the provinces between that city and Lucknow was entrusted; while at Delhi, another council, presided over by the king, directed measures for ensuring the successful progress of the insurrection in all other parts of the country.

Sir Patrick Grant, who had been appointed to the chief military command in

foreign hostility and from internal commotion, occasionally render it necessary to place under personal restraint individuals against whom there may not be sufficient ground to institute any judicial proceeding, or when such proceeding may not be adapted to the nature of the case, or may, for other reasons, be unadvisable or improper.” There could be no doubt as to the necessity in this case.

India on the death of General Anson,* left Madras to assume the functions of the high charge temporarily confided to him on the 13th of June, and on the 17th, issued, at Calcutta, his first "General Order." In this document, General Grant reminded the troops that "he had been attached to the Bengal army for upwards of six-and-thirty years; that he had served with it in quarters and in the field, and had fought and bled in its ranks;" and he proceeded to say, that "he had ever" cherished a heartfelt pride in believing it to be second only to the unequalled British army in every soldierlike quality, and inferior to none in its loyalty and devotion to the state, and attachment to its officers. "But," said the gallant general, "these illusions have now been most painfully dispelled. Many regiments have broken into open and defiant mutiny, and, forgetful of their oath of fealty to the state and their former well-won high reputation, they have steeped themselves in crime, and committed a series of cowardly murders and cold-blooded atrocities, so cruel and ruffianly as to be almost beyond belief. A heavy retribution awaits those miscreant traitors. Many of them have already paid the penalty, and all will ere long have it made manifest that the government, which treats its good and faithful servants with unexampled liberality and unbounded consideration, is all-powerful to punish as well as to reward."

The arrival of the acting commander-in-chief was a source of much gratification to the European residents of the capital, as they looked much to the energetic spirit he had displayed in his past career, and anticipated great results from his active exertions at the head of the Bengal army. Sir Patrick, however, did not consider the time had arrived for active personal interference; and shortly after his arrival at the seat of government, his excellency submitted his views upon the subject to the governor-general in council by the following memorandum:—

"Calcutta, June 22nd, 1857.

"I beg to submit the following observations regarding my own position:—

"If the present disturbances were confined to a particular locality, and we had an army in hand and under control, a few concise general instructions would answer every purpose. As it is, however, we have

* See *ante*, p. 191.

no native army; and the very limited European force available must operate on many distinct and separate points, each body under its own commandant; the whole being properly subject to the general control and guidance of the commander-in-chief.

"I think the commander-in-chief can most efficiently, and assuredly most expeditiously, control and direct all general military arrangements and movements now, and the reorganisation and regeneration of the army hereafter, if he has the advantage of being in personal communication with the head of the government; if he learns the views of government with respect to the innumerable questions which must constantly arise; and, which is highly important, if he is made acquainted with the mass of intelligence which may be expected to reach the government from every quarter of the empire.

"If the commander-in-chief is at the seat of government, he can readily direct and guide the military arrangements of every description of the whole army; if he attaches himself to one of the small isolated bodies of troops moving about the country, he can only direct its proceedings, and the general conduct of matters connected with the entire army must be altogether neglected and put aside for the time.

"I may also observe, that it is quite impossible to conduct the multifarious duties of this large army without a numerous staff and extensive office establishment, requiring, when moving about the country, a complete regiment as an escort, and a large amount of carriage for their transport, neither the one nor the other of which can be supplied under present circumstances.

"On the whole, therefore, I entertain a decided opinion, that the duties of the commander-in-chief can be most efficiently and most usefully discharged at the seat of government; but if the governor-general thinks otherwise, and considers that my presence at some other point would be more beneficial to the public service, I am prepared to start at once for any destination to which it may be desired I should repair.

"PATRICK GRANT, Lieutenant-general,
"Commander-in-chief."

The view taken by the acting commander-in-chief, of his duties and proper sphere of action, met with the concurrence of the governor-general and his council, and the former recorded his opinion of the proposal in the following minute:—

"I agree with Lieutenant-general Sir Patrick Grant, that the duties of the commander-in-chief can, at present, be most efficiently and usefully discharged at the seat of government."

This opinion was endorsed by the members of council, Messrs. Dorin, Low, J. P. Grant, and Peacock; and the secretary to the government accordingly apprised Sir Patrick Grant of their adoption of his views, by the following letter to the deputy adjutant-general of the army in India:—

"Fort William, June 23rd, 1857.

"I am directed to acquaint you, for the information of Sir Patrick Grant, K.C.B., that the governor-general in council concurs with his excellency, that the duties of the commander-in-chief can at present be most efficiently and usefully discharged at the seat of government. When the course of events shall tend to allay the general disquiet, and to show to what points our force should be mainly directed with the view of crushing the heart of the rebellion, it will, in the opinion of his lordship in council, be proper for his excellency to consider anew the question of his movements. His excellency's experience and high authority will then, in all probability, be most usefully employed in the disturbed districts or their neighbourhood.

"For the present, the governor-general in council thinks there will be the greatest advantage in his excellency remaining at the seat of government.—I am, &c.,

"R. J. H. BIRCH, Colonel."

Shortly after the panic that had unsettled society at Calcutta had subsided, the grand jury of the city, having a wholesome dread of the Mohurrum before them, made a presentment to the judge of the supreme court, recommending that the native population of Calcutta and the suburbs should be disarmed, and that the unrestricted sale of arms and ammunition should be prohibited. It was represented, that the measure was proposed "with a view to allay apprehension of danger on the part of the public, to preserve the peace, and to prevent crime, with reference especially to the then approaching Mohammedan festival. The recommendation of the grand jury did not, however, obtain the sanction of government; and the secretary, in reply to the presentment, stated, by command of the governor-general in council, that the subject had already been pressed on his attention by other parties, and that it had re-

ceived his most careful consideration; but his lordship was of opinion, that the important object the grand jury had in view could be more effectually provided for by other means. The secretary further stated, that the several places in Calcutta where arms could be procured, and the quantity in store at each, were well known, and effectual measures would be taken to prevent any of them being used for mischievous purposes.

A memorial, similar in purport to that of the grand jury, but signed by about 300 of the most influential European residents of Calcutta, was also transmitted to the governor-general in council; who, in reply, assured the memorialists that a general measure for the registration of arms throughout the presidencies, and for prohibiting the possession of them except under certain restrictions, was then under the consideration of government. The continuous details of accumulating horrors and outrages that now reached the capital by every dâk, coupled with an apparent inertness on the part of the executive authorities, had at length the natural effect of impressing the European population with a painful sense of insecurity. It was known that the revolt was no longer confined to the native army, and that it was now spreading among the inhabitants of the towns and villages, who were incited to rebellion by the example around them; and it was felt, also, that as yet no salutary and really efficient check had yet been interposed to the progress of the calamity. The frightful massacres at Meerut and Delhi had inspired dread of extermination among European society, and its apprehensions were not lessened by the fact, that the government had practically ceased to derive revenue from the provinces of Upper India, and had put a peremptory stop to all public works not of a military character. In the capital trade was paralysed, and the markets were crammed to repletion with accumulating stores of British and European manufactures and productions, for which no returns could be made; the native banks having suspended operations, and being occupied in converting their available wealth into specie, and holding it for a crisis. Added to these sources of disquietude, agriculture had been neglected in large districts; and with the prolongation and spread of the revolt, it was certain the crops already in the ground would suffer from the want of necessary hands to gather

them in. Thus a dread of eventual famine became added to the other forebodings that depressed the public mind of Calcutta, and, by many of the people, its dread indications were already shadowed forth.

Stimulated, partly by real, partly by imaginary dangers, the inhabitants of Calcutta again joined in petitioning the governor-general. They impressed upon his attention the total inefficiency of the existing police force for the preservation of the peace of the city, and the urgent necessity that, in their opinions, had become daily apparent for a more vigorous arm on which to rely for protection; and they called upon the government to supply that arm by proclaiming martial law. To this application the secretary to the government was instructed to reply, "that, in the opinion of the governor-general, the substitution of courts-martial for those of the ordinary courts of justice, would be accompanied with much private inconvenience, uncertainty, and hardship; and his lordship was not aware of any commensurate public gain that could be derived from compliance with the prayer of the petition."

On the 10th of July, a proclamation was issued by command of the governor-general, offering a reward of fifty rupees for the apprehension of mutineers and deserters, and of persons inciting others to mutiny and desertion, if the offenders should be found with arms; and of thirty rupees, if without arms. It was also declared, that all persons delivering up arms and other property belonging to government, should be rewarded in proportion to the value of such property. The result of the proclamation did not justify the expectations upon which it was founded. About the same time, Major-general Hewitt, commanding the Meerut division of the Bengal army, was removed from divisional command,* Major-general Penny, C.B., being appointed to succeed him. Until the arrival of the latter at Meerut, Brigadier Wilson, commandant of artillery, held temporary command with the rank of brigadier-general, which that distinguished officer continued to hold until appointed major-general a short time before his successful assault upon Delhi.

At length the arrival, in quick succession, of the troops originally destined for China,

* See *ante*, p. 56.

† *Vide* Lord Ellenborough's despatch of April, 1858.

infused a feeling of security among the Europeans at the seat of government; and, before the end of July, the clouds that had loomed so gloomily over society, had, in a great measure, disappeared. An idea, however, still prevailed, that in the measures adopted towards the mutinous and murderous soldiers of the Bengal army, a far too lenient disposition was manifest on the part of the governor-general; and the impression became strengthened by the publication of the following official instructions to the local authorities of the North-Western Provinces of Bengal, on the 31st of July, 1857. This document, it may be observed, has subsequently acquired peculiar importance from circumstances in connection with the subject, that will be hereafter referred to;† and it is, therefore, given *in extenso*.

"Resolution 1.—The governor-general of India in council has observed with approbation the zealous exertions of the local civil authorities for the apprehension and condign punishment of the mutineers and deserters concerned in the present revolt. It was necessary, by the severe and prompt punishment of such of these criminals as found their way into the districts in our possession, where the minds of the native troops could not but be in a very unsettled state (though the men for the most part had abstained from open mutiny), to show that the just fate of the mutineer is death, and that the British government was powerful to inflict the penalty. It was necessary, also, by the offer of rewards for the apprehension of all deserters, to check the crime of desertion, which was becoming rife in some of these regiments, and to prevent the possible escape of men who, apparently mere deserters, had been concerned in such terrible atrocities, that their apprehension and condign punishment was an imperative duty.

"2. But lest measures of extreme severity should be too hastily resorted to, or carried too far, his lordship in council thinks it right to issue detailed instructions on this subject, by which all civil officers will be guided in the exercise of their powers in the cases of mutineers, deserters, and rebels.

"3. There is reason to believe, that in some even of those native regiments whose revolt has been stained by the most sanguine atrocities, some men may have distinguished themselves from the mass by protecting an officer. In some such cases, men of very guilty regiments possess certificates in their

favour from officers of their regiments; but there may be others, equally deserving of clemency, who are without any such ready means of clearing themselves from the presumptive evidence of their deep guilt.

“4. Where the number of men guilty of what it is impossible to pardon is so great, the government will gladly seize every opportunity of reducing the work of retribution before it, by giving a free pardon to all who can show that they have a claim to mercy on this ground, provided they have not been guilty of any heinous crime against person or property, or aided or abetted others in the commission of any such crime.

“5. It is understood, that in regiments which mutinied, and for the most part went over to the rebels, without murdering their officers, or committing any other sanguinary outrage, there were men who appeared to have had no heart in the revolt, though they failed in their duty as soldiers, and who have evinced their peaceable disposition and their want of sympathy with those who are now armed in open rebellion against the government, by dispersing to their villages when the regiment broke up, and mixing quietly with the rural population. It is desirable to treat such men with all reasonable leniency.

“6. The governor-general in council, therefore, deems it necessary to lay down the following rules for the guidance of civil authorities in exercising the powers vested in them by recent legislation for the punishment of native officers and soldiers charged with mutiny or desertion:—

“No native officer or soldier belonging to a regiment which has not mutinied is to be punished by the civil power as a mere deserter, unless he be found or apprehended with arms in his possession. Such men, when taken before or apprehended by the civil power, are to be sent back to their regiments whenever that can be done, there to be dealt with by the military authorities. When such men cannot be sent back to their regiments immediately, they should be detained in prison pending the orders of government, to whom a report is to be made, addressed to the secretary to government in the military department.

“Native officers and soldiers, being mutineers or deserters, taken before or apprehended by the civil power, not found or apprehended with arms in their possession, not charged with any specific act of rebellion, and belonging to a regiment which has

mutinied, but has not been guilty of the murder of its officers, or of any other sanguinary crime, are to be sent to Allahabad, or to such other place as government may hereafter order, and are there to be made over to the commandant, to be dealt with by the military authorities. Should any difficulty arise in sending the offender to Allahabad, either by reason of its distance from the place of arrest or otherwise, the offender should be imprisoned until the orders of government can be obtained, unless for special reasons it may be necessary to punish the offender forthwith; a report being made to the government.

“Every mutineer or deserter who may be taken before or apprehended by the civil authorities, and who may be found to belong to a regiment which killed any European officer or other European, or committed any other sanguinary outrage, may be tried and punished by the civil power. If the prisoner can show that he was not present at the murder or other outrage, or, if present, that he did his utmost to prevent it, full particulars of the case should be reported to government in the military department, before the sentence, whatever it be, is carried into effect, otherwise the sentence should be carried into effect forthwith.

“If it cannot be ascertained to what regiment a mutineer or deserter taken before or apprehended by the civil authorities belonged, he is to be dealt with as provided by the second rule.

“7. Lists showing the several regiments and detachments which have mutinied, will be prepared with all practicable dispatch in the military department, stating, in each case, all known particulars of the mutiny, and accompanied by nominal rolls, with appropriate remarks opposite to the names of those native officers and men who are known to have been absent from their regiment at the time of the mutiny, and of those who, if present, are known to have taken an active part either in promoting or suppressing the mutiny, or to have simply joined or abstained from joining it. These nominal rolls, as soon as prepared, will be printed and circulated to all civil officers and to military officers in command.

“8. The governor-general in council is anxious to prevent measures of extreme severity being unnecessarily resorted to, or carried to excess, or applied without due discrimination, in regard to acts of rebellion committed by persons not mutineers.

"9. It is unquestionably necessary, in the first attempt to restore order in a district in which the civil authority has been entirely overthrown, to administer the law with such promptitude and severity as will strike terror into the minds of the evil-disposed among the people, and will induce them by the fear of death to abstain from plunder, to restore stolen property, and return to peaceful occupations. But this object once in a great degree attained, the punishment of crimes should be regulated with discrimination.

"10. The continued administration of the law in its utmost severity, after the requisite impression has been made upon the rebellious and disorderly, and after order has been partially restored, would have the effect of exasperating the people, and would probably induce them to band together in large numbers for the protection of their lives, and with a view to retaliation—a result much to be deprecated. It would greatly add to the difficulties of settling the country hereafter. If a spirit of animosity against their rulers were engendered in the minds of the people, and if their feelings were embittered by the remembrance of needless bloodshed, the civil officers in every district should endeavour, without canning any heinous offences or making any promises of pardon for such offences, to encourage all persons to return to their usual occupations, and, punishing only such of the principal offenders as can be apprehended, to postpone as far as possible all minute inquiry into political offences until such time as the government are in a position to deal with them in strength after thorough investigation. It may be necessary, however, even after a district is partially restored to order, to make examples from time to time of such persons, of any who may be guilty of serious outrages against person or property, or who, by stopping the dāk, or injuring the electric telegraph or otherwise, may endeavour to promote the designs of those who are waging war against the state.

"11. Another point to be noticed in connexion with this subject is the general burning of villages, which the governor-general in council has reason to fear may have been carried too far by some of the civil officers employed in restoring order.

"12. A severe measure of this sort is doubtless necessary, as an example in some cases, where the mass of the inhabitants of

a village have committed a grave outrage, and the perpetrators cannot be punished in their persons; but any approach to a wholesale destruction of property by the officers of government, without due regard to the guilt or innocence of those who are affected by it, must be strongly reprehended. Apart from the effect which such a practice would have upon the feelings and disposition of the country people, there can be no doubt that it would prevent them from returning to their villages and resuming the cultivation of their fields—a point at this season of vital importance, inasmuch as if the lands remain much longer unsown, distress and even famine may be added to the other difficulties with which the government will have to contend.—(True copy.)

"C. BEADON,

"Secretary to the Government of India.
"Fort William, July 31st, 1857."

The publication of this order revived the sleeping energies of all who were opposed to Lord Canning's policy in the treatment of persons connected with the revolt; and while few were found to disagree with the general principles enunciated, it was objected to as offensively implying that unreasonable rigour had been employed in the suppression of the revolt. Lord Canning had from the first been suspected of entertaining an unwarrantable sympathy with the insurgents, and of shrinking from measures of severity that were essential to control a turbulent and ill-disposed population. It was observed with some truth, that in the very midst of harrowing and convulsive struggles, a wrong opportunity had been selected for launching this series of instructions; and certainly, when the relative positions of the parties concerned are considered, there appears great force in the objection. Beyond a line drawn across Bengal, at a distance of between 300 and 400 miles from Calcutta, every European was at the time struggling for bare life. The co-operation of all, for the safety of all, was needed; and not a hand, not an eye, not a moment could be spared for superfluous duty; whereas, in the capital, the governor-general and his colleagues, who inhabited strongly-built and well-guarded palaces, had leisure for calm and dispassionate consideration, and were exempt from apprehension of personal danger. That, under such circumstances, his lordship should take occasion, from reports that had reached him from the upper provinces, to

pass deprecatory remarks upon the acts of those who, in the defence of order, had avenged the wrongs of humanity and of European society, was felt to be ungracious and unjust. It was feared, moreover, that the effect of these orders would be, to render the most energetic officers reluctant to act upon bold suggestions, and might tempt them, in the spirit of the instructions, to exhibit a dangerous and mistaken lenity. People considered, that after Delhi and Lucknow had been effectually relieved from rebel domination, and when the struggle had finally been determined, it might be judicious to check the ardour of our troops, and to temper the just severity of the civil authorities before whom the savage perpetrators of unparalleled atrocities might be brought for trial and punishment. But while results were yet trembling in the scale; while it was still possible that English blood might once more convert a palace into a slaughterhouse in Oude, as it already had done at Delhi, it was felt to be premature and unseemly to cast this mixture of reproof and caution in the faces of those who were straining every effort to prevent the British power from being trampled under foot by surging hosts of rebels and assassins. So long as such a state of things existed, the great object, it was averred, should be to strike terror—to retaliate blow for blow—to bear down the mutiny by irresistible violence, and to crush the disaffected under an iron heel. The proclamation was in every sense considered unnecessary and ill-timed; and it was felt that the governor-general might have displayed a more generous appreciation of the inborn humanity of British soldiers and civilians, and if it was necessary to speak at all upon the subject, that he would first have recognised the imperative demand that existed for the infliction of a great example of power and of justice, in avenging the devastation of the country it was his high mission to govern and protect.

Public feeling had now worked itself up to fever heat; and the unpopularity of Lord Canning at his seat of government, at length found expression in a petition to the Queen for his immediate recall. The document is valuable as tracing some of the more important events of the period in connection with his lordship's administration; and it was as follows:—

“To the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty.

“The humble petition of the under-

signed Christian inhabitants of Calcutta, and of the presidency of Fort William, in Bengal, most humbly sheweth:—

“That your majesty's petitioners humbly solicit your gracious consideration to the present deplorable state of this country, and of your majesty's most loyal Christian subjects, residents in this presidency. It is not unknown to your majesty, that now nearly all Behar, one of the first, and all Oude, the last, acquired of the territories of the East India Company in India, are in the possession of the rebels; that in every district, Englishmen, women, and children have been foully and treacherously murdered with every circumstance of horror; that almost all the British and Christian population is mourning; the English name and reputation are lowered; commerce and trade are paralysed; agriculture is interrupted; ruin and famine are impending over those who have escaped massacre; the treasuries of the East India Company are pillaged and exhausted, their credit is wholly gone, and their securities are so depreciated as to be almost unsaleable at any rate of discount. It is the deliberate conviction of your majesty's petitioners, that all these calamities, the results of the spread of the mutiny, are directly attributable to the blindness, weakness, and incapacity of the local government of India, of which the present governor-general is the responsible head; and in support of this charge your majesty's petitioners submit the following facts:—

“It is now clear, from the papers relating to the mutiny, produced in both houses of parliament by your majesty's command in the last session of parliament, that the government of India had sufficient warning, in the months of January and February of this year, that the four sepoy regiments stationed at Barrackpore had formed the design of murdering their officers, and marching on Calcutta—distant only sixteen miles from Barrackpore—for the purpose of massacring all Christians, and pillaging the treasuries and city, and that they were in treasonable communication with the disaffected regiments at Berhampore. It is also now well-known that the government had numerous other clear intimations given them of the spirit and mutinous designs of their native army in other parts of India, both by their officers and by the incendiary fires which were nightly breaking out at Umballah and other stations. And it is

further a fact, that certain of the officers who gave such warnings were reprimanded for having so done. Not the slightest preparations were then made by the governor-general to meet the impending danger; nor was any warning given to the inhabitants of Calcutta, who were thus left nightly in the danger of being surprised by a massacre, which, in magnitude and horror, would have surpassed all in the annals of this country, against which any such warning would have enabled them instantly to have protected themselves, and which nothing, humanly speaking, but the indecision of the mutineers and accident preserved them. The only European force which there then was in Calcutta to oppose to these four sepoy regiments, to the Calcutta native militia, who were equally disaffected, to the bazaar rabble, who, out of a native population of about 600,000, would have joined the mutineers by thousands, and to the hordes of Dacoits and other professional robbers, who would have crowded from all sides to the plunder of so wealthy a city, was one wing of your majesty's 53rd regiment, stationed in Fort William, a fort which requires upwards of 10,000 men for its full garrison, and where they would have had to protect themselves against as well the attack from without, as the treachery of the native garrison within, and so could have afforded no assistance whatever to the inhabitants of a city extended over several miles.

"The design of the mutineers, as has since been ascertained, was to seize the fort and turn its guns on the shipping in the port, so as to sink them, and take away all means of flight. Had this succeeded, not one Christian could have escaped massacre. Symptoms of spreading disaffection continued; the sepoys, determined on a pretext for revolt, refused explanation or satisfaction on the subject of the cartridges; the 19th native infantry, at Berhampore, on the 26th of February, broke into open mutiny, seized their arms, menaced their officers, and were subsequently marched to Barrackpore; where, on the 31st of March, having been paid in full, together with the hire of their carts, cattle, and boats, they were disbanded and sent to swell the ranks of your majesty's enemies in the upper provinces.

"On the 30th of March, a private of the 34th native infantry at Barrackpore fired at and wounded the adjutant, and also the

European sergeant-major of that regiment, in the presence of a guard and native officer, and of a number of the other sepoys of the same regiment. With one single exception, none moved to save their officers or arrest the culprit. As the punishment of this offence, the assassin and the native officer were executed, and their accessories, who stood by, were with the other men of the seven companies then at Barrackpore, paid off and dismissed in like manner as had been the 19th regiment. Your majesty's government and the court of directors were then informed by the governor-general 'that discipline was restored throughout the Bengal army,' and your majesty's 84th regiment, which had been brought up from Pegu to assist at the disbanding of the 19th regiment of native infantry, was ordered to re-embark for Rangoon. After this, and until the seizure of Delhi, with the exception of issuing certain proclamations, calculated to encourage the mutineers by proving to them the blindness and weakness of the government, nothing whatever was done to arrest the mutiny, and its existence was consistently ignored in the face of every evidence.

"On the 10th of May, the massacre took place at Meerut, and, on the 11th, that at Delhi, the horrors of which it is unnecessary to dwell on to your majesty. Delhi was seized by a number of regiments of native infantry and the 3rd native cavalry. In Oude, on the 19th of May, three native regiments went over to the mutineers at Delhi; the whole of that country was clearly on the brink of revolt, and Sir Henry Lawrence was fortifying himself in Lucknow, to meet the siege in which he has since fallen.

"On the 21st of May, while matters stood thus, the British and other residents of Calcutta forming the trades' association, the Masonic fraternity, and also the French inhabitants, presented their several addresses to the governor-general, offering their services generally. The governor-general, in his reply, informed them that he had no apprehension whatever of any disturbance in Calcutta, and expressed his regret that, in the address of the trades' association, they should have assumed the existence of disaffection in the sepoy army generally, and so done an injustice to the army of Bengal, as well as those of the other presidencies.

"On the 25th of May, the European inhabitants generally came forward, and ten-

dered their services as volunteers to the government; but this offer was also ungraciously declined, and the secretary for the home department of the government of India, was directed by the governor-general to inform them, that 'the mischief caused by a passing and groundless panic had been arrested, and that there was every reason to hope that in the course of a few days tranquillity and confidence would be restored throughout the presidency.' At this time, rebellion and mutiny were breaking out openly on every side, Christian men and women were being murdered and mangled on every road and in all parts throughout India. The villagers and other marauders were joining the mutineers in their work of pillage and bloodshed. The three remaining sepoy regiments at Barrackpore, of whose murderous designs the government had for months been possessed, were allowed still to retain their arms, and were only waiting their opportunity. In consequence of the governor-general's replies to those addresses, no volunteer force was then enrolled. In the following month, the inhabitants of Calcutta formed voluntary associations for their defence, and these were afterwards embodied into the volunteer guard, to whom the safety of the city has been since entrusted and owing: had the government accepted the first offer, the number enrolled would have been from three to four thousand. In consequence of the discouragement offered by the government, the volunteer guard numbers about 800.

"On the deposition of the king of Oude, in last year, his army, numbering about 50,000 men, was disbanded, with the exception of about 12,000, who were taken into the service of the East India Company, and retained in the kingdom of Oude. The population of that kingdom is notoriously among the most turbulent in India, and all habitually carry arms. The country is studded with the forts and jungle fastnesses of the zemindars and chiefs. In consequence of the Crimean campaign, there was then remaining of your majesty's troops for the garrisons of Lucknow and Cawnpore, and for the maintenance of the East India Company's rule against the wide-spread discontent of a newly-annexed province of such character and extent, against the intrigues of the deposed royal family, the disbanded soldiery, and the possible mutiny of those who had been lately transferred, only your majesty's 32nd regiment.

"Your majesty's petitioners submit, that the continuance of such a state of things was an invitation to, and a main cause of revolt, and that it was the clear duty of the governor-general to have provided against it, by representing to your majesty's government the imminent risk of such a position, and the absolute necessity there was for sending more of your majesty's troops thither on the conclusion of the Russian war, and in the meantime to have removed the Oude troops from that kingdom, and supplied their place by regiments raised in other districts, and having no sympathies with the royal family and people of Oude. This course had been adopted on the annexation of the Punjab, and that precedent could have been followed without difficulty in Oude. Various suggestions to that effect were made at the time to the government of India; but, so far as your majesty's petitioners are aware, no precaution whatever was taken for the security of Oude.

"On the 4th of June, the native regiments at Cawnpore mutinied. The siege of the barracks containing a small body of European soldiers and the Christian population of the place—men, women, and children—was carried on till the 26th, when they surrendered on terms, having exhausted their food, water, and ammunition. The men were massacred then, and the women and children, to the number of upwards of 140, on the 15th of July. During the whole duration of the siege, though the danger of the garrison of Cawnpore was well known, no attempt was made to relieve it—the government of India had not any force to send, the troops at their disposal being merely sufficient for the protection of Calcutta, Benares, Allahabad, and the other river stations. If the governor-general had, in the month of May, armed and embodied the Christian inhabitants of Calcutta, for the protection of that city, it would have placed at his disposal, for the relief of Cawnpore, the whole, or nearly all, of the European force in Calcutta. That such a volunteer force would have been fully equal to the protection of Calcutta, has been proved by the effectual manner in which its peace has been since assured by a far smaller number. And that the relief of Cawnpore might have been effected by a small force, has been shown by the relief of Arrah by a body of English soldiers numbering less than 200: had a further force seemed necessary,

the government could have embodied the British sailors in the port, to the number of from two to three thousand.

“After the seizure of Delhi, the aid of a body of Ghoorkas was offered to the governor-general by Jung Bahadoor, the minister of the Nepaul government, and at first accepted. The advanced guard was sent forward, and had nearly reached Lucknow about the end of May, when a despatch from Calcutta, informing them there was no need of their services, sent them back home, which they had no sooner reached than they were asked to return. They again started, but arrived too late. Had this force remained in the first instance, before all Oude had risen, it would have been sufficient to have relieved Cawnpore, checked revolt in Oude, and so prevented the siege of Lucknow. To the weakness and vacillation of the government of India and its council are due the massacre of Cawnpore, and the sufferings of the garrison of Lucknow, and of its Christian population, comprising among them hundreds of women and children. In the months of June and July, mutinies and massacres took place at Futteghur, Sealkote, Jhansie, Gwalior, Nee-much, Sultanpore, Sasnee, Hattras, Shahjehanpore, and other places: and that which at first appeared to be a military mutiny, was on all sides assuming the dimensions of a general native insurrection.

“On the 20th of July, a deputation of British merchants, and others interested in the safety of Behar, waited on the governor-general, and having represented to his lordship the fatal consequences which would ensue in case of the mutiny of the sepoy regiments stationed at the river station of Dinapore, prayed that orders should be issued for the disarming of those regiments. It was suggested to his lordship, that your majesty’s 10th regiment, also stationed at Dinapore, should be employed for that purpose, and that such further force as should be considered necessary might be supplied from your majesty’s 5th regiment, which was then on its way up the country by the river, and would thus have been detained for this purpose but a few hours. The governor-general refused to do so, and stated as his reasons, that one of those sepoy regiments—the 40th native infantry—had always had a high reputation, and that he would not consent to delay, even for an hour, the progress of any of your majesty’s troops.

“On the 25th day of July, those three

native regiments mutinied, and went away with their arms. The result of this mutiny was the revolt of Behar, the siege of Arrah, and the almost total destruction of a detachment of your majesty’s troops. These additional calamities had not occurred, if the still-continuing confidence of the governor-general in the native army had not prevented him from listening to the warnings given him, and disarming these troops.

“On the 13th of June, the governor-general personally introduced into council, where it was at once read three times and passed, an act placing the press of India, English and native, wholly at the mercy of government. The governor-general then stated, that he had received, up to that time, every support from the English press, and that it was not his intention to use the act to prevent fair discussion or curtail the liberty of the British press. The passing of that act caused great alarm and offence in the English and Christian community, of whom many were desirous of protesting strongly against it. They were, however, induced, by reliance on the assurance of the governor-general, and their desire not to embarrass the government at such a crisis, not then to do so. That act has been since so systematically used by the governor-general and his council for the intimidation of the press, the suppression of the truth, and of every discussion or expression of opinion unfavourable or unpleasant to government, and even for the prevention of all criticism on the conduct or misconduct of government officials, that there is not now remaining one newspaper in this presidency which dares to publish here that which is the opinion of all British India as to the conduct of its government and various of its officers.

“Your majesty’s petitioners submit that such a proceeding was uncalled-for, despotic, repugnant to British feeling, and most mischievous in a country where, as here, the free expression of opinion through a public press is the only check on a narrowly constituted and arbitrary government; and in many instances, as has been often acknowledged by the most eminent English statesmen that have ruled this country, has proved a most valuable guide and source of information to them. The only excuse for such severity, viz., seditious writing, was not pretended to exist as regarded the English press, though it was charged against the native press. Your

majesty's petitioners submit that they were entitled to have the distinction drawn between loyalty and sedition; that the act, if necessary for the native press, should have been applied and confined to it; and that whatever aggravation so hateful an invasion of the liberty of the press is capable of, it has received from the weak and wanton confounding of your majesty's loyal subjects with the seditious and rebels. And it is further the belief of your majesty's petitioners, that if there has since appeared anything offensive to government in the press of this presidency, it has been in a great measure owing to the passing of the said act.

"On the 12th day of September a bill was passed for the registration and licensing of arms and ammunition. Notwithstanding the broad line of distinction which was afforded to the legislature, by the fact of the present movement being avowedly one of race and religion, the governor-general and his council refused to draw any such distinction, and the act was made applicable to the Christian as well as native races. A numerous signed protest against this act, as both highly offensive and dangerous, has been sent in by the Christian population of Calcutta, to the governor-general in council, and similar protests from other parts of India are being now signed.

"The governor-general in council (who had censured and repudiated the proclamation of Mr. Colvin, the governor of the North-Western Provinces, issued in the month of May, when the extent of the mutiny was not so clearly known, by which he had offered pardon to all mutineers who should lay down their arms) issued circular orders on the 31st of July, addressed to all the civil authorities of the presidency, and containing directions as to the mode of dealing with mutineers who should be brought before them for trial, which amount, in fact, to the declaration of an amnesty to all mutineers, except those who should have taken an actual and active part in the murder of their officers or others.

"If it be borne in mind that the mutineers, to whom this almost indiscriminate forgiveness is to be extended, had of their own free will entered the service of the East India Company, with which their connection was of an hereditary nature; that they were highly paid and pensioned, pampered and indulged to a degree known to no other army in the world; that they had

in mere wantonness, and lust of blood and plunder, mutinied without a grievance; had banded in one general conspiracy, massacred their officers and their wives and families with every circumstance of outrage and dishonour, and declared a war of extermination against all Christians in India—then your petitioners submit to your majesty, that such lenity towards any portion of those conspirators is misplaced, impolitic, and iniquitous, and is calculated to excite contempt, and invite attack on every side, by showing to the world the government of India so powerless to punish mutiny, or so indifferent to the sufferings which have been endured by the victims of the rebellion, that it allows the blood of your majesty's English and Christian subjects to flow in torrents, and their wives, sisters, and daughters to be outraged and dishonoured, without adequate retribution. And your majesty's petitioners submit further, that the publication of these orders at such a time, while still the mutiny and rebellion were raging, could have no other effect than to produce a prolongation of the struggle, by holding out to the mutineers the prospect of being received into mercy, whenever they shall please to desist from fighting against the government.

"Notwithstanding the numerous well-known instances of treachery on the part of Mohammedan officers of the East India Company during the present insurrection, of which your majesty's petitioners may here instance the case of Mr. Tucker, judge of Fnttehpore, betrayed to death by the Mohammedan deputy-collector of that station, and Mr. Robertson, judge of Bareilly, betrayed in like manner by another Mohammedan official, the governor-general has continued to display his confidence in that class of men, by lately sanctioning the appointment of one Ameer Ali, a Mohammedan, to be deputy-commissioner of Patna, a place of great importance and trust, and also the appointments of other Mohammedans to other places of trust, to the great offence and discouragement of the Christian population of this presidency. The governor-general and his council have taken numerous occasions to express their sympathy with the native races, to the disparagement of your majesty's loyal Christian subjects. Lately, on the approach of the Mohammedan festival of the Mohurram, the governor-general in council permitted the commissioner of police for the

town of Calcutta to offer to its Christian inhabitants the gratuitous insult of having conspicuously inserted for several days an advertisement in the Calcutta papers, warning them that any of them who interfered with the native religious ceremonies would render himself liable to punishment. There was not at that time the slightest ground for apprehending the existence of any such intention; and, notwithstanding those advertisements, not the least disturbance took place.

"In the month of February last, a memorial was presented to the governor-general in council by a number of the principal holders of the four per cent. promissory notes of the East India Company, praying that the government would allow subscriptions to the then recently opened five per cent. loan to be paid, one-half in cash, and the remainder in the four per cent. promissory notes. By granting this prayer, any sum of money could have been then procured. It was refused. In July following, the government issued a notification that subscriptions to that loan would be received in that manner. But their vacillation had so destroyed their credit that hardly any subscriptions were received, and they could now hardly obtain the required amount at any rate.

"The governor-general, by pertinaciously refusing at first to acknowledge the existence of mutiny, by the subsequent feebleness and vacillation of his measures, when it could no longer be denied, by pursuing an ill-timed and hopeless policy of conciliation towards the rebels and mutineers, and by his wanton attacks on the most valued rights of your majesty's British and Christian subjects in this country, has, as your majesty's petitioners believe, been a principal cause of the great calamities which have desolated this land, has strengthened the hands of the enemy, weakened or destroyed the respect before entertained for the name of Englishman in the East, imperilled British rule, exposed the capital of British India to massacre and pillage, excited the contempt of all parties, estranged from the government of India a large and loyal body of Christians, and in every way proved himself unfit to be further continued in his high trust.

"Your majesty's petitioners submit, that the only policy by which British rule and the lives, honour, and properties of your majesty's Christian subjects in this country

can in future be secured, is a policy of such vigorous repression and punishment as shall convince the native races of India, who can be influenced effectually by power and fear alone, of the hopelessness of insurrection against British rule, even when aided by every circumstance of treachery, surprise, and cruelty, and may teach them henceforward to respect the inviolability of English and Christian men and women by the recollection of the just retribution for foul and horrid murder and outrage that their countrymen have exacted. And it is the firm conviction of your majesty's petitioners, that the adoption of any milder policy will be regarded as springing wholly from conscious weakness, and will lead at no distant day to the repetition of the same scenes, and endanger British India.

"Your majesty's petitioners, who, wholly unrepresented as they are in the government of this country, have no other refuge or resource against the dangers which threaten them except in the gracious interference of your majesty in their behalf, humbly solicit your majesty's consideration to the facts which they have ventured to bring before your majesty in this their petition, and pray that if, on investigation, the same shall appear to your majesty's wisdom to be true and sufficient, your majesty would be graciously pleased to recall the present governor-general of India, Viscount Canning, and thereby mark your majesty's disapproval of the policy hitherto pursued by that nobleman, and give assurance in the future of the stability of British rule, and of the security of life, honour, and property, to your majesty's most loyal Christian subjects in this country.

"And your majesty's petitioners will ever pray, &c."

The preceding document was accompanied by the following appeal to the British parliament:—

"The humble petition of the undersigned British inhabitants of Calcutta most humbly sheweth—

"That your petitioners view with daily increasing anxiety and alarm the condition and prospects of British India. They do not despair of its speedy reconquest by the forces of her majesty; but it is undeniable that, with the exception of three or four places of strength, the whole of the North-West Provinces, as well as the newly-acquired kingdom of Oude, is lost for the present. In addition to which, Tirhoot, Behar, and

Chota Nagpore are in danger. Throughout India the native belief in the *prestige* of British power has been destroyed, and where the Asiatic has no dread of physical force he has no respect for moral influence. Over thousands of square miles, where, three months since, Englishmen travelled in security unarmed, at this moment European women, for themselves and their children, court speedy death as a blessing. On every highway lie the dishonoured and mutilated remains of our countrywomen and their children, and the bodies of British soldiers and unarmed men foully murdered.

“The government of the East India Company, to whose care the interests of Great Britain in the East have been confided, possess from their constitution absolute power. They have a perpetual majority in the legislative council, which is composed entirely of official persons. They have the sole appointment to all offices, with the exception only of those of the governor-general, the commander-in-chief, and the judges of the supreme court. There are no private or corporate rights that can be effectually opposed to them, nor is there any representation of public opinion.

“In the country, desolated by the rebels, there are hundreds of civil servants, judges, magistrates, and collectors; village chowkedars and policemen in tens of thousands, and more than two thousand commissioned military officers, European and native; and yet, if we may believe the government, there was not, in all this vast establishment, to be found one person to acquaint the authorities of the existence of a conspiracy spread over countries many times larger than the area of the British isles, and in which upwards of one hundred thousand soldiers have joined.

“The rebellion broke out and found the government totally unprepared. No efficient commissariat, no organised means of procuring intelligence, and, with a few brilliant exceptions, no men of sufficient capacity for the emergency. At the commencement of the outbreak, Delhi, the largest arsenal of ordnance in the north-west of India, the important military depôt of Cawnpore, and the fortress and arsenal of Allahabad, the key of the lower provinces, were without a single European soldier to defend them. The two former fell into the hands of the insurgents.

“On the 25th of May last, when a number of regiments were in open revolt, when

many treasuries had been plundered, and various important stations fallen into the hands of the rebels, the secretary to the home department officially notified, in reply to a loyal address from the French residents of Calcutta, proffering aid to the government, ‘that the mischief caused by a passing and groundless panic had already been arrested, and there was every reason to hope, that in the course of a few days tranquillity and confidence would be restored throughout the presidency.’*

“From that moment to the present the policy of government has not undergone the slightest change. In the teeth of events the most startling, in defiance of warnings the most emphatic, they steadily persisted in ignoring the fact of danger for which they had made no preparation.

“On the 13th of June, they passed a law which destroyed the liberty of the press, and placed every journal in India at the absolute feet of the executive authority.

“Your petitioners refrain from here commenting on this act of the government, uncalled-for by the occasion, repugnant to British feeling, and subversive of the principles of the British constitution. This was done at a time when the government were receiving universal support from the English portion of the press.

“Your petitioners felt themselves bitterly aggrieved by the attempted imposition of what is known as the ‘black act;’ but their feelings in that respect never hindered them for a moment in coming forward to assist the government with heart and hand. Their offers were coldly declined, though ultimately accepted when danger was too apparent. At the present moment, not only does Calcutta owe its chief security to European volunteers, but government have invited the enrolment of paid corps for service in the interior. The whole trade of the presidency has suffered more or less; many branches of it are ruined entirely. The sale of imports is almost nominal; the cotton goods of England are not to be disposed of, even at great sacrifices. The export of silk, indigo, sugar, and other articles of export, will suffer considerable diminution for some seasons to come, in consequence of the destruction of many factories, and the loss of much capital. In the train of the revolt, it is more than probable, that famine, with all its Indian horrors, will follow. To remedy all these

* See *ante*, p. 156.

evils, and to fix on a firmer basis the British power in the East, your petitioners can alone appeal to the British nation.

“Your petitioners can look for no redress to the powers to whom the government of this great country is delegated, they having shown themselves unequal to the task. The government of the East India Company have neither men, money, nor credit; what credit they had was destroyed by their conduct in the late financial operations. The army has dissolved itself, the treasuries have either been plundered by the rebels, or exhausted by the public service; and a loan, even at six per cent., would scarcely find subscribers.

“When tranquillity is once restored, her majesty’s ministers will find that many millions sterling have been added to the Indian debt, and that the annual deficits of the Indian budget will be materially increased; but, under good government, your petitioners have the fullest confidence that the boundless resources of this vast country are sufficient to meet all the necessary demands of the state. The system under which the country has been hitherto governed—utterly antagonistic as it has ever been to the encouragement of British settlement and enterprise in India—has entirely failed to preserve the power of the Queen, to win the affections of the natives, or to secure the confidence of the British in India.

“Your petitioners, therefore, humbly pray that your honourable house will adopt such measures as may be necessary for removing the government of this country from the East India Company, and substituting in its place the direct government of her majesty the Queen, with an open legislative council, suitable to the requirements of the country, and compatible with the British supremacy; Queen’s courts presided over by trained lawyers; and with the English language as official court language. And your petitioners shall ever pray, &c.

“Calcutta, August 3rd, 1857.”

Here, probably, are to be found the rudiments from which a system of government for the vast territory and numerous races comprehended under British domination in the East Indies might be beneficially constructed. At any rate, there were truths enunciated in the two petitions that it was impossible to deny, and it had become hazardous to neglect the consideration of.

Similar petitions were also forwarded from Bombay, Madras, Singapore, Moul-

mein, Rangoon, and other ports in the territories of the Company. And the movement was deemed the more necessary, as, in the language of those interested in the welfare of India, “the statements made at home, in and out of parliament, by the representatives and friends of the East India Company, were generally not only opposed to fact, but calculated to mislead and divert the attention of the country from that remedy which only could restore the *prestige* and power of England in the East—such remedy being the transfer of the government from the Company to the crown; an open legislative council composed of Englishmen alone; Queen’s courts presided over by trained lawyers; and the use of the English language as the official language of India.”

On the 26th of August, a public meeting of European residents in Calcutta was held, for the purpose of organising and establishing an Indian reform league, founded upon the principle of the English corn-law league; the objects of the proposed association being to promote the improvement of the political condition and government of India in connection with British interests, and to encourage British enterprise and the employment of British capital; and the primary object of the league was declared to be, to urge upon the attention of the parliament and people of England, by all legitimate and constitutional means, the advantages that would accrue to Great Britain and India by the placing of British India under the direct government of the crown, independent of the colonial-office; and the constitution of a legislative council, to be composed of independent persons chosen from the British community of India, in place of the then existing council, composed of nominees of the court of directors, and other official persons. The meeting was attended by a large portion of the influential European society of Calcutta; and resolutions approving the objects declared, and confirmatory of the allegations in the petitions to the Queen and the two houses of parliament, were unanimously carried. At this period, Calcutta was at war both within and without its boundaries, and society was convulsed through every grade of its varied populations. Most opportunely at this time, the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell, as commander-in-chief of the armies of India, had the effect of reassuring society, and imparting new strength and

energy to the government. The qualifications of Sir Patrick Grant for the post he had been temporarily called upon to occupy were not doubted; but he laboured under the disadvantage of holding his military appointments from the Company, and, consequently, could do nothing without the sanction and approval of the governor-general in council. His hands were thus tied. Sir Colin, on the contrary, was free to act upon his own responsibility as an officer of the British crown; and the brightest anticipations were indulged as to the conduct of the war in his hands. The new commander-in-chief, who left England in July, at some twenty-four hours' notice, in order to carry out the wishes of his sovereign in her Eastern empire, is a scion of one of the many branches of the Scottish clan of Campbell. He was born near Glasgow in 1792, and entered the army in 1808, as an ensign in the 9th regiment of foot. His first campaign was amidst the swamps and fetid miasma of Walcheren, and he afterwards participated in the glories of the Peninsular campaigns, being present, among other engagements, at the battles of Vimiera, Corunna, Barossa, and Vittoria, and also at the siege of San Sebastian, where he received two severe wounds, adding to them a third at the passage of the Bidassoa. He then proceeded to North America, and served there during 1814 and 1815. He was subsequently employed in the West Indies; and, in 1823, was engaged as brigade-major in quelling a formidable insurrection in Demerara. In 1842 he embarked for China, in command of the 98th regiment of foot, which he headed during the storming of Chin-kiang-foo, and the operations in the Yang-tze-Kiang, which led to the signing of the peace of Nankin. His next field of service was India, where he greatly distinguished himself in the second Punjab campaign, under Lord Gough, in 1848-'49. Throughout that period of his military career he commanded a division of infantry, and distinguished himself at Ramnuggur, the Chenab, at Sadoolapore, at Chillianwallah (where he received his fourth wound), and at Goojerat; and took an active part, after the battle at the last-mentioned place, in the pursuit of Dost Mohammed, and the occupation of Peshawur. In consideration of his gallant services in the last-named campaign, and of his wounds, he was, in 1849, appointed a knight commander of

the Bath, and received the thanks of parliament and of the East India Company. In 1851 and the following year, while brigadier-general, in command of the Peshawur districts, he was constantly engaged in most difficult operations against the hill tribes surrounding the valley, including the forcing of the Kohat Pass, under the late General Sir Charles J. Napier, and the repeated affairs against the Momunds, who were glad to come to terms after their defeat at Punj Pao by a small detachment of cavalry and horse artillery, under Sir Colin Campbell's immediate command, the combined tribes numbering upwards of 8,000 men. Returning to England in the early part of 1853, he was appointed, on the breaking out of the war with Russia, to the command of a brigade of infantry in Turkey, whence he proceeded to the Crimea, where he commanded the highland division. His services during the Crimean campaign were rewarded by promotion to the rank of lieutenant-general; and the grand crosses of the Bath, the Legion of Honour, and the Sardinian order of Maurice and St. Lazare, were conferred upon him. On his return home, he was presented with the freedom of the city of London, and the honorary degree of D.C.L. was conferred upon him by the university of Oxford. The important charge of inspector-general of infantry was subsequently held by Sir Colin; and at the time of his departure for India, he was also one of her majesty's aides-de-camp.

Sir Colin Campbell arrived at Calcutta on the 14th of August, 1857; and on the 17th of the same month he announced his assumption of the chief command of the troops in India by the following notification:—

“By the Commander-in-Chief.—Her majesty having been graciously pleased to appoint me commander-in-chief of the forces in India, in the room of the late lamented General the Hon. George Anson, and her majesty having also been graciously pleased to confer upon me the rank of general in the East Indies, I now assume the command of the army in India. In doing so, it affords me the highest satisfaction to find under my orders troops who have so fully proved themselves, in the recent arduous operations in the field, to be what I have ever known British soldiers in every quarter of the globe—courageous, faithful, obedient, and enduring.

"In former years, I have commanded native troops of India, and by their side I have been present in many battles and victories, in which they have nobly borne their part; and it is to me a subject of deep concern, to learn that soldiers of whom I had been accustomed to think so favourably, should now be arrayed in open and defiant mutiny against a government proverbial for the liberality and paternal consideration with which it has ever treated its servants of every denomination.

"When I join the force now in the field restoring order to the district disturbed by the disaffection of the army of Bengal, I shall, at the head of the British troops, and of those native soldiers who, though few in number, have not feared to separate themselves from their faithless comrades and to adhere to their duty, feel my old confidence that they will march to certain victory. I shall not fail to notice, and the powerful government which I have the honour to serve will not fail to reward, every instance of fidelity and valour shown by the troops under my command.

"I call upon the officers and men of both European and native troops, zealously to assist in the task before us; and, by the blessing of God, we shall soon again see India tranquil and prosperous.

"C. CAMPBELL, General,

"Commander-in-Chief.

"Calcutta, August 17th."

The gratification of her majesty's troops at having a favourite and highly distinguished officer of their own service at their head, was universal throughout Bengal, and it was enhanced by the selection of officers forming the staff of the Indian army, each of whom had, on well-contested fields, given proof of ability to carry out the views of their gallant chieftain. The staff of the Bengal army consisted of the following:—*Commander-in-chief*—General Sir Colin Campbell, G.C.B. *Chief of the Staff*—Major-general Mansfield. *Lieutenant-general*—Beresford, from Madras. *Major-generals*—Windham, Havelock, Sir Robert Garrett, K.C.B. (from China), and Cotton. Dupuis commanded the royal artillery: a major-general of cavalry remained to be selected. *Deputy Adjutant-general*—the Hon. W. L. Pakenham, C.B. *Deputy Quartermaster-general*—Colonel Wetherall, C.B.

It will be remembered that Sir Colin had reached the seat of government on the 14th of the month; but for some cause not then

intelligible to the public and the army, it was not until the 31st that his appointment as commander-in-chief, and as extraordinary member of the council of India, was recognised by the governor-general in council—a period of fourteen days after he had actually assumed command, and apprised the army of the fact! The government notification at length appeared in the following terms:—

"Fort William, Home Department, Aug. 31.

"*Notification.*—The honourable the court of directors having, in a despatch dated the 22nd of July last, announcing to the government of India, that they had appointed General Sir Colin Campbell, knight grand cross of the most honourable military order of the Bath (commander-in-chief of the forces in India), to be an extraordinary member of the council of India; and the said General Sir Colin Campbell having informed the right honourable the governor-general of India in council, that he has assumed the command of the forces in India, it is hereby notified that General Sir Colin Campbell has assumed the office of commander-in-chief of the forces in India, and that he has this day taken his seat and his oaths as an extraordinary member of the council of India, under the usual salute from the ramparts of Fort William.

"By order of the right honourable the governor-general in council.

"CECIL BEADON,

"Secretary to the Government of India."

Considering the state of public feeling at the time, and the general tendency that prevailed to criticise and censure every act of the government, it was not surprising that the delay of a fortnight which had been suffered to intervene between the arrival of the commander-in-chief at Calcutta, and his recognition by the Indian government, should elicit murmurings and forebodings of evil. Thus, in remarking upon the "tardiness" which government had evinced in publishing the above notification, the *Friend of India* says—"It is to be hoped that the delay is not ominous, and that precedent will not have it all its own way. The powers which Sir Colin Campbell possesses are not known in India, but it may be expected that he is not so completely tied down as Sir William Gomm or Sir Patrick Grant. Such a system may work well when the governor-general is a man of military genius, and can take the field himself; but at present

its effects would be ruinous. We must have one man who is able to direct military operations, and in whom implicit confidence can be placed. So long as the civil and military authorities pull together, all is well; but if there be knowledge on the one side and power on the other, things are apt to become very unpleasant. We suppose that Lord Canning was chosen by the government at home not on account of any military abilities which his lordship may happen to possess, but simply for his administrative capacity. On that account so able a soldier as Sir Colin Campbell was selected to assume the command of her majesty's and the honourable Company's forces in India, so soon as the crisis arrived which would render military talents of more value than the exercise of any of those qualities by which a settled government is established and improved. Such being the case, the powers of the commander-in-chief could hardly have been too extensive: not, indeed, his offensive powers, but his capabilities of resistance, which would enable him to persevere in any line of conduct which he might deem it expedient to pursue. But the silence of Lord Granville upon this point in the House of Lords was ominous; and the mere fact that Sir Colin Campbell has only assumed his seat as an extraordinary member of council fourteen days after his arrival, wears an ugly aspect, though not with reference to himself. We suppose that the governor-general had ample powers to permit Sir Colin Campbell to assume his seat even without any authorisation from home. But perhaps the latter chose the more independent plan, and thought that as he had been appointed from England, so his position in the legislative council should come from thence.*

From the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell at Calcutta, on the 13th of August, to his departure for the field at the end of October, a period of nearly ten weeks elapsed, during which the public mind was left in total ignorance of his movements; and the silence that prevailed upon the subject, at length produced a considerable degree of animadversion; but when the veil that had shrouded his proceedings from general view was lifted, it was perceived that this very period

* Among the *on dits* of Calcutta society at the time, it was currently reported, that at first government for some time positively refused to recognise Sir Colin Campbell as commander-in-chief. With his usual promptitude, Sir Colin gave them a day to

of supposed inactivity, was that in which ceaseless energy and marvellous activity had been most displayed, and in which he had laid the foundations whereon his subsequent successes were based. When the commander-in-chief first set foot on the soil of India, nothing could be more disastrous than the intelligence that awaited him. Oude in arms—Rohilcund revolted—the Doab in the hands of the enemy—all Central India in confusion. One great magazine had been lost at Delhi; the gun manufactory at Futteghur was destroyed; all communication with the Punjab cut off; a small British force was struggling to hold a position of observation, not of siege, before Delhi; Lucknow and Agra were tottering amidst the surrounding surge of rebellion that threatened every moment to engulf them; the heroic Havelock, with matchless skill and courage, was maintaining himself in the neighbourhood of Cawnpore, against overpowering numbers and the ravages of a deadly epidemic; while in Calcutta, itself full of anxiety and dread, he found a small European garrison, scarcely sufficient to overawe the loose native population, and watch the three disarmed sepoy regiments in its vicinity: in short, at that moment, he had the mutinous army of Bengal (100,000 strong) and the revolted populations of Oude and the North-Western Provinces to contend against; while the whole force under his direct orders, as commander-in-chief, amounted to something less than 7,000 English bayonets, with only about 2,000 native troops that could be relied on; and this force not concentrated, but scattered over a vast extent of territory between Calcutta and Cawnpore. Yet, with this inadequate means, he had in the first place to secure and hold the river line of communication to Allahabad, 800 miles in length; to keep open the land route to the same point, 498 miles of road; to maintain an imposing force under Havelock at Cawnpore, 200 miles yet further in advance; and, at the same time, to hold down with giant grasp the excited populations of the great cities of Benares, Patna, and Calcutta. In addition to these causes of anxiety, a fall in the Ganges had at this period rendered the river route to Allaha-

make up their minds and arrive at a decision, as, in the event of further non-recognition, it was his intention to return to England by the next steamer. The notification appeared within the time limited, and the return voyage was for the present averted.

bad tedious and uncertain, and it became necessary to organise another and surer method of forwarding reinforcements to the front. This Sir Colin did by establishing along the Great Trunk-road a mode of transport, by which 200 men a-day were regularly forwarded in covered carts, drawn by bullocks, and relieved at regular stages; and so perfect was the system he established for this purpose, that when the troops arrived at their halting-places, they found their meals regularly prepared for them, as would be the case at regular quarters, the whole line of road being meanwhile kept clear of rebels by movable columns of infantry and artillery, which marched along it at irregular intervals, and so completely protected the route, that not a detachment or a man was cut off through the entire march. It was in maturing these arrangements, and in settling the plans for future operations in the field, that the time passed by the commander-in-chief in Calcutta was occupied; and to the indefatigable exertions and ceaseless care of Sir Colin Campbell during this period of supposed inaction, much of the success of the ensuing campaign may justly be attributed.

While the capital of Bengal was agitated by continual alternations from a state of comparative tranquillity to the wild excitement of sudden panic—its population alike discontented with itself and with the government upon which it depended for safety and importance—the chief cities of the sister presidencies were not exempt from causes for disquietude, though happily such were of insignificant extent and brief duration. Thus, at Madras, although it was generally believed that the troops were perfectly stanch and without the slightest sympathy for the Bengal mutineers, it was known, by some intercepted treasonable correspondence, that a spirit of discontent existed among the Mussulmans there, and it was consequently deemed expedient to bring into the city a strong force of horse artillery, and to patrol the streets of the Black Town with mounted guards of volunteer cavalry. The occasional arrival of disbanded mutineers from the Bengal stations, did not diminish the anxiety inseparable from their presence; but happily, although upon several occasions much consternation and confusion prevailed among the European population, no serious grounds had appeared for disquietude until the

18th of August, when it was reported in the city, that the 8th regiment of Madras light cavalry had mutinied while on the way from Bangalore, to embark at Madras for Calcutta. As the affair occurred not more than twenty-six miles from the former city, and was repeated on a nearer approach, it naturally occasioned intense alarm among the European inhabitants, as well as excitement among the native population. The circumstances were as follows:—The regiment had volunteered for foreign service, and was on its march down from Bangalore for the purpose of embarking at Madras. But on its arrival at Streepormutore, twenty-six miles from Madras, it put forward a claim for the rates of pay, batta, and pension which existed before 1837, and were more favourable to the sepoy than the present rates. Such a claim, put forward at such a moment, was most distressing and perplexing. Nevertheless, some of the officers started by train at once for Madras, to represent the difficulty to the government, which, under the pressure of circumstances, agreed to guarantee the concession of the terms demanded; and the officers returned to Streepormutore, to inform the sepoys that their requests were complied with. The corps then proceeded to Poonamallee, thirteen miles from Madras, and, having halted, declared, "They would march on no terms whatsoever; they would not make war upon their countrymen." Fortunately two guns and some artillerymen had just arrived at Poonamallee. The sowars were speedily deprived of their horses, pistols, &c., and left only with their swords. The corps submitted quietly to being disarmed, and were soon after disbanded.

Upon intelligence of this affair reaching Madras, the volunteers were instantly warned for duty; patrols traversed the thoroughfares of the town by day and night; the government compound, in an incredibly short time, became filled with artillery, and its banqueting-hall with soldiers; mortars were placed on the fort facing the Mussulman quarter of Triplicane, the inhabitants of which were known to be of dubious fidelity, as were those also of Arcot and Vellore; and it was felt that, as the plague-spot had now touched Madras, it would be impossible to predict how far and how fatally it might spread. Fortunately for the city and its inhabitants, the mutiny of the 3rd light cavalry was the beginning and the end of rebellion in Madras.

With regard to the sister presidency of Bombay, all had remained quiet in its capital up to the middle of August; but at some of the military stations on the northern border, the mutinous spirit that raged with devastating effect, and had saturated the earth with European blood throughout Bengal, had crossed the boundaries and infected the army. Thus at Ahmedabad, Deesa, and Punderpore, attempts were made to incite the troops to revolt and

murder their officers; but in the first-named place, the instigators to mischief were seized by the men to whom they applied, and given over to the authorities for condign punishment; and in the other stations, a show of firm resistance on the part of the civil officers, and the total indifference of the troops generally to the arguments of stray incendiaries from the Bengal stations, speedily restored the presidency to its accustomed serenity.

CHAPTER XXVI.

ERRONEOUS IMPRESSIONS IN ENGLAND; LORD ELLENBOROUGH AND THE MUTINIES; DISCUSSIONS IN PARLIAMENT; THE NEWSPAPERS; VERNON SMITH AND LORD CANNING; EUROPEAN OFFICERS WITH THE NATIVE REGIMENTS; THE MISSIONARIES; LEGISLATIVE INDIFFERENCE TO INDIAN AFFAIRS; ALARMING NEWS FROM CALCUTTA; DISPATCH OF TROOPS; LORD ELLENBOROUGH, MR. DISRAELI, AND MR. MANGLES; QUESTION AS TO TRANSIT; INEFFICIENCY OF THE INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE; POLICY OF ANNEXATION DISCUSSED; VIGOROUS ACTION CALLED FOR; SIR COLIN CAMPBELL APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN BENGAL; PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ON INDIAN AFFAIRS; POPULAR DISQUIETUDE; ADDRESS OF THE COMMONS TO HER MAJESTY; FURTHER AUGMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN FORCE; THE ROYAL FAMILY OF OUDE; PETITION OF THE QUEEN-MOTHER AND PRINCES TO THE HOUSE OF LORDS; REJECTED ON A POINT OF FORM; LORD REDESDALE; SIR FITZROY KELLY; APPEAL TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS; THE CAWNPORE MASSACRE DENIED; COMPENSATION; THE INDIAN RELIEF FUND; MUNIFICENT CONTRIBUTIONS; PROROGATION OF PARLIAMENT BY COMMISSION.

IN order to preserve the continuity of the grand historical drama enacting amidst the blood-stained cities of Hindostan, it is now necessary to refer to the effect produced in this country by the arrival of official details of the mutinous outbreak, and to trace the proceedings of her majesty's government, of parliament, and of the court of directors, in reference to a calamity which, although known to exist, was not, for a considerable time, looked upon as more than a mere ebullition of military dissatisfaction, which a resolute application of means already in possession of the authorities at the seat of government in India, would be sufficient to repress, and to prevent a repetition of. In short, the magnitude of the danger to be grappled with was not yet appreciated, or even imagined, by the people of Great Britain, who, secure at home from the attacks of foreign enemies, hesitated to admit the possibility of aggression by any portion of their own fellow-subjects, and least of all, were prepared to doubt the loyalty and attachment of the "mild and gentle Hindoo."

Thus, at the commencement of the sanguinary struggle of 1857, by which India has

been made desolate, and its plains and cities have been saturated with the blood of slaughtered thousands, it was persistently believed that the evil to be dealt with had been confined to the revolt of some half-dozen native regiments in the neighbourhood of Delhi, and about the like number in various distant localities; and it was contended, that as the native army of Bengal was composed of seventy-four infantry and thirty-four cavalry regiments, besides three brigades of horse artillery, and a host of irregular battalions (the whole of which, with the exception of the few corps enumerated, were still relied upon as faithful to their colours), it could only be necessary for the government to show its strength and determination by a moderate accession to the European force already upon the spot, to ensure the defeat and ready submission of the dissatisfied regiments. It was admitted that those regiments, irritated by imaginary indications of meditated insult to the mysteries of their faith, or by the absence of a feeling of union on the part of their European officers, and perhaps, also, tempted by the seductive offers of some emis-

saries of tributary states panting for opportunity to cast off the yoke of English domination, had raised the standard of rebellion in the city of the Mogul, and perpetrated a wanton and unprovoked massacre, and that a few detachments of troops at other places had emulated their example, and participated in their treason: but it was insisted that the affair could only be of transient duration, and certainly that nothing like a struggle for life or death existed, or could possibly exist, between the British government and its native Indian subjects; nor was it doubted for a moment but that the insurgent regiments, without commanders, money, or military stores, would be speedily coerced into submission, or annihilated, and that the authority of England over its Oriental empire would ultimately be established upon a firmer basis than ever. Such were the ideas, and such the anticipations of people in this country in the month of July, 1857. The rivers of blood that were to be waded through, the fields of carnage that were to be traversed, before such consummation could be arrived at, were happily yet hidden by the mists of distance and the veil of futurity. But the mistake has since been evidenced through the length and breadth of British India, and of many of the dependent states around its borders.

It must, however, be observed, that up to this time, the *prestige* of British ascendancy in the East had not been dimmed by reverses, and that for upwards of a century, its career, whether aggressive or otherwise, had been almost uninterruptedly triumphant. It was not thought possible that the native troops of India, trained by English officers, and paid, clothed, and fed by the English government, with present advantages and prospective benefits that elevated them in social position above all others of their class and *caste* that were not in the service of the state, would madly throw away the advantages they enjoyed for the sake of a motiveless rebellion; for the idea of their seeking to re-establish an independent Mogul empire upon the ruins of that of England in Hindostan, did not yet enter the most romantic imagination. Neither the Madras or Bombay army had given occasion to suspect their fidelity. The epidemic had not yet spread beyond Bengal, and it was not known or suspected that the insurgent regiments had any leader, or that they had concerted any

common plan of action with the native princes around the English borders. The non-military population of Bengal was also believed to have taken no part in the outbreak, and to have exhibited no sympathy with the mutineers; and upon consideration of the whole circumstances, it was agreed at home, that, taking into account the friendly disposition of the semi-independent native states, the gigantic scale upon which British authority in India had been established and sustained, the undisputed loyalty of the people, and the often-proved attachment of the vastly superior numerical proportion of the sepoys to the flag under which they had been so often led to victory, there could be no fear as to the result; or that the rebellious temerity of a few treacherous battalions could shake the solid groundwork of our Oriental rule. The outbreak was admitted to be a subject for serious consideration; but that any difficulty could arise in disposing of it satisfactorily when England should in earnest put forth her hand to arrest the progress of the evil, was a contingency not thought of for a moment.

We have traced, in the preceding chapters of this work, some of the earlier incidents connected with this gigantic upheaving of the races and powers of India against their English rulers in various districts, embracing, also, as well the loss as the recovery of Cawnpore and of Delhi, with their attendant horrors; and shall now proceed to narrate the progress of events associated with the mutiny in India, as they arose in this country during the months of June, July, and August, 1857.

The fact of mutinies having broken out among the sepoy regiments at Barrackpore, Meerut, and other stations, had been reported to the directors of the East India Company, by Lord Canning, as they occurred in order of time; and after the catastrophes at Meerut and Delhi, his lordship urged upon the attention of the court, the necessity that became every day more apparent for a large and immediate addition to the strength of the European force in Bengal.* On the 10th of June, the Earl of Ellenborough, in the House of Lords, called the attention of their lordships to the lamentable details that had then been received of the disturbances in India, and expressed his opinion, that there must have been some strange misrepresen-

* See *ante*, p. 156.

tations and suppressions in the accounts that had reached this country in reference to the outbreak. His lordship proceeded to say, that "he had looked most carefully into all the statements laid before the house as to the mutinies in the Bengal territory, and from them could come to no other conclusion, than that the source of the discontent and mutiny was the apprehension that there was a design on the part of the government to interfere with the religion of the natives." His lordship then examined the proceedings of the Indian government for removing the erroneous impression; and, after eulogising General Hearsey for his address to the men of the 19th regiment, when disbanded at Barrackpore on the 31st of March (in which the general disclaimed, on the part of the government, any intention to interfere with their *caste* or religion),* he proceeded to comment on the conduct of the governor-general in the following terms:—"And what should the course of the governor-general have been? Ought he not, with his own hand, in three sentences, to have communicated to the whole country his cordial concurrence with everything which General Hearsey had said; and should he not have made his concurrence with that speech as public as the speech itself was necessarily made throughout the country? I am convinced, that if the governor-general had pursued that course we should have heard no more of the incendiary fires, nor of the open mutiny at Meerut. But that course was not taken; and although I absolve the government of India, as a government, from any intention to interfere with the religion of the natives, I must say that there have been of late—and daily increasing of late—circumstances which were calculated to excite in the minds of the natives great apprehension upon that subject. I saw, in a newspaper which I read yesterday, the names of six or eight colonels, and of important persons in the civil administration of the country, high in office, mentioned as being connected with missionary operations; and to my great astonishment—I can scarcely believe it now to be true, though I saw it distinctly stated in the papers—that the governor-general himself (Lord Canning) largely subscribes to every society which has for its object the conversion of the natives. My lords, the governor-general of India

can do nothing in his individual capacity. He cannot separate himself from his public character as governor-general. He is essentially the government of the country. No one looks to anybody else. There may be others who think that they are of importance; but they are not. The only man looked to in India is the governor-general. It is not in India alone, but more particularly in India, that it is generally understood that if a man at the head of the government earnestly desires anything, it is his intention to enforce his desire, and to effect his purpose. I deem that fact of these subscriptions of Lord Canning, the governor-general of India, to societies having for their object the conversion of the natives (if it be true), to be one of the most dangerous things which could have happened to the security of our government in India. You may depend upon it, that if persons holding high office in the government of India, and above all, at the head of the government, are permitted to act on this principle, and to indulge their own personal feelings—I do not doubt but they may be acting from conscientious motives—for the purpose of changing the religion of the people, you will see the most bloody revolution which has at any time occurred in India. The English will be expelled from India; and, expelled from that country, they will not leave behind them a dozen sincere converts to Christianity. The question which I wish to put to the noble earl opposite is, whether instructions have been sent, or will forthwith be sent, to India, directing the different governments to make known at every station of the army throughout the country, that the government will for the future, as in times past, protect all its subjects in the undisturbed exercise of their religion?"

In reply to the question, Earl Granville stated the opinion of government to be, that Lord Canning had acted with admirable judgment in abstaining from making any such notification as that suggested by the Earl of Ellenborough. His lordship expressed his astonishment at the attack made upon the governor-general by the noble earl, in the remarks he had made upon an imaginary sacrifice of the important interests of the country, by alleged attempts to proselytise the natives of India; and declared his belief, that although Lord Canning was, as an individual, sincerely religious, there was no one more likely to act

* See *ante*, p. 49.

with judgment in every respect, on such a subject as the faith of a whole people, than the governor-general. His lordship proceeded:—"I do not know whether he has subscribed to any missionary society, or under what circumstances such subscription may have been made; but I know that he has had to deplore rumours which have been circulated, of the most unfounded and ridiculous character, and which will gain some strength by the attack made upon him by a person of the eminence of the noble earl (Ellenborough.) As a personal friend of Lord Canning, I rejoice that, from what I hear, the whole community of Calcutta has been struck by the judgment, firmness, and courage which he has shown in dealing with the beginning of these mutinous proceedings. I have no hesitation in saying, that the course taken by Lord Canning has been more judicious than that pointed out by the noble earl. The notification, had it been issued when the mutiny was threatened, would have appeared as an acknowledgment of a change in the policy of the government; whereas, it ought to be as patent as possible, that it is, always has been, and always will continue to be, the policy of the government, to afford the greatest possible protection to the natives in the exercise of their religious rites. The government, therefore, approve his not having issued any such notification, and no instructions have been sent to India of the kind suggested by the noble earl."

After some observations from the Earl of Malmesbury and the Marquis of Lansdowne, upon the importance of the question replied to, and the utter groundlessness of any assumption of a disposition on the part of Lord Canning to interfere with the religion of the races of India, the Earl of Ellenborough declared himself satisfied with the disclaimer of Lord Canning's friends; but said, that "if it had been the fact, as he understood it to be, that the governor-general had subscribed to any societies having for their object the conversion of the natives, he ought to be immediately removed from the office he held, and thus all danger that might otherwise arise from his misconduct would be obviated."

* That the court of directors were not ignorant of the prejudicial effect of the system by which regimental officers were taken from their proper sphere of duty to perform the functions of civil magistrates, collectors, superintendents, &c., &c. is clear, from the fact that, on the 5th of April, 1856, the governor-

The discussion so commenced in the House of Lords by the Earl of Ellenborough, furnished occasion for much comment both in and out of parliament. Day after day the public journals teemed with reports of wholesale massacres and frightful sufferings, inflicted upon defenceless women and children; while extracts from private correspondence filled their columns with piteous details of strange and overwhelming calamities, from which neither age, sex, or station was exempt, until at length the popular mind became imbued with a sense of accumulating but yet undefined evil, the more portentous because distant; and because, also, an accurate knowledge of facts could only be obtained at uncertain intervals, and long after the rumoured calamity had been consummated. Many of the accounts describing the progress of the revolt, as furnished by the Indian journals at this time, were confused and disjointed, and sometimes were contradictory; but, as time elapsed, there came enough of positive information to render it too certain that a terrible catastrophe had fallen upon British society in India; that whole regiments had risen in revolt; that European officers, with their wives and children, had been put to death under circumstances of unparalleled barbarity; that the mutinous sepoys had taken possession of Delhi, the imperial city of the Mogul, and had proclaimed the pensioned and titular king of Delhi emperor of Hindostan.

The state of the army in India, and especially of that branch immediately connected with the presidency of Bengal, naturally, under such circumstances, became a subject of interest, and attracted much attention. On the 11th of June, Mr. Rich (member for Southampton) inquired "if any measures had been taken since the passing of the act of 16th and 17th Vic., cap. 95, for increasing the number of European officers in the sepoy regiments; for checking the drain of officers to civil employments; and for otherwise securing the constant presence with their regiments of a greater number of officers than at the time of passing that act appeared to be the practice of the Indian army?*"—also, whether any measures

general in council reported to the court of directors that the pressure of officers for detached employment had become so great, that it was necessary to take measures to supply the existing vacancies of ensigns, as well as to appoint supernumerary cadets. "In some regiments," it was stated, "there are seven,

had been taken for raising the general condition of the native officers, and for opening promotion to them at a shorter term than the twenty or thirty years of previous service, by which only it was then to be obtained? Upon this occasion, the president of the Board of Control (Mr. Vernon Smith) stated, that with respect to the drain for civil employment, the directors *then* had under their consideration a plan for obviating the inconveniences that had been found to arise from the prevailing system, by declaring that officers in the Queen's regiments were to be considered competent to obtain staff employment; and, as a consequence, the number of Company's officers now required for that purpose would be diminished. He was not aware that any measures had been taken with a view to raise the general condition of native officers; nor did he know that any complaints had been made on the subject: and nothing had been done in reference to opening promotion to the rank of native officers, at a shorter period than the ordinary terms of twenty or thirty years. He observed, that as the question might have

and in some more than seven, officers per regiment on staff and detached employ." In the following September the directors, in answer to the governor-general, stated, that "the difficulties which our several governments, and especially those of Bengal and Bombay, have experienced in providing officers for staff and other detached employments, and at the same time in maintaining regimental efficiency, have been long a source of anxiety to us." They then intimated their intention of sending supernumerary cadets; but added—"We need hardly say, the appointment of one or more officers to the rank of ensign, in addition to those at present on the establishment of a regiment of native infantry, would not be the remedy required to meet effectually the present exigencies of the Indian army." And they then quoted the following opinion of Sir C. Napier, expressed ten years before:—"The court of directors may rest assured that neither the native officers nor the sepoy look with either respect or affection on a set of European officers who, as far as I can observe, scarcely speak to, much less mix with and study the character of, the native officers." The truth is, the practice of drawing away the best, the cleverest, and the most hard-working officers for staff and other departments, and leaving the actual command to the young, the ignorant, and the idle, seems to have been carried to the very extreme of imprudence, and the evil was apparent in every quarter. The European regimental officers were young—mostly ignorant of the language of the men they commanded; and from their supercilious refusal to mix with the natives, they were of course slow to acquire any colloquial proficiency. Thus the sepoy regiments were, in reality, officered by men of their own race and religion, who taught the young gentlemen from England the routine of duty. The

been founded upon the unfortunate occurrences which had recently taken place in India, it might be desirable that he (Mr. Vernon Smith) should state, that "those occurrences were in no way to be attributed to the absence of the officers from their regiments;" and he expressed a hope that the public would be under no alarm upon that subject, as, owing to the promptitude and vigour which had been displayed by his noble friend Lord Canning, and the excellent demonstrations which had been made upon the occasion of the disbandment of the 19th regiment by General Hearsey, "the late disaffection among the troops in India had completely been put an end to."

Never was man more mistaken!—never did a servant of the crown, exercising high responsible functions, betray grosser ignorance of facts that it was his special province to deal with. It was patent to the world, that the regimental duties of European officers attached to native corps, were neglected for the advantages and emoluments of civil and staff employment;* that through absence from regimental duty, and

latter learned to look upon service with their regiments as a vexation, and, after a time, as a humiliation. Every one who was anybody was draughted away to something else, and of course it was both onerous and mortifying to remain. When seven or more of the senior officers are away, getting higher pay, and with the prospect of indefinite advancement, it cannot be wondered at that the regimental service should be demoralised, and that the Hindoos should discover the fact.

* The pernicious system by which the troops in India have been deprived of their best officers, is thus illustrated by the Calcutta correspondent of the *Times*, July 15th, 1857:—"For the past twenty years the course of events has compelled the government of India to deprive the Bengal army of its most energetic and most able officers. Every ten years has added a new kingdom. Every new kingdom has, and must have, an administrative service. That service must be cheap and efficient. It must also be composed of men ready-made—of men who, at least, understand the native language and native character. Such men can be found only in the army; and every man who can talk readily in the vernacular—who has an appetite for native traditions—who has a tendency to rate natives at their fair value—who is, in short, competent to govern, is drawn away for civil employ. The brain of the regiment thus abstracted, it remains to steal its muscles. The youngster who can ride, hunt, swim, wrestle, and fight; the boy who pursues tigers on foot; the man who can quell a row by a rough jest—the very men to attract and govern the childlike sepoy—are 'appointed to the irregulars.' What is left to the line regiment? We will not say 'the refuse,' but, at all events, half-a-dozen thoroughly disheartened men. They have lost their chance.

an unwarrantable and offensive assumption of personal superiority, a wide and daily-increasing chasm yawned between the European and native officers of the same regiments; that the former, influenced by an idea of European importance, had of late years kept their Indian colleagues and brother officers at an irritating distance, and affected to tolerate rather than encourage even necessary professional intercourse with them. But while indulging this blind assumption of superiority, they neglected to seek, or to cultivate, other influences over the men than such as might arise from a mere mechanical obedience to the requirements of military command. The soldiery of Hindostan, containing, as it did at the time, a vast portion of the more irregular and excitable elements of the native population, required to be ruled with a firm but gentle hand by their European officers; and, therefore, so much the more necessary was it that the latter should be ever near to, and capable of understanding the language, the habits, the prejudices of their men—to occupy their minds, and to engage their affections. To the neglect of these paramount duties may fairly be attributed, to a great extent, the irritable state of feeling in the Bengal army, which at length exploded in revolt and massacre, and in which European officers were among the first victims. But of this obvious fact the president of the Board of Control had apparently suffered himself to remain profoundly ignorant. Nor does it appear that his colleagues in office were better informed than himself upon a subject so vitally affecting the interests of the whole native army of Bengal; although, to persons unconnected

with government, and whose views of Indian affairs were unobscured by the mists of official ignorance and prejudice, the magnitude of the evil was apparent, and the necessity for reform in the system by which the European element in the native army was managed, admitted of no question.

On the same day, Mr. Kinnaird, M.P. for Perth, upon the presentation of a petition from certain missionaries in Bengal, called the attention of the House of Commons to the administration of the government of India, more especially as it referred to the lower provinces of Bengal, which, said the honourable member, “comprised an area of 290,000 square miles, and sustained a population of from forty to forty-five millions of people.” These provinces, he observed, had been for more than three-quarters of a century under the dominion of England; and, having been her first possessions, there she had committed the greatest errors in her government. He then referred to the system of land tenure, established by Lord Cornwallis in 1792, as being a source of boundless misery. This system, known by the name of the “permanent settlement,” and the “zemindaree system,” was good in theory, and, if honestly carried out, might have been beneficial to the people; but, in practice, all those provisions in it calculated to protect the poor, had been systematically lost sight of. If (said he) they compared the state of the lower provinces with the North-West Provinces, which had more recently come under their sway, they would see in the latter the beneficial results of good government, and in the former the evils of grinding oppres-

Promotion comes slowly and without work. At forty, sepoy-talk becomes tiresome. There is the billiard-table. ‘Jack’ is voted a bore, and the officer either sinks into the useless, self-indulgent ‘*Qui hye*,’ or more frequently disencumbers himself of Orientalism altogether, and lives on, a grumbling Englishman in a foreign land. There are better specimens, of course, else had the system already broken down; but with the multiplication of new departments, and the opening up of new careers, they are becoming few. Moreover, as if it were not enough to draw off the best soldiers from these regiments, the government is compelled, just when they have become unfit for active life, to send them back to regimental commands. A colonel who has been teaching the ‘black classics’ for thirty years, commands one regiment. An officer, who cannot ride, and never saw even a review, is placed at the head of another. Half the regiments in Bengal are commanded by men whose lives have been spent, and well spent, in the *bureau*. Nor is this all. As if to

destroy the last relic of *esprit de corps*, or soldierlike pride, the regiments are turned into penal settlements. Any unlucky staff-officer, who commits a fault, or who is too stupid, or too slow, or too careless, or too ignorant for staff work, is ‘remanded’ to his regiment. The other day a native revenue-officer in Pegu bolted. His superior, a very able collector, was immediately remanded to his regiment, and all India murmured at the severity of the sentence. Imagine the guards turned into a penal settlement for commissioners of excise! What wonder that a regiment, commanded by an old tax-gatherer, aided by a couple of discontented captains, and five or six boys hungering for civil employ, should lose confidence in its officers? As we said before, it is loss of confidence that constitutes the present danger. The sepoy has always believed lies. He was just as credulous in the time of Clive; but he has until now always had confidence in his immediate superiors, has always been able to gain access easily to men whom he knew would not deceive him.”

sion. In eight years Lord Dalhousie, in the Punjab, which came into their possession in 1848, created a system of government said to be free from all the defects developed in the older provinces, and, with due allowance for the weakness of the native character, a perfect model of excellence. But in Bengal their institutions were pronounced a failure; and some who knew the country felt that they were on the eve of a crisis; for not only were things bad, but in very important respects they were growing worse. Let the house just consider that the Europeans, who were the governing class in India, were but a handful compared with the natives (less than 100,000, against 150,000,000), and they would at once perceive that their power rested on *prestige*. Destroy that *prestige* by any violent shock, and their power was gone. The house would agree with him, that a government that did its duty should at least secure to the subjects of the government these four things:—1, the administration of justice; 2, security to life and property; 3, protection to all classes, poor as well as rich; 4, and lastly, exemption from excessive taxation. It became, therefore, his duty, in submitting these resolutions to the house, to give them such information as was within his power on these several points; and if he succeeded in showing that on all these points our administration had been radically and grievously defective, he must believe that they would take some effectual steps to secure for these their fellow-subjects those rights to which they were as much entitled as themselves. The honourable gentleman then proceeded to quote public documents, to show that the condition of the people of India had not been made the subject of parliamentary inquiry; that the real state of the case was known only to a few civil servants, who had for many years done nothing to remedy it, and who were utterly unable to explain their neglect. The same evidence proved, that in Bengal an amount of suffering and debasement existed which probably was not equalled, and certainly not exceeded, in the slave-states of America. The laws were oppressively severe, enabling the zemindar or landlord at any time to sell up and ruin the unfortunate tenant; while, by the arts of bribery and intrigue, the zemindars acquired an influence in the courts of justice which practically precluded all hope of redress for the unhappy ryots. For a few shillings any number of

false witnesses could easily be procured, and the police always took the strongest side. The zemindars were also in the habit of treating their ryots not as their tenants, but their servants: they set themselves up as petty kings, and exacted tribute from the poor cultivator every time a birth, marriage, or death occurred in his family. Not only did the zemindaree system grind the ryots to the dust, but it operated as one of the most powerful obstacles to the spread of Christianity in India. The honourable member next referred to a petition presented to the governor-general in council, in which it was alleged, that the cruelties and extortions practised under the police arrangements, and the maladministration of justice, had engendered among the rural population a wide-spread discontent, and a daily-increasing disaffection towards their rulers. In the lower provinces of Bengal (continued the honourable gentleman), thousands of square miles are inhabited by millions of people who enjoy neither justice nor protection. The magistrate's court was often sixty miles distant from certain districts; and so wide was one man's jurisdiction, that a judge had sometimes to go 140 miles to try a case of murder. It occasionally happened that a native population of 2,000,000 were governed by two solitary Europeans; and this, too, it must be remembered, in a country without roads. He (Mr. Kinnaid) had in his possession a copy of a document which had been moved for, but had not been laid on the table. Though it had not been produced, it had been at the India-house for the last month. It came from Mr. Halliday, a great authority in India; and throughout the whole of Bengal, according to the evidence of Mr. Halliday, the strong preyed almost universally upon the weak. The native police, from not being closely and vigorously superintended, were a scourge instead of an advantage to the country. The village police were inadequately and uncertainly paid, and kept in a permanent state of starvation. By the evidence of another Indian official, the police were no worse than the rest of the population. But the truth was, they were even worse than the people whose lives and property they had been appointed to protect. The police committed one-fourth more murders and robberies than the rest of the population. What would be our thoughts if such a state of things existed in England? The right honourable gentleman (Mr. V.

Smith) might, in opposing this motion, rely a good deal on the evidence of Mr. Grant; but that gentleman knew very little of the interior of Bengal, whereas he (Mr. Kinnaid) had mentioned positive facts. He thought the house must be convinced, from the statements he had brought before them, that the whole subject demanded a thorough investigation; not an investigation that was to stop any measure now in progress for the amelioration of these evils; not an investigation which was to array class against class, and promote discord; but a calm, patient investigation such as English gentlemen were capable of making, and the result of which ought to be submitted to that house. If he was asked what object would be attained by inquiry into facts which were admitted to a great extent, to say the least, by the authorities in Bengal, he would say there were three objects. Firstly, it would put all men who cared to know, in possession of the facts which some men, only, now knew. Did the governor-general himself know them? Did that house know them? He was tempted to ask, did the court of directors themselves know them? Secondly, it would put the stamp of the government authority on the authenticity of the facts, so that it would be impossible to have official denials of those facts from interested parties either in India or at home. Thirdly, and lastly, the knowledge of the publicity given to the existence of the evils must, in the nature of things, quicken the activity both of the legislative council of India and of the lieutenant-governor of Bengal, to devise and to push forward measures of fundamental reform; so that they should have no more obstructions put in the way of such measures as the one lately introduced into the legislative council by Mr. Grant on the sale of land for arrears, as he understood from a letter he had received from Calcutta, was now the case. And, to refer to another most important subject, they would perhaps cease to hear of such a fact as this—that when the Indian authorities were themselves desirous of putting down the cruel swinging festivals in Bengal, as had been done in Madras and Bombay, they had been prevented doing so by a despatch from the court of directors at home! He considered that the present government of India was on its trial. Four years had passed away since it had assumed its present form, and nothing to alleviate these evils had been done for Bengal, whatever

had been talked about. The North-West Provinces might be enjoying a good system of government. The Punjab, thanks to that distinguished nobleman who had so ably presided for many years over the government of India, might be under a still more perfect system; but what was this to the 35,000,000 of Bengal? It was for them he pleaded. He fully recognised the importance of many things which had been done, such as—1, abolishing the government connection with idolatry; 2, destroying sutteeism; 3, infanticide; 4, thuggism; 5, human sacrifices; 6, introducing a system of education for the people; and, 7, more recently, legally recognising the marriage of widows. But again he said, this did not alter the fact of the miserable social condition of the inhabitants of Bengal. The honourable gentleman concluded by moving the following resolutions:—"That, from representations made to this house, there is reason to believe that the present administration of the lower provinces of Bengal does not secure to the population the advantages of good government; but that the mass of the people suffer grievous oppression from the police, and the want of proper administration of justice: that, in the opinion of this house, it is desirable that her majesty's government should take immediate steps with a view to the institution of special inquiries into the social condition of the people; and to ascertain what measures have been adopted in consequence of the oppression under which a large proportion of the inhabitants of the lower provinces are now said to be suffering, more especially with reference to the system of landed tenures, the state of the police, and the administration of justice; and also that such report be laid upon the table of the house."

The indifference with which the affairs of India were regarded, even at this time, by the imperial parliament, may be conceived by the fact, that upon the honourable member resuming his seat, it was moved that the house be counted; but as there happened to be actually more than forty members present, out of the 654 composing the House of Commons, the subject was resumed. Mr. Vernon Smith expressed his concurrence in the opinion of the mover of the resolutions, that it was desirable for the house to interfere occasionally in the affairs of India, and to exhibit some tokens of sympathy with the natives; but he contended that the resolutions before the house

were not of such a practical character as to call for attention. He combated the views of the honourable mover, and deprecated any attempt to disturb the existing state of government in India. The resolutions were also objected to by Lord John Russell, by Sir Edward Perry, and by Mr. Mangles (chairman of the court of directors.) The latter honourable member said—He entertained the most unaffected respect for the whole body of missionaries in India, and especially for some of those gentlemen who had signed the petition, among whom was the Rev. Dr. Duff, a clergyman of the greatest worth, and whose opinions were well entitled to consideration; but, at the same time, he must say he thought they had acted with singular want of judgment in this matter. He would tell the house why he entertained this opinion. He believed that, for very many years to come, the greatest difficulty of the Indian government would be to hold the balance evenly, and secure the safety of all classes, while the great experiment of converting the people to Christianity was in progress. He had no doubt whatever in his own mind, that Providence had been pleased to place the magnificent empire of India in our hands, in order that, in due time, we might be the instruments of converting the inhabitants to Christianity. The Hindoo religion was a most tolerant religion, and the people always entertained a real respect for any one whom they believed to be a devout man, whatever creed he might profess, and who preached to them the love of truth. As long as missionaries were content to do that alone, and to remain unconnected in any way with the government, they would always have a fair field open for their labours; but he deeply regretted, both for the sake of the missionaries themselves and the cause which they advocated, that they had placed themselves in the position of having taken up a political line. The unhappy spirit of disaffection which had manifested itself in certain regiments was, no doubt, based upon an ill-founded opinion, that the government had some intention of interfering with their religion; and no time could have been worse chosen for the missionaries to have taken the step which they had taken. Bengal, which was perhaps the oldest British possession in India, was, as regarded the affairs of internal administration, in a very bad condition, and the East India Company would spare no pains or

expense to remedy the present defects of the system. It was necessary, however, to consider the causes which had led to such a state of things. The first cause was the rashness with which Lord Cornwallis, in spite of the remonstrances of Sir J. Shore, made a permanent settlement, and handed over the ryots to the zemindars without any adequate protection: another cause was the long tyranny under which Bengal had groaned for a century, and under which all village institutions had fallen into disuse; and the third cause was the complicated judicial system which had been introduced by Lord Cornwallis. He was perfectly ready to support the statement, that the inhabitants of Bengal were an extremely timid people, and that their want of energy was so great, that it was very difficult to provide for them any institutions likely to prove of advantage to them, inasmuch as they had not the spirit necessary to maintain their own rights. Mr. Marshman, who knew Bengal well, represented the task of endeavouring to deal with the people of that province as only to be compared to carving in rotten wood; while Mr. Macaulay described the Bengalee as being devoid of courage, and his physical organisation as feeble and effeminate. There were very few Bengalees in the Indian army; and, indeed, the general impression was, that one might as well enlist a monkey as a Bengalee for a soldier. Such, then, was the material upon which the government of Bengal had to work; and he should appeal to the candour of that house to say, whether the task of providing a good government for such a people was not one in which great difficulty was involved. He had that very day been in communication with a gentleman who had acted in the capacity of secretary to Lord Hardinge in the Punjab, and he had been told by that gentleman, that when our troops were approaching the Sutlej, and a battle was expected, the whole of the clerks in the offices under the commander-in-chief, who were Bengalees, had signed a round-robin, requesting permission to retire to the rear of the army. The letter conveying that request commenced thus:—"It is well known, your excellency's lordship, that we, the Bengalees, are a cowardly people." Now, he supposed, that since the beginning of the world, no class of men, with the exception of that to which he alluded, had placed upon record such a statement with

respect to itself. Let him not, however, in making these remarks, be misunderstood. Notwithstanding the want of energy by which the Bengalees were characterised, it was our duty to give them the best government in our power. But he did not look upon it only in the light of a duty; he regarded it as a pleasure to provide for them the best scheme for the administration of justice, as well as the best system of police which it was possible to devise. That object the court of directors had in some measure endeavoured to effect; and he would answer for it, that the court of directors would do, and were doing, all that they could to reform the existing evils; and that when the railroads and other great measures came into operation, the progress of India would be a marvel to the world, and something without example in history.—Lord Bury thought that the recent mutinies were in some degree referable to the withdrawal of European officers from native regiments to perform civil functions. Even when these regiments had their full complement of officers, there were only one colonel, one major, seven captains, eleven lieutenants, and five ensigns, to a regiment of 1,000 men. There being only seven captains, five lieutenants were charged with the duties of captains, leaving only six lieutenants and five ensigns, or half a lieutenant and half an ensign per company, to do regimental duty. From these numbers of officers must be deducted those who were employed in civil duties, and those who were on sick leave, or on furlough. He had not mentioned the native officers, because he did not think they were of much value. They were promoted from the ranks by seniority; and, being frequently sixty or seventy years of age, were of about as much use as a superannuated Chelsea pensioner would be in a regiment of the line. It was true that in the Bombay army this state of things had been altered, and the native officers were now not appointed entirely by seniority.—Mr. A. Mills hoped that the honourable member would be satisfied with this discussion, and would not press his motion to a division. He quoted a minute of Lord Canning, on the 6th of October, 1856, in reference to a similar application on the part of the missionaries, and said his lordship upon the occasion wrote as follows:—"A wide and vague field of inquiry, inviting discussion and difference upon such subjects

as rent, wages, fixity of tenure, and the relations of poor and rich; class made to testify openly against class; the weaker remanded, when their task is done, to the vindictiveness of the stronger, against which no interposition could effectually protect them; wild and extravagant expectations of immediate advantage raised in the minds of a whole people only to be disappointed; the examination of the share which the memorialists had in causing the social evils which they deplore, and the investigation of those delicate and dangerous questions confided to persons whose responsibility would cease with the inquiry. With every sincere respect and admiration for the character of the body from which this memorial proceeds, I cannot think that the advice which they have tendered to the government of India is, in this instance, well judged, or that to adopt it would advance the end at which we all aim—the moral and social improvement of the Indian people."

After the expression of opinion thus elicited, Mr. Kinnaird declared his intention not to divide the house upon his motion; a course which was deprecated by Mr. Hadfield, who said, the debate had taken a very extraordinary turn. The honourable gentleman (Mr. Kinnaird) had taken upon himself to say that the motion ought not to be pressed, without having had the slightest consultation with those honourable members who had been attending the debate all night, and who supported him in that critical moment when, but for their presence, the house would have been counted out. The president of the Board of Control had said that he felt no surprise at the thinness of the house during this discussion; but did not the right honourable gentleman recollect, that when his predecessor addressed the house three years ago, for two hours, with respect to the finances of India, there were no more than fourteen members to listen to his statement. But how happened it that, on the present occasion, the house was so thin? Where were those honourable and valuable servants of her majesty, the whips of the house? What were they doing? He asked that question in the presence of her majesty's government. Were they not employed in thinning the house? Was it not a fact that they were at the door keeping members out? Except the right honourable gentleman the president of the Board of Control, there was not a member of the government on the minis-

terial bench, and even he walked out of the house.—Mr. V. Smith: That is not the fact.—Mr. Hadfield: An honourable gentleman said he saw him walk out; but after the right honourable gentleman's denial, of course he (Mr. Hadfield) could say no more: and now he begged to recall the attention of the house to the great seriousness of the question which was under consideration, being no less than that of the administration of justice in a country containing a sixth of the entire population of the world. It had not been, and could not be denied, that the people of India had been most unjustly treated by their rulers. All that the president of the Board of Control and the honourable member for Guildford had said, amounted to nothing more than a plea of guilty. He should insist on a division being taken on the motion. The time for mere inquiry had passed; and now was the time for the house to insist on justice being done to the down-trodden people of India, who were the worst governed nation on earth. Fifty-five Christian missionaries, of all denominations, concurred in describing the manner in which the people of India were governed to be so barbarous and corrupt, that the people's minds had become slaves to the most appalling fatalism. They cared for nothing but a mere miserable subsistence, and looked upon moral and social improvement as not destined for them. The opinion of the house in reference to these statements ought to be placed on record, and he should therefore object to the motion being withdrawn without a division.—Mr. Liddell thought it would be unwise, looking to the impression which the vote might produce in India, to press for a division; and the previous question having been moved and carried, the motion fell to the ground.

At length the time for action had arrived. On Saturday, the 27th of June, 1857, a telegram reached Leadenhall-street, that rudely awakened the sleeping responsibilities of the court of directors, by whom an extraordinary special meeting was immediately held, the result of its deliberation being, on the same evening, submitted to the president of the Board of Control, for the information of her majesty's government. A cabinet council was at once assembled; but before its results had trans-

pired, the Calcutta mail of the 19th of May had also arrived, and the massacres of Meerut and of Delhi, although but hurriedly and imperfectly described, spread feelings of horror and apprehension through the country. As a first step on the part of the court of directors, it was resolved to apply to the government for a reinforcement to the European troops in India, to the extent of four regiments; and all officers belonging to the Company's service below the rank of regimental colouel, who were at home on furlough, were ordered to return immediately to India, and rejoin their respective corps—a measure which had the effect of restoring to their proper sphere of duty not less than 750 European officers.* On the part of the government, an order from the war-office directed the immediate embarkation of about 3,000 non-commissioned officers and men of the provisional battalion at Chatham, for the purpose of joining the service companies of their respective regiments in India, and no women or children were to be permitted to accompany them. The first detachment of this force, consisting of 220 men of the 35th regiment, and 124 of the rifle brigade, were embarked in the *Bucephalus* and *Barham*, at Gravesend, on Wednesday, the 1st of July, within five days of the receipt of the governor-general's despatch, calling for reinforcements. These drafts were followed, in rapid succession throughout July and August, by other detachments and regiments, until, by the end of the latter month, the total number of troops on their way to the scene of war amounted to 31,274 men.

Both houses of parliament had now begun to take great interest in the affairs of India. On Monday, the 29th of June, the Earl of Ellenborough descanted at much length upon the disastrous news that had arrived on the preceding Saturday, announcing the outbreak and murders at Meerut, and the fall of Delhi and its attendant massacres, and that, from Calcutta to Lahore, the troops of the Bengal presidency were in open and undisguised revolt; and he severely censured the government in India for the neglect of warning that had led to such deplorable consequences. "From all I have learnt," said the noble lord, "I believe the measures which have been taken by the government

* The *Overland Mail*, referring to this order, says—"We are happy to be able to state, that the court of directors of the East India Company, have determined, with characteristic liberality, to pay the

passage-money of all officers, either in their own or the Queen's service, ordered back to India to join their regiments."—The liberality, in this case, was secondary to the necessity that compelled it.

of India, from the moment they heard of the occupation of Delhi, have been prompt and judicious. I have no fault to find with their conduct since that period; but I do find fault with them for having been blind to that which ought to have been obvious to all, and for having taken no precautions before this dreadful calamity took place." His lordship then commented upon the conduct of the commander-in-chief, General Anson, in reference to the outbreak at Meerut; and said—"Where was the commander-in-chief upon that occasion? Why was he not in the midst of his troops? He must have been aware of all the difficulties which were growing up. He must have known the danger by which he was beset. He did know that those dangers existed; for on the 9th of April he assembled the troops at Umballah, and addressed them in the most sensible terms, endeavouring to undeceive them, and to bring about among them a right feeling. He, however, then went to the hills, leaving the dangers to which I refer, behind him in the plain. Such is not the conduct which a man occupying the position of commander-in-chief ought to have pursued. * * * The government have now drawn troops to Bengal, as it seems to me very properly; but, in doing so, they have left both Madras and Bombay almost defenceless. We know not the danger to which such a state of things may give rise. In short, my lords, we are, and I trust her majesty's ministers are, alive to the full extent of the danger. We are really in a position in which it becomes necessary for us to use every effort which this country can make to maintain—perhaps it may be to *recover*—that great empire which we have acquired in the East." His lordship then asked if, with India in danger under such circumstances, ministers were to be suffered to persist in carrying out their policy in China, and engaging the country in two wars at the same moment? He also desired to know the course government would adopt to reinforce the army in India. To this inquiry Earl Granville replied, that before the arrival of the recent news, 10,000 men, consisting of four fresh regiments, and reinforcements for regiments already serving in India, had been placed under orders for embarkation; and since that news had arrived, four regiments had received the same orders; making, in all, about 14,000 men. With regard to the position of affairs in India, the govern-

ment had every reason to be satisfied with the energy and determination displayed by the lieutenant-governors of the districts in which attempts at mutiny had occurred; while, from the governor-general himself, "letters had been received, in which, while discussing the events which had taken place with all due gravity, he spoke so cheerfully of the ultimate result, as to inspire the government with the greatest confidence."

On the same evening, in the House of Commons, Mr. Disraeli called attention to the subject of the revolt among the native troops. He desired information as to the causes of the outbreak, and whether the civil and military authorities in India were not at issue. The right honourable member avowed his confidence that the house and the people would fully support the sovereign and her ministers in all measures necessary to the preservation of that great empire, which he looked upon as "the chief source of our wealth and power!" No one could be insensible to the extreme peril to which British authority was then exposed in India, although he believed that the tenure by which we held that country was not a frail one. Everything, however, he said, is possible where there is a negligent or incompetent government; and it was desirable to know if the governor-general had resigned. He thought the house had a right to expect from her majesty's government that they should tell the house the cause of these great disasters; and not only what was the cause of them, but whether they had been forewarned; whether the cause was political or religious; whether they originated in the maladministration of officials, or in a sudden outbreak of fanaticism; and, lastly, whether the governor-general had resigned his high office.—Mr. Vernon Smith, in reply, hoped the house would not be led away by the notion that our Indian empire was in danger. He denied that that empire was imperilled by the present disaster, and hoped that, in a very short time, the revolt would be completely suppressed by the military force already in the country, to which, however, an augmentation of about 14,000 men was about to be sent out. As to the cause of the dissatisfaction, he had some difficulty in affording an explanation; but the question would undergo the closest investigation by the Indian government. One of the causes, perhaps,

was the withdrawal of military officers from the civil service. At any rate, religious feelings had something to do with the matter; but whatever might be the cause of complaint, it would be inquired into by the Indian government. As to any differences between the commander-in-chief and the governor-general, although he was aware of such being bruited abroad, he knew nothing of them from any authentic source; but, on the contrary, was informed that, in private, each of those eminent individuals had spoken of the other in the highest terms. The governor-general had not resigned, nor was he likely to do so at such a crisis. His letters showed perfect calmness and resolution; and he repeated, there was every probability that the outbreak would be speedily suppressed.

On the 30th of June, Colonel French inquired of her majesty's government, whether it was really their intention to send the troops required for immediate service in India, out in sailing-vessels, in preference to her majesty's steamers?—and was informed, in reply, by Sir Charles Wood (first lord of the admiralty), that sailing transports were more readily and conveniently fitted for carrying troops, and therefore they would be used for the present occasion.

A motion for the production of certain returns connected with the civil service in India, was made by the Marquis of Clanricarde, on the 6th of July, on which occasion, the noble marquis said that, at present, he spoke upon imperfect information; but it appeared to him, that they were expecting the present governor-general to administer the affairs of India with the same number of civil servants that were at the disposal of the Indian government in 1846, when our territory was much smaller in extent. He learned, from the twelfth paragraph of a minute of Lord Dalhousie, laid upon their lordships' table in the

course of the preceding year, that, "in eight years, four Indian kingdoms had passed under the sceptre of her majesty, and that various chieftainships and smaller districts had also been brought under her sway." Among the smaller acquisitions, were enumerated Khyrpore, Ungool, Sikkim, some Nepaulese Sirdars, Mundote, the Nawab Nazim of Bengal, and the states of Central India. There were, besides those, the Punjab, Rangoon, Nagpore, Sattara, Hyderabad, and Oude. The population thus brought under the dominion of this country, amounted to nearly eleven millions of souls; while the extent of territory acquired, reached to 207,637 square miles; and the amount of revenue derived from these recent additions to our territory in India, was £4,330,000 per annum. But notwithstanding this great increase of territory and wealth, no addition had been made to the strength of the civil service. The number of the covenanted civil servants of the Company, in 1846, was 431; while in 1856, it was only 432! It was therefore quite clear, that we were imposing upon the governor-general of India the task of ruling an empire of considerably enlarged proportions, with precisely the same numerical staff as had been appointed in 1846, with a much smaller territory. The consequence was, that when an office of high importance had to be filled up, the governor-general had to resort to the military branch of the service, and to take officers away from the duties of their profession to fill civil employments; and thus, when an increase in the number of civil servants became imperative, a diminution of the military force was the invariable result.* His lordship then moved for the production of papers connected with the subject.

The Earl of Albemarle expressed a hope that a full and searching inquiry into the condition of India would be instituted, and said, if such an inquiry took place, it would

* A letter received from Calcutta about this time, throws some additional light upon the subject, in the following passages:—"There has been a good deal said lately about the system prevailing in the Indian army, of so many officers being away from their regiments. I have spent a few hours to-day in making out the following abstract, concerning the Company's troops in the Bengal army alone, which may surprise you rather. The system is rotten, absurd, and infamous. In fact, every man who gets a chance leaves his regiment for the sake of doing any other work which he ought not to be doing, and for which he gets extra pay, besides his regimental pay, received for work which he does not do. It reminds

me of that bit of the Confession, 'We have left undone that which we ought to have done, and done that which we ought not to have done.'—Abstract of regimental officers of the Hon. East India Company's service in the Bengal army alone, absent from their corps; compiled from the Bengal 'Quarterly Army List' (April, 1857):—On civil and political employment, 216; belonging to irregular corps, contingents, and forces, 260; on leave, both on sick certificate and private affairs, 416; employed in the department of public works, 148; holding staff and other appointments of a similar nature, 175: total, 1,215."—If these men could be spared from military duty, the army ought not to be burthened with their cost.

be found necessary to make very material changes in the policy which had hitherto been adopted towards that country, especially as it was connected with the annexation of the territories of princes whose dominions bordered upon our own. In the adoption of that policy, one at least of the causes that had led to the present disturbances might be found. In a conversation he had had with an intelligent Mohammedan native of India, about fifteen months since, in reference to the annexation of Oude, that gentleman observed—"If you annex Oude, you will find that disaffection will break out among the native troops; and for this reason—they are all drawn from the agricultural, but not from the peasant class. They are what you would call in this country, yeomen, or small landlords. They are of the highest class, being either Rajpoots or Brahmins, and are of a most inflammable character. They number about 50,000, and will necessarily be deprived of many of their privileges by the annexation of their territory." Such was the opinion of the person to whom he had referred; and it had also been pointed out to him, that the new land revenue system, which the government had introduced into the North-Western Provinces of India, and which was made to follow the annexation of this new territory, was regarded by the natives as a great hardship, inasmuch as, under its operation, every man's property was surveyed, and each of those 50,000 sepoy would thus be compelled to make out his title to the land in his possession. Fourteen thousand petitions had already emanated from the sepoy of Oude in reference to that subject, and he therefore trusted government would institute inquiries into the whole system.—The Duke of Argyle having assented to the production of the papers moved for, they were ordered accordingly.

Whatever difference of opinion might exist as to the cause of the disastrous occurrences in India, it was now manifest that the government at home, as well as that on the scene of action, had become sensible of the necessity for acting with vigour and promptitude. At Calcutta, Lord Canning pursued the tenor of his way with a calmness and dignity that inspired confidence and respect; while the conduct of Sir Henry Lawrence in Oude, of his brother Sir John Lawrence in the Punjab, and of Mr. Robert Colvin in the Western

Provinces, was eminently calculated to exercise a wholesome influence over the populations under their immediate superintendence. The energy of Sir Henry, already referred to in connection with the disarming of the 7th native regiment at Lucknow, in April,* may be cited as a favourable example of the quality most requisite in those occupying high responsible stations in India at the period, and it would have been beneficial if that example had been generally emulated. On the first appearance of insubordination among the troops, it will be remembered, he applied to the governor-general in council for unlimited power to deal with the mutinous spirit that was effervescing around him, and, without a moment's hesitation, the important concession was transmitted to him.† Wise to resolve, and prompt to act, he at once assumed the military command of his province, and, for a time, placed his foot upon the neck of revolt by well-directed severity, mingled with generous appreciation of desert. At home, also, men were found equal to the emergency. On Saturday, the 11th of July, the electric telegraph announced to government, that the mutinous sepoy at Delhi had presumed to attack the English troops under General Reed, but had been repulsed; and that 30,000 of the native soldiers of the Company had deserted their colours, and gone off to swell the ranks of the rebel army. The same telegram also conveyed intelligence of the death of General Anson, the commander-in-chief in Bengal. The disastrous tidings were immediately forwarded to her majesty's ministers, and a cabinet council, which had been appointed for three o'clock that afternoon, was instantly summoned to assemble, and met at half-past one. After a brief discussion, the attendance of Sir Colin Campbell was required, and, upon his arrival, the desire of government that he would assume the chief command in India, was made known to him. The veteran, "nothing loth," heartily responded to the wishes of his sovereign and her ministers, and declared his readiness to start for Calcutta within twenty-four hours. "His act was suited to the word;" for, by noon on the following day, Sir Colin departed from London on his way to Marseilles, where a steamer, about to proceed to India, had been telegraphed to wait for his arrival, that no possible delay might intervene in

* See *ante*, p. 51.]† See *ante*, p. 52,

his progress to the metropolis of British India, which he reached on the 13th of August, as already mentioned.*

On the following Monday, the Indian mutiny again became a subject of discussion in both houses of parliament. In the Lords, the Earl of Ellenborough complained that, although three months had elapsed since the minds of the most reflective men had been anxiously directed to the state of the army in India, not one word of official information had yet been given to parliament. "We know nothing," said his lordship, "of the cause of the danger, or the nature of the measures adopted by her majesty's government to suppress it. Every successive mail increases our anxiety; and yet, by every successive telegraphic despatch, we are told that the crisis is past, that the danger is over, and that things have been at their worst. My lords, it is not so! In a case of this kind—of a dangerous and extensive mutiny—things go on from worse to worse, and so will proceed until the strong hand of power has interfered to suppress resistance to the authority of the government; and, as yet, no indication has been given of the existence, on the part of the government of India, of that power which is necessary to put down the present mutiny. I do not believe there exists in this house, or in the other, any indisposition to grant to her majesty's government all the means they may ask for the purpose of establishing our authority in India. What her majesty's government have done since the last telegraphic communication we have received, is, so far as I am acquainted with their conduct, right. They could not, I think, have appointed a better officer than Sir Colin Campbell to be at the head of the army in India. I have at all times held the highest opinion of that officer. I received it from the late Sir Charles Napier, who, from the first moment of his acquaintance with him, considered him one of the first officers in the Indian army. But, in order to give full effect to the abilities of Sir Colin Campbell, two things are necessary: first, that, in acting as commander-in-chief in India, he should be altogether relieved from the thralldom to which it has been too customary to subject commanders-in-chief in India—the thralldom of politicals: the next is, that he should, as Lord Harris did, in the time of Lord Wellesley, carry with him the whole

strength, and force, and power of the governor-general. My lords," he continued, "we hear that the defection is becoming very general—that it has extended to 26,000 men of the Bengal army. We hear more than this—we hear that in the Punjab all the native regiments have been disarmed. Now, among those regiments there are two of which I happen to know the recent history—viz., the 16th grenadiers and the 26th light infantry. The 16th grenadiers was one of the noblest regiments of the Indian army. It bore on its colours almost as many records of actions fought and victories gained as any regiment in her majesty's service. It was brigaded with her majesty's 40th regiment during the whole of Sir W. Nott's operations in Affghanistan. It served at Maharajpore; and by the side of the 40th regiment it equalled the Queen's troops in courage, fortitude, and devotion, and lost as many men. The 26th regiment of light infantry distinguished itself under the command of Sir G. Pollock. When that officer joined the army, 2,800 men out of the whole 4,000 were in hospital, the majority of whom suffered more from their own apprehensions than from any actual sickness. The only troops, under those circumstances, upon which Sir George Pollock could entirely depend, were this 26th regiment, which has just been disarmed. My lords, there must have been a continuance of mismanagement and misconduct which I cannot comprehend before the nature of the soldiers composing those regiments could have been so changed. There cannot have been one non-commissioned, and certainly not one commissioned, native officer in those regiments who did not show his gallantry and fidelity under General Nott and General Pollock; and it is lamentable to think that the glories of two such regiments should be obliterated from the Indian army, or that any circumstances, whatever they may have been, should have occurred to alienate them for an instant from the government, and to make the officer in command think it necessary to deprive them of arms which they have always borne so nobly and so successfully in the field." His lordship then took a prospective view of the future position of affairs in India, and expressed his opinion as to the means to be adopted for the effectual suppression of the revolt, and the extent to which the army required to be augmented

* See ante, p. 603.

for the purpose; and concluded thus:—"I firmly believe, that if parliament and the government will reinforce the army of India to the extent I have suggested, you may with absolute certainty—subject to those unforeseen accidents which befall all military operations—calculate that, by the end of April, the authority of the British government will be firmly established in every part of the upper provinces. But if you act in a different way—if you act undecidedly—if you think there is nothing in it, and that it will die out of itself—if you are not determined to put forth your whole strength and crush this rebellion against your dominion, which threatens your existence in India as conquerors, you may depend upon it you will have entailed upon you campaign after campaign; and the suspense which will affect the minds of the whole people of India, will imperil your rule, and destroy your character and authority in India. I do not believe there will be any indisposition on the part of parliament to support the government, if the government take the right view of the present state of things. It is for them to decide. I trust that they will prove worthy of the difficulties of their position, and of the greatness of the danger in which we are all involved; and that by coming forward in a manner to maintain the national character and the public interests, they will give permanent security to our Indian empire, as well as honour—which I shall not grudge them—for themselves. What I wish to know from the noble earl is, what measures the government now intend to take for the reinforcement of the army of India, and whether it is their intention to give, at the earliest period (that is, within three days), official information on the subject?"

In reply to this question, Earl Granville stated, that he was not aware that any information had been sought for which had been refused by government. The latter had only received three or four official communications by electric telegraph, viz., by Malta, Marseilles, and Trieste; and the public had been put in possession of the information conveyed by each; and he assured the house it was not the object of government to conceal the real state of affairs, whatever that state might be. His lordship averred, that her majesty's government did not treat the matter lightly, but considered it as a most serious question. He declined to follow the noble earl in his

military details; and said, that so far as the government was acquainted with what the governor-general had done, he could speak for it, that they were perfectly satisfied with, and entirely approved, every act brought to their knowledge that had been taken by the governor-general in dealing with the events around him; and that they would take every precaution to strengthen his hands and carry out his views. In conclusion, his lordship said—"The noble earl argues as if there were a general insurrection; but it has not extended beyond the army. As to the regiments that have been disbanded, we have no knowledge that they had any communication with the rebels. Her majesty's government will give the fullest information to parliament and the country. They will act with the greatest vigour on the present emergency; but they will not give way to unfounded apprehensions of any great calamity and disaster."

Upon this occasion, Lord Melville also entered at some length into a statement of the condition of the Bengal army, and said, that the want of discipline which had recently been manifested in its ranks, was a circumstance of no unusual occurrence. He had served with that army, and he was therefore in a position to state the reasons to which the difference which existed between it and the Bombay and Madras armies was to be attributed. The system of appointing native officers in the Bengal army he looked upon as one of the causes of that absence of discipline by which it was characterised, and probably of the mutiny which had lately taken place. Those officers, he might add, were, generally speaking, selected, not for their merit or fitness to command, and were raised from the ranks when they were old men, and when disaffection at not having previously been enabled to obtain their discharge from the service had, to a considerable extent, operated upon their minds. In the Bombay and Madras armies, upon the contrary, a different system prevailed. The havildars in those armies were selected for their intelligence and activity, and were recommended for promotion to that rank by the commanding officers of their regiments. But, be that as it might, nobody could deny that the discipline of the Bengal army was of the worst possible description, and in that light it had been looked upon by the late General Anson, who had in

consequence, ever since he had assumed the command of the army in India, deemed it to be his duty to represent to the board of directors the absolute necessity of increasing the European force in India—a recommendation to which, however, so far as the government was concerned, no sort of attention had been paid. In proof of the statement that the discipline of the Bengal army was of the worst description, he might inform the house, that in the year 1849, shortly after the first occupation of the Punjab, when he had commanded on the frontier, two Bengal regiments had mutinied, and when he had returned home in 1850, he had expressed the greatest disapprobation of the condition of the troops of which that army was composed. He had, however, been told that, no matter how just his opinions upon the subject might be, he must not give utterance to them in public, inasmuch as it was extremely undesirable that foreign nations should be acquainted with the real state of affairs. The result, at all events had been, that no steps had been taken in the matter by the board of directors, and that the discipline of the Bengal army continued to be of that character to which he had drawn their lordships' attention. He had had the honour of leading the Punjab division of the Bombay army, and he had no hesitation in saying, that nothing could be more praiseworthy than the conduct which the troops composing that division had exhibited. To show their lordships how different was the conduct of the Bengal army, he might state a circumstance which had taken place at the siege of Mooltan, and which had been reported to him by an officer who had been present on the occasion. A covering party had been ordered into the trenches, and some disturbance having occurred among them during the night, the officer to whom he referred had gone to ascertain its cause. He had found that it had arisen from the fact, that some soldiers of the Bengal army had been endeavouring to prevent the men belonging to one of the Bombay regiments from digging in the trenches in discharge of their duty, observing that they were sepoys, and would fight, but would not work. Yet the officer in command of those Bengalese had not ordered them into confinement, notwithstanding that they had not done one bit of the work which had been ordered by the engineers. He might also add, that the morning after the assault

of Mooltan, Mr. Lake had asked the officer in command of one of the pickets, to post a sergeant and twelve men at one of the gates of the town. The officer had done so; but not long after the men had taken up their position, three officers of the Bengal engineers had come up, one of them having a loaded gun, and bearing between them something covered by a piece of tarpaulin, which they had represented to be engineering stores. They had been, however, told by the guard that they could not pass; and the tarpaulin having been raised, that which they were in reality carrying had been found to be plunder. But it was unnecessary to cite further instances in proof of the accuracy of the opinion which he had expressed in reference to the spirit which prevailed among the troops of the Bengal army. He trusted, now that a fitting opportunity of dealing with the subject presented itself, her majesty's government would become alive to the necessity of reorganising that army, and placing the whole system upon which it was based upon an entirely different footing. As to the existing mutiny in India, he could not find in the fact that certain cartridges had been issued, a sufficient reason for its occurrence. It was, indeed, difficult to ascertain to what the breaking out of that mutiny was immediately to be attributed; but of one thing he felt assured—namely, that the government would act very culpably if they did not pay due attention to the representations which had been made to them in reference to the want of discipline which prevailed among the regiments of the Bengal army.

The Earl of Albemarle having expressed his opinion that the existing discontent in Bengal was attributable to the fact, that men of *high-caste* were exclusively employed in the Bengal service, and that the remedy for the evil, in future, would be found in abandoning that exclusiveness, the subject dropped in the Lords: but, on the same evening, in the House of Commons, Mr. Disraeli said—"There are such serious, and, in some respects, such contradictory statements respecting the information received from India, that I think it would be for the convenience of the house if her majesty's government would make some authentic statement of the intelligence they have received."—In reply to this invitation, Lord Palmerston said, the only intelligence received by ministers, was

that communicated by telegraphic messages, which were as well known to the public as to the government; the general outline of the intelligence so received being, in the first place, that "we have had the misfortune to lose the commander-in-chief; in the next place, that the disaffection which existed only in a few regiments, according to the former accounts, appears to have spread to a greater extent among the Bengal army; and that a large number of the Bengal troops have, as stated in the despatch, 'disappeared.' From that I presume that they have returned to their homes; but that is the expression used, and no further information is given. On the other hand, the troops which remained faithful, together with some British forces, have had an encounter with the mutineers under the walls of Delhi. That encounter is stated to have resulted in the complete success of her majesty's troops: twenty-six pieces of cannon were taken, and the mutineers were compelled to seek refuge within the walls of the town. The walls of Delhi, as the house is no doubt aware, are not regular fortifications, but are merely upright walls, not possessing any of the defences which are usual in the case of fortifications. Further, it was expected, when the intelligence left, that the town would be immediately assaulted. When the despatches arrive, we shall be ready to lay before parliament such portions of the communications as may be calculated to give to the house and to the public full information as to the course of events. Perhaps I may as well state, though no question on the point has been put to me, the general outline of what the government have thought it right to do. Immediately on the receipt of the information I have just described, steps were taken by my noble friend at the head of the war department, in conjunction with the commander-in-chief here, to select an officer to go out to India to take the place of General Anson. The offer was made to Sir Colin Campbell, who accepted it. Upon being asked when he would be able to start, the gallant officer, with his ordinary promptitude, replied, 'To-morrow;' and, accordingly, the offer having been made on Saturday, he was off by the train yesterday evening. A telegraphic despatch was sent to Marseilles to stop the steamer which is to take the mail, which left London on Saturday night, until the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell, who, therefore, would

not lose a single hour in reaching his destination. The house is aware that 14,000 men were under orders to go out to India before the arrival of the recent intelligence. Additional troops will now be sent out; and the house may rest assured that the government will take all the steps necessary to meet the emergency. Lord Canning had, in the meantime, on his own responsibility, done that which has been entirely approved of. He wrote to Lord Elgin, whom he thought his despatches would find at Ceylon, to request that he might divert for the Indian service a part of the force now on its way to China. I have no doubt that those despatches reached Lord Elgin; and the government have made such arrangements with respect to China, that even if those troops should be for a time diverted from their original destination, still there would be found on the China station ample means to carry on the operations there."

In reply to Sir E. Colebrook, Lord Palmerston further stated, that independent of the 14,000 men under orders for India, and the troops on their way to China, the government considered it their duty to dispatch, as early as possible, a considerable force in addition; and, of course, means must be taken, by recruiting, to supply the gap which would be thereby occasioned in the strength of the army at home.

On the following evening, Mr. Disraeli again inquired, whether government could yet give more authentic and detailed information respecting the exact posture of affairs in India; and if they would afford the house an early opportunity of expressing its opinion upon the causes and probable consequences of this state of affairs?—and was informed by Lord Panmure, in reply, that the despatches which had been received merely contained an amplification and detail of the information which the electric telegraph had already communicated the substance of, and that the intelligence received by the government did not vary from that published in the newspapers. His lordship also declared that, although the government felt no apprehension or alarm as to the ultimate result of the events in India, yet they would feel it their duty to act as if there were real reason for alarm, and to leave nothing undone that was within the reach of administrative functions, to provide for any emergency that might arise.—On the same evening, in answer to a question by Sir J. Walsh—founded upon rumours

that, for a considerable time prior to the outbreak, the late General Anson had made strong representations to the government, that danger was imminent in India through the disaffection of the Bengal army—Mr. Mangles, the chairman of the court of directors, said, that although he had on a former occasion declared he had not seen one line on the subject, in the shape of warning, in any official document from General Anson, yet he had that day made more strict and special search at the India-house, and could then state positively, that there was not one single word of warning or of notice given by General Anson on the subject.—Lord John Manners having objected that the question of Sir J. Walsh should be answered by the member for Guildford (Mr. Mangles) instead of by the president of the Board of Control, the latter functionary stated, that the question was replied to, not as member for Guildford, but as chairman of the court of directors of the East India Company; and General Anson having no communication with the government, but with the court of directors, their chairman was the proper person to reply to the question.

At this time rumours were prevalent of discordant views said to be existing not only between the Board of Control and the Board of Directors, but also among the directors themselves; and that, in consequence of such want of unanimity, the news received by electric telegraph on a Thursday evening or Friday morning, was not communicated to the directors until a late hour on Saturday; and further, that while some of the directors urged the immediate dispatch of ships of war to the Hooghly and Bombay, others opposed a measure so calculated to give confidence to the Europeans, and scatter dismay throughout the ranks of the mutineers, upon the miserable ground of extra expenditure!

On the 17th of July, the Earl of Ellenborough again brought before the House of Lords the prospects, present and future, of India; and urged, that with a view to relieve the local government from the burthen then occasioned by the transit of the forces required for its support, the home government should contract for it a loan of five millions, to be paid by instalments.—To this proposition Lord Granville objected, on the ground that the governor-general had ample funds at his disposal to meet the exigencies that had arisen: the subject,

however, was of importance, and should receive the consideration of government. His lordship protested against a remark of the Earl of Ellenborough, imputing incompetency or neglect of duty to the president of the Board of Control, who, his lordship said, was “at that moment devoting his utmost energy and attention to the consideration of measures adapted to meet the emergencies of the hour.”—Lord Ellenborough, in reply to this vindication of an absent servant of the crown, said—“My lords, such may be the belief of her majesty’s government; but I communicate very extensively with gentlemen connected with India; and I never meet one man among them who has not the most thorough distrust of the right honourable gentleman now at the head of the Board of Control.”

The intelligence that, from time to time, reached the public, of occurrences in Bengal, had at length the effect of concentrating its earnest attention upon the struggle; and the questions, “What are we to think of this Indian mutiny?—what do foreign nations think of it?”—occupied the serious consideration of the people of this country. It was notorious, that throughout Europe the emergency was looked upon as one pregnant with the gravest consequences to England. The struggle was considered as a social or servile war, according to the light in which the rebellious sepoys were viewed; and it was felt to be the most arduous and most discouraging kind of war; for in it neither glory nor territory was to be gained, nor increase of influence, nor increase of wealth; while the cruelties perpetrated on the one hand, and the merciless retaliation pursued on the other, placed the contending forces almost beyond the pale of civilisation and humanity. The mystery in which its origin had birth, and amidst which disaffection was nurtured, until ready to break out into actual rebellion, was not the least extraordinary fact connected with the crisis. The mutiny had ripened to maturity without awakening suspicion on the part of hundreds of officers, whose whole lives had been devoted to the superintendence, if not to the study, of the men who had risen in revolt against the European race, as well as against the government to which they owed fealty: and it was asked, “As the present rulers of India have been so completely surprised by events that have occurred, why may not other contingencies arise for which they will be equally unprepared?”

They believed in the fiction of greased cartridges up to the moment when the whole native army, spread over 1,500 miles of country, was in a state of actual revolt. What security, it was asked, was there that similar credulity should not enable the mischief to take a yet wider range? And it was felt that parliament and the people of England could no longer rely for the safety of the Indian empire, upon the exertions of the present race of Indian officials, since proof was glaring before the world, that there existed among Asiatics an understanding and a power of co-operation, which years of experience and uninterrupted service did not enable a European to detect and guard against. Government was therefore urged by all parties to act with promptitude and vigour, without which it was impossible to conceive how far the flame might spread. Delay was protested against as suicidal; for every day that witnessed a native army and a native prince affecting to defy the power of England in India, gave strength to the cause of the enemy, and might require months of after-exertion to counteract its effect upon the native populations. Moreover, every day's delay in grappling to the death with the rebel forces, afforded opportunity for sepoy deserters to spread reports of their grievances in more distant villages, and to indoctrinate with new and baneful ideas, a thousand localities that hitherto had worshipped the Company and the lowest of its subordinate agents. All authority was considered to be dependant on the speedy defeat and severe punishment of all who had mutinied or fled from their colours. Not only Indian rajahs, but the monarchs of Persia and Tartary—of Burmah and Siam—were, it was said, anxiously awaiting the result of this blow at English power. The blow then, it was urged, should be more than warded off; it should be returned with crushing—annihilating force. There was no real fear that India would be lost; no absolute idea that the authority of the governor-general would be impaired by any lasting suspension in any district; it was considered merely a question of blood and treasure. England, it was boasted, could crush any ordinary enemy that impeded her path; but in this instance, the climate, the distance, the interruption of communication, and the Asiatic cunning of the foe opposed to her, rendered a prolongation of the sepoy war more than likely, and would, in

the end, make it as costly and as destructive to human life, as a contest with a first-rate power in Europe. To obviate these evils, it was felt that more vigilant and energetic agents must be employed than those by whose supineness and neglect the mischief had been suffered to acquire its present serious magnitude.

On the 27th of July, the affairs of India again occupied the attention of both houses of parliament. In the Lords, the Marquis of Clanricarde moved for copies of the correspondence of the court of directors with the Board of Control and with the governor-general of India, relating to the amount of European forces, either of the British or Indian army, to be maintained in that country since the 1st of April, 1856, or relating to the employment of military officers upon political or other civil services. The marquis contended, that the whole subject of the administration of affairs in India required prompt consideration and revision. The state of the tribunals was disgraceful to this country; the finances of the Indian empire were admittedly in an unsatisfactory state; and as to the native army, within one fortnight 30,000 men had, without apparent cause, deserted from the standards of this country, though many of these men had spent from ten to fourteen years in the service. This had been foretold a year and a-half ago by an officer in the Indian army, who wrote to his family, declaring that, with respect to that army, India was on the eve of revolt; and yet nothing had been done by the court of directors, nor had the government taken any steps to avert such an evil. He regarded this as a crime on the part of the authorities to whom he had alluded, for they could not have been ignorant of the state of things existing in the vast empire committed to their rule and dominion. Nothing could be worse than taking officers from their regimental duties, and employing them in political and civil appointments. Among the various valuable suggestions for the improvement of the Indian army, made by the late Sir C. Napier in his evidence before their lordships' committee, was one for requiring young cadets, before going out to India, to pass some time in the army in England, in order to acquire a knowledge of their regimental duties. The reason why this was not carried out was, because it was only after a certain period of service in India that a person

became eligible for those civil situations for which every young officer was looking out. The object of the parents of a cadet, and of those who gave him his appointment, was, that he should hurry out as quickly as possible, and qualify himself for a civil situation at the earliest moment. What was the effect of thus drafting the officers of the army into the diplomatic and civil service? Why, in one instance cited out of many, Sir C. Napier gave an account of his visit to a battalion of 800 men, to which there were only two European officers. One of them was a young ensign not then released from drill; and if anything had happened to his senior, this boy, who could not pretend to drill a company or even to march a guard, would have been placed at the head of 800 men, and in command of many native officers who thoroughly understood their duty. How could we expect to find regiments in a proper state of discipline or organisation under such a system? He had lately seen a friend of his whose son was in India, and on expressing sympathy with what he thought must be the natural feelings of the father, at the danger in which his son was placed, his friend coolly replied—"Oh, I am not at all alarmed; my son has not been near his regiment for twelve years." On his hinting that the son, being a captain, would in the present crisis be ordered to join his regiment, the father added—"Oh, no, there is no danger of that; my son is engaged in an important civil employment, collecting the revenue, and he cannot be removed from where he is." Was it surprising if an army so conducted could not be relied on in time of trouble? This state of things appeared to have been entirely ignored by the court of directors. In Lord Dalhousie's minute of the 28th of February, 1856, there was this extraordinary passage:—"If large improvements have been made under the various departments of civil administration during the last eight years, the military branch of the service has received its full measure of attention and amendment. The position of the native soldier in India has long been such as to leave hardly any circumstance of his condition in need of improvement." Then followed forty-eight paragraphs, relating not to the native, but to the European soldier, or to the military board. They were told that the military branch of the government had received its full measure of "attention and improvement;" and yet a

few months later they had 30,000 men, the majority of whom had been long in the service, leaving their standard without any ostensible cause! This subject did not, however, long escape the attention of the present governor-general. Lord Canning assumed the government of India in March, 1856, and it soon became evident to him that all was not right; for as early as April the 5th, in the same year, his lordship wrote home to the court of directors, that "your honourable court will observe that, in October, 1855, the late governor-general recorded a minute, in consequence of the strong representations of the late commander-in-chief as to the paucity of officers for the demands of the public service." So little did the directors know whether the Bengal army required supervision, that they sent increased employment upon the civil service for officers of the army; and it was not to be wondered at that, in the absence of a proper staff of officers, the native army fell into disorganisation, ending in revolt. Such neglect of an army had never before been manifested by any government. The recommendations of Sir John Malcolm, and other eminent Indian officers, had been wholly disregarded; and hence the present predicament to which the Indian government had reduced itself. With proper organisation, the late Sir Charles Napier had declared, that an army of sepoys might be raised, fit for any service, but that great care and caution would be necessary to prevent that which might be our strength being turned to our weakness. But these sepoys, it was said, were to be got rid of, and 60,000 British troops were to replace them. But who was to pay for these 60,000 men, and how were they to be recruited? To suppose that such a force could maintain order in a population such as India, was a proposition at once monstrous and ridiculous. The truth was, that the government of India ought to be regulated by the imperial parliament, and ought not to be delegated to any board of directors. The best days of our Indian empire had been when parliament exercised a wholesome control. This had been so in the days of Lord Clive, Warren Hastings, Lord Cornwallis, and Lord Wellesley. He expected that, early next year, the government would be prepared to submit a plan for the better administration of the affairs of India; if not, he was sure parliament would discharge its duty by demanding a reform of Indian government.

—The Duke of Argyll said, that the papers moved for by the noble marquis had already been presented to the other house, and there would be no difficulty in their being laid on the table of the house. On this difficult question of the Indian army, and with the contrariety of opinion which prevailed on the subject, it would be injudicious at this moment for him, on the part of the government, to give any promise as to the steps they would next year be prepared to take. He defended the administration of affairs in India by the present governor-general, who had secured the good opinion and feeling of the native princes. But in India itself the most contradictory statements were put forth by the Indian press, and the consequence was to increase the difficulty which beset this important question. His (the Duke of Argyll's) opinion was, that the existing state of affairs was attributable to the board of directors, whose object naturally was to maintain their military patronage; therefore they naturally would not be niggardly in their supply of officers. The cause of the great calamity which had recently occurred was the vast increase of territory undertaken, not at the instance of the directors, but by British statesmen, sent out by the British government as governors-general. He trusted that the revolt which had taken place would not induce the British public to withdraw its confidence in the native army, which had distinguished itself in so many glorious campaigns. To abandon them now would not only be a shame to this country, but would prove a calamity to mankind.—The motion was then put, and agreed to.

In the House of Commons, on the same evening, Mr. Disraeli, pursuant to notice, called the attention of the house to the state of affairs in India. After noticing the suddenness of the intelligence of the mutiny among the native troops, which had taken the government by surprise (their impression being that it would speedily pass away), he observed, that even after they had time to consider the events, the house had been told by a principal member of the cabinet—the chancellor of the exchequer—as the result of its mature opinion, that the revolt of the Bengal army was a sudden impulse, occasioned by a superstitious feeling. It was of the greatest moment that the house should have a clear notion of the cause of these events. It was said to be only a military mutiny; but it was of

primary importance to know whether it was a military mutiny or a national revolt. He presumed, therefore, to address the house upon two points of inquiry: first, what were the causes of the present state of affairs in India?—and, when the house had arrived at a conclusion upon that point, what were the proper measures which, under the circumstances, should be adopted? That the state of the Bengal army had been unsatisfactory, the house knew from the criticisms of the late Sir Charles Napier, and the calmer reflections of Lord Melville; but he contended, that the mutineers in the Bengal native army were not so much the avengers of their own individual injuries as exponents of general discontent, and that they had at last been drawn into its vortex. He ranged under three heads the various causes which, in his opinion, had led to the general discontent of all classes with our rule—namely, first, the forcible destruction of native authority in India by our government; second, the disturbance of the settlement of property; third, tampering with the religion of the people. Directly or indirectly, the principal causes of the public discontent in India ranged, he contended, under these three heads. Under the first head he referred to what he termed the new policy of the annexation of states on the ground of the failure of natural heirs, although adoption was sanctioned by the Hindoo law; and he specified particular instances, including those of the well-known rajah of Sattara and the rajah of Berar. These violations of the Hindoo law, he observed, shook the confidence not only of princes, but of large and powerful parties. This led him to the second head; and he argued that, as the law of adoption applied to landed proprietors, our new system touched all jaghiredars and possessors of enam lands. Inquisitions had also been prosecuted into the titles to landed estates; and he believed that the amount obtained by the Indian government by the resumption of estates, was not less, in Bengal alone, than £500,000 a-year; while in Bombay, he had been assured, the annual amount was £370,000. The government had further reduced guaranteed pensions, by curtailment and conversion, into annuities. All these proceedings had, he said, estranged numerous classes from our authority. He now proceeded to the last head—tampering with the religion of the people; and here he hesitated in attributing

any part of this cause to missionary efforts. So far from the Hindoo looking with suspicion on the missionary, he was convinced that he was ready to discuss any point of religion. But what the Hindoo did regard with dread and apprehension, was the union of missionary enterprise with the power of the government. He was much misinformed if the government had not furnished ground for suspicion in relation to native education; but there had been two acts passed within these few years by the legislative council of India, which had greatly disquieted the religious mind in Hindostan. One enacted, that no man should lose his property on account of changing his religion; the other permitted a Hindoo widow to marry a second husband. Both these acts had spread the greatest alarm and disturbance among the Hindoos. Mr. Disraeli then adverted to the "startling event" of the annexation of Oude, the consequence of which, he said, was to inspire the Mohammedan princes with apprehension, and to unite them in a common cause with the Hindoos. He had been informed, besides, that in our Bengal regiments there were no fewer than 70,000 natives of Oude, who, in returning to their villages, would find them in the possession of the East India Company; and those who were owners of land, would be subject to the hard and severe system of our land revenue. It was after this event that the circulation of symbols, in the form of cakes and lotus-flowers, throughout the Bengal army, proved the existence of a general conspiracy. He thought it was impossible that the Indian government could have been ignorant that the Bengal troops were in a state of chronic insubordination; and it was their duty solemnly to impress upon the government at home (and they must have done so), that the time had come when they must seriously consider the state of our Indian army. The greasing of the cartridges Mr. Disraeli dismissed with the remark, that nobody believed that to have been the real cause of the outbreak. In the last place, he proceeded to inquire, assuming that the views he had developed were correct, what were the measures which the government ought to adopt in the emergency? Regarding the revolt as a national one, military measures were not sufficient, and the measures of the government were inadequate: there should be an expedition up the Indus; our force in India should be doubled: but, further,

the population of India should be told that there is a future hope; they should be taught at once that the relations between them and their sovereign Queen Victoria, would be drawn nearer; and a royal commission should be sent from the Queen to India, to inquire into the grievances of all classes. He concluded by moving for certain papers.—Mr. V. Smith could not help asking, what was the use of Mr. Disraeli's three hours' oration; and whether there was not very great mischief in bringing forward this subject in the manner he had done? He had represented the mutiny as a national revolt; but he had adduced no evidence to show that it was owing to national discontent. No native prince had been concerned in it, and there was not a shadow of evidence of any conspiracy among the native princes. The system pursued by Lord Dalhousie, in regard to adoption, might be right or wrong; and before that question was decided, the law of succession in each state must be inquired into; but this subject had no connection whatever with the revolt. The right honourable gentleman had referred to what he called the disturbance of property in India, as one of the causes of the great wrath that now existed in that country. In so doing, he alluded to the propriety of inquiry being made, by a royal commission, into the rights of tenure under the native princes. "Now," said the president of the Board of Control, "I at once admit that we have not been able to deal with many of those tenures as the native princes did. Many of them were of feudal origin, and could not be carried out under our system of government. For example, the holders of land had in some cases to keep horses saddled and bridled ready for the use of the rajah when he went into action. Such tenures as these—and there are thousands of a similar kind—were brought to an end when the government of the country came into our hands; and, in most cases, it was for the advantage of the tenant that they should be so. The rajahs were, among other things, entitled to what we call fines from the holders. These fines were done away with; but by the equalisation of their property, it has been found that, on the whole, the rajahs have rather gained than otherwise. It is beyond doubt that enormous frauds and corruptions have taken place, and there may be a good reason for the appointment of a commission; but the

right honourable gentleman, without assigning these frauds as a cause for inquiry, has dexterously thrown out the idea of a commission to inquire into the titles of the proprietors to their lands. No doubt, much discontent has been caused in India by the changes that have taken place; but does any important change of law ever take place in our own country without creating discontent among some class or other affected by the change?" The interference with religion was a matter of immense delicacy: and he had no hesitation in saying, that it would be the best policy at once to interfere, and prevent the exercise of missionary zeal by our civil and military servants. He coincided with Mr. Disraeli entirely in thinking interference with the religion of the natives of India highly objectionable. On the subject of annexation, he was an enemy to systematic annexation; but the question of Oude was this: the subjects of Oude were kept in subjection by our force, and we made ourselves responsible for everything the king did; Lord Dalhousie, therefore, thought it better to annex the territory, which was done with the least possible injury to the parties concerned. The attempt to connect this annexation with the mutiny had completely failed. He denied that the government had received any warning of the mutiny, or that there was the slightest indication of any disaffection among the native troops. Lord Dalhousie and Sir W. Gomm had borne testimony to their loyal spirit down to a very late period; and he did not believe that Sir C. Napier had made any representation to the Indian government founded upon the criticisms he had left behind. It was premature to say what was the real cause of the mutiny; but he thought there must have been some mismanagement at Meerut; and mismanagement at the beginning often led to serious results in such cases. There had been of late years a severance between the men and their officers in the native regiments, and he was sorry to hear that the latter sometimes spoke of the sepoys at their mess as "niggers." After reviewing other portions of Mr. Disraeli's speech, Mr. Smith proceeded to consider the remedies he had proposed. The sending a royal commission would, in the first place, supersede the governor-general, which would be, he thought, one of the most fatal errors that could be committed. Then Mr. Disraeli would connect

the name of the Queen with the whole administration; but the present machinery of the Indian government had been deliberately approved by the legislature. He thought, however, that it might be advisable, with the sanction and authority of the governor-general of India, to send out a commission, not to supersede him, but to inquire into various matters, and, among others, the reorganisation of the native army, certain points connected with which Mr. Smith indicated as worthy of consideration.

Sir E. Perry observed, that Mr. Disraeli had treated this question as an Indian question ought to be treated in that house, without any reference to party politics. The grave question was, whether this revolt was confined to the army, or was a reflex of the national mind?—and his deliberate opinion was, that the military revolt was sympathised with throughout the country. He agreed, too, with Mr. Disraeli as to the causes of this sympathy, especially the new policy of annexation, and the resumption doctrine, which invalidated titles of forty years' standing.—Mr. Whiteside detailed at some length the opinions of Sir C. Napier, who, when commanding the army in India, communicated to the Indian government, he said, his opinion of the Bengal troops, and distinctly stated that Delhi ought to be defended by 12,000 picked men. He cited other proofs that the government were aware of the necessity of reorganising the Bengal army, and of increasing the European force upon that establishment. Mr. Disraeli, he observed, had raised questions of great interest: one was, that a large number of the mutinous sepoys had been enlisted in Oude, and the petitions of some of them, in reference to land in Oude, were not answered; and this, he contended, must have made an impression upon their minds, and must, of course, have influenced their actions.—Lord J. Russell said he had no wish that the house should enter upon this discussion, and, in presence of what had been rightly termed an awful calamity, he could not conceive anything less tending to the advantage of this country or of India than such a discussion, if it was to end either in a vote of censure, or a transfer of India to the crown. Neither of these measures was proposed in the motion, which was only for the production of papers. Mr. Disraeli, he observed, had never ventured to say that the great mass of the people of

India had suffered under oppression. It appeared to him that we had trusted rather too much to Indian troops, and troops of one particular kind, and have had too large an army. He thought that 50,000 Europeans and 100,000 natives would afford a far better security than our present force. The first matter, however, upon which the House of Commons ought to pronounce an opinion was, that the government ought to be supported; he thought the house ought not to separate without expressing such opinion; and he accordingly moved, by way of amendment, an address to her majesty, to assure her majesty that they will support her majesty in any efforts necessary to suppress the disturbances in India, and in any measures required for the establishment of tranquillity.—Mr. Mangles said there had been nothing from the government of India to show the causes of the outbreak, and the best-informed authorities in this country professed themselves at a loss to account for it. The right honourable gentleman (Mr. Disraeli), had, however, undertaken to explain the cause; but the facts of the case were totally opposed to the theory which he had set up. The right honourable gentleman said this was not a mere military mutiny, but that it was the reflection upon the sepoys of the discontent felt by the native princes at the treatment which other native princes had met with. It happened, however, that none of the native princes had taken part in this outbreak, but all of them had sided with the government; and some of them had rendered the most valuable assistance. Then, again, the right honourable gentleman said the landowners were dissatisfied; but the fact was, that, with one or two exceptions, the zemindars had freely offered their aid to the government. The same was to be said of the native inhabitants of Calcutta. In truth, so far from this being a national revolt, the fact was, that where there were no sepoys there had been no revolt. There were many stations in Bengal and the central provinces where there were no sepoys, and in all those places the authority of the government, up to the date of the latest advices, had been completely maintained. Even in Oude, which had been referred to as the focus of disorder, that gallant soldier and valuable public servant, Sir H. Lawrence, had driven off with a small body of Europeans and artillery a mutinous sepoy regiment. He had seen in the newspapers a letter from Colonel Baird Smith,

describing how, when deserted by his sepoys, he patrolled the country with a few European officers, and was received by the natives with the utmost enthusiasm. Even all those who had fled from Delhi spoke of the generous and friendly treatment they experienced from zemindars. In the Punjab, one of our latest acquisitions, where, if anywhere, a spirit of dissatisfaction might be expected to prevail, not a finger had been raised against us; and he had seen letters from Sir J. Lawrence, Mr. Montgomery, Colonel Abbot, and others, in which they stated that the population was with us to a man, and were daily bringing in mutinous sepoys who had deserted their colours. At the present time a large additional force was being raised in the Punjab, and the whole of the regiments of that district had remained faithful. Surely those facts were at variance with the theories of the right honourable gentleman; but, supposing there was any truth in the causes assigned by the right honourable gentleman for the outbreak, every one of those causes existed in 1853, when the committee upon Indian affairs was sitting. The right honourable gentleman was a member of that committee; and if he believed that the East India Company and the government between them were ruining India, he ought then to have brought those causes under the notice of parliament, when they could have received that full investigation which it was impossible could be given them now. The right honourable gentleman appeared to be, in regard to Indian affairs, something like a stormy petrel—he never appeared save in times of danger. He (Mr. Mangles) had never heard the right honourable gentleman open his lips about India since the Cabul occurrences, at which time he was a free lance—one of the hangers-on of Sir R. Peel—and spoke in most indignant terms of the disasters at Cabul. Another reason which had been assigned by the right honourable gentleman for the present disturbances, was the dissatisfaction of the native princes with the suppression of the system of adoption; but the fact was, there had really been no such suppression. Adoption was necessary in cases where there was no room for the due performance of certain religious rites, and with that arrangement the Indian government had not interfered. What had been done was, that in certain cases, and under certain circumstances, the Indian government would not permit king-

doms or principalities to pass by adoption. In the case of the rajah of Sattara, upon which so much stress had been laid, what were the facts? The rajahs of Sattara were descendants of Sivajee, the founder of the Mahratta empire; but the descendants of Sivajee had long been put aside by the Peishwas, who ruled the country much in the same way as the mayors of the palace ruled the descendants of Clovis in France. The unfortunate rajah, at the time we conquered the Peishwas, was a captive closely confined, if not actually in chains. It was then the policy of the government to set up the descendants of Sivajee in order to conciliate the Mahrattas, and the rajah was made a prince upon condition that he should not marry nor do anything without the consent of the Indian government. In fact, he was not a sovereign at all, but a mere puppet set up by the Indian government for political purposes. This foolish lad (said Mr. Mangles) chose eventually to rebel against British power; and for that offence he was deposed, and his brother succeeded him. His brother died without heirs; but on his deathbed he adopted a son who was not even a descendant of Sivajee. So little did the boy whom he adopted expect that adoption, that he could not be found when the rajah was dying. He had gone out birdcatching, or on some other boyish pursuit. They had to hunt for him up and down. The British government refused to recognise him as the successor of the rajah. And that was one of the great hardships which the right honourable gentleman, the member for Buckinghamshire, had described with so much unction. It was remarkable that the only two remaining Mahratta princes—Holkar and Scindia—had rendered us assistance. The right honourable gentleman had quoted with great respect the opinions of Sir Charles Napier; and he (Mr. Mangles) could also show him the opinions which had been expressed by Sir Thomas Munro with regard to the manner in which the native princes of India had been treated by the Indian government. Sir Thomas Munro said that that treatment was much more remarkable for the simplicity than the good sense of the Indian government. The right honourable gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) had spoken of the grievances of the sepoys, and had quoted Lord Melville as an authority. Lord Melville had certainly spoken disparagingly of the state of the Bengal sepoys, but he did not

say that they had any grievances to complain of. The truth was, that the only grievance which did exist was one of which the government itself had to complain, and that was, that they had been so much indulged that their discipline had been affected. He (Mr. Mangles) believed that Sir Charles Napier said what was perfectly true, when he stated that no body of men in the world—certainly no body of soldiers—had ever been so indulgently and overkindly treated, and had had so little grievances to complain of as the sepoys. He believed that they had been spoilt; but he did not believe that this mutiny was a matter of discipline. It was the work of fanaticism on the part of some of them who would not listen to explanations, and who acted like madmen because they fancied that the government intended, by force or fraud, to deprive them of their caste. The Bengal sepoy was a simple-minded and almost childlike person. He was taken from the best description of the agricultural classes; and he (Mr. Mangles) would stake the little reputation which he had as to a knowledge of India, that when the facts of the case came to be known, it would be found that the frightful atrocities which had occurred had not been committed by the sepoys at all, but by a few of the rabble that congregated at the bazaars and other places of that sort. The men were mad from a fear that their caste was to be interfered with, and were scarcely masters of their own actions. The right honourable gentleman, in his eagerness to get at the causes of this mutiny, did not wait until the matter was reported upon by those in India who were best qualified to form an opinion upon it. Yet, strange to say, he had not hinted at the hypothesis that these men might possibly have been acted upon by some foreign or extraneous agency. Nobody in this country was competent at this moment to speak positively on such a point; but from all that was known of the habits and general fidelity of the sepoys, it might fairly be suspected that they had been acted upon by extraneous influence of some kind or another. He entirely agreed with what the right honourable gentleman had said as to the Christian missionaries. While these missionaries were entirely unconnected with the government, and went among the native population simply as preachers of the truth (the purity of whose lives was generally known), their labours would be viewed not

only without jealousy, but with respect by the people of India. The real danger to be carefully guarded against was a belief, on the part of the people of India, that the government aided and abetted the missionaries. The government should give no assistance, direct or indirect, to the missionaries, but should simply stand by and see that they were not wronged or persecuted. It was alleged that the Indian government had resumed endowments of land once dedicated to the support of the Mohammedan religion. That was a total error. All such endowments were held sacred by the state, and never interfered with.—Mr. Liddell said, the noble lord's amendment was wholly incongruous to the motion. That amendment asked them to do that which, no doubt, every man in the country would cheerfully do at such a moment of peril, viz., to support her majesty in maintaining the brightest of her territorial acquisitions. But the motion of his right honourable friend asked for information, which was yet denied them, as to the causes of the late disasters.—Mr. Ayrton then moved that the debate be adjourned; but this motion was negatived, upon a division, by 203 to 79.

The discussion was then resumed by Mr. Ayrton, who supported Mr. Disraeli's motion; and, after a reply from that right honourable gentleman, explanations followed from Mr. Mangles, Lord J. Russell, and Mr. T. Baring, who removed certain misconceptions of Mr. Disraeli regarding the proceedings of the East India committee of 1852, and condemned the course he had taken that night.—Lord Palmerston could not but express his regret that Mr. Disraeli, holding the prominent position he did, should have selected a moment of great difficulty for the expression of the opinions which the house had heard. He should not enter into the question at that late hour; he was satisfied to rest it upon the speeches of Mr. Smith and Mr. Mangles, which would serve as antidotes to those opinions.—General Thompson observed, that no notice had been taken, in the debate, of a breach of military faith and honour towards the soldiers of the Indian native army.—The original motion was then negatived,

and Lord J. Russell's amendment carried without a division.

That the system of annexation pursued of recent years—the gradual destruction of native thrones—was one main cause of the mutiny, has been a favourite doctrine with theorists of a particular school; but something more than the ingenuity of Mr. Disraeli was required to convince a rational assembly that the sowars of Bengal forsook their flag because Sattara had been absorbed, or that the cantonments at Meerut were fired because the kings of Oude were no longer permitted to flay their subjects alive. It was one thing to dispute the policy of annexing Berar; but it was a totally different thing to argue, that the act would account for the lapse of Delhi under the symbols of insurrection. The Tories, upon this occasion, went too far in search of their explanations; and Mr. Disraeli, taking the lead, floundered the deepest in absurd misrepresentation. He was more successful when dealing with English acts of interference with the religions of India. Proselytism by soldier-missionaries was a dangerous expedient, where, as in India, the military and priestly classes are so largely and indefinitely blended. As to his proposition, that a large military force should be equipped for the rescue of British India, and that royal commissioners should be dispatched to examine into the causes of the insurrection, it may be observed, that the first idea was propounded too late, and the second too early. It had already, as we have seen, been determined to augment the strength of the European army; and already nearly 10,000 additional troops were on their way to the rescue; and an inquiry that must be traced through a myriad of accidents, traditions, and local specialties, could not possibly have been satisfactorily or conclusively conducted before the revolt had been suppressed, and British authority vindicated. That the government did not put forward its most effective speakers to repel the attacks of the member for Buckinghamshire, was taken as a proof that his complex philippics had obviously little influence upon the judgment of the House of Commons.*

The address, as proposed by Lord John

* A morning journal, referring to this discussion, and to the rejection of Mr. Disraeli's motion, says—"The members felt that, by following the tory craftsman, they should not be exploring the depths of the Indian mystery; for, after all that the creaky

rhetorician said about lotus-buds and pancakes, territorial acquisitions, and the wretched rajah of Sattara, the house remembered that it had only been listening to a political Thug, a Derbyite Santal, and a mutinous crew of tory barristers yearning for the

Russell, was presented to her majesty at a *levée* on Wednesday, the 29th of July; and on the following day, Lord Castlerosse, comptroller of the household, brought down her majesty's answer to the Commons as follows:—"I thank you for your loyal and dutiful address, and for the assurance of your cordial support in any measures I may consider necessary for the suppression of disturbances in India, and the permanent establishment of tranquillity and contentment in that important portion of my dominions."

The measures of the East India Company, and of government, to strengthen the hands of the governor-general, were now pursued with vigour. Further reinforcements, consisting of four new infantry regiments (the 44th, 56th, 66th, and 72nd), two more regiments of cavalry (the 1st dragoons and 7th hussars), and two additional troops or companies of artillery, with guns and equipments complete, were placed under orders for India, and followed the reinforcements already dispatched, with the least possible delay. A large number of vessels, including several screw steamers, were taken up for their conveyance, and every possible effort was made to expedite their arrival in India. A large augmentation of the Company's European artillery, and a draft of artillery cadets from the military college at Addiscombe, were also dispatched for the seat of war; and all members of the civil service of the Company, who were at the time on leave in this country, were ordered to their posts in India, under the same conditions and reservations as their military brethren.

By an order from the Horse-guards, on Monday, July 27th, detachments of non-commissioned officers and privates were to set off from the depôts of all regiments then serving in, or on their way to, India, to proceed on the recruiting service in different parts of the country, it being resolved to add a second battalion of 1,200 men to each of those regiments. The East India Company also sent out additional recruiting parties in the metropolis, to enlist men for service in the infantry and artillery of the army of the three presidencies. To give Golconda rubies and the Persian pearls of office. The impression that had been produced when the debate came to a close, was that the nation would be enlightened, but that the opposition had lost ground. What does it signify that Mr. Disraeli, for three long hours, speaks to the House of Commons as to a mechanics' institute, that Sir Erskine Perry is

éclat to the departure of the troops already prepared to embark, her majesty, on the 4th of August, proceeded, with a numerous retinue, on board the *James Baines* and *Lady Jocelyn* at Portsmouth, under orders for India, and inspected those vessels, and the arrangements for accommodating and provisioning the troops, with which she expressed her entire satisfaction. Her majesty afterwards passed in review the troops collected for embarkation by those vessels.

Upon the arrest of the king of Oude becoming known to the members of his family in this country, an appeal was made on his behalf, that he should not be condemned upon an *ex parte* view of the circumstances affecting him. The Moolavie, Musseeh Oud-deen Khan, accredited vakeel to the king, by public letter declared, "that nothing could be more inconsistent with the views of his majesty, and of the royal family at present in England, and the instructions of his majesty to his other agents in this country, than anything like a conspiracy against the British government in India, or elsewhere; his wishes having been throughout, that his case should be laid before the British parliament and public in the most open and constitutional manner:" and the Moolavie prayed that his majesty should not be deemed guilty of offence until the publication of the evidence upon which he had been arrested was fairly laid before the English public.

The position of the unfortunate queen-mother of Oude, and the two princes, her relatives, in this country, had now become one of extreme embarrassment both to themselves and the government. Her majesty had been received at an audience by the Queen, and her son and grandson had been also recognised by the public authorities; but the events that had occurred in Oude since their arrival in England, and the alleged complicity and imprisonment of the king in Fort William, naturally surrounded them with difficulties that, for a time at least, were insurmountable, and in the end were destined to be fatal. The object of the mission of the queen and her relatives had already been long before the mediocere, and Mr. Whiteside impertinent? Lord Palmerston holds the crisis in his hands, and parliament, by its decision, sustains his authority, and bids him go forward, subduing the public enemy, and rearing up new bulwarks of our Indian empire." [The authority so sustained rested, however, on a very insecure foundation, as subsequent events showed.]

government and the court of directors; but no step appears to have been taken by either towards a satisfactory termination of the question between the king of Oude and the East India Company, when the revolt broke out; and the legitimate sovereign of the recently "annexed" kingdom was, upon the evidence of a spy, deprived of his liberty, as he had already been of his throne. For the queen of Oude (his mother), and for the princes (his brother and son), there was, therefore, no power to which they could appeal in their distress from the new misfortune that had fallen upon them, but the British parliament; and to that august tribunal the deposed royalty of Oude, in full reliance upon its justice, its honour, and its wisdom, appealed for its interposition, and was refused!—not upon the merits of the case, but upon a miserable technical objection, as insulting to the royal petitioners as it was degrading to the coroneted lawyer in the house of peers, by whom only such an unworthy expedient could have been resorted to upon such an occasion.

On Thursday, the 6th of August, 1857, Baron Campbell, the lord chief justice of England, in his place in the House of Lords, said he had just received a petition which he felt it his duty to present, in order that it might be generally known that their lordships were ready to hear the petitions of all persons who addressed them *with proper respect*. The document was as follows:—

"The petition of the undersigned Jenabi Auliah Tajara Begum, the queen-mother of Oude; Mirza Mohummud Hamid Allie, eldest son and heir-apparent of his majesty the king of Oude; and Mirza Mohummud Jowaad Allie Sekunder Hushmut Bahadour, next brother of his majesty the king of Oude, sheweth—

"That your petitioners have heard with sincere regret the tidings which have reached the British kingdom of disaffection prevailing among the native troops in India; and that they desire, at the earliest opportunity, to give public expression to that solemn assurance which they some time since conveyed to her majesty's government—that the fidelity and attachment to Great Britain, which has ever characterised the royal family of Oude, continues unchanged and unaffected by these deplorable events, and that they remain, as Lord Dalhousie, the late governor-general of India, emphatically declared them—'a

royal race, ever faithful and true to their friendship with the British nation.'

"That in the midst of this great public calamity, your petitioners have sustained their own peculiar cause of pain and sorrow in the intelligence which has reached them through the public papers, that his majesty the king of Oude has been subjected to restraint at Calcutta, and deprived of the means of communicating even with your petitioners, his mother, son, and brother.

"That your petitioners desire unequivocally and solemnly to assure her majesty and your lordships, that if his majesty the king of Oude has been suspected of any complicity in the recent disastrous occurrences, such suspicion is not only wholly and absolutely unfounded, but is directed against one the whole tenor of whose life, character, and conduct, directly negatives all such imputations. Your petitioners recall to the recollection of your lordships the facts relating to the dethronement of the king of Oude, as set forth in the petition presented to the House of Commons by Sir Fitzroy Kelly, on the 25th of May last, that when resistance might have been made, and was even anticipated by the British general, the king of Oude directed his guards and troops to lay aside their arms; and that when it was announced to him that the territories of Oude were to be vested for ever in the Hon. East India Company, the king, instead of offering resistance to the British government, after giving vent to his feelings in a burst of grief, descended from his throne, declaring his determination to seek for justice at her majesty's throne, and from the parliament of England.

"That since their resort to this country, in obedience to his majesty's commands, your petitioners have received communications from his majesty which set forth the hopes and aspirations of his heart; that those communications not only negative all supposition of his majesty's personal complicity in any intrigues, but fill the minds of your petitioners with the profound conviction that his majesty would feel, with your petitioners, the greatest grief and pain at the events which have occurred. And your petitioners desire to declare to your lordships, and to assure the British nation, that although suffering, in common with his heart-broken family, from the wrongs inflicted on them, from the humiliations of a state of exile, and their loss of home,

authority, and country, the king of Oude relies only on the justice of his cause, appeals only to her majesty's throne and to the parliament of Great Britain, and disdains to use the arm of the rebel and the traitor to maintain the right he seeks to vindicate.

"Your petitioners, therefore, pray of your lordships that, in the exercise of your authority, you will cause justice to be done to his majesty the king of Oude; and that it may be forthwith explicitly made known to his majesty and to your petitioners wherewith he is charged, and by whom and on what authority, so that the king of Oude may have full opportunity of refuting and disproving the unjust suspicions and calumnies of which he is now the helpless victim. And your petitioners further pray that the king of Oude may be permitted freely to correspond with your petitioners in this country, so that they may also have opportunity of vindicating here the character and conduct of their sovereign and relative, of establishing his innocence of any offence against the crown of England or the British government or people, and of showing that, under every varying phase of circumstance, the royal family of Oude have continued steadfast and true to their friendship with the British nation.

"And your petitioners will ever pray, &c."

On laying the petition upon the table, Lord Campbell said he had done his duty in presenting it; but he must express his confidence, that the government of India, in what they had done in the matter referred to, had acted with perfect propriety. He, individually, had entire confidence in their wisdom in that respect; but, at the same time, it gave him satisfaction to witness this testimony, from the royal family of Oude, of their devoted attachment to this country, and he should rejoice if the charges against the king of Oude should prove to be unfounded.

Lord St. Leonards trusted it would not be supposed, from the petition being laid on their lordships' table, that any injustice had been done to the king of Oude. He had sufficient confidence in the East India

Company and the government of India, not to acquiesce in the assertion that the king of Oude had been improperly treated.—In tone with this remark, Lord Campbell said, he had guarded himself against being supposed to assent to that assertion when he expressed his confidence that the government of India had acted with perfect propriety. At the same time, he added, that all who approached their lordships "respectfully," should have the opportunity of being heard. The noble and learned lord having thus given the *cue*, it was readily caught by Baron Redesdale,* who forthwith noticed that the word "*humble*" was not prefixed to the word "petition;" and, upon that ground, objected to the reception of the document.—Lord Campbell immediately said, that *if* there were any technicality of that sort in the way of the reception of the petition, he would withdraw it! And the petition of the queen and princes of Oude, praying for justice, was accordingly withdrawn upon a mere technicality! It would have required extraordinary courage to have rejected it upon any other plea, or to have denied justice by any other expedient! It was a remarkable fact, that with the convictions afterwards expressed by the Earls of Ellenborough and Derby, and other peers, of the injustice that had been practised towards the royal house of Oude by the East India Company, not one was found to raise his voice at this time on behalf of the unhappy petitioners, who were thus insulted upon the wretched pretext, that a mere expression, conveying, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred (when used), a positive and palpable untruth, had not been observed. Their lordships, by their act of the 6th of August, achieved for themselves an unenviable position before the world; which, irrespective of the merits of the question itself, saw nothing in the proceedings but an unmanly insult to an exiled queen and broken-hearted mother.

On the following day, in the House of Commons, Sir Fitzroy Kelly also presented a petition from the queen and princes of Oude, expressive of their deep regret at the deplorable events in India. They prayed

* His lordship is the son of Sir John Mitford, first Baron Redesdale, who, after enjoying the advantages connected with the successive appointments of attorney and solicitor-general, was elevated to the dignity of lord chancellor of Ireland upon the death of the Earl of Clare, in 1802; and was thereupon introduced to the peerage by the title of Baron Redesdale, of

Redesdale, in the county of Northumberland. The present lord succeeded to the title upon the death of his father, in 1830. Perhaps none but a legal peer of yesterday's creation, could have suggested the rejection of a queen's appeal upon such a wretched pretext as the omission of the word "*humble*."

to be permitted to communicate with the captive king, whose entire innocence they implicitly relied on; and claimed for him that he should be allowed full opportunity to refute the charges that might have been brought against him. In conclusion, the petitioners, while insisting that they had suffered grievous wrong, declared they were satisfied to rely upon the justice of the British sovereign, the parliament, and the people. No discussion arose upon the presentation of this petition, which was simply ordered to lie on the table!

Upon the 11th of August, on the order for going into a committee of supply, Sir De Lacy Evans drew attention to the military arrangements for meeting the contingency in the Bengal army, taking at the same time a comprehensive view of the possible effects of the events in India upon the foreign and domestic interests of the country. The suggestions of the gallant general were commented upon by Lord Palmerston, who said he had listened to them with the respect and deference due to his high military character. He had, however, in his lordship's opinion, over-estimated the European difficulty that might be produced by the events in India. The nations of the world had seen with what an unanimous spirit and energy the British people had responded to the call which the government made to them in a moment of national emergency. While some 30,000 troops had been sent to India, troops were being raised at home as fast as possible; and not only was the regular army being increased, but a portion of the militia was about to be embodied. Recent events in India were undoubtedly serious; but, as far as Europe and foreign countries were concerned, nothing had occurred to alter the conditions of peace. He assured Sir De Lacy and the house, that while the government were at present doing all they thought necessary to meet the difficulty (not going beyond the necessity), if events should take a turn different from what they expected, they felt they had at hand the resource of calling parliament together, and asking for additional means of national defence.—After some discursive remarks by Colonel North, Mr. Newdegate, and other members, Mr. Whiteside reviewed, at some length, the possible causes of the mutiny, and the conduct and policy of the government of India; contending that the former had been the natural and inevitable consequence of the

latter. He maintained that the government had shown neither watchfulness, foresight, nor judgment, otherwise they would long since have discovered the real state of things in India, and have been prepared to meet it, or prevent its natural consequences. The fearful results that had lately been witnessed were, he said, the inevitable consequences of causes which had been patent to all men; and either the Board of Control, the Court of Directors, the local government of India, or all of them together, were answerable for disasters which were fairly ascribable to their mischievous policy.—Mr. Vernon Smith protested against, and distinctly denied, the assertion of the honourable member for Enniskillen, that her majesty's government was not conscious of the gravity of the existing state of affairs in India, or had neglected to attach to them the importance they possessed. "I think," said the right honourable president of the Board of Control, "the honourable and learned gentleman has idly wasted his powers in throwing out general abuse against all persons who have been members of the government for the last ten or twenty years. When I asked him whether he charged me with being responsible for the present state of India, he said that he did not. He declines to make an attack upon any particular member of the government, and his declamation has nothing to do with the present government. But, he says, for all these things we have no redress and no inquiry. I say, have as much inquiry as you will; but what you have to do at present is, to put out the fire which is now raging over India. After you have quenched it, then have inquiry till you sicken of it. I should be most happy to assist the honourable and learned gentleman in a future session of parliament, if he wishes to have an inquiry upon the state of India. I do not think that the honourable and learned gentleman has in any way sustained his accusation against the Indian government. I defy any man to point out, in any of the documents relating to India, any passage showing that my Lord Canning has been in fault on this occasion. I believe that, throughout these transactions, he has shown the greatest possible judgment. All persons with whom I speak, who are well acquainted with India, say, that he has exhibited the greatest vigour and personal courage that could be expected from any man in his position. That I be-

lieve to be the undenied and undeniable fact as regards Lord Canning. There may be some expressions of distrust with regard to India in the letters addressed by Sir C. Napier to Lord Hardinge; but I believe that any man would be denounced as a madman or a visionary, who had hinted that such an outbreak as that which has occurred would occur in India: and I believe that that outbreak can by no means be attributed to any want of foresight on the part of the governor-general."—Mr. Disraeli expressed his surprise at the tone adopted by the president of the Board of Control, who, he said, seemed to object to the criticisms that had been passed upon the policy of the Indian government, because it had not been made a party question. He did not consider the answer of Lord Palmerston to Sir De Lacy Evans at all satisfactory; for his lordship had underrated our position in India, and overrated our position in Europe; and no mistake could be greater than to undervalue the national danger. Nothing, he observed, had occurred since his recent speech upon the subject of India, to refute the opinion he then expressed—that the outbreak was not a military mutiny, and that one of its causes was the tampering, by the Indian legislature, with the religious prejudices of the people. He warned the government that everything depended upon the second campaign, which would commence in November. If our energy and resources were adequate, it might re-establish our empire upon a firmer foundation; but if that campaign should prove unfortunate, and a third was entered upon, we should have others to contend with besides the princes of India. The governor-general, he remarked, was not an isolated individual; he was surrounded by men—the council of India—whose conceit and arrogance had endangered our Indian empire, and who ought to be called to account for their conduct.—Colonel Sykes then read some extracts from a letter of Colonel Edwardes at Peshawur; from which it appeared that, in the opinion of the writer, the mutinous soldiery had met with very little sympathy from the people in any part of the country; and that the Hindoo sepoys were beginning to find that they were made tools of by their Mohammedan comrades.—Lord John Russell expressed his regret at hearing some of the arguments employed by Mr. Disraeli, who had charged the council of the governor-general with

gross misconduct; but whatever errors might have been committed by the Indian government, he (Lord John) was convinced that it had imparted a great amount of good to the people of India, and that its intentions were as benevolent towards the people as those of any government that ever existed. The mutiny, he observed, must be put down; tranquillity must be restored; and it was the primary duty of that house to assure the executive government that its support should not be withheld.

At the sitting of the house on the 14th of August, Sir Fitzroy Kelly, addressing Lord Palmerston in reference to the king and royal family of Oude, said, that from the moment intelligence had reached this country of recent events in India, the royal family of Oude had forborne to urge their case upon the attention of parliament, and were content to await in patience the moment when they could appeal to the justice of the legislature. It was, he said, by their wish that he had forborne to revert to their claims. No communication had reached any one member of the royal family of Oude, in this country, from the king; and they had only learned, through the ordinary channels of information, that the father of one of their number, and the son of another, had been conveyed to a fortress, and were then suffering a harsh imprisonment, under circumstances which rendered it impossible for any of them to communicate with the king, or for him to receive any communication from them. And he asked, on behalf of the queen-mother, that the government would permit some communication, even if subject to their inspection, between the king of Oude and his family in this country; and this, said the honourable and learned member, "I ask as an act of kindness, of charity, and of justice."—Mr. Vernon Smith said, as his noble friend at the head of the government would have other matters to attend to, the house would perhaps allow him to answer the questions as to the imprisonment of the king of Oude, and the charges alleged against him. He (Mr. Smith) believed, from the letters received by the last mail, that the king of Oude was still under arrest, and that the charge upon which he had been arrested was that of complicity in the revolt that had taken place at Delhi. The charge was made by a person who was to be examined *hereafter*. No doubt an investigation into the fact

would take place as soon as possible; and if it should appear that the king and court of Oude had had nothing to do with the revolt, it would be the duty of the governor-general to liberate that personage. But the honourable and learned gentleman had overstated the case when he described the imprisonment of the king of Oude as *harsh*. His majesty had certainly been removed from his residence to Fort William, but there every species of attention that could be paid to a royal prisoner was manifested to him. It was his (Mr. V. Smith's) desire to treat the native princes with the utmost consideration and courtesy; and his noble friend, the governor-general, was animated by the same desire. No restraint had been put upon the king of Oude's family in this country; and it was not quite correct to say that no communication had taken place between them; because a communication had been brought to him from the king of Oude to his relatives in this country, which he (Mr. V. Smith) had desired should be immediately forwarded to the queen of Oude. It was obvious, said the right honourable gentleman, that as the king of Oude was in confinement at Calcutta, for the purpose of restraining any correspondence in which he might be engaged with the supposed conspiracy, it was impossible to allow any communication to take place between him and his friends. His family in this country would, for the present, be cut off from such communication, but there would be no desire, after the trial, to continue that restraint.

In the course of a discussion in the House of Lords, on the same evening, in reference to the occurrences in India, Earl Granville, in reply to the Earl of Ellenborough, expressed his opinion of the atrocities at Cawnpore in the following words:—"With regard to the rumour which has been alluded to, of a dreadful massacre having taken place at Cawnpore, owing to General Wheeler having been deluded by the assurances of a native, I have every reason to believe that the whole of this story is a fabrication! I have seen a letter from Sir Patrick Grant,* in which he states it to be his belief, that the rumour is a *vile fabrication*; and I have also seen a letter from the son of a gentleman, who, writing from his regiment between Cawnpore and Calcutta, and speaking of the great alarm which had

been caused by this rumour, says, that they had been reassured by the discovery that the story was the invention of a sepoy, *who was to be hanged in consequence of the fabrication.*" It is hoped the fearful truth was made manifest before a judicial murder was added to the list of crimes engendered by this terrible insurrection.

In reply to a question by Lord Ellenborough, as to the application of a sum of £200,000, to be voted by the House of Commons for the embodiment of the militia, Lord Panmure stated that the money would be employed in the embodiment of 10,000 militia, between that time and the 25th of the ensuing March. Those 10,000 men would be in aid of the force sent to India. He did not underrate the magnitude of the emergency that had arisen; but he thought the public mind might be calmed when he informed the house, that since the news of the revolt had arrived, an army of more than 30,000 men had been dispatched, and would arrive in India at a season when its assistance could be made available without delay; and, altogether, such preparations had been made for putting down the revolt, as had never before been known in India. If more men were required to terminate the war, the government would not hesitate to call upon parliament for the purpose.—The Marquis of Clanricarde hereupon observed, that "we were engaged in putting down a mutiny, not a war; and one quarter of the troops sent out would be sufficient to march triumphantly from one end of India to the other:" but, at the same time, he believed, that until India was governed in the Queen's name, the stability of government would never be maintained there.—The Earl of Ellenborough agreed with the noble marquis on the latter point, but considered the present was not a fitting time to make any change in the government.

On the 18th of August, Mr. Disraeli, referring to the loss of property incurred by British subjects in India during the insurrection, inquired if it was the intention of her majesty's government to propose compensation to such persons as were placed in adverse circumstances by the deprivation of their property, in consequence of the revolt?—and was informed by Mr. V. Smith, that a scheme of compensation was then under the consideration of the court of directors, and the subject would meet with the attention due to it. On a subsequent evening (the 20th), the right honourable gentleman

* Acting commander-in-chief, until the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell.

qualified this statement, by explaining that he understood the question to refer to the widows and orphans of those persons in the civil and military services, who had perished by the massacres. As to the interpretation that had been generally put upon that answer—that the East India Company had under their consideration a scheme of compensation for the loss of property sustained during the recent mutiny—such a question of compensation opened up a much wider question, into which the directors of the East India Company were not prepared to enter.

The attention of parliament continued to be applied to the affairs of India, its press, and its native armies; and, on the 20th of August, the Earl of Shaftesbury moved for the production of a circular issued by Sir Henry Somerset (then general commander-in-chief at Bombay), dated January 14th, 1857, in which he prescribed certain rules for enlistment, and declared it to be indispensable that no low-caste men should be admitted into the ranks of the native army when others could be obtained, inasmuch as, "from ill-feeding, they are rarely equal in stamina to their better caste neighbours, and are generally deficient in that pride and soldierlike feeling which it is our duty to inculcate as essential to the well-being of the native army." This order was issued some days before the general outbreak; and, as soon as it was issued, it was cancelled by the local government. His lordship observed—"I think it very desirable that a copy of that document should be laid on the table of this house, in order that we may see what has been the course of conduct of the regimental officers and the commanding officers, with reference to that which lies at the root of the mutiny in the Bengal army. I believe that all persons acquainted with India would admit, that nothing has tended more to laxity of conduct and discipline, to foster a spirit of mutiny in the Bengal army, and to make the troops proud, conceited, arrogant, and resistant to the proper labour and duty imposed on all other soldiers, than this homage that has been paid to Brahminical caste. I must say, the disclosures made in the papers lately laid before this house, are sufficient to warn us of the evils of pandering to the vanities, and bigotry, and religious prejudices of the Hindoos. I may state, that when General Hearsey disbanded the 19th regiment, he found 419 high-caste men in that regiment alone. I believe that nothing has

tended more to foster the prejudices of the natives, and to encourage among them self-conceit and the idea of possessing exclusive rights and privileges, than the apparent homage paid to them by the officers and the European authorities. I must say, this is a principle wholly inconsistent with the position which we occupy in India; and it is certainly inconsistent with our political position, and with our position as a Christian country. I do not know that any one single thing has done more mischief throughout India, than the homage that has been paid to the system of idolatry, by declaring that the Brahmins were to be selected and preferred above all others for service in the native army. I want, therefore, to know from some member of her majesty's government, whether the principle of selection, to which I have alluded, is to be recognised in future? For myself, I believe if the principle were laid down, that men of the lowest caste, such as Pariahs, Sudras, and Chundals, should be admitted to stand in the same rank as men of the highest caste, without anything in the nature of exclusion, you would go further to put down Brahminism than by any other mode of action to which you could possibly have recourse. I think it would be very advisable to act upon the principle laid down by General Jacob in a pamphlet he has recently published—that in making levies, the consideration should be, not who are the best Hindoos, but who would make the most true, obedient, and loyal soldiers. I hope my noble friend will relieve the public mind by giving an assurance that, in future, the levies of the Bengal army will be raised on the principle adopted in Madras and Bombay, and that no preference whatever will be given to the Brahmins on account of their caste."

Lord Granville had no objection to produce the paper asked for; but, as regarded the future composition of the Bengal army, he could give no pledge whatever.

The reiterated tales of heartrending distress, of total deprivation of home and property, and of wide-spread misery that had been inflicted upon the European community in Bengal, through the merciless ravages of the insurgent troops, and the havoc caused by reckless marauders who followed their example, at length aroused the active sympathies of the merchant princes of the metropolis of the British empire; and, on Tuesday the 25th of Au-

gust, a public meeting, convened and presided over by the lord mayor (Alderman Finnis) was held in the Egyptian-hall of the Mansion-house, preparatory to the formation of a committee, for the purpose of devising means for affording immediate relief to those who were suffering from the calamities produced by the revolt. The lord mayor took the chair at two o'clock, and was supported by a host of the most influential and opulent of his fellow-citizens. The objects of the meeting appear in the subjoined resolutions, which were unanimously adopted:—

“1.—That this meeting, sympathising with the many helpless sufferers by the late mutiny in India, who are now reduced to a state of utter destitution, feels itself called upon to record its public sense of this calamity, and its detestation of the unheard-of atrocities of the rebel army, and of the rabble abettors of its cruelty, to helpless women and children, and our unarmed fellow-subjects in the East; and trusts that the energetic efforts of the British government and of the East India Company, for the repression of the rebellion and the punishment of the guilty, may, by the Divine blessing, be crowned with the earliest success.”

“2.—That in consideration of the extreme urgency of the case, and the necessity for promptly meeting the wants of the sufferers (now literally depending on others in Calcutta and elsewhere for clothing and food, in addition to their cruel loss of husbands and parents), this meeting most anxiously entreats the contributions of its fellow-citizens and the public at large, and recommends that the subscription-lists be kept open at Messrs. Smith, Payne, & Co.'s, the Oriental Bank Corporation, and the Agra Bank; and that the amounts so collected be dispatched by each mail to the right honourable the governor-general, to be by his lordship placed at the disposal of the other local governments, the Calcutta committee, or other recognised committees and distributors employed in India for carrying out the object in view.”*

A third resolution merely suggested, that the example thus set by the city of London, was deserving of imitation by all other towns in the United Kingdom.

* At a special general meeting of the subscribers to the fund (held subsequently), it was stated, that the committee had ascertained that a great number of cases existed in this country, requiring relief; and to obviate the difficulty which had thus arisen, and to

empower them to apply the funds to meet these fresh exigencies, resolutions were passed, giving the committee a discretionary power in the application of the funds in this country. This extension of power was highly beneficial to many individuals.

These resolutions were eloquently supported, and liberally carried into practical effect upon the instant; the subscription at the first meeting amounting, within an hour, to upwards of £1,000. The example was cheerfully followed throughout the kingdom, and contributions poured in to the bankers in one uninterrupted stream of national liberality. Her majesty and the royal family headed the subscription-list with princely donations; and the nobility, and all other classes of society, vied with each other in the effort to alleviate the miseries of the hapless victims of a dire calamity. Foreign princes and their people also emulated the spirit of England's beneficence; and, in a very short period, the Indian relief fund had acquired colossal dimensions, and was the means of dispensing proportionate benefits among the persons for whose assistance, in their extremity, it was designed. By the first mail that left England after the meeting—namely, the 26th of August—a sum of £2,000 (20,000 rupees) was remitted to Calcutta by the lord mayor, as the first instalment resulting from the meeting held at the Mansion-house on the previous day! Within a fortnight, the Mansion-house “Indian relief fund” reached £35,836 16s. 8d.; and, by the close of the year, the amount of subscriptions from all sources in this country, exceeded £350,000 sterling, and was still progressing.—Among the singular anomalies that were presented in the formation and course of this great act of national, or, it may more correctly be said, of European, liberality and benevolence, it is upon record, that the East India Company, of all the corporations in the kingdom, was the only one that did not feel itself called upon, in its corporate capacity, to contribute to the relief fund; the plea urged by the chairman of the court of directors for refusal being, “that the greatest care should be taken to prevent private liberality being damped. There were many who would refuse to subscribe, if they could say that government would make good all losses. It was impossible that government could reach all cases; and he could not conceive a nobler opportunity than this for the exercise of individual charity.”

In the House of Commons, on the 28th of August, Sir De Laey Evans inquired, "whether it would be consistent with the feelings of government to give orders that the widows and children of the military and civil victims of the mutiny in India should be brought home free of cost, by the returning steamers and transports?"—and was informed by the chairman of the board of directors, that the authorities in India had been instructed to give the most ample assistance to all who were destitute, including not only the military and civil services, but all classes of the community—an announcement which was received with marked satisfaction by the house and country.

Parliament was prorogued by royal commission on the 28th. The following passages in the royal speech were the whole that applied to the Indian mutinies, and are therefore inserted:—

"Her majesty commands us (the commissioners) to inform you that the extensive mutinies which have broken out among the native troops of the army of Bengal, followed by serious disturbances in many parts of that presidency, have occasioned to her majesty extreme concern; and the barbarities which have been inflicted upon many of her majesty's subjects in India, and the sufferings which have been endured, have filled her majesty's heart with the deepest grief; while the conduct of many civil and military officers who have been placed in circumstances of much difficulty, and have been exposed to great danger, has excited her majesty's warmest admiration.

"Her majesty commands us to inform you that she will omit no measure calculated to quell these grave disorders; and her majesty is confident that, with the blessing of Providence, the powerful means at her disposal will enable her to accomplish that end."

The graceful tribute offered, in the above passages of the royal speech, to the heroism and endurance of our countrymen in India, was simply expressive of a sentiment of admiration that was gratefully and proudly felt by all Englishmen. If, at the moment, any consideration could mitigate the anxiety experienced among all classes of the people, through the unprovoked rebellion and massacres that were deluging the cities of Hindostan with innocent blood, it was assuredly only to be found in the national reliance upon the courage and prudence that had, under circumstances of most

trying severity, been universally displayed by those exposed to the sanguinary ordeal. Terrible as, at the best, are the characteristics of even regular warfare, their horrors fade into comparative insignificance when contrasted with the atrocious outrages to which European society in India had been subjected. In war, the daily business of all engaged is that of death: the contingencies are known, and accepted beforehand: the chances of the game are evenly divided;—if there is danger to be encountered, there is honour to be won: a code of recognised usages mitigates the law of the sword; and, above all, it is seldom that the soldier has to contemplate the sufferings and dishonour of those whose lives and safety are more precious to him than his own existence: but, in India, the conditions of civilised warfare were all disregarded. Our countrymen were abruptly surprised, amid the ordinary occupations of peace, by the outburst of a calamity infinitely more terrible than simple war. At a moment's notice they were called upon to defend, not only themselves and the property of the state, but also the lives and honour of their wives and children, against the ferocious and insidious attacks, not of a legitimate enemy, but of the very troops under their own command. As if by the stroke of a magician's wand, the men with whom but a few hours previously they had been con-sorting on terms of amity, or in the interchange of duties, were transformed into foes bent upon rapine and murder—implacable enemies, acknowledging no instinct of clemency, and recognising no laws of war or claims of humanity. One day our countrymen were in a state of profound peace; the next they were struggling for their lives against hordes of ruffians, whose declared and boasted purpose was the extermination of all Europeans. To find a parallel for such a position would be a work of difficulty; and if a writer of fiction were to imagine the circumstances under which the national fortitude of a body of men could be most severely tried, he could hardly invent conditions better calculated for the test than those under which, in May and June of 1857, our countrymen were surprised in Hindostan.

That Englishmen should have borne the shock of such a surprise with dauntless fortitude, was only characteristic of their race. At the very outset of the revolt, there was scarcely a station affected, at

which heroism as splendid as any that ennobles the early history of the Indian conquests, was not displayed. In every garrison the spirit of a *Clive* animated the men, to whose brave hearts and strong arms were entrusted the duty of preserving to their country the provinces won by his genius and his sword; and nobly they discharged the trust reposed in them. The first prospect before their eyes, as the rebel sowars flashed their reeking tulwars in the bosoms of defenceless women and children, amidst the horrors of Meerut, of Delhi, of Jhansi, and of Cawnpore, must have been that of inevitable death; but though destruction thus stared many of them in the face, the condition was calmly accepted, with the resolution only to better it, as far as Providence might enable them, by enduring courage and indomitable self-reliance; and in no instance were they wanting to themselves and to honour. They either escaped death by dexterity and daring, or encountered it like Christians and British soldiers. The dangers and horrors that encompassed them were, in numberless instances, a thousand times more trying than those of a pitched battle; and yet they were encountered with a determination that deprived the crisis of half its terrors. And while such was the case in every instance where Europeans were surprised in the isolated stations, so, also, was it in the field. For instance, although for many weeks the aggregate body of mutinous troops in Delhi outnumbered the small beleaguering force under General Barnard, as largely as the particular bands of murderers did the surprised European inmates of a station, the English troops were never other than victorious in the field. The rebel hordes poured out upon them, five to one in number, from their blood-polluted city, but it was to fight only as men fight with halts round their necks, and the black flag flying over their heads: the despair which they imbibed from their situation, and the martial discipline they retained from the instruction of their betrayed and insulted comrades, were vain altogether; for their cause was evil, and their hearts were faint, in the presence of the avengers.

It was a distinguished, though not extraordinary, feature in the succession of catastrophes that followed the outburst at Meerut, that no pusillanimity was anywhere exhibited among those surprised by the

rebel bands—neither among officers robbed of their men, nor among civilians transformed suddenly into soldiers: in every instance, the coolness and courage of the Anglo-Saxon race was practically demonstrated. The incidents of the murderous surprise were met as would have been those of any ordinary duty. If there was a fort in the place, they retired to it, as at Agra;* if none, they extemporised defences, as at Cawnpore.† Having provided for the safety of their women and children, they then secured their position by every ordinary and extraordinary expedient, and bravely held out till rescued, or, at the worst, until reduced by treachery. If there was no place of protection, and no resource but flight, man and wife ran the gauntlet together through swarms of murderers that were gathered around them, and either saved their lives, or sold them dearly. When there was any chance of fighting on an open field, no odds were refused; nor, as yet, had any proved too great to be overcome. Even the sortie from Agra—though, in the engagement that followed, the rebels had 1,200 horse, and the British only eighteen, and those volunteers—was not without honour nor without success. The death of Captain D'Oyley in this unequal conflict, was as glorious as any that had immortalised the fields of Alma and of Inkermann. It will be recollected that, though mortally wounded, he leant upon a tumbril, and continued to give the word of command to his artillery until all his ammunition was expended; and then, when the hue of death had overshadowed the hero's brow, his last thoughts were of honour—his last words, of a soldier's duty‡ —“Tell them at home, I died fighting my guns!”

However the fact might have been undervalued in June, it was perfectly understood in August, that a sepoy mutiny was only another name for a fierce and sanguinary war of races; and that, although the native troops of Bengal were no match for the English in a regular engagement, the difficulty was not so much to cope with the enemy on the battle-field, as to keep possession of a vast extent of country at numerous points; to guard the highways; to hold the strong places; to wrestle with a Mahratta insurrection in one quarter, and with twenty or thirty thousand infuriated and fanatic Brahmin sepoys in another; to attack

* See *ante*, p. 552. † *Ante*, p. 315. ‡ *Ante*, p. 553.

hordes of malcontents of all creeds and classes, concentrated behind stone walls in distant localities; and to arrest the practical operations of agrarian discontent, that were spreading the flames of rebellion over a vast extent of newly-annexed territory. In the face of all this, it was palpable that all military organisation in the Bengal presidency was lost, so far as the native army was concerned, and that it had been traitorously turned against its creators; and the grand difficulty now was, how to struggle on while a substitute was provided that should effectually supply the deficiency by replacing the revolted troops.

The struggle, then, had resolved itself, with stern simplicity, into a single question—that of time—of time measured, not by years or seasons, but by weeks, and even days. Could our countrymen hold out until succours might reach them, against the raging fiends that were gathering around, impatient for their blood?—was the portentous question to be solved. Not the least doubt was felt as to the actual result of the struggle, or about the reconquest, if necessary, of all India, step by step, fort by fort, province by province;—not a single misgiving had yet been breathed about the eventual issue of the contest;—not a doubt that India would still be British, and that British rule would be re-established in greater strength and dignity than ever. But still, up to the end of August, not a single battalion had reached the shore of India from the ports of Britain. Three weary months had elapsed since the outbreak of the mutiny; and during the whole of that period, the victims of treason and fanaticism had been maintaining a desperate fight for life and honour against overwhelming odds, with only such help as could be picked up from distant colonies or a casual expedition. The gloomy certainty was before our countrymen from the very first—that the aid they appealed for in May, could not reach them from England before the middle of September; but they knew that appeal would not be in vain, and they hopefully and boldly awaited the issue. Under Providence, the fortitude and heroism displayed during this awful interval of suspense, preserved India to the British crown.

The appealing cry that arose from the smouldering ruins of Meerut and the blood-stained pavements of Delhi, was not disregarded. The responsibility that had de-

veloped upon every department of the government at home, to rescue, with all possible dispatch, the remnant of our distant countrymen from the perils by which they were surrounded, and to re-establish, upon a firm and durable basis, the *prestige* of British supremacy in Hindostan, was universally recognised: and the passages of the royal speech before referred to, met with the cordial sympathy and approval of the whole nation upon that ground also. The efforts made by the government, in discharge of its duty, during the few weeks that elapsed between the arrival of the first intelligence and the close of the session, had certainly displayed extraordinary activity; but still it was felt, that the old war maxim, which declares that “nothing shall be considered accomplished while aught remains to be achieved,” would apply with peculiar force to the existing difficulty; and, consequently, from the first, there was no relaxation of effort to carry out the desire of the country.

It is necessary here to advert to the fact, that the army estimates for 1857 had provided for the maintenance in India of twenty-four regiments of infantry and four regiments of cavalry; comprising, altogether, about 30,000 Europeans of all ranks. Of this estimated force, the actual number stationed in India at the period of the outbreak in May, fell considerably short of its proper effective strength, through cases of sickness, death, and employment on civil service; but on the other hand, in addition to the numerical strength of her majesty's troops, the Company's European military establishment consisted of nine battalions of infantry, equally divided among the three presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay. Altogether, therefore, there might have been about 40,000 British troops in India at the commencement of the outbreak; and of this force, not less than one-half was stationed within the limits of the Bengal presidency. In the distribution of the force so located, the Punjab had the advantage of the lion's share; an arrangement partly owing to the necessity that existed for the exercise of great vigilance over the native states bordering the North-Western Provinces, and partly to the prescriptive demands of the newly-acquired territory; and by which the Punjab usually absorbed about two-thirds of the entire European strength of the Bengal army, leaving only a scanty remnant for the pro-

tection of the vast extent of country between Umballah and Calcutta.

Hitherto, the result of such disposition of the European force had not been attended with mischief; but, on the contrary, as far as the Punjab was concerned, it had been beneficial—that province being, in reality, the only one in British India occupied and administered upon a system that was conformable to the enlightened views of the most experienced among Anglo-Indian statesmen. In the present case, however, the arrangement was productive of calamitous results, inasmuch as, in the spring of 1857, the whole European force stationed in the North-Western Provinces and in Bengal Proper, did not numerically amount to more than 5,000 or 6,000 men. There were, it is true, besides the European element in the Company's service, the entire strength of the native armies of Madras and Bombay, which, as yet, were not affected by the taint of rebellion; and there were also a numerous body of Sikh and Ghoorka auxiliaries, and some few of the Bengalese corps that still professed fidelity. From the gross total of this heterogeneous mass, the calamities by war and disease had, of course, to be deducted; but still, the force at the disposal of the government of India, might have appeared to the non-military and distant observer, as sufficiently formidable to trample out the fires of rebellion, though they had spread from Cape Comorin to the Hindoo-Koosh, and from Assam to the gulf of Cutch.

To the experienced soldier, however, the same facts were apparent under a very different aspect, and suggested a less favourable conclusion. It had to be considered how the vast region, comprising the kingdom of Oude, and the provinces of Bundelcund, Agra, and Rohilcund (all then in actual revolt), could be restored to order with such portion of the above gross total as might remain after striking out of the list all the troops in the two presidencies of Madras and Bombay, whether European or native, as well as those that garrisoned the Punjab. The Madras army had sufficient to occupy its attention within its own borders, in overawing Hyderabad and Nagpore, and in curbing the fanatic Moham-medan population scattered over the presidency. That of Bombay had also enough to do to preserve internal order, and in furnishing reinforcements for Scinde and the Punjab, that a good front might be

maintained towards Affghanistan and the Persian frontier. The European troops already distributed over Bengal were, it was notorious, insufficient, in point of numbers, to garrison the principal points on the main lines of communication, and to hold the great cities of the presidency, and had not a man to spare for operations in the field. On the other hand, the disciplined forces of the insurgents in Oude alone, were computed, in June, 1857, at from 25,000 to 30,000 men; in and about Delhi, were at least 30,000 more; and, estimating the revolted contingents of Gwalior and Scinde, and the Bhurtpore levies, with the straggling bands of armed mutineers spread over the country from Neemuch, Hausi, and other stations, to amount to at least another 50,000—we had a rebel force of at least 110,000 men, all disciplined, and well provided with artillery and material for active warfare. Besides this force, there was an immense host of auxiliaries, composed of an armed rabble, the Goojurs, bud-mashes, &c., who, although useless in field operations, were not the less dangerous in the rear of an army, or in forays upon unprotected localities, for the sake of plunder and murder. It had also to be considered that, in this sepy war, the resources of the rebels were relied upon as exhaustless, both as regarded men and means. For every mutinous band dispersed, or utterly destroyed on one point, two others, yet more formidable, immediately sprang into existence in another direction; and the blood that mingled with the soil of Hindostan had scarce time to sink into the earth, before its traces were obliterated by new and more abundant torrents.

Taking, however, the very inconsiderable force mentioned as the basis of our military strength in Bengal, it will be proper, in the first place, to contemplate the efforts made by the governor-general to meet the emergency that had suddenly arisen, and to avert the danger that so imminently threatened the stability of the Anglo-Indian empire. Between the time when the serious character of the revolt had developed itself in India, and the close of the parliamentary session of 1857, in England, Lord Canning had collected at Calcutta, and from thence dispatched to the points where aid was most required, the following troops:—viz., the 29th, 35th, and 84th regiments, with the fusiliers, from Madras and Burmah; the 64th and 78th, with the Bombay fusi-

liers, from Bombay, together with the 5th regiment from the Mauritius, and a wing of the 37th, with some royal artillery from Ceylon. He had also succeeded in intercepting, upon the route to China, the 23rd, the 82nd, the 90th, and the 93rd European regiments; and he had dispatched a steam flotilla to the Cape, for such reinforcements as could be spared from that quarter: and these efforts, by which an accession of at least 12,000 Europeans was added to the defensive strength of the presidency of Bengal, were entirely independent of any instructions from, or exertions yet made at home, to arrest the progress of the calamity by which India was plunged in anarchy and mourning.

It was on Saturday, the 27th of June, that a telegraphic announcement, *via* Trieste, suddenly apprised her majesty's ministers, and the board of directors, that the supposed partial mutiny in one or two regiments of the Bengal army, had assumed the character of a general revolt. The portentous message, terrible as the handwriting on the wall in the palace of the Persian king, ran thus:—"From Calcutta to Lahore, the troops of the Bengal presidency are in open and undisguised mutiny. Delhi is in the possession of 3,000 rebel sepoys. All the Europeans have been massacred. A son of the king is proclaimed emperor of Hindostan." With the speed of lightning the disastrous intelligence spread over the country, and fear and anxiety threw their shadows over the hearts and homes of the people. Instantaneously public feeling was awakened to a sense of the importance of the crisis: and, despite the obstacles and delays that routine and departmental interference would fain have interposed, the government had no choice but to exert all its energies to second the efforts of the authorities in India, and, by prompt and vigorous action, to extinguish the flames of an unnatural rebellion. Decisive action followed swift on prudent resolve; and on Wednesday, the 1st of July, within four days from the receipt of the telegram, a stream of reinforcements for India steadily set out; and from that period to the end of August, it flowed on so continuously, and with such a sustained and accelerated current, that no former war of this country affords a precedent for. On one single day (the 21st July), six vessels left the ports of England, conveying 1,700 troops; and the whole number of

ships dispatched during the month, was thirty-four. The following month witnessed redoubled efforts, as the energies of the country rose promptly to the level of the exigencies which each mail from India announced. In the aggregate, about 9,000 troops were dispatched to the East during the month of July; and in August, upwards of 16,000 more were sent in ships of greater size and swiftness than were available at the moment of the first alarm. In the thirty-four vessels that departed during July, there were but four steam-ships: among the thirty-seven that followed in August, there were nineteen vessels of that description.

It will be observed, from the above statement, that some 25,000 British soldiers were actually dispatched from this country to the assistance of their comrades and countrymen in India, between the 1st of July and the 31st of August, irrespectively of all those reinforcements already mentioned as collected at the seat of government, from the colonies, and other dependencies; and if it be remembered, that the efforts so made at home were accomplished with a mere peace establishment, and immediately after a considerable reduction of the military strength of the country, the result assumes an aspect that cannot fail to be gratifying to the national pride of Englishmen.

But it was not felt that this was the point at which repose should take the place of action. It was prudently considered, that not only might the yet undiscernible exigencies of the future require even a greater array in arms than that already provided, but that such very array itself would demand commensurate reinforcements, to fill the gaps made by the chances of war or the ravages of disease, among troops unaccustomed to the climate. The demands of an army, in this respect, are of course proportional to its original strength, since for every battalion sent forth, it becomes necessary to establish corresponding reserves; and, in the discharge of this obvious duty, government was not wanting: 15,000 men of the militia were promptly enrolled, and fifteen second battalions of the line were ordered to be formed with all possible dispatch, to fill the vacancy in the military establishment of the kingdom, occasioned by the sudden departure of so many regiments for India. All other regiments at home, or on colonial service, were

raised from 840 to 1,000 men each, as fast as recruits could be obtained for them; and an additional force of artillery, with a corps of sappers and miners, were also dispatched for service in Bengal. The past could not be recalled; but it was determined that the future should not be left unprovided for.

For some time the Indian revolt was universally felt to be a mere barbaric movement, such as civilised states, in all times, have been exposed to from the ruder nations over whom they have acquired mastery, and whose people they hold in subjection, not as friends and equals, but as subdued enemies, who simply tolerate what they can no longer successfully resist. The Romans, in their pride of empire, encountered with success the same difficulty, at various epochs, from Gauls, from Britons, from Germans, from various Asiatic nations, and, at an early period of their history, from their own Italian cohorts. In the old sense of the word, the Asiatic races have been unchanged from the beginning of their existence as a people; and in point of habits and feelings, dissimulation and cruelty, they are, at the present time, the same as their historians describe them to have been a thousand years ago. And not only was the movement itself purely Asiatic in its origin, since every phase in which it developed itself partook of the barbaric nature—wild, impulsive, and reckless; but it was exhibited in the first stages as merely the rebellion of a pampered soldiery—one of the oldest incidents of Asiatic history. For some time the people themselves took no part in the excesses of their disciplined but mutinous countrymen. At length the torrent overflowed the banks, and the waves of treason saturated the moral soil of Hindostan. It was then expected that those waves would overwhelm and destroy the entire European element; and that when the torrent of rebellion should again confine itself within bounds, patriotic India, freed from its alien rulers, would bow only to the independent sceptre of a native prince, the descendant of kings who had associated the name of India with traditions of grandeur and romance unparalleled in the sober annals of Western climes. The movement now assumed a more important aspect; it became the rebellion of a whole people, incited to outrage by resentment for imaginary wrongs, and sustained in their delusions by hatred and fanaticism.

The celebrated proclamation of the mutineers from Delhi, adopted, distinctly and

expressly, a religious ground as the pretext for the revolt; and it was a very extraordinary document on such a subject, being literally the joint production of two religious bodies that had hitherto mortally hated and persecuted each other. Those bodies—the Mohammedan and Hindoo worshippers—had, at this juncture, nothing in common but their mutual hatred of Englishmen. For instance, the whole creed of Mohammedanism is a protest against idol-worship; which worship is, on the other hand, the very essence of Brahminism. The Mohammedan is the most zealous and unsparing iconoclast in the world, and outruns both Jew and Christian in his hatred of idols. Mahomet did not much care about his deity being just or beneficent; but he would have him a sole and unembodied deity. That was the one truth which fed the long meditations in the cave at Mount Hira, and gave the prophet's unrelenting sword its one excuse. He knew, that so long as he veiled the Deity, hid him from human eyes, divested him of fictitious form or colour, and removed him into the profound depths of mystery, and the sanctuary of the unseen and impalpable, that, so far, he exalted the Deity. He mixed with some truth a multitude of fictions; but the maxim of invisibility and mystery, Mohammedanism does imperatively teach and defend. Brahminism, on the other hand, is the most multifarious and outrageous system of idolatry in the world. There is no other religion that has so grossly offended decency by its audacious representations of the infinite unseen Being—that has dragged Him so rudely to the very surface of the world of sense, and clothed Him in such grotesque, monstrous, and offensive shapes. Brahminism absolutely riots and luxuriates in fanciful, and sometimes hideous, representations of the invisible and incomprehensible Infinite. Here, then, were two religions, each based upon a totally opposite principle to the other—one resting on the idea of representing the Deity; the other, on the principle of abstaining from all representation, as being impious and blasphemous—the one the greatest and grossest of idolatries, the other the fiercest of protests against idolatry. Yet the believers in those two antagonistic creeds had now actually combined in one religious appeal to the native populations of India, against the professors of a more rational and benevolent faith.—The manifesto, it will be remembered, was addressed

“to all Hindoos and Mussulmans;”* and it urges them to a common and mutual defence of their two respective religions against English assault. Perhaps a more extraordinary combination of mutually-repulsive principles, for a specific purpose, is not to be met with in the history of the human race.

To the innate weakness of the mental and physical nature of the Hindoo populations, and to the impetuous and unstable character of their sometime Mohammedan rulers, we may doubtless attribute the long continuance and progressive enlargement of British dominion in India; where a handful of European merchants had acquired rule over nearly two hundred millions of human beings, by their enterprise, probity, and wisdom. The acquisition thus obtained was perpetuated, because the native races, with their multifarious and conflicting creeds, found that they could enjoy greater security and tolerance under the government of Europeans, than they could possibly expect to obtain from one another, or from a prince selected from either of the great sections into which the populations of India are divided; and it was credulously supposed, that under such circumstances of reciprocal benefit, the bulk of the people would naturally and nationally be averse to any movement that could possibly endanger the continuance of their connection with a country whose domination had been signalled by moderation and justice. It was not deemed possible that, after flourishing in peace during several generations under British rule, they would desire to plunge into a state of anarchy; to imbue their hands in the blood of helpless women and children; to murder in cold blood their European friends and benefactors; to resort, as in sport, to the abduction and sale of European females; to throw open gaols, and let loose upon society the pestilential hordes that peopled them; or that they would not have recoiled with horror from offering homage to a sovereign whose reign could only commence with treachery, and must inevitably close with infamy. All these things, however, were resorted to, and accepted as a means to independence, by the recreant slaves and traitors of Hindostan.

When the Mohammedans, under Sultan Mahmoud, had, in 1024, overrun a great part of India, they exemplified the proselytising tendencies of their creed by establishing the Koran, in open and active pre-

* See *ante*, p. 459.

† See *ante*, p. 183.

dominance, wherever their arms prevailed. In a preceding chapter of this volume, reference has been made to a report that, in the early part of 1857, had obtained currency throughout Southern India; wherein it was stated, that some missionaries had prevailed upon the Queen of England to adopt means by which the Hindoo soldiers of the army of Bengal should be deprived of their distinction of *caste*, and thus be compelled to become Christians; † and also, that her majesty had reproached herself for not having made as many converts in a century, as Tippoo Sultan would have made in a month. Putting aside the gross absurdity of such a rumour, there was in it evidence of the fact, that Hindoos yet remembered how Mohammedanism was propagated by the strong arm of the government, and by the sword of power; and that remembrance was employed to alarm and irritate the impulsive races to whom its disclosures were addressed. Now, the entire policy of this country had been based upon a principle totally opposite to that of the Mohammedan persecutor. Not only had proselytism been never attempted by authority, but a respectful deference had always been shown to the religious prejudices of the people—a deference that rather assumed the aspect of direct encouragement than of prohibitory interference; and sentiments favourable to the Hindoo creed and its adherents, had been for years almost ostentatiously obtruded on the attention of the natives, as embodying the views of government in connection with their religion. Every opportunity was embraced to disclaim anything like intervention in such matters; and, for a long time, the paramount authority of the government was suffered to remain inactive, in regard to the suppression of cruel and abominable usages and ceremonies connected with the Brahminical ritual; while a portion of the revenues of the state were contributed to the support of institutions in which false doctrines and idolatrous practices were openly inculcated. While thus pandering to the errors of a cruel faith, it was impossible not to reflect, occasionally, that the course pursued was hardly susceptible of more than one interpretation—namely, that we were bartering our convictions, as a Christian nation, for the convenience of the Indian government; and that, for the sake of an easy tenure of dominion, and economical facilities of administration, we had been

willing to let some of our prerogatives as Christian governors remain in abeyance.

The outburst of the revolt of 1857, at once raised the question, whether the policy that had been thus observed was either so becoming as it should have been, or even so worldly wise as it was thought to be; and arguments were not wanting calculated to prove, that it would be better, for the future, to conduct ourselves, in matters of religion, with less indifference and more dignity. The people of this country desired that British rule in the East, as in the West, should be characterised by tranquillity and security; but, at the same time, they repudiated anything like an idea of compulsory conversion. Proselytism by violence is utterly opposed, not only to the natural tendencies of Englishmen, but to the genius of Christianity; and no preacher or teacher, however enthusiastic, would obtain a moment's support, who ventured to urge that either menace or seduction should be employed by the government of India, as a medium for turning earnest Hindoos or Mohammedans into insincere Christians; and the great point at length to be solved was, as to the attitude which would most beseem our position as Christian rulers, and be most conducive, in the long run, to the welfare of the people under our sway. It was argued that, if it should be proposed to go on as before in relation to this matter, proof was ready that such a course had not answered the end designed; since it was palpably obvious that our policy had not hitherto been successful in tranquillising the religious susceptibilities of the natives; since, at the very moment, the proof of wide-spread insurrection, upon the ground of an alleged design to interfere with Hindoo worship, was before the world; and it had become painfully evident, that if an attempt had been made to carry the Bible with fire and sword from Calcutta to Peshawur, greater perils could not have been encountered than those to which European society in India was then exposed. It would have been preposterous to affirm the fitness of the system pursued, in face of the fact, that an entire army had actually risen in revolt against the government by which it was supported, through alarm for the inviolability of the religious creed it professed to reverence; and that it had endeavoured to re-establish, to the prejudice of that government, a

dynasty that never scrupled to advance the doctrines of its race by persecution and the sword of the conqueror.

As regarded the future of India, it was perfectly clear that no party of the slightest weight or influence over public opinion, would venture to call upon the Indian government to take a decidedly hostile part against the creeds, the *castes*, and the superstitions of the millions under its rule; to infringe, however slightly, upon the principle of complete toleration; or to devise any measures against *caste* or creed, with the special aim of destroying either. The idea of forcible proselytism was universally repudiated; and it was agreed by all sections of professing Christians, that Hindoos and Mohammedans must be suffered to worship after their own fashion, as they had done in past years; but at the same time, the question was mooted, whether a greater assumption of self-respect might not procure a greater amount of confidence?—and it was asked, whether if, while disclaiming any compulsory propagation of Christianity, we should plainly avow ourselves Christians, and act up to the avowal, we should not find the strength of our influence much augmented by our sincerity? It might not be desired that the Indian government should evince a blind hostility to the native superstitions; but it was now considered, that it would have been as well had we been less deferential—that *castes* need not be obtrusively interfered with, but care might be taken to render less homage to the institution of which they were a part.

In this affair of religious toleration, it was to be considered that government propagandism was one thing, and natural Christian influence another: There could be no doubt that, as a government, the English are prohibited by compact from proselytising in India; but it is not to be supposed, because they are prohibited from converting Hindoos by the sword, that therefore private Christians may not maintain missionaries, establish funds, and found institutions for the peaceful dissemination of the truths of their creed: and it would be an arbitrary and offensive interference with the liberty of the individual, to say that civil and military officers, or even governors-general, might not, in their private and, unofficial capacity, and as simple members of society, subscribe to such institutions. Thus the odium attempted to be at-

tached to Lord Canning, upon an assumption that he had contributed to the funds of some, or all, of the religious institutions of Calcutta, was felt to be as uncalled-for as it was unjust.* As an English gentleman, his lordship had an undoubted right to contribute, if he thought fit so to do, to the Calcutta Bible Society, to the college at Serampore, and to the school of the Scotch Free Church; and he transgressed no rule, and violated no reasonable principle, by so doing. Former governors-general had done the same thing without eliciting invidious remarks; and Lord Wellesley, Lord Minto, Lord Hastings, Sir Charles Metcalfe, and Lord William Bentinck, all aided such schemes, and did not, either in India or in this country, awaken suspicion as to the security of the religion of the people they governed.

Nevertheless, in one sense, it is obvious that we cannot, as Englishmen, avoid becoming tacit instruments in the work of proselytism among the false and idolatrous millions that people the countries subject to our domination throughout the world; since the very presence of the Christian religion among such people, is virtually of itself a missionary appeal. The effect of the sight of European power, greatness, wisdom, and justice, is not within the control of those by whose agency such attributes are developed; nor can they repress the influence which the mere sight of a Christian power, armed with those attributes, may have upon the minds of sagacious and inquiring natives. England cannot divest itself of its character as a Christian nation, or annul the fact, that its European military and civil establishments compose a Christian population in India. To call upon the Indian government wholly to abandon all schemes for improving and elevating the native Hindoo, grovelling amidst the filth of a revolting and impure theology—to abstain from all efforts to enlarge his mind by acquainting him with European literature and history, merely because such advance in knowledge might indirectly have the effect of making him discontented with his own absurd religion, and introduce him to the evidences and moral fruits of another, would have been to violate a most sacred injunction, and to neglect a national duty. Such indirect propagandism, therefore, as that implied by the alleged connection of Lord Canning with certain religious or

educational institutions, ought not, then, to have excited the spleen of even the patrons of intellectual darkness. England, as before remarked, is bound by compact not to interfere by force with the religions of Hindostan; but she is also bound, by her duty as the actual and supreme ruler of India, to advance the moral and intellectual welfare of the people under her charge.

It may be, that to the apparent relinquishment, by successive Indian administrations, of that high Christian principle which, while it inculcates forbearance to the religious opinions of others, inflexibly asserts and maintains the purity and dignity of its own faith, and invests its consistent followers with a resistless moral influence over all that surround them, much of the evil that has for years past been quietly germinating (and at length has grown and ripened into a sanguinary rebellion), may be attributed. By an erroneous system of payments direct from the coffers of the state for the support of the temples and priesthood of a monstrous idolatry, instead of allowing such support to be silently and unobtrusively drawn from lands appropriated to the purpose (and with which no necessity for state interference need have existed), the cruel and blasphemous ritual of the Hindoo worshippers might have appeared to be tolerated rather than encouraged; and the necessity for continually yielding to the claims and assumptions of a fanatic and ignorant priesthood would have been obviated. The concession to the pride of caste and the encroachments of fanaticism, that has permitted the soldiers of a Christian government to take part in absurd and (to them) meaningless ceremonies at the religious festivals of the people—the processions of Juggernaut, and the parading of idols—was of itself sufficient to teach the bigoted fanatics of other creeds, that a government so permitting was regardless of the inviolability of its own; and that, in fact, religion of any kind was a matter of perfect indifference to it. When, therefore, on a sudden, the rumour spread among a credulous and impulsive people, that the English government contemplated a serious interference with, or rather the subversion of, the great outworks of Hindoo superstition—namely, the distinctions and privileges of caste—it was not surprising they should suspect, that a government hitherto so lax in principle as regarded the religion of its own people,

* See *ante*, pp. 606, 607.

must now have some hidden and dangerous motive for interfering with that of the Hindoo races subjected to its power. The rancour and bitterness that spring from religious fanaticism, have produced in all ages, and still produce, the same fruits in all parts of the world. Spain, America, the Low Countries, France, and even England itself, can testify to this fact; for the annals of each are red with the stains of blood poured out in the wars of creeds. Hence, perhaps, may be traced the origin of that ferocious hatred which has from the first characterised the Indian revolt; and which, in its inordinate thirst for blood and vengeance, has, happily for mankind, been as yet without parallel amongst the crimes of nations.

But whatever may have been the grounds upon which the rapidly-spreading calamities that jeopardised the safety of India were based, and whatever the errors of those entrusted with the supreme administration of its government, it was perfectly obvious by the end of August, 1857, that nothing short of the most decisive and energetic measures could avail for the preservation of India. Throughout the British empire, the shout of the people was for rescue and for vengeance: the blood of their slaughtered countrymen, of their martyred women and children, came welling up before their mental vision; and one desire for retribution seemed to pervade all hearts, and nerve all arms. And yet the fact is noto-

rious, that, in both houses of parliament, men were found who still affected to doubt the magnitude of the crisis, and denied the enormity of the outrages that had been perpetrated—men who, in the alleged maladministration of the East India Company and its officers, could find a plea for palliating acts of cruelty that were without parallel in history; and, upon the pretext of Christian feeling, could hold the shield of their sympathies over the truculent ruffians by whom the wives and daughters of British soldiers had been dishonoured and massacred. Such, however, were but extraordinary exceptions among the people of England; and they did not represent the tone of popular opinion, which declared that, in the prosecution of the just and retributive war that had been forced upon the British government, the man who should counsel half measures, or any measure short of the most stern and unrelenting justice, ought to be deemed an enemy to his country and to the human race. The contest of rival factions, in their greed for place and patronage, had not yet fully developed the mischievous and obstructive influences that were silently acquiring strength; and it was not then believed possible that the safety and future welfare of India could be made subservient to a question as to its form of government, or to a struggle whether this or the other statesman, and his friends, should secure a brief tenure of political power upon the ruins of an empire.

THE HISTORY

OF THE

INDIAN MUTINY.

CHAPTER I.

LUCKNOW; THE RESIDENCY AND ITS DEFENCES; STRENGTH OF THE GARRISON; DISMISSAL OF NATIVE TROOPS BY SIR HENRY LAWRENCE; ATTACK UPON THE REBELS AT CHINIUT; TREACHERY OF THE GUNNERS, AND OF THE OUDE CAVALRY; RETREAT OF THE BRITISH TROOPS; CONCENTRATION OF THE EUROPEAN INHABITANTS WITHIN THE RESIDENCY; COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE; DEATH OF SIR H. LAWRENCE; BRIGADIER INGLIS SUCCEEDS TO THE COMMAND; VIGOROUS OPERATIONS OF ATTACK AND DEFENCE; A MESSENGER FROM CAWNPORE; MINES AND COUNTERMINES; DEATH OF MAJOR BANKS; CONDITION OF THE BESIEGED; WEEKLY PROGRESS OF EVENTS; STATE OF THE WOMEN AND CHILDREN; ADVANCE OF GENERAL HAVELOCK FROM CAWNPORE; BATTLES OF OONAO AND BUSHERUT-GUNGE; RETROGRADE MOVEMENT; JUNCTION WITH OUTRAM; SECOND ADVANCE TO LUCKNOW, AND PARTIAL RELIEF OF THE GARRISON.

THE story of the relief of Lucknow will ever occupy one of the brightest pages in the annals of British heroism. The unquenchable spirit of the besieged, amidst the perils of war, the ravages of disease, and the wear of anxiety; the indomitable energy and perseverance of the noble band sent forth to the rescue; and, finally, the glorious triumph by which their united efforts were crowned, present to the world a continuity of events as interesting in detail, as they were supremely important in result. The lives and honour of Englishwomen were imperilled, and the brave hearts and strong arms of their indignant countrymen were irresistible, as they sprang forward to save or to avenge them.

Turning from the crime-polluted streets of Cawnpore, while yet reeking with the blood of the victims of treachery and lust, and echoing with the despairing shrieks of the miscreant slaughterers of the defenceless and the weak, as they writhed in the retributive grasp of the avenger Neill; we have now to trace the progress of the lamented Havelock, as, with his noble band, progressively augmented to about 2,500 British soldiers, he fought his way step by step through a country whose entire population was in arms against him, and whose

every town, village, and even house had been converted into a fortress, only to be reduced by blood and toil. With but one practicable road along which he could advance, he found on either side impenetrable jungle, or death-exhaling swamps, that rendered the slightest deviation from the main route perilous, if not fatal, to the troops under his command. The bridges over the intervening rivers and streams, between Cawnpore and Lucknow, which at the period were swollen to an enormous height, had been carefully destroyed by the people of Oude; and on the further banks, as he approached, innumerable bands of armed rebels, consisting of the mutinous soldiers of the Bengal native army, and of regiments of the several contingents in revolt, had taken their position—strongly intrenched, amply supplied with artillery and ammunition, and all burning with hatred and fanaticism; impatient to avenge their imagined wrongs by exterminating the whole race of their benefactors, whom they felt they had outraged by crime so sanguinary, and insults so foul, that a life of despair, or a felon's doom, had left no alternative for them but a war of reckless desperation. Yet, under a leader whose name had now become synonymous with assurance of victory, the band

of Havelock overcame in detail every obstacle as it presented itself; and though for a moment checked in its triumphant career by a swollen river, or by the visitation of disease, neither paucity of numbers, increasing difficulties, or unavoidable privations, could prevent the accomplishment of the glorious task enjoined them, or could avert the just punishment it was their mission to inflict upon the merciless and unmanly destroyers of helpless women and innocent children.

Anticipating the result of General Havelock's advance upon Lucknow, we must pause for a moment before the vista opened to us by three weary months of daily-increasing peril and diminishing resources, to compare with the generous perseverance and resistless valour of the rescuers, the heroic spirit and unwavering faith of the rescued;—to contemplate the exertions of that small but glorious band, whose vigilance and bravery preserved the priceless treasures of womanly honour and infant purity, dependent upon it for protection, and for even more than existence;—to trace, with exulting admiration, the ceaseless energies called into action by the inspiring examples of a Lawrence and an Inglis, and their co-rivals in a glorious emulation; sustained by which, a few worn-out heroes, regardless of wounds or fatigue, had, from June to September, successfully repulsed the assaults of an enemy outnumbering them by thousands, as day by day they rushed upon a position ill-provided to withstand a siege; and whose defence consisted in the brave hearts and strong arms of its handful of defenders, rather than in the walls by which it was partially surrounded. And thus it was, that, sustained by the impulses of their true English hearts, and by their faith in the outstretched arms and sleepless anxiety of their advancing countrymen, no impatient cry, no desponding wail was heard, though the women and children far outnumbered their defenders, every one of whom, as he fell, struck down a barrier behind which they were sheltered, and left a gap through which the tide of horrors that surged around them, might rush in to desecrate and destroy. No wonder, then, that while the defended thus bravely sustained the spirits, and cheered the energy of the defenders by their inspiring faith and patient endurance of hardship and of peril, the assaults of the rebel hordes that thirsted for their blood, were shorn of half their

terrors, and assurance of ultimate deliverance became daily yet more strong, as the counter-attacks of the little garrison occasionally forced the assailants to reel backward in dismay, and by well-timed and judiciously-planned sorties, found opportunity to drive into the beleaguered inclosure, the herds and stores of provisions collected by the besiegers for the necessary use and sustenance of their own troops, and the hungry multitudes that swarmed around them.

The relief of Lucknow from the rebel host that surrounded it, involved a struggle in which every nerve was strained to its utmost power of tension, both by our beleaguered countrymen and by those who fought their way through hostile myriads to relieve them; and the capability of English endurance was, indeed, then tested. Before the gates of the residency could be thrown back to welcome the generous rescuers, death had already thinned the ranks of its defenders: the wisest and bravest—where all were wise and brave—had fallen in the shock of war; physical weakness had prostrated the strength, though it could not subdue the indomitable spirit, of the heroes of Lucknow; and famine had already unveiled its ghastly face amidst the beleaguered band. One day—perhaps but a few hours longer, and the unsurpassed heroism displayed by all, for the sake of all, might have proved unavailing; and three months of unsurpassed endurance and unshaken faith would have been succeeded by an hour in which the shrieks of dishonoured and dying women and children would have mingled with the expiring groans of their mutilated and overpowered defenders. Already the mines of the insurgents had penetrated within the line of defence, and a short time need only have elapsed before the extemporised bulwarks of the residency would be blown into the air, and the infuriated and ferocious host that panted for slaughter, with their no less brutal abettors from the bazaars and the gaols, would have been streaming over the ruins to glut themselves with the blood of the defenceless victims. It was the will of Providence that this crowning atrocity of the sepoy war should be wrested from the grasp of the murderous host that designed its consummation; and Lucknow, its women, and its children were saved! but some of the best blood of England bathed the laurels that were implanted to immortalise the memory of their deliverance.

The position of Sir Henry Lawrence had

become extremely onerous after the events of the latter end of May, to which reference has already been made;* and it was impossible he should avoid being deeply impressed with a sense of the importance of an approaching crisis. In anticipation of this, he had already begun to make preparations for the defence of the residency, in which he purposed to collect the whole of the European community, both civil and military, then in Lucknow; and, with this view, had thoroughly armed several important points of defence within the enclosure, distributing his European soldiers to the best advantage over the place. Two squadrons of the 2nd Oude irregular cavalry were at the *dák* bungalow, half-way between the residency and the cantonment; and at the latter were stationed about 340 men of her majesty's 32nd regiment. The cantonment was situated about six miles from the city, and the residency was itself entirely isolated from both.

According to a plan recently published of the residency and a part of the city of Lucknow, the former appears to have been, in its entirety, an irregular, lozenge-shaped enclosure, having its acute angles nearly north and south; the southern extremity being contiguous to the Cawnpore-road, and the northern point approaching near to the iron suspension-bridge over the Goomtee, which separated the cantonment from the city and residency. Near the south point of the enclosure was the house of Major Anderson, standing in the middle of a garden or open court, and surrounded by a wall: the house was defended by barricades, and loopholed for musketry; while the garden was strengthened by a trench and rows of palisades. Next to this house, and communicating with it by a hole in the wall, was a newly-constructed defence-work, that received the name of the Cawnpore Battery; mounted with guns, and intended to command some of the houses and streets adjacent to the Cawnpore-road. A house next this, occupied by a Mr. Deprat, had a verandah, which, for defensive purposes, was blocked up with a mud wall six feet high, and two feet and a-half thick: this wall was continued in a straight line to that of the next house, and carried up to a height of nine feet, with loopholes for musketry. Next to this was a house occupied as a school for boys of the Martinière college—strengthened by a stockade of

beams placed before it; and adjacent was a street or road, defended by stockades, barricades, and a trench. Further towards the western angle of the enclosure was a building known as the Daroo Shuffa, or King's Hospital; but then called the Brigade Mess-house; having a well-protected and lofty terrace, which commanded an exterior building called Johanne's House. In its rear was a parallelogram, divided by buildings into two squares or courts, occupied in various ways by officers and their families. Then came groups of low brick buildings, around two quadrangles, called the Sikh Squares, on the tops of which erections were thrown up to enable the troops to fire upon the town. Separated from these by a narrow lane was the house of Mr. Gubbins, the financial commissioner; the lane was barricaded by earth, beams, and brambles; the buildings were strengthened in every way; and the extreme western point formed a battery, constructed by Mr. Gubbins himself. Then, passing along the north-west side, were seen in turn the racket-court, the slaughterhouse, the sheep-pen, and the butcher-yard—all near the boundary of the fortifications, and separated one from the other by wide open spaces: there was a storehouse for cattle-food, and a guard-house for Europeans; and all the buildings were loopholed for musketry. In the rear of the Bhoosa Intrenchment (as this post was called), was the house of Mr. Ommaney, the judicial commissioner; guarded by a deep ditch and cactus-hedge, and provided with two pieces of ordnance. North of the slaughterhouse, a mortar battery was formed. The English church was the next important building towards the north: it was speedily converted into a granary; and in the churchyard was formed a mortar battery, capable of shelling all the portion of the city between it and the iron bridge. This churchyard was afterwards destined to receive melancholy proofs of the sacrifices required for the defence of the station. Beyond the churchyard was the house of Lieutenant Innes, in dangerous proximity to many buildings held by the rebels, and bounded on two sides by a garden; and it was a difficult but most important duty to strengthen this house as much as possible. The extreme northern point of the whole enclosure—not 500 yards from the iron bridge—was scarcely susceptible of defence in itself; but it was fully protected by the Redan

* See vol. i., p. 183.

battery, constructed by Captain Fulton. This was decidedly the best battery in the whole place, commanding a wide sweep of the city and country on both banks of the river. Along the north-east side, connected at one end with the Redan, was a series of earthworks, fascines, and sand-bags, loopholed for musketry, and mounted with guns. A long range of sloping garden-ground was turned into a glacis, in front of the line of intrenchment just named. In the centre of the northern half of the whole place was the residency proper, the official abode of the chief commissioner. This was a spacious and beautiful brick building, which was speedily made capable of accommodating several hundred persons; and as it stood on elevated ground, the terrace roof commanded a view of the whole city—for such as would incur the peril of standing there. The hospital, a very large building near the eastern angle of the whole enclosure, had once been the banqueting-room for the British resident at the court of the king of Oude; but it was now occupied as a hospital, a dispensary, officers' quarters, and a laboratory for making fuses and cartridges: it was defended by mortars and guns in various directions. The Ballee, or Bailey Guard, was near the hospital, but on a lower level; various parts of it were occupied as a store-room, a treasury, and barracks: the portion really constituting the Bailey Guard gate (the station of the sepoy's formerly guarding the residency), was beyond the limits of the enclosure, and was, therefore, productive of more harm than good to the garrison: and as a means of security, the gateway was blocked up with earth, and defended by guns. Dr. Fayer's house, south of the hospital, had a terrace roof, whence rifles were frequently brought to bear upon the insurgents; and, near it, a few guns were placed in position. Southward, again, was the civil dispensary; and near this the post-office—a building which, from its position and construction, was one of the most important in the whole place. Soldiers were barracked in the interior; a shell and fusee-room was set apart; the engineers made it their headquarters; several families resided in it; and guns and mortars were planted in and around it. The financial office, and the house of Mrs. Sago (the mistress of a charity-school), were on the south-east side of the enclosure; and were, with great difficulty, put in a defensive condition. The judicial

office, near Sago's house, could only be protected from an open lane by a wall of fascines and earth. The gaol near the Cawnpore gate was converted into barracks, and the native hospital became a tolerably sheltered place. The Begum's kothee, or "lady's house" (formerly belonging to a native lady of rank), was in the centre of the whole enclosure: this comprised many buildings, which were afterwards converted into commissariat store-rooms, cooking-rooms, and dwellings for officers' families.

The residency at Lucknow, it will be seen from the above description, was a small town, rather than a mere single building, occupied by the chief commissioner. Before the defences were commenced (in June), it could be approached and entered from all sides; and, at the beginning of July, only a part of the defence-works above described were completed. The brave occupants of the improvised fortress had to fight and build, to suffer and work, to watch and fortify, day after day, under privations and difficulties it is almost impossible for those at a distance to appreciate. The various houses, frequently denominated "garrisons" by those engaged in the siege, did really deserve that title in a military sense; for they were gradually transformed into little forts or strongholds, each placed under one commander, and each bravely defended against all attacks of the enemy, until the triumphant advance of Havelock gave all that survived of the heroic band a respite from their labours.

Of the Europeans collected together within the enclosure of the residency, on the 30th of May, 1857 (numbering, altogether, 794 persons), the women and children alone amounted to 522; besides whom were 138 civilians: the entire military force for their immediate protection, consisting of 144 men of all grades—from the chief commissioner downward. At a subsequent period, when the whole of the European troops had been withdrawn from the outposts, and were concentrated within the enclosure, the residency became necessarily the shelter of a much larger number of persons, including as well the English troops as also a number of men belonging to the native corps, who as yet professed to be loyal to the government.

After the affair of the 30th of June (hereafter referred to), the discomforts of the individuals shut up within the line of defences began to be seriously augmented. The un-

fortunate result of the affair near Chinhut, rendered it apparent that every European or native Christian who valued existence, must look for its preservation within the walls of the residency; and many who had risked remaining in the city until that time, now rushed into the enclosure, without having made any preparation for flight, and, in most instances, divested of every article of property but the clothing they happened to be wearing at the moment of their panic. The confusion for the first few days after this sudden influx, was indescribable. Numbers who had thus come in at the eleventh hour, vainly for a time sought to find, or to make, something which they might call a home; and the consequent excitement, aided by the clamour and perplexities of the native servants, rendered the enclosure for a short time a perfect Babel in miniature.

Without further anticipating events which will be better understood in their due course, it is necessary here to observe, that, after the defection of a portion of the native troops at Lucknow, on the 31st of May, and their flight towards Seetapore,* some 700 men of the several corps who still remained, or professed to remain, faithful to the government, continued to be employed in their military duties as usual; but as time progressed, and it became evident to the keen perception of Sir Henry Lawrence that the whole surface of Oude was seething with rebellion; when, day by day, intelligence reached him that station after station had been a scene of sanguinary outrage, and that regiment after regiment had, after murdering its officers, either dispersed in lawless gangs over the country, or, in a mass, had joined the rebel hordes that were directing their steps towards the capital; it was no longer prudent that reliance should be placed upon the loyalty of men so closely connected by blood and religion with the rebellious soldiery, and whose presence had become a source of embarrassment rather than of strength. At length, intelligence reached the residency that the deserters from Lucknow had succeeded in exciting their co-religionists at Seetapore to mutiny; and the danger of an explosion among their comrades who still remained, became hourly more imminent. No time, therefore, was to be lost in removing this cause of anxiety, and, in all probability, of danger also; and Sir Henry Lawrence at once determined upon getting rid of the whole of the native

* See vol. i., p. 183.

troops that remained in the cantonment. This object was accomplished by giving each man the arrears of pay due to him, with leave of absence from duty for three months. The plan succeeded, without, at the moment, exciting suspicion of the motive; and nearly the whole of the men availed themselves of the proffered indulgence; thus relieving the European garrison from much anxiety, and greatly strengthening its confidence in its own means for surmounting the difficulties that appeared likely to surround it.

In a non-official communication from Mr. Martin Gubbins (the finance commissioner already mentioned), to his brother, the assistant judge at Benares (printed among the Indian correspondence laid before the House of Commons).† that gentleman observes as follows:—"Here in Oude we have lost every station but Lucknow. We hope to hold against all the world for a length of time. We hold two positions—that is, the residency and Muchee Bhowun, separated by about three-quarters of a mile; and we have 225 Europeans and three guns in the Muchee Bhowun cantonment. We have, thank God, got rid of the remnants of the mutinous regiments of Lucknow—that is, the 48th, 21st, and 39th native infantry, and 7th light cavalry. Sir H. Lawrence was so ill that a provisional council has been appointed. We ordered commanding officers to recommend their men to go home for three months after receiving their pay; it succeeded, in most cases, with a mere trifling exception: none remain of all our disciplined troops. About 1,200 Seetapore mutineers threaten us on the north; six regiments and a battery on the Fyzabad side, and two regiments and a battery from beyond the Gogra, also threaten us. I have no fear if we are true to ourselves, and go at the first force which approaches. We have plenty of elephants to carry the Europeans, and the fellows fear us immensely; but if, as I expect, we may be hemmed in, though I do not fear the result, yet we must needs undergo the misery and sorrow of a siege."

Although the residency was the main point of defence, the city and cantonment were still under British control up to the end of June; and, on the 27th of that month, Sir Henry Lawrence apprised the authorities at Allahabad, that he still held the residency and the Muchee Bhowun, having

† See Blue Book (Indian Mutiny), No. 3; p. 75.

then concentrated his force upon those points only; and that his supplies were equal to two months' consumption: adding, that although he felt assured that Lucknow was at that moment the only place in Oude where British influence was paramount, and he dared not leave the city for twenty-four hours without risk of a popular rising; he declared his belief, that if he could be strengthened by one additional European regiment, and a hundred artillerymen, he could re-establish British supremacy in Oude. It was not the will of Providence that he should have an opportunity for testing the soundness of his faith.

The next authentic information received by the Indian government, in reference to events at Lucknow, was conveyed by the following telegrams from the officer commanding at Allahabad, and the chief commissioner at Benares, to the governor-general in council. The first is dated "Allahabad, July 10th, 1.30 P.M. This just come in to officer commanding here:— 'Lucknow, June 30th. From Sir H. Lawrence. Went out this morning eight miles to meet the enemy, and were defeated, through misconduct chiefly of artillery and cavalry, many of whom deserted. Enemy followed us up, and we have been besieged for four hours. Shall likely be surrounded to-night. Enemy very bold, and our Europeans very low. Looks upon his position now ten times as bad as it was yesterday: it is very critical. We shall be obliged to concentrate, if we are able. We shall have to abandon much supplies, and blow up much powder. Unless we are relieved in fifteen or twenty days, we shall hardly be able to maintain our ground. We lost three officers killed this morning, and several wounded—Colonel Case, Captain Steevens, Mr. Brackenbury.'"

The second telegram, dated from Benares, July 11th, 6.15 P.M., is more explicit:—"A man belonging to the commissariat-office in Lucknow, deposed that, on June 29th, it was rumoured that 7,000 or 8,000 insurgents were encamped on the opposite side of the Kookral canal. Sir Henry went out to meet them with two companies of her majesty's 32nd, eleven guns, and sixty sowars. After a severe contest of two hours, and a loss of sixty men, he was forced to retreat. The sowars were panic-struck, and fled. At Allygunge, about two miles from the Kookral canal, the enemy attacked and captured six guns.

Sir Henry said to have been wounded there. The British fought their way to the residency, closely followed by the insurgents, who entered the city, and began plundering the inhabitants, who would not join them in their excesses."

The siege of Lucknow commenced on the 1st of July—the day succeeding the disastrous affair above-mentioned; and it was, for duration and severity, even more truly such than was that to which the ill-fated Sir Hugh Wheeler had been subjected at Cawnpore; since, in addition to the incessant firing of musketry, cannon, and mortars, there were also, in its progress, subterranean mines or galleries dug by the mutineers from the outer streets, under the enclosing wall of the position, intended to blow up and destroy the defences. To detect these proceedings, it was necessary to maintain strict and unceasing watchfulness at every point of the residency at all hours. The concentration of the European troops being now indispensable, a telegraph, established upon one of the buildings, signalled to the officer in command at the Muchee Bhowun, directing him to blow up the fort, and retire to the residency with the treasure and guns. This affair was successfully accomplished; and 240 barrels of powder, and 600,000 rounds of ammunition, were blown into the air to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy; the officers and soldiers meanwhile taking their departure for the residency, where they helped to strengthen the ranks of its valiant defenders.

As yet, nothing had occurred seriously to depress the spirits of the garrison; but the period approached when the master-mind that had hitherto successfully grappled with every difficulty opposed to it, was destined to succumb to the lethargy of the tomb, by an accident as extraordinary as it was unexpected. After repeatedly facing the perils of treason, and the more honourable dangers of the battle-field, it was the fate of Sir Henry Lawrence to be stricken down in a moment of comparative repose, and beneath the shelter of his own roof. It had happened, during the morning of the 1st of July, that an 8-inch shell, from a battery of the rebels, entered a small apartment of the residency, in which at the time Sir Henry Lawrence was sitting, in conversation with his private secretary, Mr. Couper. The missile burst between them, without injuring either: and now as the

residency seemed to have become a special target for the round shot and shells of the insurgents, the officers of Sir Henry's staff earnestly besought him to remove his personal quarters to another and more secure part of the building. He, however, declined to accede to their wishes, jestingly observing, that the room was so small, another shell would certainly never pitch into it. Unfortunately, his error was a fatal one.

On the very next day, while resting on a couch in the same apartment, after several hours of severe and exhausting labour, another shell penetrated the wall, and burst; one of the fragments inflicting a wound upon Sir Henry, that was immediately known to be mortal. The consternation and grief of the whole garrison, when this lamentable occurrence was made known, was excessive; but it was fruitless. The truly great man, and true soldier, lingered in agony until the morning of the 4th of July, when death relieved him from further suffering. No military honours marked the funeral rites of the chief commissioner of Oude; there was neither time nor opportunity for the pomp of grief: a hurried prayer was offered up amidst the booming of cannon, and volleys of hostile musketry performed the soldier's requiem, as a few spadefuls of earth fell on the mortal remains of one whose name is inscribed among the most worthy of the sons of England.*

Sir Henry Montgomery Lawrence was the elder brother of Sir John Laird Muir Lawrence, K.C.B., chief commissioner of the Punjab, and eldest son of the late Lieutenant-colonel Alexander William Lawrence, who was distinguished by his gallantry at the siege of Seringapatam. The mother of Sir Henry was the daughter of the late Captain Knox, of the county Donegal, Ireland. Henry Montgomery Lawrence was born in 1806, at Mattura, in Ceylon; and, in 1837, married Honoria,

younger daughter of the Rev. George Marshall, of Cardonagh, Ireland; but was left a widower in 1854. Having received his early education at the diocesan school of Londonderry, and afterwards at the Royal Military College, Addiscombe, he entered the military service of the East India Company in 1821, as a cadet in the Bengal artillery, and soon acquired the reputation of being one of the most able and intelligent officers in the service. Having shared the perils and glories of the Cabul campaign with Sir George Pollock, he was, in 1843, raised to the rank of major; and, in the same year, became British resident at Nepaul. He afterwards took a distinguished part in the campaigns on the Sutlej; soon after which, he was made a military companion of the Bath; and, at the same time, promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel. In 1846, he was appointed resident at Lahore, and agent for the governor-general on the north-western frontier; and, in consequence of his able services in the administration of this important office, the distinction of K.C.B. (civil) was conferred upon him in 1848. In the following year, he was appointed, by Lord Dalhousie, president of the board for the reduction and government of the recently annexed province of the Punjab; and subsequently was appointed chief commissioner of the kingdom of Oude, upon the annexation of that state also. In each of these high and important posts, Sir Henry Lawrence increased the high opinion already entertained of his administrative talents both by the government and by his friends. In 1854, he obtained the rank of full colonel, and was nominated an honorary aide-de-camp to her majesty, as a further recognition of his extraordinary merits.

In Sir Henry Lawrence, the Indian service and the country lost an officer whose head and hand could ill be spared at the moment they were deprived of his services.

* Some affecting incidents connected with the last moments of the lamented chief, are preserved by the authoress of *A Lady's Diary of the Siege of Lucknow*; who was, at the time the fatal wound was inflicted, staying with her husband at the house of Dr. Fayer, a surgeon, who had repeatedly urged upon Sir Henry Lawrence the paramount duty of cherishing his own life as one valuable to others, even if slighted by himself. This lady says—"He was brought over to this house immediately:—prayed with him, and administered the holy communion to him. He was quite sensible, though his agony was

extreme. He spoke for nearly an hour quite calmly, expressing his last wishes with regard to his children. He sent affectionate messages to them; and to each of his brothers and sisters. He particularly mentioned the Lawrence Asylum, and intreated that government might be urged to give it support. He bade farewell to all the gentlemen who were standing round his bed, and said a few words of advice and kindness to each. There was not a tearless eye there; every one was so deeply affected and grieved at the loss of such a man." The depression occasioned by his loss was extreme.

but it was not merely as a soldier, or as an administrator, that he stood high in general appreciation. As a frank, honourable, and straightforward English gentleman, and as a generous and unselfish friend, he had few equals and no superiors: so that his loss fell quite as heavy upon private society in India, as it did upon the public service. In India, his memory will long be cherished as that of one of its most valued benefactors; and the asylum founded by him, between Simla and Umballah, for the orphan children of European soldiers, will long attest his claim to the lasting gratitude of his countrymen.

A few hours previous to his death, Sir Henry Lawrence nominated Major Banks to succeed him as chief commissioner, until the important functions of the office were otherwise provided for by government. Colonel Inglis, of the 32nd regiment, was also named by him to command the troops and watch over the safety of the residency until it should be relieved. How nobly that arduous task was performed, will be best described in the official documents hereafter referred to.

On the day Sir Henry Lawrence was laid in his hurried grave, his nephew, Mr. G. H. Lawrence, was wounded; and Miss Palmer, daughter of Colonel Palmer, of the 48th regiment, had her thigh shattered by a ball: on that day, also, all order or legitimate trade ceased in the city, which was entirely in the hands of marauders and bndmashes. On the 5th of July, the rebels obtained possession of a high building called Johanne's House, from which they were able to keep up a galling fire upon Anderson's house, the gaol barracks, the post-office, and the Begum's kothee. On the 6th and 7th, a harassing fire was kept up on the residency from various points; and some of the *bhoosa* (or chopped straw, for bullocks' fodder) which had been stored in an ill-protected place, was set on fire by the enemy, placing a magazine in its vicinity in imminent danger. On one of these days, Major Francis had both his legs cut off by a cannon-ball while sitting in the mess-room. Mr. Marshall, an opium-merchant, was killed; and the Rev. Mr. Polchampton was wounded. Many of the enemy's batteries were not more than from fifty to a hundred yards' distant from the exterior boundary of the residency enclosure, and the practice from them was most destructive. The principal number of deaths, however (which

were from ten to twenty a-day during the first week), were caused by musket bullets, the enemy having many good marksmen among them; and one especially—an African eunuch, belonging to the late court of the king of Oude—who used his musket with deadly precision from Johanne's house.

The second week of the siege opened with an augmentation of the evils already endured. On one day, the Bailey Guard would be fiercely attacked; another day the Cawnpore battery demanded incessant watchfulness and exertion from the officers and men posted at those outworks. Brigadier Inglis, upon whom the mantle of Lawrence had worthily fallen, sent off letters and messages to Cawnpore and Allaha-bad; but none reached their destination, the messengers being invariably intercepted on their way. This he knew not at the time; he only knew that no intelligence, no aid, reached him in return; and he felt that he was, in fact, thrown upon his own resources, which he consequently measured with an anxious heart. Sometimes a few officers would retire to obtain a little rest just before midnight, to be aroused at one or two o'clock in the morning by a message, that Gubbins' house or "garrison" (as most of the fortified houses within the enclosure were now called), or the Bailey Guard, or some other important post, was closely attacked. Sleep, food, everything was forgotten at such moments, except the paramount duty of repelling the enemy at the first attack. One day, a rebel armed with a musket pushed forward to such a spot as enabled him to shoot Lieutenant Charlton within the door of the church. Sometimes the enemy would fire logs of wood from their cannon and mortars, as if they were deficient in shot or shell; but their fire did not slacken on that account. Occasionally they sent shots which set the commissioner's house on fire, causing danger as well as difficulty in the attempt to extinguish the flames; and it soon became perilous for any one within the enclosure to be seen for an instant by the enemy, so deadly accurate were their marksmen. Sometimes the officers, with a few men, longing for a dash that might inspire them in the midst of their troubles, would make a sortie beyond the defences, spike a gun or two, dispatch a few rebels, and then hasten back to the enclosure. Lives, however, were too valuable to be risked for

advantages so small as these; and, consequently, such acts of heroism were not encouraged by the brigadier.

The indignation and anxiety of the garrison became much increased during the third week of the siege, in consequence of the enemy having commenced firing at the brigade mess-house, where the ladies and children had taken refuge. In perfect keeping with the sepoy tactics, attacks were thus persistently made upon those who could not defend themselves; and thus the officers and soldiers found their attention distracted from necessary duties at other points. Anderson's house had by this time become so riddled with shot, that the stores were removed from it; and Deprat's house, similarly battered by the enemy, in like manner became uninhabitable. The buildings near the boundary suffered most, and, as a consequence, those nearer the centre became more crowded with inmates. Day by day, and hour by hour, did officers and men work hard to strengthen the defences. Mortars were placed behind the earthwork at the post-office, to shell the battery at Johanne's house; and stockades and traverses were made to screen the entrance to the residency, within which so many persons were sheltered. Nevertheless, the attack increased in vigour quite as rapidly as the defences gained strength. The custom of the insurgents at this time, was to fire all night, so as to afford the garrison no rest, and wear them out with a want of it. They also now placed a mortar that sent shells directly into the residency building, and commenced a new battery to bear upon Gubbins' house; and their cannon-balls fell upon and into Fayrer's and Gubbins' houses, the post-office, and the brigade mess-house. On the 20th, a shot swept through a room in which several of the officers were breakfasting, and a mine was sprung inside the Water-gate, intended to blow up the Redan battery; while, at the same time, vigorous attacks were made on almost every point of the enclosure, as if to bewilder the garrison with crushing onslaughts on every side. Almost every building was the object of a distinct attack. The Redan battery was fortunately not destroyed, the enemy having miscalculated the distance of their mine; but the explosion was followed by a desperate struggle on the glacis outside, in which the insurgents were mowed down by grapeshot before they would abandon their efforts to

enter at that point. At Innes's house, Lieutenant Loughnan maintained a long and fierce contest against a body of insurgents twenty-fold more numerous than the little band that aided him; and before they desisted, a hundred of their dead and wounded were carried off by the rebels. The financial office and Sago's house, entirely defended by military men, bore up bravely against the torrent that sought to overwhelm them. In short, every point was attacked with vigour; but every attack was also vigorously repelled.

When the muster-roll was called after these exciting struggles, it was found that many valuable lives had been lost; though, happily, not more than thirty persons of all grades were killed or wounded on the 20th. But it is asserted by the author of *A Personal Narrative of the Siege*, that the loss of the enemy during seven hours of incessant fighting, could not have been less than 1,000 men—a result attributed to the showers of grapeshot poured forth from the beleaguered garrison.

In the course of the fourth week, a gleam of hope brought transient joy to the besieged. On the 23rd, a messenger who had succeeded, amidst imminent peril, in reaching Cawnpore and returning, entered the residency, bringing news of Havelock's victories in the Doab. He was immediately sent off again, with an urgent request to the general to advance with his column to Lucknow as speedily as possible. Now, indeed, the anxiety of the English residents was painfully augmented; they began to count the days that must elapse before Havelock could arrive—a hopeful idea at the moment, but bitterly disappointing afterwards; for succour came not, and they knew not why; and, at last, the “deferred hope that maketh the heart sick,” shed its chilling influence around them. Meanwhile, the enemy were not idle: on narrowly watching, the engineers detected the rebels forming a gallery beneath the ground, from Johanne's house to the Sikh Square and the brigade mess-house. They could hear the miners at their subterraneous work, and immediately ran out a countermine, and destroyed the enemy's work by an explosion. On the 25th of the month, a letter arrived from Colonel Tytler at Cawnpore—the first received from any quarter throughout the month of July; for the former messenger had merely brought rumours concerning

Havelock, and not a letter or message. The assurance that that general intended to advance to Lucknow, again awakened hopes that had almost ceased to exist; and the messenger was dispatched to him with a plan of the city, to aid his proceedings, and to urge his prompt advance; the messenger being promised a reward of 5,000 rupees if he safely brought back an answer.

To add to the distress of the Europeans, Major Banks, the civil commissioner named by Sir Henry Lawrence, was shot dead while reconnoitring from the top of an out-house. The Rev. Mr. Polehampton was also killed; as were Lieutenants Lewin, Shepherd, and Archer. Dr. Brydon was severely wounded; and the death of Major Banks greatly increased the care and responsibilities of Brigadier Inglis; who, now that there was no chief commissioner, felt the necessity of placing the community under strict military garrison rules.

The following picture of the condition of the occupants of the residency during July, is drawn by one of themselves.*—"The commissariat chief was ill; no one could promptly organise that office under the sudden emergency; the food and draught bullocks, unattended to, roamed about the place, and many of them were shot, or tumbled into wells. Terrible work was it for the officers to bury the killed bullocks, lest their decaying carcasses should taint the air in the excessively hot weather. Some of the artillery horses were driven mad for want of food and water. Day after day, after working hard in the trenches, the officers had to employ themselves at night in burying dead bullocks and horses, the men being all employed as sentries, or on other duties. As the heat continued, and the dead animals increased in number, the stench became overpowering, and was one of the greatest grievances to which the garrison was exposed; and the officers and men were troubled by painful boils. Even when wet days occurred, matters were not much improved; for the hot vapours from stagnant pools engendered fever, cholera, and other diseases. The children died rapidly, and the hospital rooms were always full; the sick and wounded could not be carried to upper apartments, because the enemy's shot and shells rendered such places untenable. The officers were put on half rations early in the month; and those

they had to cook for themselves, as most of the native servants had ran away when the troubles began, and many of them ended their service by plundering their unsuspecting masters." The English ladies suffered unnumbered privations and inconveniences, as may be conceived from the following account in the Diary before alluded to; which, recording the first day of the siege, says—"No sooner was the first gun fired, than the ladies and children (congregated in large numbers in Dr. Fayer's house) were all hurried down stairs into an underground room, called the Tye Khana—damp, dark, and gloomy as a vault, and excessively dirty. Here we sat all day, feeling too miserable, anxious, and terrified to speak, the gentlemen occasionally coming down to reassure us and tell us how things were going on. — was nearly all the day in the hospital, where the scene was terrible; the place so crowded with wounded and dying men, that there was no room to pass between them, and everything in a state of indescribable misery, discomfort, and confusion. In the preceding month, it had been a hardship for these ladies to be deprived of the luxuries of Anglo-Indian life; but they were now driven to measure comforts by a different standard. They were called upon to sweep their own rooms, draw water from the wells, wash their own clothes, and perform all the menial duties of the household; while their husbands and fathers were cramped up in little out-houses or stables, or anywhere that might afford temporary shelter at night. When food became scanty, and disease prevalent, these troubles were of course augmented, and difference of rank became almost obliterated, where all had to suffer alike. Many families were huddled together in one large room, and all privacy was destroyed. The sick and wounded were, as might be supposed, in sad plight; for, kind as others were, there were too many harassing duties to permit them to help adequately those who were too weak to help themselves. Officers and men were lying about in the hospital rooms, covered with blood, and often with vermin; the *dhobees*, or washermen, were too weakhanded for the preservation of cleanliness; and few of the British had the luxury of a change of linen: the windows being kept closed and barricaded to prevent the entrance of shot, the pestilential atmosphere carried off almost as many unfortunates as the enemy's mis-

* Rees' *Personal Narrative of the Siege.*

siles." Of the flies, it is said—"They daily increased to such an extent, that we at last began to feel life irksome, more on their account than from any other of our numerous troubles. In the day, flies; in the night, mosquitos: but the latter were bearable; the former intolerable. Lucknow had always been noted for its flies; but at no time had they been known to be so troublesome. The mass of putrid matter that was allowed to accumulate, the rains, the commissariat stores, the hospital, had attracted these insects in incredible numbers. They swarmed in millions; and though we blew daily some hundreds of thousands into the air, this seemed to make no diminution in their numbers—the ground was still black with them, and the tables were ever covered with these flies. We could not sleep in the day on account of them. We could scarcely eat. Our beef, of which we got a tolerably small quantity every day, was usually studded with them; and when I ate my miserable boiled lentil-soup and unleavened bread, a number would fly into my mouth, or tumble into and float about in my plate."

The fifth week of the siege opened with the same dreary prospect as the last, only deepened in intensity: the enemy did not, it is true, attack with more vigour, but the defenders were gradually becoming weaker in all their resources except courage, and the resolution to bear all rather than yield to the enemy. Colonel Tytler's letter had inspired hope that the relieving column, under General Havelock, would arrive at Lucknow before the end of July; but when the 30th and 31st had passed, and the 1st and 2nd of August had passed also, then, indeed, were their hopes cruelly destroyed, and it required all the energy of the brigadier to keep up the spirits of himself and his companions under the disappointment.

About the beginning of the month a great accession to the number of rebel sepoys had occurred, thereby increasing the phalanx opposed to the British, and requiring yet more strenuous exertions to repel their constant attacks. During the operations of this week (the fifth), one of the ladies, Mrs. Dorin, was among the number who fell from the shots of the enemy—an event which was peculiarly distressing to all. A soldier learns to brave death on his own account, but he is inexpressibly grieved when he sees tender women falling near him by bullets intended for men alone.

Shortly after the sixth week had commenced, the brigadier succeeded in obtaining the services of a native, who undertook the perilous duty of conveying a small note to General Havelock at Cawnpore. On the 8th of August, the garrison could hear and see much marching and countermarching of troops within the city, without being able to discern its cause; but fondly hoped, when the booming of guns was heard, that Havelock was at hand. This hope was, however, speedily and bitterly dashed; for, on the following day, a great force of rebels was seen to approach from the direction of the cantonment, cross the river, and join the main body of the insurgents in Lucknow. On the 10th, they made a desperate assault on all parts of the enclosure; but the attacks were again frustrated by the heroic valour and determination of the besieged.

Up to the time when the seventh week of the siege had commenced, there had been twenty letters sent for succour; first by Sir Henry Lawrence, and then by Brigadier Inglis; and to only one of these had a direct reply been received. Few of them had reached their destination; and of those few a reply to one alone safely passed through all the perils between Cawnpore and Lucknow; and this was not of a nature to impart much comfort. At length, on the 13th (each intermediate day being occupied with fighting), a letter was received from General Havelock, telling of his inability to afford present succour. The residency had by this time been so shaken by shells and balls, that it was no longer a secure retreat; but a great increase of discomfort was yet in store for the numerous persons who had been hitherto accommodated within it. On the 18th, a terrible commotion took place, the enemy having exploded a mine under the Sikh Square, or barrack, and made a breach of thirty feet in the defence boundary of the enclosure. Instantly all hands were set to work: boxes, planks, doors, beams, were brought from all quarters to stop up the gap; while muskets and pistols were brought to bear upon the assailants. Not only did the gallant fellows within the enclosure repel the enemy, but they made a sortie, and blew up some of the exterior buildings which were in inconvenient proximity.

By the eighth week, the report of firearms had become so familiar to the residents of the enclosure, that they ceased to notice the missiles as they whistled past their ears.

Every day was now marked with some vicissitudes. On the 20th, the enemy opened a tremendous cannonading, which knocked down a guard-room over the mess-house, and lessened the number of places from which the garrison could obtain a look-out. The enemy were, on that day, also detected in an attempt to run new mines under the Cawnpore battery and the Bailey Guard. This led to a brilliant sortie, which resulted not only in the spiking of two of the enemy's guns, but also in the blowing up of Johanne's house, which had been such a perpetual source of annoyance to the garrison. It was one of the best day's work yet accomplished, and cheered the poor, hard-worked fellows for a time; but they had still enough to trouble them. The Cawnpore and Redan batteries were almost knocked to pieces, and needed constant repair; the judicial office became so riddled with shot, that the women and children had to be removed from it; while the enemy's sharpshooters were deadly accurate in their aim: their miners began new mines as fast as the old ones were destroyed or rendered harmless; and, worst of all, Inglis's little band was rapidly decreasing.

The last week in August was the ninth of a perilous life in the residency at Lucknow. As the days passed slowly and sadly by, they exhibited variations in the degree of danger; but they brought no comfort to the hearts of the garrison and its charge. The advantage gained by the successful mining and blowing up of Johanne's house (the post from which the African eunuch before mentioned had kept up a most accurate and fatal fire into the enclosure, bringing down more Europeans than any other person in the enemy's ranks), was more than balanced by abundant miseries in other quarters. Gubbins' house had become so shot-riddled, that the ladies and children placed there for shelter, were too much imperilled to remain longer: they were necessarily removed to other buildings; adding to the number of inmates in rooms already sadly overcrowded.

Distressingly severe as the labours of the besieged had been from the commencement, they now became doubly so; for the enemy had crected a new battery opposite the Bailey Guard, and commenced new mines in all directions. As the defenders could seldom venture on a sortie to examine the enemy's works of attack, they were driven to the construction of listening galleries—

underground passages, where the sound of the enemy's mining picks and shovels could be heard. And then would be renewed the digging of countermines, and a struggle to determine which party should be the first to blow the other into the air.

During this harassing week, another letter was received from General Havelock; whose intimation, that a period of three weeks, at least, must yet elapse before he could possibly reach them, threw them into a state of despondency; the more painful because the announcement that a letter from him had reached the residency, had raised their hopes and expectations to the utmost: when, therefore, the delay was made known, the disappointment of all was excessive. The sick and wounded, and the women and children, suffered in health and comfort much more terribly in August than in July: every kind of peril and discomfort had increased in severity; every means of succour and solace had diminished in prospect. Death struck down many; disease and wounds prostrated a still greater number; and those who remained were a prey to apprehensions that weakened mind and body together. The poor women, shut up by dozens together in small rooms, yearned, but yearned in vain, for the breathing of a little air free from impurities. They dared not move out, for the balls and bullets of the enemy sped into and across every open space. Sometimes an 18-pounder shot would burst into a room where two or three of them were dressing, or where a large number of them were at meals. In some of the houses where many ladies formed one community, they would take it in turn to keep awake for hourly watches during the night. One of these said in a letter—"I don't exactly know what is gained by these night watchings, except that we are all very nervous, and are expecting some dreadful catastrophe to happen." The little children now died off rapidly, their maladies being more than could be met with the resources at hand; and those who bore up against the afflictions were very much emaciated. The husbands and fathers, worn out with daily fatigue and nightly watching, had little solace to afford their families; and thus the women and children were left to pass the weary hours as best they could. A few little creatures ("siege babies," as their poor mothers called them) came into the world during this stormy period; and with them each day was a struggle for life.

To the officers and men, much additional misery arose from the fact, that the commissariat quarter, offensive to every sense, on account of the organic accumulations inseparable from the slaughtering and cutting up of animals, was one of the weakest parts in the whole enclosure, and required to be guarded at all hours by armed men, who loathed the spot for the reasons mentioned. The chaplain, also, now found the churehyard getting into such a horrible state, that he dared not go near the graves to read the burial-service. An instance is mentioned by Mr. Rees, which illustrates the mental sufferings of many who, however willing to endure suffering themselves, were almost crushed by the contemplation of the miseries around them. "One of the officers," he says, "had at first told me of his wife being feverish, and quite overcome with the abominable life she had to lead. And then he talked to me of his boy, Herbert; how he was attacked with cholera, and feared he was very ill; and how, instead of being able to watch by his bedside, he had been all night digging at Captain Fulton's mine; and then, how his child, next night, was convulsed, and what little hope of his darling being spared to them; how heartrending the boy's sufferings were to his parents' feelings; how even his (the father's) iron constitution was at last giving way; how he had neither medicine nor attendance, nor proper food for the child; and how the blowing-up of the mine so close to his sick child had frightened him. And then to-day he told me, with tears in his eyes, that yesterday—the anniversary of his birthday—his poor child was called away. 'God's will be done,' said he; 'but it is terrible to think of. At night we dug a hole in the garden; and there, wrapped in a blanket, we laid him.'" This case, says the narrator, is not singular: many another poor parent's heart was similarly torn in this terrible ordeal.

The necessary supply of provision for the garrison was naturally a constant source of anxiety to Brigadier Inglis and the other officers, and the distribution of food became a work of some difficulty, as the store rapidly diminished, and no prospect appeared of replenishing it. Fresh meat could be obtained for the garrison as long as any healthy bullocks remained; but in other articles of food, the deficiency grew serious as the month advanced. An immense store of *attah* (the coarse meal from

which *chupatties*, or *eakes*, were made) had been provided by Sir Henry Lawrence; but this was now nearly exhausted, and the garrison had to grind corn daily from the store kept in the impromptu granaries. The women and elder children were much employed in this work by means of hand-mills. The store of *bhoosa*, or animal food, was also diminishing; and the commissariat officers saw clearly before them the approach of a time when the poor bullocks must die for want of food. The tea and sugar were exhausted, except a little store kept for invalids. The tobacco was all gone; and the soldiers, yearning for a pipe after a hard day's work, smoked dry leaves, as the only substitute they could obtain. A few easks of porter still remained, to be guarded as a precious treasure. Once now and then, when an officer was struck down to death, an auction would be held of the few trifling comforts he had been able to bring with him into the enclosure, and then the prices given by those who possessed means, plainly told how eager was the desire for some little change in the poor and insufficient daily food. A few effects left by Sir Henry Lawrence were sold: among them £16 was given for a dozen bottles of brandy; £7 for a dozen of beer; the same amount for a dozen of sherry; £7 for a ham; £4 for a quart bottle of honey; £5 for two small tins of preserved soup; and £3 for a cake of chocolate. And these prices were moderate, compared with those given towards the close of the siege.

September brought with it the commencement of the tenth week of the captivity. New mines were everywhere discovered, and the officers and men attended sedulously to the underground "listening galleries" before mentioned, and there obtained unmistakable evidence that the enemy were running mines towards Sago's house, the brigade mess, the Bailey Guard, and other buildings, with the intent of blowing them up, and making a forcible entry into the enclosure. Unceasing exertions at countermining alone prevented this catastrophe, and its attendant horrors. On one day the upper part of the brigade mess was smashed in by a shot; on another, a breach was made in the wall of the Martinière temporary school, requiring instant barriering to prevent the entrance of the enemy; on another, a few engineers made a gallant sortie from Innes's house,

and succeeded in blowing up a building from which the enemy had kept up an incessant fire of musketry; and on one occasion, an officer had the curiosity to count the cannon-balls, varying from three to twenty-four pounds each, which had fallen on the roof of one building alone (the brigade mess-house), and they amounted to the incredible number of 280 in *one day*!

On the 5th of September, the enemy appeared, by their activity, to be determined upon the accomplishment of some extraordinary object. Five thousand of them advanced towards the residency, and having formed a battery on the opposite side of the river, they exploded two mines near the Bailey Guard and the mess-house. They then rushed forward to Gubbins' house and to the Sikh Square, bringing with them long ladders to effect an escalade. In short, they seemed determined to carry their point on this occasion: but their efforts were vain. The garrison, though worked almost to death, gallantly rushed to every endangered spot, and repelled the enemy, hastily reconstructing such defence-works as had been destroyed or damaged; and the two mines, being short of their intended distance, fortunately wrought but little mischief.

At length, vague rumours reached the residency that General Havelock had a second time defeated the troops of Nana Sahib at Cawnpore, or Bithoor; and, as much unusual marching and activity were occasionally visible among the troops in the city, apprehension became painfully excited as to the effect such intelligence might have upon the passions of the enemy, who had been continually receiving reinforcements, and appeared resolutely determined to possess themselves of the enclosure, if not by hand-to-hand fighting, by the utter exhaustion of its defenders. Thus, the nights now became to the residents more terrible than even the days; for the rebels, as if to destroy all chance of sleep for the wearied garrison, kept up an unceasing torrent of musketry close to the walls, accompanied by the most unearthly yells and shouts, the very sound of which was enough to strike dismay into the hearts of the women and children, who vainly sought to shut their ears against the hellish din.

The peril of the garrison had, as may be supposed, increased as time wore on; and, by the beginning of the eleventh week, wounds and fatigues had weakened the

physical energies of the strongest among them. Still the spirits of all were buoyant; they knew that their extremity would have a triumphant end—that help would come; and, although still left in uncertainty as to the movements of the force under Havelock, not a doubt was felt that its approach would be sudden, and their deliverance sure. Still they did not rely with blind confidence upon the efforts of friends without the enclosure; while instant and increasing effort was indispensable for the safety of those within it. In short, there was no time for reflection upon the probabilities of what others might do for them, since every moment was necessarily devoted to the bare preservation of existence. The officers, who had from the first been driven from place to place for their scant opportunities of repose and food, had for some time messed in one of the buildings of the Begum's kothee; and this fact appeared to be known to the rebels, who were from the first better informed of what took place within the enclosure, than the garrison were with the transactions beyond the walls: they therefore directed their shells and balls so thickly on that spot, that access to it became exceedingly difficult and dangerous. Two sides of Innes's house were blown in, and the whole structure made little else than a heap of ruins. The residency proper had become so much shattered by the continual firing to which it had been exposed, that great caution was necessary on the part of those as yet sheltered within its walls. New mines were also discovered, directed to points underneath the various buildings; and the enemy sought to increase their means of annoyance, by throwing shells filled with abominable and filthy compositions.

One of the most annoying perplexities, because the most constant, was the uncertainty in which the men and officers were kept as to the point at which their efforts would be next required: then there was the constant anxiety as to whether they were mined or not; and they could not be sure a moment that the ground would not open under their feet, or the buildings around them fly into the air, by the explosion of a mine. Shells came smashing into their rooms, and knocked the furniture, &c., into fragments; then followed round shot, and down tumbled huge blocks of masonry, while splinters of wood and bricks flew in all directions; beds were literally blown to

atoms, and trunks and boxes smashed into little pieces. Nevertheless there was still no flinching: if a mine were discovered, a countermine was speedily run out to frustrate its purpose. If a wall or a verandah were knocked down by a shot, the mine was instantly converted into a rampart, barricade, or stockade; and the persevering obstinacy of the rebel assailants was thus more than met by the indomitable spirit and energy of those assailed.

A loss was incurred on the 14th of September, which occasioned much grief to the whole garrison. Captain Fulton, who had succeeded Major Anderson as chief engineer, and whose skilful operations had justly earned for him the admiration of all, while his kindness of manner had rendered him a general favourite, was struck by a cannonball, which took his head completely off. His loss was severely felt by Brigadier Inglis, and mourned by everyone.

At length the period had arrived when deliverance was near. The twelfth week of the siege was the last in which the beleaguered garrison and its helpless charge were destined to suffer the perils and suspense of a cruel captivity. Its approach found them with spirits much saddened, but with determination firm as ever. They had now lost a number of valuable officers and estimable friends, and could not choose but feel the deprivation. Within the last few days Lieutenant Birch had fallen; then Mr. Deprat, a merchant, who had worked and fought most valiantly at the defences; then Captain Cunliffe; and then, most mournful loss of all, Lieutenant Graham, whose mind, over-worn by exertion and fatigue, had given way; and his own hand had sadly terminated a career of honour. As a natural consequence of these and similar losses, harder work than ever pressed on those who remained alive. Not for a moment could the look-out be neglected. At all hours of the day and night, officers were posted on the roofs of the residency and post-office, finding such shelter as they could while watching intently the river, the bridges, the roads, and the buildings in and around the city. Every fact they observed, serious in its apparent import, was at once reported to Brigadier Inglis, who made such defensive arrangements as the circumstances called for, and as his gradually lessened resources rendered possible. The enemy's batteries were now more numerous than ever: they were con-

structed near the iron bridge; in a piece of open ground that formerly comprised the kitchen-garden of the residency; near a mosque, by the swampy ground on the river's bank; in front of a range of buildings called the Captan Bazaar; in the Taree kothee, opposite the Bailey Guard; near the clock-tower opposite the financial office; in a garden and buildings opposite the judicial office and Anderson's house; in numerous buildings that bore upon the Cawnpore battery and the brigade mess; in fields and buildings that commanded Gubbins' house, and in positions on the north-west of the enclosure;—in short, the whole place was surrounded by batteries bristling with mortars and great guns, some or other of which were incessantly firing shot and shell into it.

The personal life of the inmates of this abode of peril, during the last three weeks of their occupancy, was fraught with wretchedness to everyone. If the men toiled and watched in sultry, dry weather, they were nearly overcome by heat and noisome odours; if they slept in the trenches in damp nights, after great heat, they suffered in their bones, for they had neither tents nor change of clothing. Such was the state to which the whole of the ground was brought by refuse of every kind, that a pool, resulting from a shower of rain, soon became an insupportable nuisance; and sanitary cleansings were unattainable by a community who had neither surplus labour or opportunity at command. Half the officers were ill at one time from disease, over-fatigue, and insufficient diet; and when thus laid prostrate, they had neither medicines nor surgeons sufficient for their need. There was not a sound roof in the whole enclosure, and provisions of every kind had at last become short. A crisis could not be distant. Such, then, was the state to which the garrison of Lucknow, and the women and children under its protection, were reduced, when the third week of September was closing upon them. Endurance, almost superhuman, had brought them thus far through suffering and peril. Deliverance was now at hand.

And here, for the present, we leave the noble band of valiant men, and high-spirited women, and confiding children, assured of their speedy emancipation from the toils that surrounded them—to trace the progress of the gallant army, led by the victorious Havelock to the rescue, and to inscribe upon future pages the record of its

trials and its triumphs. It will be remembered, that the previous detail of the operations of the force under Brigadier-general Havelock, closed with a telegraphic announcement from that officer to the commander-in-chief, on the 21st of July, that he was then "free to cross the Ganges" from Cawnpore; and that a portion of the troops, with five guns, which had already passed over, were in position at the head of the road to Lucknow.* From this date, therefore, the narrative of proceedings for the relief of the capital of Oude are properly resumed.

By a telegram from Lieutenant-colonel Tytler (assistant quartermaster-general with the force), to the commander-in-chief, on the 23rd of July, that officer reports as follows:—

"We have 1,100 men across the river. Passage most difficult on account of the breadth and strength of the stream. I hope to complete the passage in two days; but can't say for certain—all working hard at it. Sent thirty-five elephants across to-day, but fear I have lost one. Lucknow holds out bravely, and in no danger—can easily hold their own until the 5th of August, and longer, if necessary. Enemy's fire very slack. Large bodies of men who occupied the villages on the road, have abandoned them on receiving intelligence of our passing the river. It is a great pity we can't keep up our old system, seen and felt at the same moment; but this river is a fatal obstacle: all possible baggage is left behind. No one takes tents—only a change of clothes, and some food and drink, and yet we are delayed. We shall resume our old ways in three days, please God! and relieve Lucknow in six. Give us 3,000 Europeans and six horsed guns, and we will smash every rebel force one after the other; and the troops coming up in the rear can settle the country."

On the 26th of the month, Brigadier-general Neill reported to the commander-in-chief, that the whole of the force destined for the relief of Lucknow, had crossed from Cawnpore, and would be ready to move on by the 28th; on which day Brigadier-general Havelock, who had waited to collect his troops at Mungulwar (six miles from the landing-place on the left bank of the Ganges), informed the commander-in-chief that the chances of relieving Lucknow were hourly multiplying against him; that Nana Sahib

* See vol. i., p. 388.

had collected 3,000 men, with several guns, and was then on his left flank at Futteh-pore Bhowrassee, with the avowed intention of cutting in upon the rear of the British force when it should advance. The telegram then proceeded thus:—

"The difficulties of an advance to the capital are excessive. The enemy has intrenched, and covered with guns, the long bridge across the Solee at Bunnee, and has made preparations for destroying it, if the passage is forced. I have no means of crossing the canal near Lucknow, even if successful at Bunnee. A direct attack at Bunnee might cost me one-third of my force. I might turn it by Mohan, unless the bridge there is also destroyed.

"I have this morning received a plan of Lucknow from Major Anderson, engineer in that garrison; and much valuable information in two memoranda, which escaped the enemy's out-posted troops, and were partly written in Greek characters. These communications contained much important intelligence orally derived from spies, and convince me of the extreme delicacy and difficulty of any operation to relieve Colonel Inglis, now commanding in Lucknow. It shall be attempted, however, at every risk, and the result faithfully reported.

"Our losses from cholera are becoming serious, and extend to General Neill's force as well as my own. I urgently hope that the 5th and 90th can be pushed on to me entire, and with all dispatch, and every disposable detachment of the regiments now under my command may be sent on. My whole force only amounts to 1,500 men, of whom under 1,200 are British; and ten guns imperfectly equipped and manned."

Carrying out the intention expressed in the preceding telegram, Brigadier-general Havelock, on the morning of the 29th, commenced his march towards Lucknow. The force moved off their camping-ground at Mungulwar as the day broke, aware that opposition awaited them at a village called Oona, about three miles from their starting-point; and, consequently, they were not surprised when, on nearing the place, three guns opened upon them. Two field-pieces were immediately brought forward, and silenced them; but, as the troops moved on, a line of white puffs of smoke from the orchard and garden walls surrounding the place, indicated that the matchlockmen intended to stand their ground. On this the skirmishers rushed forward, and drove

the enemy out of the orchard into the village, leaving the three guns in the possession of the British, who, pushing forward, attempted to clear the village, but met with a resistance they were not at the moment prepared for.

The mud-walled villages of Oude, and their fighting inhabitants, are among the peculiar features of the country. Every hamlet is at chronic feud with its neighbour; and all of them look upon open rebellion against the farmer of their taxes as a sacred duty. The consequence is, that a century of practical experience in the art of self-defence, had converted those villages into almost impregnable fortifications, and the villagers themselves into excellent garrison troops. A hundred Oude men would flee from the attack of ten English soldiers on an open plain; but if ten Oudians are placed behind a loopholed mud wall, they will hold their position without shrinking, nor consider it much of an achievement. Such was the case in the petty village of Oonao. The enemy were completely hidden behind walls: the British troops were in the place and all round it, and yet they could comparatively do nothing, and were dropping fast under the bullets of their unseen foes. Thrice did a portion of them charge a mud-walled enclosure filled with men, and thrice were they driven back with heavy loss. At length it was determined to fire the place; the artillery drew back, portfires were laid to the thatch, and the men of the light companies stood waiting around the outskirts, with eager eyes and rifles cocked, like terriers waiting for the rats to rush out.

Just at this moment, while the thatch was crackling amidst the spreading flames, the field engineer of the force, who had gone round to the front of the village by himself to reconnoitre, came spurring back in hot haste with the information that a very large force of infantry, cavalry, and guns, was rapidly advancing from the other side upon Oonao. Upon this, the task of finishing off the rebels in the burning village was left to the Sikhs; and the whole British force was ordered to turn the position by the right, and move on to the front as quickly as possible. This, however, was no easy matter as far as the artillery was concerned; for the ground was heavy, and the guns frequently stuck fast in the swamp for five minutes together, under a galling fire of matchlocks. At length the

main road was reached again, and the force pushed on through the groves which encircled the place.

Beyond the trees lay a level, swampy plain, of vast extent, traversed by a main road, along which was seen approaching, a force of about 6,000 men, bearing down on our right and left flanks, with their guns in advance; the distance between the opposing columns being about 1,500 yards. The leading gun of the English troops was immediately unlimbered, and opened upon the insurgents, with a view to arrest their progress, and give the infantry time to deploy; while the other guns, as they came up one by one, went into action in line with the first. By this time the enemy's artillery had closed to within a thousand yards, and opened fire. The sun, fortunately, was at the back of the English gunners, and they could distinctly see the objects they were to fire at; and, consequently, in about ten minutes they had silenced the enemy's leading guns, and the whole of the English force moved forward, with the artillery in the centre. The immense disproportion between the attacking column and the force of the enemy, was a subject of hilarity among the troops, as their small thin line struggled forward knee-deep in swamp, with sloped arms, to encounter the vast masses of infantry and cavalry that swarmed in front of them. Not one of those grim and bearded Englishmen but felt confident of victory, and a groan ran through the line, "Oh that we had cavalry, to cut the dogs up!"

During this advance, the artillery came into action as opportunity occurred, and, still pressing forward, gun after gun was abandoned on the road; while those in the front, and on the left flank, stuck in the swamp, and were left to their fate. At last the English artillery got up near enough to tell upon the rebel infantry; while the saddles of the cavalry began to empty rapidly under the fire of the Enfield rifles. Presently the enemy's horsemen went threes about; there was a wavering among the infantry; and then, as if a sudden panic had seized them, they rushed off the field to a village in the distance, across the plain, where they were afterwards discovered huddled together like a flock of sheep, leaving the British in possession of the road and of fifteen captured guns. It was now past two o'clock P.M., and the troops halted

where they stood for a couple of hours, to cook and eat.

After this refreshment the force again marched forward about eight miles, to a large walled village named Buserut-gunge, also surrounded by swamps, to which the enemy had retired, and where they showed an intention to make a stand. On approaching this place, three more guns were found to be in position; two behind a mud wall built across the road, and one on an elevated mud bastion. The two guns on the road were quickly silenced by the fire of the English artillery; but the one on the bastion continued to give some trouble until a well-directed 9-pounder dismounted it, and prevented further annoyance from that quarter. The sepoy at this place made but a feeble defence, and were quickly driven out of the village; but the matchlockmen, on the contrary, fought boldly and well, although uselessly; for Havelock's men had now become fierce and flushed with success, and nothing could withstand their impetuosity, as house after house was stormed and carried, until the village was finally evacuated.

The pertinacity of one of the villagers at this place was remarkable. He had stationed himself in a little mud fort at the entrance of the place (which was almost the first position carried), and had contrived to hide himself, thus escaping the fate of his comrades in the general bayoneting. As soon as the main body of the English had passed on, this man emerged from his shelter, and plied his solitary matchlock with effect at the guns, the baggage, the elephants, or anything that came within range. His bravery amused the men of the rear-guard, who, as he was not a sepoy, would have spared him if possible, and they repeatedly called to him to desist; but their humanity was thrown away; and the result was, that a party of Sikhs went and smoked him out of the fort, and the poor wretch was shot through the head as he was crossing over the parapet for a last hit at his enemies.

The result of the above actions was communicated by Brigadier-general Havelock to the deputy-adjutant-general of the army,

* From this despatch, it is evident that the incident of valour recorded in vol. i., p. 373, was attributed erroneously to the brave man, now named by General Havelock; and it is to be regretted that, through the confusion of names which has frequently occurred in details of actions during the sepoy war, the identity of the individual who so gallantly

in a despatch, from which the subjoined passages are extracted.

"Camp, Buserut-gunge, July 29, 1857.

"I moved forward from the strong position of Mungulwar on the 29th instant, and soon became engaged with the enemy near the town of Oonao. It is necessary to describe the enemy's position: his right was protected by a swamp, which could neither be forced nor turned; his advance was drawn up in a garden enclosure, which, in this warlike district, had purposely, or accidentally, assumed the form of a bastion. The rest of his force was posted in and behind a village, the houses of which were loopholed. The passage between the village and the large town of Oonao is narrow. The town itself extended three-quarters of a mile to our right. The flooded state of the country precluded the possibility of turning in this direction. The swamp shut us out on the left. Thus an attack in front became unavoidable.

"It was commenced by the 78th highlanders and 1st fusiliers, with two guns, and soon became exceedingly warm. The enemy were driven out of the bastioned enclosure; but when our troops approached the village, a destructive fire was opened upon them from the loopholed houses. It became necessary to bring up the 84th, under Colonel Wilson, R.H. Here some daring feats of bravery were performed. Private Patrick Cavanagh, 64th, was cut literally in pieces by the enemy, while setting an example of distinguished gallantry. Had he lived I should have deemed him worthy of the Victoria Cross. It could never have glittered on a more gallant breast.*

"Lieutenant Boyle, 78th highlanders, in an attempt to penetrate into a house filled with desperate fanatics of the Mussulman faith, was badly wounded. The village was set on fire; still its defenders resisted obstinately. Finally the guns were captured, and the whole force was enabled to debouch by the narrow passage between the village and the town of Oonao, and formed in line. It found the enemy rallied and re-formed in great force. Infantry, guns, and cavalry were drawn up in line on the plain. They were attacked in direct *échelon* acquitted himself upon the field before Cawnpore, on Thursday, the 16th of July, should have been suffered to remain doubtful, since it is hardly probable that two men of precisely the same name, regiment, and rank, could have rendered themselves so enviably conspicuous within a few days of each other, and with a like result in both cases.

of detachments and batteries, their guns taken, and the infantry and horse put to flight. During the whole of the action a large detachment of the troops of Nana Sahib threatened our left flank.

"The troops halted three hours, and then moved on towards Buserut-gunge. It is a walled town, with wet ditches. The gate is defended by a round tower, on and near which four pieces of cannon were mounted; the adjacent buildings being loopholed and otherwise strengthened. In the rear of the town is a broad and deep inundation, crossed by a narrow *chaussée* and bridge. The guns pushed on in admirable order, supported by the 1st fusiliers (skirmishing) and the 78th highlanders, and 64th regiment in line. The enemy's cannonade was well sustained, nevertheless our force continued to gain ground. The 64th were then directed to turn the town by our left, and penetrate between it and the swamp, thus cutting off the enemy from their *chaussée* and bridge. The fusiliers and highlanders precipitated themselves on the earthworks, broke through the intrenchment, and captured the town.

"The whole of the guns of the 5th company of 7th battalion artillery were taken by us, with nearly all its ammunition. It had come from Fyzabad and Lucknow. The ground on both sides the road at Oonao was so flooded that it was impossible for cavalry to act. My volunteer horse were, therefore, reduced to inactivity, though most anxious to engage.

"The loss of the enemy at Oonao is estimated, by native report, at 1,500 killed and wounded. It might, in truth, amount to 500: it was lighter at Buserut-gunge. In these two combats nineteen guns were captured from the enemy. I must praise the conduct of all my staff-officers. Lieutenant-colonel Tytler, hardly able from indisposition to sit on his horse, set throughout the day an example of daring and activity. Lieutenant Havelock, deputy assistant-adjutant-general, had a horse shot under him. Lieutenant Seton, my acting aide-de-camp, was severely wounded. Major Stephenson, at the head of the Madras fusiliers, showed, throughout the day, how the calmest forethought can be united with the utmost daring.

"The victorious troops encamped on the night of the 29th, on the causeway beyond the village of Buserut-gunge, having fought from sunrise to sunset, with an interval of

three hours during the heat of the day, and captured nineteen guns; amongst which were two complete 9-pounder English batteries, new from the Cossipore foundry.

"The loss during the day's fight was heavy for the small force engaged—namely, 100 men, killed and wounded; and as the number of wounded took up nearly the whole available sick carriage of the force, considerable embarrassment might have arisen on account of the wounded in a future action, before the supply had been augmented. The contingency was, however, foreseen and guarded against."

On the 30th of July, Brigadier-general Havelock again reported to the commander-in-chief as follows:—

"Camp, Buserut-gunge, July 30, 1857.

"The loss of the enemy, in killed and wounded, has on every occasion been considerable; but as I have no cavalry, they carry off both dead and wounded. How, then, did I capture their guns? I advanced steadily on their lines, and they abandoned their guns. The horses, bullocks, and equipments generally, if not always, escaped me."

It was probably owing to the want of cavalry, and of sufficient hospital carriage, coupled with the certainty of further opposition on the road, and that a heavy fight before Lucknow awaited the force, that General Havelock was induced reluctantly to make a retrograde movement on the day after his double victory. The troops accordingly marched back to their fortified station at Mungulwar, and proceeded further to strengthen it by loopholing it, throwing up breastworks, and adopting other essential measures, until, after two days' labour, an intrenched camp was formed that might have been sufficient to defy the whole force of Oude, had it been deemed expedient to await its attack. The return of the force was announced to the commander-in-chief by the following telegram from General Havelock:—

"Camp, Mungulwar (six miles from Cawnpore), July 31st, 1857.

"My force is reduced, by sickness and repeated combats, to 1,364 rank and file, with ten ill-equipped guns. I could not, therefore, move on against Lucknow with any prospect of success, especially as I had no means of crossing the Solee, or the canal. I have therefore shortened my communications with Cawnpore by falling back two short marches, hitherto unmolested by an enemy. If I am speedily reinforced by 1,000

more British soldiers, and Major Olphert's battery complete, I might resume my march towards Lucknow, or keep fast my foot in Oude, after securing the easier passage of the Ganges at Cawnpore by boats and two steamers, or I might retrace and hold the head of the Grand Trunk-road at Cawnpore. A reinforcement of 1,000 British soldiers, from which it would be necessary to make a detachment to defend the bridge-head on this side, might yet enable me to obtain great results; but with a smaller addition to my column, little could be effected for the interests of the state."

On the same day, Lieutenant-colonel Tytler reported to the commander-in-chief as follows:—

"Mungulwar, July 31st, 1857.

"We crossed the river on the 28th; encountered the enemy at and between Oonao and Buserut-gunge on the 29th; took nineteen guns of sorts, one battery included; but only six horses were captured. We inflicted a heavier loss than usual—I should say some 400 killed and wounded; our own loss was eighty-eight, reducing us to 1,000 European infantry. We could now only place 850 in line, our numerous sick, wounded, and baggage, requiring strong guards in this country, where every village contains enemies. We were diminishing daily from cholera, diarrhœa, and fighting. The Bunnee bridge, 120 yards long, strongly intrenched, and said to be destroyed, had to be passed. We could not hope to reach Lucknow with 600 effective Europeans. We had then to pass the canal, and force one and a-half miles of street. We found we thrashed the Oude people easily in the open, but failed to force two small occupied serais: the men hung back. One of our guns was left under fire; it was some time before I could get the 64th rifles to keep down the fire: had then to dismount: called for volunteers to run it out; the artillery, on this, did the work.

"Buserut-gunge is a strong place on our line of communication; it is in rear of an extensive jheel, traversed by a narrow raised road and bridge: 150 men might hold it against us, and cut off our retreat. We had not a man to hold it with. It is absurd to see our handful of men outflanked by the numbers of the enemy. The Gauges was also in our rear. Neill says his guns command the opposite bank: its breadth is, at the lowest esti-

mate, three-quarters of a mile. I make it more: the range of a 24-pounder is 1,400 yards. His shot would do more harm to us than to the enemy. Under these circumstances, when asked my opinion as to the probability of at once relieving Lucknow, I decided against it; for the following reasons:—if we failed (and I saw no chance of success), Lucknow was inevitably doomed, and government in a worse position than ever; while, if we waited for reinforcements, we might still be in time to save it, as the garrison say they can hold out to the 5th of August, and longer if necessary, and warn us not to approach Lucknow with less than from 2,000 to 3,000 Europeans. We retired to this place (Mungulwar, six miles from the Ganges), as the Nana threatened our rear. We are constructing a work to cover the passage when we require to pass the river. One thousand infantry for the field, and 300 to hold Buserut-gunge and the Bunnee bridge, when repaired, will enable us to bring off the garrison. Cawnpore is threatened by the 42nd from Saugor, and some rabble."

The force remained in camp at Mungulwar until the 4th of August, when it again moved towards Lucknow, having, in the meantime, received a reinforcement of about 150 men and two 24-pounder heavy guns. This augmentation to his column, is adverted to in a telegram from Brigadier-general Havelock to the commander-in-chief on the 4th, which reports as follows:—

"Camp, Mungulwar, Aug. 4th, 1857.

"I was joined this morning by the half of Major Olphert's battery, under Lieutenant Smithett. I inquired of him minutely how his detachment had behaved. He told me that the conduct of all had been very good, except his gun lascars. They had, in April last, threatened to spike the guns whenever they might be engaged with the enemy. At Benares, Major Olphert informed me that they had conducted themselves ill on the night of the mutiny.

"So far as depends on me, I cannot afford to have a single traitor in my camp. I paraded the detachment, and spoke to them all, both British and natives. I congratulated the former on having come into a camp of heroic soldiers, who had six times met the enemy, and every time defeated him and captured his cannon. The lascars at this moment were facing the detachment. I turned to them, and told them what

miscreants I had this morning discovered them to be—traitors in heart to their fostering government. I made the British soldiers disarm them, and ordered them out of the camp under a light escort, to be employed under General Neill in the labours of the intrenchment. He will look after them. If they attempt to desert, I have ordered them to be punished with death: the same if they refuse to work with the other soldiers. They shall do no other duty till I am better instructed. I have given the same orders regarding a detachment of sepoy of the 60th regiment, now on duty at Cawnpore.”

General Havelock left his fortified camp at Mungulwar on the 4th, bivouacked for the night at Oonao, and, on the following morning, received intelligence that the enemy had reoccupied the town of Busheernt-gunge in considerable strength. He immediately commanded the advance, and, on reaching a serai about six miles distant from the bivouac, found the information correct. Two heavy guns and two 24-pounder howitzers were at once pushed forward by the road; while six guns, with the 78th highlanders and Sikhs, under Colonel Hamilton, proceeded to turn the left of the village; and the 1st Madras fusiliers and 84th foot covered the turning column with the heavy guns. By this movement the enemy was speedily expelled from the serai, but still obstinately held the villages on the other side of the street beyond it. At length they were driven out by the artillery, and the troops advanced the heavy guns, silencing some guns of the enemy, posted on the right and left of the road; which were, however, withdrawn by the rebels, who retired slowly—forced back but not beaten. The troops then passed through the village and came to the causeway, crossing the swamp, from the other side of which a hot fire of matchlocks and guns was kept up both on the causeway and on the right wing of the English force, which returned their fire across the water with interest. Taking advantage of the diversion thus made, the 84th dashed across the causeway, and began skirmishing on the other side. The heavy guns followed, and opened fire at grape-range on the enemy's cavalry, who were scattered to the winds by four volleys.

The troops were now in a richly-cultivated country, studded with hamlets, every one of which swarmed with matchlockmen. Cross-

ing the causeway, the whole force spread out to the right and left, engaging the villagers, and driving back the sepoy in front, and thus passed through the belt of cultivation, emerging upon an extensive open plain, on which were half-a-dozen different camps crowded with troops, and as many fortified villages occupied by matchlockmen. The artillery immediately opened fire on a camp in which a large red-and-white striped tent rose above the rest, surrounded by a strong body of cavalry and infantry, with several guns; the whole of whom made a precipitate retreat the moment the 24-pounder grapeshot and shrapnel began to drop amongst them. Unfortunately the British guns were too far in advance of the infantry, and could not venture to follow without support. A halt was therefore sounded, to allow the remaining troops time to come up; and, when the whole had joined, the men were ordered to cook and eat, while a consultation was held as to the expediency of pursuing the advantage already gained, or of returning to Mungulwar. The result of the deliberation was an order to return thither without delay.

In the opinion of Lieutenant-colonel Tytler, this transaction was altogether unsatisfactory, as it resulted in the capture of two small iron guns only; and it had become painfully evident that the present force could never reach Lucknow: it had three strong positions to force, defended by fifty guns and 30,000 men. One night and a day had already cost, in sick and wounded, 104 Europeans and a fourth of the gun ammunition, besides ten men killed: the whole effective strength numbered but 1,010, and not more than 900 of those could be paraded. In short, according to the lieutenant-colonel, there was no alternative but to retire, inasmuch as he says, in a report to the commander-in-chief on the 6th of August:—“The men are cowed by the numbers opposed to them, and the endless fighting. Every village is held against us, the zemindars having risen to oppose us. All the men killed yesterday were zemindars. We know them to be all around us in bodies of 500 or 600, independent of the regular levies. I therefore had no hesitation in giving it as my opinion, that the force had no chance whatever of forcing its way into Lucknow, and that it was sacrificing it without a chance of benefiting the garrison; that Cawnpore, with 500 men (half sick), would be in great danger, and had no

chance of being reinforced. All were of the same opinion; and we retired to our position five miles from the river, to prevent Oonao and Buserut-gunge being occupied in our rear."

The report of General Havelock to the commander-in-chief, in reference to this affair and his subsequent arrangements, was as follows:—

"Camp, Mungulwar, Aug. 6th, 1857.

"I yesterday received information that the enemy had reoccupied in great force the town of Buserut-gunge. I advanced upon it, turned the position by its left, and drove the mutineers and rebels out of it with great slaughter. They had eight or ten guns beyond the causeway—two on this side of it: two of those beyond were 24-pounders. The whole were kept at such a distance, and withdrawn so rapidly, that we never got a fair sight of them; none, therefore, fell into our hands but two on the walls, which had been captured on the 29th ultimo, and dismantled by the commandant of artillery so imperfectly, however, that the enemy again fired out of them. The enemy's dead strewed the town. I estimate their loss at 300 killed and wounded. I returned to this position in the evening.

"I must prepare your excellency for my abandonment, with great grief and reluctance, of the hope of relieving Lucknow. The only three staff-officers in my force whom I ever consult confidentially, but in whom I entirely confide, are unanimously of opinion, that an advance to the walls of Lucknow involves the loss of this force. In this I concur. The only military question that remains, therefore, is, whether that, or the unaided destruction of the British garrison at Lucknow, would be the greatest calamity to the state in this crisis. The loss of this force in a fruitless attempt to relieve Colonel Inglis, would of course involve his fall. I will remain, however, till the latest moment in this position, strengthening it, and hourly improving my bridge communication with Cawnpore, in the hope that some error of the enemy may enable me to strike a blow against them, and give the garrison an opportunity of blowing up their works and cutting their way out. The enemy is in such force at Lucknow, that to encounter him five marches from his position, would be to court annihilation."*

From the evening of the 6th until the morning of the 11th of August, the troops

* Parliamentary Blue Book—No. 4; p. 83.

remained in camp at Mungulwar, during which time a council was held as to the expediency of recrossing the Ganges, and falling back upon Cawnpore. That measure was ultimately decided upon, and arrangements for the purpose were made by the field engineer, who selected a spot for the embarkation, considerably lower down than the place formerly crossed by the troops. The river at this place was much narrower; but, to reach it, a succession of swamps and creeks had to be crossed. Causeways were thrown across the first; and the second was bridged with boats in an incredibly short space of time, considering the amount of work to be done, and the very inefficient means at the disposal of the engineer officers. The commissariat stores and baggage were sent down daily, and passed over; and, finally, on the morning of the 11th, an order was issued that all the bedding (the only article of baggage the troops had been allowed to keep) was to be sent across the river immediately. The troops, consequently, anticipated that they would have to follow during the night; but their astonishment may be conceived when, at three o'clock in the afternoon, the bugles sounded the "turn-out;" and they learned that they were, for the third time, to advance to the front, in consequence of information that the enemy had come down to Oonao, with the intent to attack them during their passage across the river. The troops, accordingly, marched off with their arms in their hands, and their clothes on their backs, and not another thing. When they reached Oonao it was found that the information was false, and not a single rebel was to be seen. During the halt, however, preparatory to retracing their steps, information reached the general that the enemy, under the impression that the British troops had actually crossed the Ganges two days previous, had come down in force to Buserut-gunge; and that 4,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, with one horse battery and some guns, were then lying encamped in front of that place. Having now advanced so far, it was felt to be impossible to retreat in the face of the enemy without exchanging shots; and accordingly the troops, after a scanty supper, bivouacked that night on the plain, and, with the first streak of dawn, marched to the encounter.

Meantime the enemy, having intelligence of the advance, had worked hard all night, intrenching themselves; and when the

troops arrived in front, they were found strongly posted; their right resting on the village of Boursekce Chowkee, in advance of the town, which they had strongly fortified; their left on a mound, about 400 yards distant, which they had cut down into a battery, and mounted with three guns—the interval between being connected by a ditch and breastwork, lined with infantry; having cavalry massed on their left flank, to act as opportunity might offer. To oppose the troops thus strongly posted, the British force did not consist of more than 800 effective men in the field, 200 having been left behind to guard the approaches to the river.

The plan of battle was soon formed. The 78th fusiliers, and four guns, moved off on the right, to attack the left of the enemy's position; the heavy guns on the left, supported by the 84th, went along the road to engage the enemy's right battery; and the remaining part of the force and guns took the centre. General Havelock was much retarded in bringing his battery and supporting-troops across the deep and wide morasses that protected the enemy's front; during which operation, the shot and shell of the rebels caused him severe loss; but on the right of the column the ground was good; and the men, being fresh, moved fast, and soon came into collision with the enemy's left. This movement appeared to annoy them much, and they turned the principal part of their guns in that direction. An officer writing of this engagement, says—"I certainly was never under so heavy a fire in my life. In five minutes after we came into action, every man at the gun I was laying was wounded with grape, except the sergeant and myself; and four of our gun cattle were knocked over by round shot. The other three guns suffered nearly as much, and we found our fire had little effect on the battery in front; their guns were too well protected. So we limbered up, and got away as fast as we could, taking ground more to the right, and then found it was possible to move still more forward, and take the adverse battery in flank. This was accordingly done, and then we had our revenge; for they could only bring one gun to bear on us; while we, with our four, enfiladed their whole position. At this time we were within 500 yards of the enemy's cavalry, who, if they had had one atom of pluck, could have charged and taken our guns

with the most perfect ease; but a handful of fusiliers with their Enfields, lying down on our right, and the small body of volunteer horse drawn up in our rear, made us feel perfectly secure, and so we went on pounding the battery, without paying the slightest attention to the horsemen. Presently an artillery waggon was seen creeping out of the battery—that was instantly knocked over; and soon after a lucky shrapnel silenced the one gun which was firing direct at us. Our fire grew hotter than ever, and at last a swarm of men was seen rushing back in confusion from the trenches. Hereupon a cheer ran along the whole of our advancing lines. The 78th quickened their pace before breaking into one of their magnificent charges, and the fusiliers on our right dashed forward with a yell, in loose skirmishing order, at the left flank of a large grove which extended along the rear of the enemy's position, and was full of men. The 78th went straight at the battery, which still remained crowded with men, the gunners working their two remaining guns to the last, and only bolting when our men were at the foot of the slope, carrying off with them one gun, the team of which had escaped the shrapnel of our artillery. After bayoneting all they could catch, the 78th turned the two captured guns on the enemy. Some artillerymen came into the battery immediately after, and we had the intense satisfaction of giving the flying foe three rounds from each of their own guns."

The position was carried about the same time at all points, the enemy flying in headlong haste from the chastisement they had provoked. On the left of the position, as they had the advantage of the road, they managed to carry off their guns, the cavalry being unable to pursue them through the swamps, and the infantry were too much exhausted by fatigue and hunger to follow them up. Having contented themselves, therefore, with driving the enemy clear through and away from the village, the force halted for a short time to breathe, and then leisurely marched back to Oonao, where they cooked some food; and, in the cool of the evening, retraced their steps to Mungulwar. On the following morning (the 13th) the troops moved down to the river; and, owing to the excellence of the arrangements by the engineer, they were all crossed over, and housed on the Cawnpore side by nightfall of the same day.

The following official report of this affair was conveyed by telegraph, from Brigadier-general Havelock to the commander-in-chief:—

“Mungulwar, August 12th, 1857.

“I was yesterday prepared to cross over the bridge of boats equipped, which Colonel Tytler and Captain Crommelin have established; but I had determined that, if there should be any assembly of hostile troops, my front should not wait their attack in this strong position, but take the initiative, and strike a blow against them. In the course of the day, a detachment of Sikhs brought me information of about 4,000 men, with some guns, having come forward from Nuwabgunge to Busherut-gunge. I at once put my force in motion, although its baggage and spare ammunition, additional dhoolies, &c., were already on the right bank. My advanced guard pushed the enemy's parties out of Oonao, where my force bivouacked under trees. Marching at dawn, we found them for the third time prepared to defend Busherut-gunge, and thus came on our eighth combat since the 12th of July. The insurgents were about 4,000 in number, with six field guns. They had varied their mode of attack by intrenching the village Boursekee Chowkee, in advance of Busherut-gunge. My superior artillery fire would soon have crushed them; but I could only slowly bring my battery and supporting-troops across the deep and wide morasses which protected their front: meanwhile their shot and shell caused some loss in my ranks; but when these obstacles were passed, our success was speedily achieved. The highlanders, without firing a shot, precipitated themselves with a cheer upon the principal redoubt, and captured two out of the three horse-battery guns with which it was armed. The highlanders, at the same time, drove the enemy's extreme left before them, and their line was speedily in full retreat. I estimate their loss at 200 killed and wounded; my own was thirty-five. I retraced my steps leisurely to this position. A body of troops of Mausoollee Ally (a rebellious talookdar) made an effort to interrupt our progress by a demonstration on our right flank; but was compelled to retreat by our artillery fire. This action has inspired much terror amongst the enemy, and I trust will prevent his effectually opposing our embarkation at Cawnpore, which is a difficult operation.

“August 13th.—The whole force came across in the best order in six hours. Not a rebel dared to show his face. So much for the lesson of yesterday!”

A letter from the camp furnishes the following details of the incident referred to in the preceding pages. The writer, an officer attached to the Allahabad movable column under General Havelock, proceeds thus:—

“Camp, Cawnpore, head-quarters of Gen.

Havelock's army, Aug. 17th, 1857.

“On the 5th of August we marched towards Lucknow, about nine miles, and then encamped on a large plain for the night. You must bear in mind that we have no tents with us; they are not allowed; so every day we were exposed to the burning hot sun, to the rain and dew by night. No baggage or beds were allowed; but every soldier wrapped his cloak around him, grasped his musket, and went to sleep, and soundly we slept too. My Arab horse served me as a pillow. I used to lie down alongside of him, with my head on his neck, and he never used to move with me, except now and then to lick my hand. Next morning (6th August, a memorable day for India) we started at a quarter-past four in the morning, and at about half-past six, A.M., came in sight of the enemy, about 10,000 strong, with lots of guns, and about 2,000 cavalry. Our little army consists of only 900 infantry, eighty-five cavalry, and fifteen guns. We were tired with a two hours' march, and the sun was getting quite hot enough to be pleasant. However, directly they saw us they opened fire, which we took no notice of, as we were too far off to give it them with good effect. The enemy had the strong town of Busherut-gunge in their rear, which they had intrenched, and had lined the tops of the houses with musket-men. We soon formed line, and the infantry were ordered to lie down on their backs while we (artillery) answered their guns. It fell to my lot to have against me four 9-pounders, which I silenced after a few rounds, without losing a man. I had, however, two drivers wounded, and two of my waggons injured by the enemy's shot. After fighting till eleven o'clock, the enemy were dispersed in all directions, and we entered the village of Busherut-gunge, where we found the ground covered with the dead and wounded of the enemy; some injured most frightfully by round shot. I saw one man with his

leg at least seven yards apart from his body. We then encamped on the field of battle and had breakfast, which we did ample justice to. You cannot think how grateful you feel after the action is over, to think you have not been killed or wounded, and how jolly to see the different officers one knows come up and shake hands, and congratulate you on your escape. We found that it was impossible for us to proceed on to Lucknow on account of our army being so small; for though we are a brave little band, and could easily fight our way to Lucknow, yet we could not compel them to raise the siege when we got there, as we should have no men to do it with. So we turned back to our old quarters, where we rested for about four days."

There can be little doubt that the fact of this retreat—for such practically it was—encouraged the enemy in a very considerable degree, as they regarded it as a concession to their superior strength and resources, and as an acknowledgment that the British force was unable to penetrate to Lucknow, through the masses that could be opposed to them. Thus, while it elated them, for the same reason it chagrined the little band that already had achieved so much, and suffered so severely; and the general himself was grieved, as well for the shade that overclouded the *prestige* of the British arms, as for the increased difficulties this forced delay would throw around Brigadier Inglis and his beleaguered companions. But it was not in his nature to sit down depressed and inactive in the face of duty to be performed, and his spirit rose with the emergency that called for exertion. While fighting his way through Oude, bravely but vainly endeavouring to advance to Lucknow, the arch-traitor, Nana Sahib, had been occupied in collecting a motley assemblage of troops near Bithoor, for the purpose of re-establishing his power in that direction; and this swarm of hornets it was necessary should be destroyed or dispersed. A whole month had been available to the Nana for the purpose of collecting troops—namely, from the middle of July to the middle of August; during which time he had been strengthened by the accession of the 31st and 42nd regiments of native infantry from Saugor; the 17th from Fyzabad; portions of the 34th, disbanded at Barrackpore; the troops of three cavalry regiments, and a vast gathering of Mahrattas; with whom he now intended to advance upon, and reoccupy

Cawnpore. On the other hand, it was determined by Generals Havelock and Neill, to rest the troops on the 14th, attack the left wing of the enemy on the 15th, and, on the 16th, march to Bithoor. Pending these movements, the state of the troops (among whom cholera was making direful inroads) became a subject of intense anxiety to General Havelock, who, on the 15th of that month, reported to the commander-in-chief as follows:—

"Camp, August 15th, 1857.

"It is now that I should report to your excellency the fearful inroads cholera is making in my little force; to-day there have been eleven fatal cases. The total sick and wounded is 335. The total British strength is 1,415. I do not despond. I must march to-morrow against Bithoor; but it seems advisable to look the evil in the face, for there is no chance but between reinforcements and gradual absorption by disease. I don't halt while the enemy keeps the field; and, in truth, our health has suffered less painfully when in bivouacs than in Cawnpore. I will not return to the cantonments if I can help it, but stay either in camp at Nuwabgunge, or further from the city.

"A number of widows of Christian drummers murdered by Nana Sahib, represent that they and their children are starving. I will, if your excellency sends me the sanction of government, order them an advance from the military chest, to the amount of their regulated pension, from the day of the murder. They have no certificates of last pay, but assert their husbands were two months in arrears."

On the 15th, according to arrangement, Brigadier Neill, with a mere handful of men, went out of his intrenchment at Cawnpore, and surprised the left wing of the Nana's forces, occupying a position in the vicinity of Cawnpore; and, after a short action, drove them back in confusion to Bithoor. This being accomplished, General Havelock, on the following day, proceeded to attack the main body of the rebels.

The town of Bithoor is situated upon the Ganges, about eleven miles north of Cawnpore: it is built on a rising ground, surrounded by orchards and dense cultivation, and protected by a deep muddy creek, which runs up from the Ganges round the base of the hill. This naturally made it a strong position; but it was still further pro-

ted by a battery of guns, and a breastwork thrown up beside the bridge which crossed the creek; there were also some intrenched enclosures (quadrangles) filled with armed men, and two villages with loop-holed houses and walls, also filled with troops.

On the morning of the 16th of August, 1857, Brigadier-general Havelock marched from his camping-ground at Cawnpore, for the purpose of attacking the enemy in his stronghold. The British force at the time consisted of about 1,300 men, being nearly the whole of the effective troops under the command of himself and Brigadier Neill at Cawnpore. About mid-day he arrived within sight of the enemy, whose cavalry were as usual found hovering on the flank of the advancing force. A couple of long shots were fired to make the rebels unmask their position, and those were immediately replied to by two guns from the battery in front. After surveying the ground, General Havelock sent his artillery—which consisted of Maude's battery, and Olphert's battery, recently forwarded from Allahabad—along the main road, supported by infantry on the right and left. A portion of the troops, consisting of the 78th fusiliers, and horse battery, were now ordered to deploy on the right, and advance towards the intrenchment. The guns opened at 1,000 yards, and, after firing a few shots, limbered up for the purpose of advancing to within 700 yards' range, when suddenly a severe musketry fire opened on them from a village on the right flank. Two companies of the fusiliers instantly went off to attack this place; and the guns getting again into action at 700 yards, fired with such effect, that an order was given to limber up, and fire within canister-range. This was done; and the battery quietly advanced, supported by the 78th and the fusiliers, when a regular hailstorm of musketry came from the breastwork in front. The mutineers, contrary to their usual practice, had coolly waited until the troops came within range, before they fired a shot. The consequence of this unexpected reception fell severely upon the troops, who immediately moved off to the right, where they got under cover of some sugar-cane; and, passing through it, came out at the left of the breastwork, which they stormed and entered. Then turning, they went along inside, and, after about ten minutes' hard fighting, drove the sepoys out, across the bridge, into the town

and surrounding sugar-cane fields, and thus captured the battery. This was the first time the troops fairly got at the enemy with the bayonet, for the sepoys stood manfully, and fought with unflinching determination, until the steel was within an inch of their breasts, and then they fled in confusion. Had the men not been so thoroughly exhausted with their morning's march in the sun, the slaughter that ensued would have been much greater. As it was, about 300 of the enemy were killed, of whom sixty fell by the bayonet alone. While this was proceeding in one direction, the remaining portion of the British force was engaged with the enemy posted in the sugar-cane fields on the left; and, having driven them out of their cover, the whole force rushed forward in pursuit of the rebels, who retreated fighting through the town, till they finally broke on the other side of it, and fled in the direction of the Great Trunk-road to Delhi. The old residency, now used by the rajah as his palace, stood on the far-side of the town: the gardens were occupied by tents, now deserted; and the place had evidently been full of cavalry, some of whom, unmindful of the flight of their comrades on foot, were busily occupied in plundering and carrying off whatever they could lift. A fair opportunity for capturing or cutting down the whole of this party of rebels, was frustrated by the noisy impetuosity of the Sikhs, ordered to attack them; but who, by their shouts and excitement, gave an alarm before they had surrounded the gardens; and the rebels lost no time in seeking safety by flight—an object they accomplished much to the chagrin of the English troops. It was impossible for General Havelock to pursue the rebels beyond the town, as he had now scarcely a dozen European horse left him, and his infantry were utterly exhausted by their march and conflict in an intensely hot day. As soon as the fight had ended, General Havelock rode along his lines, and was vehemently cheered; but, saluting the men in return, he said, "Don't cheer me, my lads; you did it all yourselves." In this engagement, the 64th and 84th regiments, with the Ferozepore Sikhs, were prevented taking a full share, through a bend or branch of the unfordable stream that intercepted their intended line of march, and, consequently, the chief glory of the day rested with the 78th highlanders and the Madras fusiliers. Worn out with fatigue and heat, the British troops bivou-

acked that night near Bithoor, and, on the 17th, returned to Cawnpore. They had now been fighting under an Indian sun almost from the day they left Allahabad, six weeks previously, and were enfeebled by disease and overstrained excitement. Slowly and sadly they marched back from the field of their ninth victory; and, on the morrow, the general endeavoured to rally the drooping spirits of his men by the following order of the day:—

“Camp, Cawnpore, Aug. 17th, 1857.

“The brigadier-general commanding, congratulates the troops on the result of their exertions in the combat of yesterday. The enemy were driven, with the loss of 250 killed and wounded, from one of the strongest positions in India, which they resolutely defended. They were the flower of the mutinous soldiery, flushed with the successful defection at Saugor and Fyzabad; yet they stood only one short hour against a handful of soldiers of the state, whose ranks had been thinned by sickness and the sword. May the hopes of treachery and rebellion be ever thus blasted; and if conquest can now be achieved under the most trying circumstances, what will be the triumph and retribution of the time when the armies from China, from the Cape, and from England, shall sweep through the land?

“Soldiers! in that moment, your labours, your privations, your sufferings, and your valour, will not be forgotten by a grateful country. You will be acknowledged to have been the stay and prop of British India in the time of her severest trial.”

The result of the action at Bithoor, was reported the same day to the deputy-adjutant-general of the army, in the following despatch:—

“Bivouac, Bithoor, Aug. 17th, 1857.

“Sir,—I have to request the favour of your informing the commander-in-chief that I marched to this place yesterday.

“The mutineers of the 31st and 42nd from Saugor, the 17th from Fyzabad, and sepoy of other regiments, with troops of the 2nd light cavalry and 3rd irregulars, united to a portion of Nana Sahib's troops, were, with two guns, in one of the strongest positions I have ever seen. They numbered 4,000 men. The plain, densely covered with thicket, and flanked by villages, has two streams flowing through it, not fordable by troops of any arm, and only to be crossed

by two narrow bridges, the furthest of which was protected by an intrenchment armed with artillery. The road takes a turn after passing the second bridge, which protects defenders from direct fire, and behind are the narrow streets and brick houses of Bithoor. I must do the mutineers the justice to pronounce that they fought obstinately, otherwise they could not for a whole hour have held their own, even with such advantages of ground, against my powerful artillery fire. The streams prevented my turning them, and my troops were received, in assaulting the position, by a heavy rifle and musketry fire from the rifles and battalion companies engaged; but, after a severe struggle, the enemy were driven back, their guns captured, and infantry chased off the field in full retreat towards Seorajpore. Had I possessed cavalry, not a rebel nor a mutineer could have reached that place alive. As it is, they shall not long remain there unmolested.

“The loss of the enemy is estimated at 250 killed and wounded. Mine is forty-nine; and my numbers are further reduced by sunstroke and cholera.—I have, &c.,

“H. HAVELOCK, Brigadier-general,
“Commanding Allahabad Movable Column.”

The campaign of General Havelock, up to this time, had been most extraordinary, if not entirely unprecedented in the annals of warfare. Between the 12th of July and the 17th of August, he had fought and won three battles in the Doab, east of Cawnpore; three in the vicinity of Cawnpore and Bithoor; and four in Oude—making ten battles in thirty-seven days: and this unbroken chain of triumph was won from an enemy immensely superior in numbers, by an army which naturally became weaker with each victory, until at length its fighting power was nearly exhausted.

In this affair of Bithoor, the ill-effects of marching Europeans in India by day instead of by night was clearly manifested. The men came into action so fatigued by the heavy road and hot sun, that before half the fight was over, they were utterly powerless; but then it was also apparent that, upon this occasion, the enemy seemed to be quite as much overcome by the heat and fatigue as the European troops were; and it is recorded as a fact, that some of the rebels actually threw themselves down from sheer exhaustion, and were shot or bayoneted without resistance. The cause

of this extraordinary prostration of the native troops, was afterwards explained by one of the thanadars attached to the English force, who had been made prisoner, but managed to escape during the confusion of the fight. The day previous to the battle had been a Hindoo fast, which was strictly kept by all the sepoys, who therefore had to fight upon empty stomachs. "Had we," said the thanadar, "been able to follow up the fugitives for another four miles, we might have killed almost the whole of them, for I saw the sepoys throw themselves down on the ground by scores, utterly unable, from exhaustion, to stir another step." The condition of the British troops as they marched back from Bithoor was also described as pitiable. The 78th highlanders had left Allahabad, a few weeks previous, over 300 strong; it was then reduced to less than 100 fighting-men. The 64th regiment, that a few months before had started for Persia 1,000 strong, was then reduced to the proportion of two companies—about 140 men in all! And similar havoc had been made, by disease or wounds, in the ranks of each of the other regiments composing the Allahabad movable column.

At this juncture, the state to which General Havelock's little force had been reduced, necessitated a constant appeal for reinforcements, which could not be supplied him. On the 19th of August he had seventeen officers and 466 men on the sick-list at Cawnpore; while those who were not ill, were so worn out as to be scarcely fit for active service. Both himself and Neill desired to encourage their handful of men by some brilliant achievement; but they were now not strong enough to attempt the relief of Lucknow, however ardently they desired to do so; and the rebels, who had excellent information of their condition, were inspired by this state of affairs, and assembled in great force on the Oude side of the Ganges, threatening to cross in three places; namely, at Cawnpore, at a spot twelve miles lower down, and at Futteh-pore; while, on the other side, the small British force was threatened by the Gwalior contingent from Calpee.

In a despatch from Brigadier-general Neill to the commander-in-chief, dated "Cawnpore, August 18th," he writes of the Havelock column as follows:—"On the 16th, Havelock moved out in one column to Bithoor—carried the enemy's position;

captured two guns; but men too much exhausted to follow them up. Returned on 17th. Had lost, in all three operations (besides by enemy), from sunstroke, cholera, and effect of exposure and fatigue, 324; including six wounded officers sick, and twelve soldiers killed by sunstroke on 16th. All this telling on the men severely. *Rest they must have.* Nothing can be done towards Lucknow from this until reinforced. An advance now, with reduced numbers (and those nearly used up from exposure and fatigue), would be madness. Cholera still among us, but confined to those who have been exposed."

Depressing as these circumstances certainly were, General Havelock was not unmindful of the claims of such of his officers as had specially distinguished themselves in the presence of the enemy, to the notice of government; and accordingly, on the 18th of August, the following recommendations for the Victoria Cross were forwarded by him to the commander-in-chief:—

"I recommend for the Victoria Cross, Lieutenant Crowe (78th highlanders), who was the first to enter the redoubt at Boursekee Chowkee, the intrenched village in front of Busherut-gunge, on the 12th instant.

"I also recommend for the same decoration, Lieutenant Havelock, 10th foot. In the combat at Cawnpore he was my aide-de-camp. The 64th regiment had been much under artillery fire, from which it had severely suffered. The whole of the infantry were lying down in line, when, perceiving that the enemy had brought out the last reserved gun (a 24-pounder), and were rallying round it, I called up the regiment to rise and advance. Without any other word from me, Lieutenant Havelock placed himself on his horse, in front of the centre of the 64th, opposite the muzzle of the gun. Major Stirling, commanding the regiment, was in front, dismounted; but the lieutenant continued to move steadily on in front of the regiment, at a foot-pace, on his horse. The gun discharged shot until the troops were within a short distance, when they fired grape. In went the corps, led by the lieutenant, who still steered steadily on the gun's muzzle, until it was mastered by a rush of the 64th."*

* The selection, by General Havelock, of his son for the much-coveted decoration upon the ground stated, occasioned much dissatisfaction in the 64th regiment; not because the gallantry of the young

Had the expected reinforcements from the lower provinces arrived at Cawnpore when due, General Havelock would doubtless have made another effort for the relief of Lucknow; but the mismanagement of the officer commanding at Dinapore, by which the whole plan of operations in Oude was disconcerted, and the very existence of the handful of men under the command of

officer was not appreciated, but because he, being at the time totally unconnected with the corps, had availed himself of an opportunity afforded him as one of the general's staff, to usurp the position and proper duty of the officers of the regiment, who were equally competent with himself to lead their men to victory; and they naturally were annoyed at the apparently invidious selection of a stranger to the regiment for the distinction that should have properly belonged to one of its own officers. This uncomfortable feeling at length attracted the notice of the lieutenant-colonel of the gallant corps, and by him it was represented to Sir Colin Campbell, who subsequently expressed his idea of the affair in the following communication to the adjutant-general:—

“Head-quarters, Camp before Lucknow,
March 30th, 1858.

“Sir,—I have the honour to bring to the knowledge of his royal highness the general commanding-in-chief, that a feeling of dissatisfaction, which has been testified in the most respectful manner, has arisen among the officers of the 64th foot, in consequence of a telegraphic despatch by the late Sir H. Havelock, K.C.B., which was published a short time back in the *London Gazette*. In the despatch alluded to, the most prominent notice was given to the fact of Lieutenant (now Captain Sir Henry) Havelock, Bart., having led the 64th foot into a redoubt, which was the object of attack, under the late Sir Henry Havelock's orders. The despatch is so worded as to make it appear, that the late Major Stirling, who afterwards became a lieutenant-colonel, was not properly leading his regiment; at least, such is the opinion of the officers of the 64th foot. Lieutenant-colonel Bingham, in the name of those officers, while he deprecates the idea of refusing just credit to Captain Sir Henry Havelock, maintains, in the most positive manner, that the late Lieutenant-colonel Stirling then commanded the 64th foot, as he did on all such occasions, most nobly and gallantly; and that he was on foot at the time, because, in consequence of a shell bursting, his horse had become unrideable. In short, he infers that it is very painful to the regiment that the memory and reputation of their late gallant commanding officer should have been so unfairly tampered with. I confess to have a strong feeling of sympathy with the officers of the 64th regiment, and it would be a matter of great satisfaction to me if you would have the goodness to move his royal highness to give a gracious expression towards the memory of the late Lieutenant-colonel Stirling, for the benefit of the 64th regiment. This instance is one of many in which, since the institution of the Victoria Cross, advantage has been taken by young aides-de-camp and other staff-officers to place themselves in prominent situations for the purpose of attracting attention. To them life is of little value, as compared with the gain of public honour; but they do not reflect,

Havelock imperilled, had entirely prevented the desired junction, and left him for a time incapable of moving from his intrenched camp at Cawnpore.

On the following day (the 19th of August), Brigadier-general Havelock reported to the commander-in-chief as follows:—

“Cawnpore, Aug. 19th, 1857; 1.10 P.M.

“There is a combination against us, which

and the generals to whom they belong also do not reflect, on the cruel injustice thus done to gallant officers who, besides the excitement of the moment of action, have all the responsibility attendant on this situation. We know that the private soldier expects to be led by his regimental officers, whom he knows and recognises as the leaders to whom he is bound to look in the moments of the greatest trial and danger, and that he is utterly regardless of the accidental presence of an aide-de-camp or other staff-officer, who is an absolute stranger to him. There is another point, also, having a great importance. By such despatches as the one above alluded to, it is made to appear to the world, that a regiment would have proved wanting in courage, except for an accidental circumstance. Such a reflection is most galling to a regiment of British soldiers, indeed almost intolerable, and the fact is remembered against it by all the other corps in her majesty's service. Soldiers feel such things most keenly. I would, therefore, again beg leave to dwell on the injustice sometimes done by general officers when they give a public preference to those attached to them over old officers, who are charged with the most difficult and responsible duties.—I have, &c.

“C. CAMPBELL, Commander-in-chief.

“The Adjutant-general, Horse-guards, London.”

The letter of General Campbell was laid before the Duke of Cambridge in due course, and by command of his royal highness, the following reply was transmitted to the commander-in-chief at Lucknow:—

“Horse-guards, S.W., May 17th, 1858.

“Sir,—I have had the honour to lay before his royal highness the general commanding-in-chief, your letter of the 30th of March last, referring to a telegraphic despatch of the late Major-general Sir Henry Havelock, in which it is made to appear, that Captain Havelock led the 64th regiment to the attack of a redoubt, and that the character of the late Lieutenant-colonel Stirling, who commanded the regiment and fell in the attack, had suffered accordingly. His royal highness regrets sincerely that any unfavourable imputation of the courage or conduct of the lieutenant-colonel should ever for a moment have been supposed to attach to the character of that gallant and excellent officer. His royal highness enters fully into the feelings of Lieutenant-colonel Bingham, who has, in vindication of the character of his late commanding officer and of the 64th regiment, so honourably appealed to your sense of justice, and he has much gratification in now recording his entire satisfaction with the whole conduct of Lieutenant-colonel Stirling, and of the excellent regiment which he commanded with so much credit to himself and advantage to the service.

“I have, &c.—G. A. WETHERALL A.G.

“General Sir Colin Campbell, &c.”

will require our best exertions to baffle. The troops from Oude have come down to the left bank, and will threaten Cawnpore; meanwhile boats are collecting at Futteh-pore, to enable a portion of their troops to cross there, and intercept the communication with Allahabad, whilst the Gwalior contingent (strong in artillery, and provided with a siege-train) passes at Calpee, and attacks my diminished force. I will do my best against them, but the risk is great.

“I have sent the steamer down to destroy the boats at Futteh-pore. I should bring into the field eight good guns; but the enemy are reported to have from twenty-nine to thirty. These are great odds, and my 900 soldiers may be opposed to 5,000 organised troops. The loss of a battle would ruin everything in this part of India. I could entice the enemy at Calpee, and prevent their crossing the Jumna, or permit them to cross and drive them back into it, if my force were adequate to the effort; but it is fearfully weak, and disease daily diminishes my numbers.

“As I am told in the camp that your excellency has heard nothing of my movements since the 4th of the month, I will mention that hitherto everything has gone on prosperously. I struck a heavy blow against the Oude troops on the 12th, at Busherut-gunge (third fight there), and recrossed the Ganges that day in less than six hours, without the slightest interruption. On the 16th, I defeated the Saugor troops at Bithoor, and destroyed everything there. I will make head against this new danger with the like determination; but, without reinforcements, I do only hope for success.”

It was, as yet, a novelty in this Asiatic warfare, that the steam navigation of the country should be employed for other purposes than the quiet transport of men and material; and yet such employ would at this juncture have been most important in several directions, had the means for it been available. Unfortunately they were not; and it furnished ground for serious comment, that while England could encircle the earth with a zone of floating castles, and had innumerable gun-boats, and other craft of every size and denomination, actually rotting and falling to pieces for want of use, in her harbours and ports throughout the world, there was not at this juncture, upon the Ganges or the Jumna,

or any one of their tributaries, such a thing as a steamboat adapted for the purposes of war! It is true that the navigation of those rivers, supplied by mountain torrents, and flowing through immense alluvial plains, with frequent inundations and shiftings of channel, was not very easy, or, indeed, always practicable; but in the months of August and September, there was at least depth of water for vessels capable of steaming with two or three guns and a hundred or two of men. Of all the vast marine appliances of naval England, but one steamer of the kind required, could be found available by General Havelock! This one, however, he dispatched as mentioned in his report, to prevent the rebels of Oude from crossing the Ganges at Futteh-pore. But he was without any means of obstructing their passage across the Jumna at Calpee, to which point the Dinapore mutineers were directing their steps, with the intention of swelling the numbers gathered against him.

Sir Colin Campbell had now arrived in India, and assumed command of the whole British forces;* but hitherto no correspondence had arisen between himself and Brigadier-general Havelock. His presence in Calcutta had, however, the effect of infusing greater energy into the movements of the executive government of India; and from this time European troops were pushed forward to Cawnpore with all possible celerity.

Further details of his operations were now forwarded by Brigadier-general Havelock, for the information of the commander-in-chief, by the following telegram:—

“Cawnpore, August 20th, 1857.

“I was appointed to the command of the Allahabad movable column in July last. Between the 12th of that month and the present date, I have been engaged with the enemy at Futteh-pore, Pandoo Nuddee, Cawnpore, in Oude, at Oonao twice, at Busherut-gunge, at Boorjah Keechowkee, and Bithoor. On every occasion I have defeated him, and captured in the field forty guns, besides recovering for the state sixty more. But I am unable, for want of troops, to march on Lucknow.

“My force, which lost men in action, and has been assailed in the most awful way by cholera, is reduced to 700 in the field, exclusive of detachments which guard the intrenchments here, and keep open communication with Allahabad. I am threatened

* See vol. i., p. 600.

by a force of 5,000 men from Gwalior, with some twenty or thirty guns. I am ready to fight anything: but the above are great odds; and a battle lost here would do the interest of the state much damage. I solicit your excellency to send me reinforcements. I can then assume the initiative, and march to Agra and Delhi, or wherever my services may be required. With 2,000 British soldiers nothing could stand before me and my powerful artillery. I shall soon have equipped eighteen guns (six of siege calibre); but I want artillerymen and officers, and infantry soldiers."

The first communication direct from the new commander-in-chief (Sir Colin Campbell) to Major-general Havelock, was as follows, by telegraph, dated August 19th, 1857:—

"I have received your despatches, by telegraph, of the 6th and 12th instant, reporting the successful result of the attacks made on the enemy by the force under your command on those days respectively.

"The sustained energy, promptitude, and vigorous action by which your whole proceedings have been marked during the late difficult operations, deserve the highest praise; and it will be a most agreeable duty to me to make known to his lordship the governor-general, the sense I entertain of the able manner in which you have carried out the instructions of Sir Patrick Grant.

"I beg you to express to the officers and men of the different corps under your command, the pride and satisfaction I have experienced in reading your reports of the intrepid valour they have displayed on every occasion they have encountered the vastly superior numbers of the enemy, and how nobly they have maintained those qualities for which British soldiers have ever been distinguished—high courage and endurance.

"I entirely concur in the soundness of the view you have taken of your position in your telegraph of the 6th instant from Mungulwar, and of all the reasons which influenced you to defer, for the present, active operations.

"I esteem myself most fortunate in having the benefit of your assistance, and that I should find you in the important situation in which you are placed at the moment."

The highly gratifying communication of Sir Colin was acknowledged by the brigadier-general as follows:—

"Cawnpore, Aug. 21st, 1857; 12.30 P.M.

"I cannot express the gratification with

which I have perused your excellency's telegram of the 19th instant, which has just reached me. The approbation of my operations and views, conveyed to me by so distinguished a soldier, more than repays me for the labours and responsibilities of two arduous campaigns, undertaken of necessity at a most unpropitious season: my soldiers will as highly and deeply value your excellency's commendation.

"I am for the present unable to give them shelter from the extreme inclemency of the weather, and the repose of which they stand in need; but sickness continues in our ranks. We lose men by cholera in the number of six daily. I will frankly make known to your excellency my prospects for the future. If I can receive prompt reinforcements, so as to make up my force to 2,000 or 2,500 men, I can hold this place with a high hand, protect my communications with anything that comes against me, and be ready to take a part in active operations on the cessation of the rains. I may be attacked from Gwalior by the mutinous contingent, with 5,000 men and thirty guns; or by the Ghoorkas who are assembling at Furruckabad, under rebellious nabobs, and have a formidable artillery; but as they can only partly unite, I can defeat either or both in fights; still if regiments cannot be sent me, I see no alternative but abandoning for a time the advantages I have gained in this part of India, and retiring upon Allahabad, where everything will be organised for a triumphant advance in the cold season.

"It is painful to repeat that, in the latter event, Cawnpore and the surrounding countries, in fact the whole of the Doab, would be abandoned to rapine and misery, and Agra will fall unsupported. I do not consider that our force would be compromised; for, in truth, the case* of the operation is, strange to say, like the Punjab. I have endeavoured briefly to state my case, and must leave the decision of the important question involved in it to your excellency.

"I do most earnestly hope that you will be able to provide prompt reinforcements. My communications with Allahabad will be quite safe as soon as detachments begin to pass upwards. I had sufficiently explained the danger to which I am exposed, should the enemy at Gwalior take the initiative, and move on Calpee with his imposing

* Sic in original.

force: it is to my left rear; and a force would at the same time endeavour to cross from Oude to Futtehpore. This would cut in my rear, and prevent even the advance of my reinforcements. I have sent a steamer to destroy his boats; but have no news of its success. The Furruckabad force would also assail me; and this column, hitherto triumphant, would be destroyed. The Gwalior force on the Jumna is 5,000 strong, with thirteen guns. The forces threatening Lucknow swell to 20,000, with all the disposable artillery of the province. The Furruckabad force is 12,000 men, with twelve guns. If I do not get any promise of reinforcement from your excellency by return of telegraph, I will retire at once towards Allahabad. I can no longer bear a defenceless intrenchment; that on the river being taken in the rear by the enemy assembling on the right bank of the Ganges."

It is to be presumed that the promise of reinforcements so urgently requested, was made, as the retrograde march to Allahabad did not occur; and the remainder of the month of August was spent by Havelock hopefully, though inactively. Although he was at this time almost surrounded at Cawnpore by gathering hosts of rebel forces, who looked upon his diminished band as certain prey, his communication by telegraph with Allahabad, Benares, and Calcutta was still open, and enabled him to learn that every possible effort was being made by the governor-general and the commander-in-chief to push forward the aid he so much wanted; and he now wrote repeatedly to Brigadier Inglis at Lucknow, urging him to remain firm to the last, in full confidence that succour would reach him before the pressure of despair should compel him to surrender to the enemy by which he was surrounded. He also learned, that some 2,000 men, belonging to the 5th, 64th, 78th, 84th, and 90th regiments, the Madras fusiliers, and the artillery, were either on their way from Calcutta, or would speedily be so; and that the naval brigade, consisting of 500 blue-jackets, under Captain Peel, of her majesty's steam-frigate *Shannon*, had left Calcutta on the 20th of the month, for the purpose of co-operating with his land force. It was known at the time, at the seat of government, that the public treasure at Lucknow, in charge of Brigadier Inglis, amounted to about a quarter of a

million sterling; and telegrams were forwarded, by command of the governor-general in council, to Havelock and Neill, directing both to convey, if possible, instructions to Inglis not to care about the money, but rather to use it in any way that might best contribute to the liberation of his heroic and suffering companions.

On the 18th of August, just two days after General Havelock had completed an unbroken series of ten successive victories, Major-general Sir James Outram—who, after his successful termination of the Persian war, had been appointed to the military command of the Cawnpore and Dinapore divisions—arrived at the latter place to assume the delegated authority, which placed under his control the whole of the British troops engaged in the various struggles at Lucknow, Cawnpore, Allahabad, Benares, &c., &c. Sir Colin Campbell, who still remained at Calcutta, maturing his plans, and organising his forces for the ensuing campaign, immediately arranged with Outram the necessary measures for reinforcing Havelock, that no longer delay might take place in an effort to relieve Lucknow; and with this view, on the 22nd of August, the commander-in-chief telegraphed to Major-general Outram as follows:—

"I am rejoiced to hear of your arrival at Dinapore. The force under General Havelock is reduced by casualties on service, and by cholera (which has been and still rages in his camp), to 700 men in the field, exclusive of detachments which guard the intrenchment, and keep open the communication with Allahabad. He is threatened by a force of some 5,000 men, with twenty or thirty guns, from Gwalior, besides the Oude force. He says he 'is ready to fight anything; but the above are great odds, and a battle lost here would do the interest of the state infinite damage: I solicit reinforcements.' His applications for assistance have been frequent; and deeming his situation to demand immediate aid, I ordered the 90th regiment to be sent to him with all possible speed, as also the detachment of the 5th regiment, which was on board the *Benares* steamer, if it could be spared. Pray send the 90th regiment at once to his aid. I will write to you again on this subject to-morrow."

On the 24th of the month, Sir Colin Campbell further communicated with Major-general Sir James Outram, by the following despatch:—

The Commander-in-chief to Major-general Sir J. Outram.

“Calcutta, August 24th, 1857.

“Sir,—I am extremely happy, and deem myself most fortunate, to find myself associated with you on service, and to have the advantage of your able assistance in carrying on the duty in which we are now engaged. I send you, herewith, the different telegraphs received from General Havelock since my arrival: they will make you fully acquainted with his operations in Oude; his reasons for recrossing the Ganges; his subsequent operations in the neighbourhood of Cawnpore, with account of his loss by sickness and casualties in the field; his present numbers, and their condition as to health and efficiency. I have been favoured by the governor-general with a perusal of yours to his lordship of the 19th instant, in which you propose to collect a force of about 1,000 infantry and eight guns at Benares, with a view to march to the relief of our garrison in Lucknow, by the most direct route from thence, and that the force under General Havelock at Cawnpore should co-operate with you in this movement, by crossing the Ganges at Futtehpore and the Saye, subsequently (with your assistance) at Rye Baccilly, and forming a junction with you beyond that place.

“General Havelock states, in his telegraph of the 20th instant, that his force is reduced to 700 men in the field, exclusive of the detachments required to guard his intrenchments and keep open his communication with Allahabad; and so inadequate does he consider his force to be for the defence of his post, that he states, in his telegraph dated August 21, 12.30 P.M., that, if not assured of reinforcements by return of telegraph, he will retire to Allahabad. Hope of co-operation from General Havelock (by a force equal to accomplish the movement you propose, by crossing the Ganges at Futtehpore) is not to be entertained. The march from Benares, by the most direct route, to Lucknow, is a long one—some 150 miles—and the population through which you would have to pass, hostile. Its great recommendation I presume to be that you (by that route) turn, or rather come in rear of, the many nullahs which, I am told, interpose between Cawnpore and Lucknow, and this would be an important advantage. But if the force you propose to collect at Benares were to be moved by the river to Cawnpore, and united

with Havelock's reduced numbers, do you think it would be equal to force its way over the numerous nullahs (necessarily full of water at this season) which are to be found on the road from the latter place to Lucknow? By this route all incumbrances, such as sick, &c., would be left at the different stations or posts along the road, and the troops, on being conveyed by steam, would suffer less than if obliged to march, and Havelock's anxiety about his post would be removed.

“In offering these remarks or suggestions to you, who are acquainted with the country, people, and difficulties attending the movements you propose, it is not with any view to fetter your judgment and perfect freedom of action; but I mention these as they occur to me in writing to you; and I think I may venture to say, that the measures you may deem most advisable to pursue, will receive the approval of the governor-general. I hope to have the pleasure of hearing from you.—COLIN CAMPBELL.”

It will be observed by the above communication, that Sir James Outram, as superior in military rank to Brigadier-general Havelock, had himself arranged a plan for advancing on Lucknow, entirely different from that on which the latter proposed to act. Sir James intended to advance from Benares direct to the besieged residency, by way of Jounpore, a route which would take him north-east of the Ganges and the Doab, leaving it to Havelock to join him on the march, provided he could overcome the difficulties likely to impede his progress; but when it became apparent that Brigadier Inglis could not cut his way out of Lucknow, and that Havelock was himself endangered at Cawnpore, a reconsideration of Outram's plan became imperative, inasmuch as it was obvious that the advance of 189 miles from Benares to Lucknow, through a country almost entirely in the hands of the enemy, must, under any circumstances, be very perilous; while a march by Allahabad to Cawnpore would be less open to difficulty. The latter route was therefore adopted, and instantly acted upon. On the 1st of September, having made the necessary military arrangements for the safety of the Dinapore district, Major-general Outram arrived at Allahabad, making a brief sojourn at Benares on his way. On the 7th of September he left that city, taking with him *en route* for Cawnpore, the 5th fusiliers and 90th regiment, with detachments of the

64th, 78th, and 84th regiments, and some companies of artillery, which had arrived at Allahabad since Havelock took his departure from that place some two months before; the whole amounting to about 1,700 men.

While rapidly progressing on his march up the country, Sir James received information that a party of rebels from Oude were crossing the Ganges into the Doab, at Koondhun Puttee, between Allahabad and Futtehpoore, and about twenty miles from the last-named town. The importance of frustrating this movement was evident; and, on the 9th of September, an expedition from his main body, consisting of 150 men, with two guns, was entrusted to the charge of Major Vincent Eyre, R.A., whose instructions were to pursue the rebel troops and destroy them. The major arrived at Hutgong—where he was joined by forty troopers of the 12th irregular horse, under Captain Johnson—by dusk on the 10th; and, after resting his men, made a moonlight march to Koondhun Puttee, where he arrived at daybreak on the 11th. The enemy, taken by surprise, fled precipitately to their boats, about half a mile off, and endeavoured to escape punishment by recrossing the river into Oude, but were quickly pursued by the cavalry, who intercepted them before they could reach their boats, and kept up a galling fire of musketry on them. The infantry coming up soon after, caused great havoc among the crowded boats; but the insurgents, now at bay, stood their ground until the two guns opened upon them; when, no longer able to endure the chastisement they had provoked, the now panic-stricken wretches threw themselves madly into the river. Showers of grape were poured upon them; and the sword and rifle brought them down in numbers, and completed their destruction; only a few scattered survivors, out of a body of 300, escaping with life. Considerable importance was attached to this service by General Havelock, who, in a subsequent despatch, said—"I now consider my communications secure, which otherwise must have been entirely cut off during our operations in Oude; and a general insurrection, I am assured, would have followed throughout the Doab, had the enemy not been destroyed, they being but the advanced guard of more formidable invaders."

The following is a copy of the despatch from Major Vincent Eyre to the military secretary of Major-general Outram, K.C.B.:—

"Camp, Koondhun Puttee, Sept. 11th.

"Sir,—I am happy to have it in my power to report, for the information of Major-general Sir James Outram, K.C.B., that the expedition he did me the honour of entrusting to my command has been attended with entire success, and the daring invasion of this territory from Oude has been signally punished. I arrived at Hutgong last evening at dusk, where I was joined by Captain Johnson's troop of the 12th irregular horse (forty in number.) As they had marched twenty-four miles, and were in need of rest, I halted until about half-past 1 A.M., when we had the advantage of moonlight to pursue our march to Koondhun Puttee, where we arrived at daybreak.

"The Oude rebels, having been apprised a little previously of our advance, had fled precipitately to their boats, about half a mile off. I ordered the cavalry, under Captain Johnson and Lieutenant Havelock, to pursue them, and followed up myself with all practicable speed with the infantry and guns. We found the cavalry had driven the enemy into their boats, which were fastened to the shore, and were maintaining a brisk fire on them from the bank above. On the arrival of the detachments of her majesty's 5th fusiliers and 64th foot, under Captains Johnson and Turner, the fire of our musketry into the densely-crowded boats was most telling; but the enemy still defended themselves to the utmost, until the guns under Lieutenant Gordon opened fire, when the rebels instantly threw themselves, panic-stricken, into the river. Grape was now showered upon them, and a terrific fusillade from the infantry and cavalry maintained until only a few scattered survivors escaped. Their number appeared to be about 300. Previously to their plunging into the river they threw their guns overboard, and blew up one of their boats, which had been boarded by a party of infantry, whereby, I regret to say, one man of her majesty's 5th was killed, and ten more or less injured (of whom five were Europeans and five natives.) All the officers mentioned above distinguished themselves highly, and the conduct of the men was all that could be desired.

"Lieutenant Impey, of the engineers, and Mr. Volunteer Tarby, have likewise, by their zeal and usefulness, merited my thanks and commendation.—VINCENT EYRE,

"Major, commanding Field Force."

While the force under General Outram is proceeding on its route to Cawnpore, it

will not be uninteresting to refer to the following letter from that place, as descriptive of circumstances that prevailed there at the beginning of September.

“Cawnpore, September 12th, 1857.

“In the course of the past week we have had augmentations to our army from the lower provinces, and more are daily expected. General Sir J. Outram, with 700 bayonets and one horse field battery, is to come in to-morrow from Allahabad; and it is said that we await the arrival of some 800 more, ere a move to Lucknow will or can be effected. Morning and evening parades and roll-calls are quite the order of the day, together with the training of the volunteer cavalry in the use of the sword, &c., as also our new horse battery, which has made wonderful progress. This morning, the battery was out manœuvring the gnns, firing blank to see the effect of the shock on the young horses. I am told they stood the fire well, and with a few more exercises will be deemed efficient for the field. The enemy are working incessantly on the other side of the river, erecting breastworks, batteries, and mining the roads. A few days since, they had an experimental explosion of one of these mines; but the simpletons had the train set on the wrong way, and when a great mob had congregated to witness the *burra tamasha*—*tamasha* in truth!—for it sent some three to four hundred kicking in the air. Yesterday we sent a reconnoitring party of one hundred men on board the Hon. Company’s steamer *Berham-pootra*; but the vessel, on crossing the Ganges, got foul of a sand-bank and stuck fast. No sooner did the rebels notice this mishap, than they thought it a good chance to sink the vessel, which they considered a great bore, and blazed away their guns at her. On hearing and seeing this, we replied to them by the 24-pounders from our intrenched camp, and several of the insurgents were floored, together with one elephant, the whole of its hind quarters being carried clean off with a round shot. This proved sufficient for the enemy; and they were seen scampering off in search of the road home. Last evening they again assembled close to the river-side in thousands, and fired off a few of their 9-pounders. We again returned the compliment by our monsters, and a few shots sufficed to scatter them. Boats were sent for the unsuccessful reconnoitring party, and the steamer soon afterwards floated, and is now safe at

the bank-side, having received no damage. The bank on this side of the river is much higher than that on the other, and we therefore command a better view and range than they do. Their shot drop far short of the land on this side; ours, though of the same calibre, carry well across. It is contemplated to leave the whole of the sick, with 400 effective men, in the intrenchment, the main body of the army going on to the relief of the garrison at Lucknow. After this is effected, our gallant boys return here, and, should we be required, will move on to Delhi; but this can scarcely be, as Delhi must soon be in our hands. The fort has been for some days surrounded by our troops, and several sorties were made by the besieged, but were repulsed with immense loss, our killed and wounded amounting to about forty of all ranks. It is, I believe, the wish of government to save, if possible, the fort and town of Delhi from total destruction. Were it otherwise, the whole would long since have been levelled. The men of our small army are in most excellent health and spirits, and wish impatiently to have Lucknow in possession. Only two casualties occurred during the week, and the prevailing disease now is fever of the common type. Cholera has totally disappeared; but it was, indeed, the bane of our little army. Our heroic general is in excellent health and spirits, and goes his rounds morning and evening. Mighty preparations are being made for the crossing of the army. We have about 1,500 bayonets, and twenty guns go on to Lucknow. We shall get across in less time than we did before, as lots of boats are moored along the bank of the Ganges. I trust we may come off as scot-free this time as we did the last. Is it not strange that this force, since its formation in Allahabad, has never had either a protestant minister or Roman catholic chaplain?”

Resuming the narrative, we find that, in the early part of September, a telegraphic message from Brigadier Inglis reached General Havelock, with the following information:—

“Lucknow, September 1st, 1857.

“Your letter of the 22nd has duly reached me, in reply to mine of the 16th ultimo. I regret your inability to advance at present to our relief; but, in consequence of your letter, I have reduced the rations; and with this arrangement, and our great diminution

in numbers from casualties, I hope to be able to hold on to the 20th or the 21st instant. Some stores we have been out of for the last fifteen days, and many others will be expended before the same date. I must be frank, and tell you that my force is daily diminishing from the enemy's musketry fire, and our defences grow weaker daily. Should the enemy make any very determined efforts to storm this place, I shall find it difficult to repulse them, owing to my paucity in numbers, and the weak and harassed state of the force. Our loss, since the commencement of hostilities here, has been, in Europeans alone, upwards of 300. We are continually harassed in counterminating the enemy, who have above twenty guns in position, many of them heavy ones. Any advance of you towards this place will act beneficially in our favour, and greatly inspirit the native part of my garrison, who hitherto have behaved like faithful and good soldiers. If you can possibly give me any intimation of your intended advance, pray do so by letter. Give the bearer the pass-word, "Agra," and ask him to give it me in person; and oblige me by forwarding a copy of this to the governor-general.

"Copy sent to General Havelock from commanding officer, Allahabad, for information and guidance, with the further remark that Maun Sing, who was promised a jagheer of two lacs conditionally on his affording us assistance, is reported to be still holding on; therefore it is by no means improbable that, if [the following line is entirely wanting, the paper being torn], that Sir H. Lawrence's promise shall be

* The state of the pent-up garrison at Lucknow had now become a source of most painful apprehension throughout British India. Among other remarks upon the subject, the following extract from the *Bombay Guardian*, will not be found devoid of interest to the English reader:—"There is something inexpressibly affecting, and tragical even we may say, about the position of the little band at Lucknow, as it is presented to our conceptions by the last advices from the neighbourhood. Encompassed by an immense force in what is now the heart of the enemy's country, cut off from communication with their countrymen elsewhere, they have nothing (under heaven) to sustain them but the hope, so long deferred, of the arrival of a British force to save them from a frightful death, and restore them to liberty. Weeks and months pass by. They feel that all Britain will be stirred with profound sympathy, and nerved with determination to suffer no obstacles to hinder the prompt dispatch of succours. They know how impossible it is that their countrymen should be for a moment indifferent to

confirmed by government, he may be induced to afford us active help. His followers are estimated to be 6,000 in number."

A copy of this important letter was forwarded to the governor-general as requested, and its receipt was acknowledged by the following telegraphic message from his excellency in council to Major-general Sir James Outram:—

"Calcutta, September 12th, 1857.

"I have received this morning Brigadier Inglis's letter of the 1st of September. Maun Sing may be assured that if he continues to give to the governor-general effective proof of his fidelity and good-will, his position in Oude will be at least as good as it was before the British government assumed the administration of the country; whilst the proprietors in Oude, who have deserted the government, will lose their possessions. The same assurance may be given to any other chiefs, who will be rewarded in proportion to the support they may afford.

"Whatever promises may have been made to Maun Sing, or to others, by Sir Henry Lawrence, are confirmed, and shall be fully redeemed. None, however, have been reported to me.

"I send the above message to Mr. Grant, as well as to yourself. He will endeavour to convey the assurance to Maun Sing by a sure route, in case your communication with Oude should be interrupted.

"I hope you will be able to send a reply to Brigadier Inglis; and to inform him of the exertions which have been made for the relief of his brave little band, and of the anxious sympathy which is felt for them."*

their fate; and they know the incomparable command of resources, the all-conquering might of England; and they say to one another, 'We have but to hold out a few days, and an irresistible force shall appear.' They learn even that a force is on its way. They fix a day when they are confident that it will make its appearance. That day arrives, and brings no help. They fix another day, and encourage one another to wait for it. It, too, comes in vain. Perhaps some reproachful thoughts of their long-tarrying friends arise. When they heard (as possibly they did) that General Havelock had crossed the Ganges, and was on the direct road to Lucknow—less than forty miles off; then less than thirty-five; less than thirty, twenty-five, twenty—hope must have waxed strong; they must have felt that now assuredly the hour of deliverance was at hand. Perhaps already a spirit of praise began to mingle with their prayers. But the days come and go; no succour yet; the force has been obliged to retreat. Twice they pass through this agony of suspense; twice the expected troops come so near that

At length, on the 15th of September, 1857, the three generals (Outram, Havelock, and Neill, each in himself a host) met at Cawnpore, and immediately proceeded to arrange the plan for future operations. It was now that an instance of chivalrous self-denial, and generous sacrifice of personal feeling, was exhibited by Sir James Outram, that won for him more enduring admiration than even his brilliant military career had ensured him among his brother-soldiers, who best could appreciate the value of the magnanimous concession. Being of higher military rank, as well as chief commissioner of Oude, the command of the forces under Havelock and Neill properly devolved upon Sir James Outram; but he, with a soldier's pride, had traced the arduous career of a brother-warrior, and was determined not to snatch from his grasp the well-won laurels that were to spring from the relief of Lucknow. In accordance with this resolution, the following "divisional orders by Major-general Sir J. Outram, K.C.B., commanding the Dinapore and Cawnpore divisions of the army," were issued on the day following his arrival at head-quarters:—

"Cawnpore, Sept. 16th, 1857.

"All Cawnpore divisional reports to be made for the information of Sir James Outram, K.C.B., commanding.

"The force selected by General Havelock, which will march to relieve the garrison at Lucknow, will be constituted and composed as follows:—

"*First Infantry Brigade.*—The 5th fusiliers; 84th regiment; detachments 64th foot and 1st Madras fusiliers: Brigadier-general Neill commanding, and nominating his own brigade staff.

"*Second Infantry Brigade.*—Her majesty's 78th highlanders; her majesty's 90th light infantry, and the Sikh regiment of Ferozepore: Brigadier Hamilton commanding, and nominating his own brigade staff.

"*Third (Artillery) Brigade.*—Captain Maude's battery; Captain Olphert's battery; Brevet-major Eyre's battery: Major Cope to command, and to appoint his own staff.

they can distinguish the sound of their guns; twice they are obliged to fall back. Their own commanders have fallen one after another. Whither shall they now look for help? How tragical their position! All India knows about them; all England even knows about them; the whole civilised world sympathises with them, and would spare no pains, no sacrifices to deliver them. Yet there they are—there they remain—help reaches them not—

"*Cavalry.*—Volunteer cavalry to the left; irregular cavalry to the right: Captain Barrow to command.

"*Engineer Department.*—Chief engineer, Captain Crowling; assistant engineers, Lieutenants Leonard and Judge: Major-general H. Havelock, C.B., to command the force.

"The important duty of first relieving the garrison of Lucknow has been intrusted to Major-general Havelock, C.B.; and Major-general Outram feels that it is due to this distinguished officer, and the strenuous and noble exertions which he has already made to effect that object, that to him should accrue the honour of the achievement. Major-general Outram is confident that the great end for which General Havelock and his brave troops have so long and so gloriously fought, will now, under the blessing of Providence, be accomplished.

"The major-general therefore, in gratitude for, and admiration of, the brilliant deeds in arms achieved by General Havelock and his gallant troops, will cheerfully waive his rank on the occasion, and will accompany the force to Lucknow in his civil capacity as chief commissioner of Oude, tendering his military services to General Havelock as a volunteer. On the relief of Lucknow the major-general will resume his position at the head of the forces."

The following order was also issued, on the same evening, by General Havelock to the force about to proceed to the relief of Lucknow, under his command:—

"Cawnpore, Sept. 16th.

"Brigadier-general Havelock, in making known to the column the kind and generous determination of General Sir James Outram, K.C.B., to leave to him the task of relieving Lucknow and rescuing its gallant and enduring garrison, has only to express his hope that the troops will strive, by their exemplary and gallant conduct in the field, to justify the confidence thus reposed in them."

The chivalrous arrangement between the rival heroes was subsequently confirmed by the commander-in-chief, Sir Colin Campbell, in the following general order:—

their enemies laugh them to scorn, and prepare to consummate their destruction. How agonising! how humiliating to us! what a satire upon our imagined command of resources, and superiority to circumstances! How little can we do! how utterly baffled and foiled do we seem! how necessary, after all, is God! Oh that this lesson might now be learned by those who have so often disdained to recognise the truth set forth by it."

“Head-quarters, Calcutta, Sept. 28th.

“Seldom, perhaps never, has it occurred to a commander-in-chief to publish and confirm such an order as the following one, proceeding from Major-general Sir James Outram, K.C.B. With such a reputation as Major-general Sir James Outram has won for himself, he can well afford to share glory and honour with others. But that does not lessen the value of the sacrifice he has made, with such disinterested generosity, in favour of Brigadier-general Havelock, C.B., commanding the field force in Oude. Concurring as the commander-in-chief does in everything stated in the just eulogy of the latter by Sir James Outram, his excellency takes this opportunity of publicly testifying to the army his admiration for an act of self-sacrifice and generosity, on a point of all others which is dear to a real soldier. The confidence of Major-general Sir James Outram in Brigadier-general Havelock is indeed well justified. The energy, perseverance, and constancy of the brigadier-general have never relaxed throughout a long series of arduous operations, in spite of scanty means, a numerous and trained enemy, and sickness in his camp. Never have troops shown greater or more enduring courage than those under the orders of Brigadier-general Havelock.

“The force and the service at large are under the greatest obligations to Sir James Outram, for the manner in which he has pressed up the reinforcements to join Brigadier-general Havelock, in the face of much difficulty.”

As it was of the utmost importance that the general in command of the force destined for the relief of Lucknow, should be well-informed of the intentions of the governor-general and the commander-in-chief, with regard to the future disposal of that city, Major-general Outram, on the 17th, telegraphed to the governor-general in council as follows:—

“Cawnpore, Sept. 17th, 1857; 1.30 A.M.

“If I find that a brigade of three regiments can surely hold Lucknow, placed in an invulnerable position commanding the city and its resources, shall Lucknow be retained or abandoned? A larger body of troops will be expended in watching Oude than in holding Lucknow in security, the communication from Benares to Allahabad, and along the line of Ganges to Furruckabad. The moral effect of abandoning Lucknow will be very serious against us; the

many well-disposed chiefs in Oude and Rohilkund, who are now watching the turn of affairs, would regard the loss of Lucknow as the forerunner of the end of our rule. Such a blow to our *prestige* may extend its influence to Nepaul, and will be felt all over India. The civil government of the city may be maintained without interfering with the province at present.”

The reply of the governor-general to this inquiry was as follows:—

“Calcutta, Sept. 18th, 1857; 9.30 P.M.

“Lucknow may be retained, if you can hold it securely and without depending upon early reinforcements. But the one paramount object is the rescue of the garrison; and whatever will most surely conduce to this will be best. If the safety of the garrison can be more thoroughly secured by retiring, pray do not hesitate to do so. We will recover our *prestige* before long.

“As to reinforcements, the China regiments are very slow in arriving. The head-quarters of the 23rd regiment (350 strong) arrived to-day, but it is not known where the rest are; therefore you must not count upon any addition to your Europeans at present.”

All necessary preparations having been completed by the 18th of September, the British force, under the command of Major-general Havelock, consisting of about 2,700 men, with seventeen guns and a small party of volunteer cavalry, crossed the Ganges on the 19th, *en route* for Lucknow, General Outram accompanying the troops in his civil capacity only, as chief commissioner of Oude. The passage of the river was effected without loss, under fire of some 24-pounders; the enemy, after a mere nominal resistance, retiring to his fortified position at Mungulwar. On the 20th, the heavy guns and baggage were got over; and, on the following day, the general stormed the position of the rebels, defeating them with the loss of four guns and some regimental colours. The enemy fled with precipitation from the field; and the result of this initiatory affair was communicated by Brigadier-general Havelock to General Mansfield (chief of the staff), by the following despatch:—

“Busherut-gunge, September 21st.

“I have to request that you will inform his excellency the commander-in-chief, that I was joined by my reinforcements on the 15th and 16th instant. On the 19th I

crossed first to the island on the Ganges, and then to its left bank by a bridge of boats, which had been laboriously constructed by Captain Crommelin, field engineer. The enemy retired, after a very feeble (in fact a nominal) resistance, to his position at Mungulwar. The two brigades of my force occupied an alignment with the right centre behind sand-hills, the centre and left on a plain, extending to the road from the Lucknow Ghaut to Mungulwar. My heavy guns and baggage were passed over on the 20th. This morning I attacked the enemy, turned his right, and drove him from his position, with the loss of four guns, two of which and the regimental colours of the first Bengal native infantry, were captured by the volunteer cavalry in a charge headed by Sir James Outram. The loss on our side was trifling. The enemy suffered severely; about 120 were sabred by the cavalry."

From this point until near Lucknow, no opposition was offered to the march of the column, the enemy flying before it as it advanced, throwing their guns into wells; and, in their hot haste, even neglecting to break down a bridge over the river Saye, which, had it been destroyed, would have materially retarded the progress of the liberating force.

The following extracts from private correspondence, afford some interesting details of incidents connected with the advance of the troops:—

"Cawnpore, September 18th.

"We are now all bivouacked on the bank of the river, waiting the completion of the bridge of boats to an island in the centre of the river, on which our guns and skirmishers are now engaged with the enemy, who have two guns firing upon us in our front. Their camp is visible at a village some two or three miles further in. We hope to cross this evening or to-morrow morning. Major Haliburton, of the 78th highlanders, is in command of the advanced troops on the island, where the advanced skirmishers of the rebels fired upon us during the evening, killing one of our Sikhs. After dark, the advanced troops and guns, under Major Haliburton, retired for the night to the sand-bank and the bridge of boats.

"September 19th.—Before daylight this morning, the advanced troops, commanded as yesterday, pushed on again, feeling their way up the Lucknow-road, where they remained in skirmishing order, covering the advance of the main force; partial musketry

firing during this time on both sides, the enemy mainly occupying a ridge of sand-hills on the right. After a time two guns of the enemy, posted in a village on the right front, commenced playing upon us; their shot fell close amongst the advance, and at times even passing over the column forming in rear; but no casualties occurred. After about an hour of this amusement, a sufficient force having crossed, the advance was ordered, diverging towards the right along two ridges of sand-hills, behind which the rebels were posted. They made a show of endeavouring to maintain themselves, sending detachments of cavalry out to their left and to the farthest removed point from the line of retreat. The advance of our skirmishers, however, supported by the column and the Enfield rifles of the former, were too much for their courage. A strong attempt was made by the leading men of the rebels on horseback to induce their men to advance on our skirmishers—Sikhs and highlanders—between the two lines of sand-hills; a simultaneous cheer passed along their line; Jack sepoy advanced with a shout—about twenty yards, and no more! and then went to the rightabout, keeping up a smart, spirited, but harmless fire. Our troops occupied the sand-hills, where they encamped for the day to enable the stores, baggage, and heavy guns to join them.

"One mile from Cawnpore, on the Oude side: September 20th.—Just a few lines to tell you we crossed yesterday over a bridge of boats—a very good one, erected by the engineers in a very short time. We had a brush with the enemy after crossing. All their shot fell wide or went over our heads; their shells did not burst. Not a man of ours touched; about twenty on their side killed by our skirmishers and artillery. We drove in their skirmishers and guns; they appeared to have one heavy gun and some 9-pounders horsed. All the struggle was over by about 10 A.M. They were popping away at us all day yesterday, and to-day they opened with their guns on the cavalry reconnoitring party, but did no harm. We shall commence our movement to Lucknow in real earnest to-morrow, when I hope all baggage and heavy guns will be over. It has been awful work getting the heavy guns and ammunition across. A cossid has just arrived to say they can hold out at Lucknow easily till the 1st of October."

Another letter of the 20th, says—"We crossed the river yesterday by a bridge of boats, constructed *pour l'occasion* by Messrs. Crommelin, Watson, and other engineers. One of our cavalry, who was acting as orderly to the general, was drowned. His horse jumped off the bridge, and he and horse were drawn down by an eddy, and nothing more was seen of them. Previous to the main body crossing, the Sikhs and two companies of the 78th highlanders had taken up a position on an island; the enemy fired upon them with their guns, but our 24-pounders seemed no favourites with them, as they became more respectful, notwithstanding they continued at intervals taking pops with their matchlocks, sheltered from sight by the long grass. No one, fortunately, was killed, beyond one Sikh, who was shot through the head. On the main body crossing, or rather after having crossed, a horse gun opened fire, but that was soon silenced. The enemy occupy a village named Mungulwar, which by to-morrow will be in our hands. It is my opinion we shall not have over-much fighting till we reach Nuwabgunge; report says they are strongly intrenched there. They are said to have a monster gun of fabulous size, 'reaching to the sun:' whatever it is it will be our property before long. I think two days or so will see us in Lucknow. What a pleasurable moment that will be when we have relieved so many of our countrymen!"

Having crossed the Saye without opposition, General Havelock found himself, on the 23rd of September, in the presence of the enemy, who had taken up a strong position in front of Lucknow, their left wing being posted in the enclosure of the Alumbagh (Garden of Beauty), a country-seat of one of the princes of Oude, distant about three miles from the city; and their centre and right upon some slight eminences in the vicinity. The Alumbagh comprised several extensive buildings, including a palace, a mosque, and an emam-barra, or private temple; enclosed by a beautiful garden, which was surrounded by a park—the park itself being bounded by a wall, with strongly-fortified towers at the angles. In this important position there was abundant space for the accommodation of a large military force; and it was capable of being converted into a formidable stronghold, if the defences were well maintained. Here, then, a vigorous effort was made by

the enemy's troops to obstruct the passage of the English; and the head of the column suffered severely from the enemy's guns, as it advanced along the Trunk-road towards the important post, between heavy morasses on either side: as soon, however, as it could deploy along the front, and its left wing enveloped the right flank of the rebel force, a terrific volley from the heavy guns of the British, announced to the besieged that their deliverance was at hand; and, after a sharp and severe contest, another triumph was added to the list of Havelock's victories, and the Alumbagh was in possession of his troops!—the enemy retiring before them, and abandoning in their flight five pieces of ordnance. The routed insurgents were pursued by a portion of the force led by Major-general Sir James Outram (as a volunteer), to the bridge of the Charbagh, crossing the canal which bounded the south side of the city. Beyond this post, however, the rebel force seemed determined to make a stand; and as their field artillery and the guns from the city were concentrated upon this point, it was considered impossible to hold it at the moment, and the column accordingly retired to the Alumbagh, where it sustained an incessant cannonade during several hours; the enemy's cavalry, some 1,500 strong, meanwhile making an attempt upon the baggage of the English force, by a sweep through some high cultivation that skirted it. The attempt was, however, frustrated by the gallantry of the 90th regiment, which formed the baggage guard, and received the charge with much firmness, but not without the loss of several officers and men. The enemy was finally put to flight with the loss of twenty-five men.

As the troops had now been marching three days under a perfect deluge of rain, irregularly fed, and badly sheltered in the villages on their route, General Havelock determined to allow them a day's rest to recruit their strength. The tents were accordingly pitched at the Alumbagh, which was by far too important to be abandoned when once obtained; and here, therefore, on the following day, General Havelock left his baggage, ammunition, the sick and wounded of his force, and an immense array of elephants, camels, horses, camp-followers, and laden carts, with 300 men to protect the whole, and four guns to aid in the defence.

On the morning of the 25th, the troops

moved forward. The first brigade, led by Sir James Outram (as a volunteer), drove the enemy from a succession of gardens and walled enclosures; while the other divisions, under General Havelock, supported the advance. From the bridge of the Charbagh, over the canal, the direct road to the residency was nearly two miles in length, and this interval was cut up by trenches, crossed by palisades, and intersected by loopholed houses; and the progress of the troops being thus obstructed, it was determined to deploy along a narrow road that skirted the left bank of the canal. By this route, the advance was not seriously interrupted until the force came opposite the king's palace, or Kaiserbagh, where two guns and a strong body of the insurgents were in position, and from whence the fire poured upon the advancing columns was so tremendous, that nothing could withstand it: for a short distance the British artillery and troops had, however, to pass a bridge partially under its range, but were then sheltered by buildings belonging to the palace of Fhureed Buksh, which adjoined the outer wall of the residency.

By this time darkness approached, and it was proposed to halt the troops for the night within the court of the palace; but General Havelock considered it to be too important that the beleaguered garrison should be at once relieved, to admit of any delay that could be avoided; and he accordingly ordered the main body of the 78th highlanders, and the regiment of Ferozepore, to take the lead in a desperate hand-to-hand fight through the narrow streets and loopholed passages in front of them. It was a desperate enterprise; but it succeeded, and the garrison was relieved. In a few hours such relief would have been too late: two mines had been driven under the chief works, which, if loaded and sprung, would have placed the diminished garrison and its precious charge wholly at the mercy of the rebels; and, in all probability, the atrocities of Delhi and Cawnpore would have been repeated. Happily this terrible calamity was averted; but, on that day, all within the residency endured an age of agonised suspense—knowing that the conflict raged fiercely around them, yet unable to assist in working out their own deliverance. But when, at length, the advanced column of the English force, surrounded by smoke and flame, had reached a street visible from

the battered defences of the enclosure, a cheer broke forth to welcome their deliverers, that must have sounded to the despairing hearts of the discomfited rebels as the knell of their destiny.

Throughout the night of the 24th, great agitation and alarm had prevailed in the city; and, as morning advanced, increased and rapid movements of men and horses, gave evidence of the excited state of the rebel force. At noon, increasing noise proclaimed that street-fighting was growing more fierce in the distance; but, from the residency, nought but the smoke from the fire of the combatants could be discerned. As the afternoon advanced, the sounds came nearer and nearer, and then was heard the sharp crack of rifles, mingled with the flash of musketry: the well-known uniforms of British soldiers were next discerned, as the generals, Outram and Havelock, fought their way with their gallant band through a continuous line of streets to the Bailey Guard entrance of the residency enclosure; where, on the evening of the 25th of September, the two heroes clasped hands with Inglis, and listened to the outpouring of the full hearts that surrounded them with blessings and welcome.

The author of *A Personal Narrative of the Siege*, describing this scene, says—"The immense enthusiasm with which they were greeted, defies description. As their hurrah and ours rung in my ears, I was nigh bursting with joy. We felt not only happy—happy beyond imagination, and grateful to that God of mercy who, by our noble deliverers (Havelock and Outram) and their gallant troops, had thus snatched us from imminent death; but we also felt proud of the defence we had made, and the success with which, with such fearful odds to contend against, we had preserved not only our own lives, but the honour and lives of the women and children intrusted to our keeping. As our deliverers poured in, they continued to greet us with loud hurrahs. We ran up to them, officers and men without distinction, and shook them by the hands—how cordially, who can describe? And those brave men themselves, many of them bloody and exhausted, forgot the loss of their comrades—the pain of their wounds—the fatigue of overcoming the fearful obstacles they had encountered for our sakes, in the pleasure of having accomplished our relief."

Another eye-witness of the event (autho-

ress of the *Ladies' Diary of the Siege*), says—"Never shall I forget the moment to the latest day I live. We had no idea they were so near, and were breathing air in the portico as usual at that hour, speculating when they might be in—not expecting they could reach us for several days longer; when suddenly, just at dark, we heard a very sharp fire of musketry close by, and then a tremendous cheering. An instant after, the sound of bagpipes—then soldiers running up the road—our compound and verandah filled with our deliverers, and all of us shaking hands frantically, and exchanging fervent 'God bless you's!' with the gallant men and officers of the 78th highlanders. Sir James Outram and staff were the next to come in, and the state of joyful confusion and excitement was beyond all description. The big, rough-bearded soldiers, were seizing the little children out of our arms, kissing them, with tears rolling down their cheeks, and thanking God they had come in time to save them from the fate of those at Cawnpore. We were all rushing about to give the poor fellows drinks of water, for they were perfectly exhausted; and tea was made down in the Tye-khana; of which a large party of tired, thirsty officers partook, without milk or sugar. We had nothing to give them to eat. Everyone's tongue seemed going at once, with so much to ask and to tell; and the faces of utter strangers beamed upon each other like those of dearest friends and brothers."

The triumph of that day was not gained but with cost of noble blood. Upwards of 400 had fallen in the conflict; and among the slain were Brigadier-general Neill, Major Cooper of the artillery, Lieutenant-colonel Bazeley, Captain Pakenham, and Lieutenants Crump, Warren, Bateman, Webster, Kirby, Poole, and Moultrie. The whole list of casualties comprised 119 officers and men killed, 339 wounded, and 77 missing—wounded prisoners in the hands of a ruthless enemy. Thus was the force, in one day, reduced by 535 fighting-men.

On the evening of this eventful day, Major-general Havelock surrendered to Sir James Outram, within the residency at Lucknow, the command he had so generously left in his hands at Cawnpore, and now became second in command to his senior officer; who had, since the 16th of the month, fought chivalrously under his orders as a volunteer! On the 30th of Sep-

tember, the following report from Major-general Havelock, announced the relief of the garrison of Lucknow, and the termination of his independent command in the province of Oude:—

"Lucknow Residency, Sept. 30, 1857.

"Major-general Sir James Outram having, with characteristic generosity of feeling, declared that the command of the force should remain in my hands, and that he would accompany it as civil commissioner only, until a junction could be effected with the gallant and enduring garrison of this place, I have to request that you will inform his excellency the commander-in-chief that this purpose was effected on the evening of the 25th instant; but I must first refer to antecedent events. I crossed the Saye on the 22nd instant, the bridge at Bunnee not having been broken. On the 23rd I found myself in the presence of the enemy, who had taken a strong position, his left posted in the enclosure of the Alumbagh, and his centre and right on low heights.

"The head of my column at first suffered from the fire of his guns, as it was compelled to pass along the Trunk-road between morasses; but as soon as my regiment could be deployed along his front, and his right enveloped by my left, victory decided for us, and we captured five guns. Sir J. Outram, with his accustomed gallantry, pressed our advance close down to the canal; but as the enemy fired with his artillery, and with guns from the city, it was not possible to maintain this, or a less advanced position, for a time, and it became necessary to throw our right in the Alumbagh, and retire our left; and even then we were incessantly cannonaded throughout the twenty-four hours; while their cavalry, 1,500 strong, swept round through lofty cultivation, and made a sudden irruption upon the baggage massed in our rear.

"The soldiers of the 90th regiment, forming the baggage guard, received the charge with gallantry, and lost some brave officers and men; shooting down, however, twenty-five of the troopers, and putting the whole body to flight. They were finally driven off by two guns of Captain Olphert's battery.

"As the troops had been marching three days under a perfect deluge of rain, irregularly fed, and badly housed in villages, it was thought necessary to pitch tents, and permit them to halt on the 24th; and the assault on the city was deferred until the 25th. On that morning our baggage and

tents were deposited in the Alumbagh, under an escort, and we advanced. The first brigade, under Sir J. Outram's personal leading, drove the enemy from a succession of gardens and walled enclosures, supported by the two brigades which I accompanied. Both brigades were established on the canal at the bridge of the Charbagh. From this point, the direct road to the residency is a little less than two miles, but it was known to have been cut by trenches, and crossed by palisades at short intervals, the houses, also, being all loopholed. Progress in this direction was opposed; so the united column pushed and deployed along the narrow road which skirts the left bank of the canal. Its advance was not seriously interrupted until it came opposite the king's palace, or Kaiserbagh, where two guns and a body of mercenary troops were entrenched. From this intrenchment a fire of grape and musketry was poured, under which nothing could live; the artillery and troops had to pass a bridge partially under its influence, but were then shrouded by the buildings adjacent to the palace of Fhureed Buksh.

"Darkness was coming on, and it was proposed to halt within the court of this mehal for the night; but I esteemed it to be of much importance not to leave this beleaguered garrison without succour close at hand, and I ordered the main body of the 78th highlanders, and the regiment of Ferozepore, to advance. This column rushed on with a desperate resolve, followed by Sir J. Outram and myself, with Lieutenants Hudson and Hargood, of my staff; and, overcoming every obstacle, it established itself within the enclosure of the residency. The state of the garrison may be more easily

conceived than described; but it was not until the next evening that the whole of my troops, guns, tumbrils, and sick and wounded, continually exposed to the attack of the enemy, could be brought, step by step, within this enclosure, and the adjacent palace of Fhureed Buksh. To form a notion of the obstacles overcome, a reference must be made to the events that are known to have occurred at Buenos Ayres and Saragossa. Our advance was through streets of flat-roofed and loopholed houses, each forming a separate fortress. I am filled with surprise at the success of operations which demanded the efforts of 10,000 good troops: but the advantage has cost us dearly.

"The killed, wounded, and missing—the latter being wounded soldiers, who, I regret to say, have fallen into the hands of a merciless foe—amount to 464 officers and men. Brigadier-general Neill,* commanding 1st brigade; Major Cooper, commanding artillery; and Lieutenant-colonel Bazely, a volunteer with the force, are killed. Colonel Campbell, commanding 90th infantry; Lieutenant-colonel Tytler, my deputy assistant-quartermaster-general; and Lieutenant Havelock, my deputy assistant-adjutant-general—are severely, but not dangerously, wounded. Sir James Outram received a flesh-wound in the arm in the early part of the action, near the Charbagh, but nothing could subdue his spirit; and, though faint from loss of blood, he continued, to the end of the operation, to sit on his horse, which he only dismounted at the gate of the residency. As he has now assumed the command, I leave to him the narration of all events subsequent to the 25th instant."

* Brigadier-general James George Smith Neill, of the Madras fusiliers, was a native of Ayrshire, N.B.; and was the eldest son of Lieutenant-colonel Smith Neill, of Barnweill and Swindrigemuir, in that shire. He was born about the year 1810, and entered the 1st European fusiliers (Madras) in 1826. His first active service was in the Burmese war, during the administration of Lord Amherst; but he was compelled to return to Europe on furlough, on account of the inroad made upon his constitution by exposure while on field service. Returning to India, he held the command of the escort of the resident at the court of the rajah of Nagpore, in the years 1835 and 1836; and about the same time married Isabella, daughter of Colonel Warde. In the second Burmese war, under Lord Dalhousie, he was also employed; and, on the outbreak of the war with Russia, in 1854, he volunteered for active service in Turkey, and commanded a brigade of the Turkish contingent. He subsequently took the command of the 1st European

fusiliers, one of the most gallant and distinguished regiments in the Indian service; and on the outbreak of the mutiny, being sent up from Calcutta with his regiment, he first relieved Benares, and then pressed on, by forced marches, to Cawnpore, where his practice with the high-caste Brahmin murderers will not be soon effaced from the memory of the natives, having compelled them to inflict their own degradation by washing, with their own hands, the blood-stained floor that formed the scene of their atrocities. Brigadier-general Neill held the command of Cawnpore on the departure of Havelock for Lucknow, and is represented as a strict disciplinarian, but at the same time, as one who never spared himself, and always shared with his men in danger, difficulty, and privation. From the time he left his native home in Ayrshire (a stripling of sixteen), he had passed thirty years of his life in the service of his country; and his honourable career was terminated by a soldier's death at Lucknow, on the 25th of September, 1857.

The government of India evinced its high appreciation of the services rendered by Major-general Havelock, and the force under his command, by the relief of Lucknow, in the following notification:—

“Fort William, Oct. 2nd.

“The governor-general in council rejoices to announce, that information has been this day received from Major-general Sir James Outram, K.C.B., showing that the residency at Lucknow was in the possession of Major-general Havelock’s force, on the 25th ultimo, and that the garrison is saved. Rarely has a commander been so fortunate as to relieve by his success so many aching hearts, or to reap so rich a reward of gratitude as will deservedly be offered to Major-general Havelock and his gallant band wherever their triumph shall become known. The governor-general in council tenders to Sir James Outram and to Major-general Havelock his earnest thanks and congratulations upon the joyful result of which a merciful Providence has made them the chief instrument. The governor-general in council forbears to observe further upon information which is necessarily imperfect; but he cannot refrain from expressing the deep regret with which he hears of the death of Brigadier-general Neill, of the 1st Madras European fusiliers, of which it is to be feared that no doubt exists. Brigadier-general Neill, during his short but active career in Bengal, had won the respect and confidence of the government of India; he had made himself conspicuous as an intelligent, prompt, self-reliant soldier, ready of resource and stout of heart; and the governor-general in council offers to the government and to the army of Madras, his sincere condolence upon the loss of one who was an honour to the service of their presidency.—By order of the governor-general of India in council.

“R. J. H. BIRCH, Colonel,

“Secretary to the Government of India, in the Military Department.”

The mere possession of the residency, with its shattered defences and worn-out garrison, by no means involved the occupation of the city of Lucknow, which is, or rather was at the time, about six miles in length, in a direction from S.E. to N.W., the residency being situated nearly at the north-western extremity. Nearly two miles, in the centre of this distance, were occupied by the old native town; while more to the north-west, about the same space was oc-

cupied by native buildings of a superior class, through which ran a broad straight street. A similar street also extended from the old native town, past the palace of the ex-king of Oude, and in the direction of the residency; and it would seem that it was only out of this south-eastern portion of the city that the troops had succeeded in expelling the enemy; the old town, by far the most favourable locality for the covering-fighting that the rebels preferred, being still in their possession, and occupying the space directly between the residency and the Alumbagh.

The isolated position of the little garrison at this post, became of course a subject for grave consideration as soon as the junction with Brigadier Inglis had been accomplished. After the first outburst of thankfulness at the arrival of their welcome deliverers, the occupants of the residency enclosure began to question how far in reality their deliverance had been effected: and they soon became convinced that, in fact, they were as close prisoners as ever. General Havelock had lost nearly one-third of his small original force during the desperate encounters of the past few days; and those who survived of his gallant band, were now too weak for any important military operation. The result of the fighting on the 25th and 26th of September, had certainly given him the command of a larger portion of the city than the mere area comprised within the enclosure of the residency; but he could not gain another foot of ground without struggling for it, nor could he hope to retain that he had already acquired, without incessant watchfulness and exertion. The enemy was in immense strength between himself at the residency, and his detachment and stores at the Alumbagh; and it was beyond his means to remove them and unite the two positions by any communication, seeing that his troops were closely besieged in both places. Neither could he remove the women and children, and wounded men, to a place remote from the scene of strife, because the escort he could have spared would have been so small as to be perfectly unavailing for their protection, in the face of the overwhelming numbers of insurgent troops that swarmed in every direction around him. The whole of the immediate benefit, therefore, consisted in an increase in the number of British soldiers for the defences; but, as these brought with them

no supplies except those left at the Alumbagh, there was an increase in the number to be fed, without any augmentation of the means of feeding them; and thus, with the prospect of prolonged captivity and increased privations before them, the disappointment of the garrison was most severe. Many councils were held to deliberate as to the measures to be pursued, and parties of volunteers occasionally rushed out, with the intention of cutting their way through to the Alumbagh, or even to Cawnpore, to seek reinforcements and supplies; but they were invariably driven back by dense masses of the rebel force, that it was impossible to cut through or resist. Sir James Outram, finding the sword powerless for emancipation, now sought, by confidential emissaries, to ascertain if any of the wealthy and influential natives in the city, could be induced, by liberal offers, to render him and his companions aid in their difficulties; but none would listen to his overtures: and nothing therefore remained but to emulate the patient endurance, the heroic daring, and the unshaken determination that had been already exemplified in the defence of the residency by Brigadier Inglis and his glorious companions.

The first official details of this memorable and protracted defence, were published in a notification of the governor-general in council, embracing a report from Brigadier Inglis; without which important documents, and the general order of the government of India, in reference to the death of Sir Henry Lawrence, this chapter of the relief of Lucknow would be incomplete.

“Fort William, 8th December, 1857.

“The right honourable the governor-general in council has received from Brigadier Inglis, of her majesty’s 32nd regiment, lately commanding the garrison in Lucknow, the subjoined report of the defence of the residency in that city, from the first threatened attack upon it, on the 29th of June, to the arrival of the force under Major-general Sir J. Outram, K.C.B., and the lamented Major-general Sir H. Have-lock, K.C.B., on the 25th of September. The governor-general in council believes that never has a tale been told which will so stir the hearts of Englishmen and Englishwomen as the simple, earnest narrative of Brigadier Inglis. It rightfully commences with a soldier’s testimony, touchingly borne, to the chivalrous character and high deserts of Sir Henry Lawrence, the

sad details of whose death are now made known.

“There does not stand recorded in the annals of war an achievement more truly heroic than the defence of the residency at Lucknow, described in the narrative which follows. That defence has not only called forth all the energy and daring which belong to Englishmen in the hour of active conflict; but it has exhibited, continuously, and in the highest degree, that noble and sustained courage which, against enormous odds and fearful disadvantages, against hope deferred, and through unceasing toil and wear of body and mind, still holds on day after day, and triumphs. The heavy guns of the assailants, posted, almost in security, within fifty yards of the intrenchments—so near, indeed, that the solicitations, and threats, and taunts, which the rebels addressed to the native defenders of the garrison were easily heard by those true-hearted men; the fire of the enemy’s musketry, so searching that it penetrated the innermost retreat of the women and children, and of the wounded; their desperate attempts, repeatedly made, to force an entry after blowing-in the defences, the perpetual mining of the works, the weary night-watching for the expected signal of relief, and the steady waste of precious lives until the number of English gunners was reduced below that of the guns to be worked;—all these constitute features in a history which the fellow-countrymen of the heroes of Lucknow will read with swelling hearts, and which will endure for ever as a lesson to those who shall hope, by treachery, numbers, or boldness in their treason, to overcome the indomitable spirit of Englishmen.

“A complete list of the brave men who have fallen has not yet reached the governor-general in council; but the names mentioned in Brigadier Inglis’s report are, in themselves, a long and sad one. Amongst those who have nobly perished in this protracted struggle, Sir Henry Lawrence will occupy the first place in the thoughts of his fellow-countrymen. The governor-general in council has already given expression to the deep sorrow with which he mourns the loss of that distinguished man. But the name of Sir Henry Lawrence can never rise up without calling forth a tribute of honour and admiration from all who knew him.

“The governor-general in council has also to deplore the loss of Major Banks, an

officer high in the confidence of the government of India, and who, with the full approval of the governor-general in council, had succeeded to the charge of chief commissioner upon Sir Henry Lawrence's death; of Lieutenant-colonel Case, her majesty's 32nd regiment, who was mortally wounded while leading on his men at Chinhut on the 29th of June; of Captain Radcliffe, whose conspicuous bravery attracted the attention of Sir Henry Lawrence on that occasion; of Captain Francis, who was also especially noticed by Sir Henry Lawrence for his gallant conduct while in command of the Muchee Bhowun; of Captain Fulton, of the engineers, whose indefatigable exertions are thankfully recorded by Brigadier Inglis; of Major Anderson, the chief engineer, who, contending against deadly sickness, did not cease to give his valuable aid to his commander; of Captain Simons, artillery, mortally wounded at Chinhut; of Lieutenants Shepherd and Archer, 7th light cavalry, killed at their posts; of Captain McCabe, her majesty's 32nd, who fell while leading his fourth sortie; of Captain Mansfield, of the same corps, who fell a victim to cholera.

"The governor-general in council laments also to find in this melancholy record the names of Mr. Lucas, a traveller in India, and of Mr. Boyson. These two gentlemen, acting as volunteers, received charge of one of the most dangerous outposts, and held it at the cost of their lives. The good services of her majesty's 32nd regiment throughout this struggle have been remarkable. To the watchful courage and sound judgment of its commander, Brigadier Inglis, the British government owes a heavy debt of gratitude; and Major Lowe, Captain Bassano, Lieutenants Edmonstone, Foster, Harmar, Lawrence, Clery, Cook, Browne, and Charlton, and Quartermaster Stribbling, of this corps, and Captain O'Brien, of her majesty's 84th regiment, are praised by their superior as having severally distinguished themselves. Of the 7th light cavalry, Colonel Master, to whom was entrusted the command of a most exposed post. Captain Boileau, and Lieutenant Warner, are entitled to the thanks of the governor-general in council.

"The governor-general in council recognises, with pleasure, the distinction accorded to Major Apthorp, Captains Kemble and Saunders, Lieutenants Barwell and Kier, of the 41st native infantry, as well as

to Captain Gernon and Lieutenant Aitken, of the 13th native infantry, the latter of whom commanded an important position in the defences with signal courage and success; to Captain Anderson, of the 25th, and to Lieutenant Graydon, of the 44th native infantry. His lordship in council desires to acknowledge the excellent service of Captain Dinning and Lieutenant Sewell, of the 71st native infantry; and of Lieutenant Langmore, of the same regiment, who held continuously a post open to attack, and entirely without shelter for himself or for his men by night or by day; as well as of Lieutenant Worsley, of the same corps; of Lieutenant Tullock, 58th native infantry; of Lieutenant Hay, 48th native infantry, who was placed under the engineers to assist in the arduous duties of that department; and of Ensign Ward, of the same regiment, who, when the officers of artillery were mostly disabled, worked the mortars with good effect; also of Lieutenant Graham, of the 11th native infantry, and of Lieutenant Mecham, of the 4th Oude irregulars. Of the native officers and men of the 13th, 48th, and 71st regiments of native infantry, who have been amongst the defenders of the residency, it is difficult to speak too highly. Their courageous constancy under the severest trials is worthy of all honour.

"The medical officers of the garrison are well entitled to the cordial thanks of the government of India. The attention, skill, and energy evinced by Superintending-surgeon Scott; Assistant-surgeon Boyd, her majesty's 32nd foot; Assistant-surgeon Bird, of the artillery; Surgeon Campbell, 7th light cavalry; Surgeon Brydon, 71st native infantry; Surgeon Ogilvie, sanitary commissioner; Assistant-surgeon Fayrer; Assistant-surgeon Partridge, 2nd Oude irregulars; Assistant-surgeons Greenhow and Darby, and of Mr. Apothecary Thompson, are spoken of in high terms by Brigadier Inglis. To Dr. Brydon especially the governor-general in council would address his hearty congratulations. This officer, after passing through the Cabul campaign of 1841-'42, was included in the illustrious garrison who maintained their position in Jellalabad. He may now, as one of the heroes of Lucknow, claim to have witnessed, and taken part in, an achievement even more conspicuous as an example of the invincible energy and enduring courage of British soldiers. The labours of the offi-

cers of engineers—Lieutenants Anderson, Hutchinson, and Innes; and of the artillery—Lieutenant Thomas (Madras), and Lieutenants Macfarlane and Bonham—receive, as they deserve, honourable mention, which the governor-general in council is glad to confirm by his cordial approval. The services rendered by Mr. McRae, civil engineer; Mr. Schilling, principal of the Martinière; and by Mr. Cameron, a gentleman who had visited Oude for commercial purposes, merit the especial thanks of the government of India.

“The governor-general in council has read with great satisfaction the testimony borne by Brigadier Inglis to the sedulous attention given to the spiritual comforts of his comrades by the Rev. Mr. Polehampton and the Rev. Mr. Harris. The first, unhappily, has not survived his labours. The officers of the staff have rendered excellent service. That of Lieutenant James, sub-assistant-commissary-general, calls for the especial thanks of the government of India. This officer, although severely wounded at Chinhut, resolutely continued to give valuable aid to the brigadier; and it is mainly owing to his forethought and care that supplies of the garrison have sufficed through the hardships of the siege. Captain Wilson, 13th native infantry (deputy assistant-adjutant-general), has evinced courage, activity, and sound judgment in a very high degree. Lieutenant Hardinge, officiating as deputy quartermaster-general, as well as commanding the Sikh cavalry of the garrison, has proved himself worthy to bear his soldier’s name. Lieutenant Barwell, 71st native infantry (fort-adjutant), is honourably mentioned; and Lieutenant Birch, of the 71st native infantry, who acted as aide-de-camp to Brigadier Inglis throughout the siege, has discharged his duties in a manner which has called forth emphatic praise from his commander.

“The officers of the civil service have not been behind their military brethren in courage and zeal. The assistance rendered by Mr. Couper to Brigadier Inglis, as previously to Sir Henry Lawrence, has been most valuable. Messrs. Thornhill and Capper were wounded during the siege; and Mr. Martin, deputy-commissioner, and Captain Carnegie, assistant-commissioner, have earned the special thanks of Brigadier Inglis. To all these brave men, and to their brother-officers and comrades of every rank and degree, European and native, who

have shared the same dangers and toils with the same heroic spirit, the governor-general in council tenders his warmest thanks.

“The officers and men of her majesty’s regiments must receive their full measure of acknowledgment from a higher authority than that of the governor-general in council; but it will be the pleasing duty of his lordship in council to express to her majesty’s government, and to the Hon. Court of Directors of the East India Company, in the strongest terms, the recommendation of them to that favour for which Major-general Sir James Outram so justly pleads.

“Meanwhile it is a gratification to the governor-general in council to direct, in a general order of this day, that the rewards and honours therein specified shall be at once awarded to the officers and men of the two services and to the civilians respectively. This notice must not be closed without mention of those noble women who, little fitted to take part in such scenes, have assumed so cheerfully, and discharged so earnestly, their task of charity in ministering to sickness and pain. It is likely that, to themselves, the notoriety of praise publicly given may be distasteful; yet the governor-general in council cannot forego the pleasure of doing justice to the names of Birch, Polehampton, Barbor, and Gall, and of offering to those whose acts have so adorned them, his tribute of respectful admiration and gratitude.

“The history of the defence of the residency of Lucknow does not end with the narrative of Brigadier Inglis. But no full reports of the course of events at Lucknow, subsequently to the junction of Sir Henry Havelock’s force with the defenders, or of the final and effectual relief by the advance of the commander-in-chief, have yet been received. It is known, however, that the success which has carried joy to so many aching hearts has been clouded by the death, within the last few days, of one of the first soldiers of India—Major-general Sir Henry Havelock.

“The governor-general in council deeply deploras the loss of this able leader and truly brave man, who has been taken from the service of his country at a time when he can least be spared, though not before he had won for himself lasting renown, and had received at the hands of his sovereign

the gracious and prompt recognition of his merits.—R. J. H. BIRCH, Colonel,
“Secretary to the Government of India,
Military Department.”

“From Brigadier Inglis, commanding Garrison of Lucknow, to the Secretary to Government, Military Department, Calcutta.

“Lucknow, Sept. 26th, 1857.

“Sir,—In consequence of the very deeply-to-be-lamented death of Brigadier-general Sir H. M. Lawrence, K.C.B., late in command of the Oude field force, the duty of narrating the military events which have occurred at Lucknow since the 29th of June last, has devolved upon myself.

“On the evening of that day, several reports reached Sir Henry Lawrence that the rebel army, in no very considerable force, would march from Chinhut (a small village about eight miles distant, on the road to Fyzabad) on Lucknow on the following morning; and the late brigadier-general therefore determined to make a strong *reconnaissance* in that direction, with the view, if possible, of meeting the force at a disadvantage, either at its entrance into the suburbs of the city, or at the bridge across the Gokral, which is a small stream intersecting Fyzabad-road, mid-way between Lucknow and Chinhut.

“The force destined for this service, and which was composed as follows, moved out at 6 A.M. on the morning of the 30th of June:—

“*Artillery*.—Four guns of No. — horse light field battery, four guns of No. 2 Oude field battery, two guns of No. 3 Oude field battery, and an 8-inch howitzer.

“*Cavalry*.—Troop of volunteer cavalry, and 120 troopers of detachments belonging to the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd regiments of Oude irregular cavalry.

“*Infantry*.—300 of her majesty's 32nd, 150 of the 13th native infantry, 60 of the 48th native infantry, and 20 of the 71st native infantry (Sikhs.)

“The troops, misled by the reports of wayfarers—who stated that there were few or no men between Lucknow and Chinhut—proceeded somewhat further than had been originally intended, and suddenly fell in with the enemy, who had up to that time eluded the vigilance of the advanced guard, by concealing themselves behind a long line of trees in overwhelming numbers. The European force and the howitzer, with the native infantry, held the foe in check for

some time; and had the six guns of the Oude artillery been faithful, and the Sikh cavalry shown a better front, the day would have been won in spite of an immense disparity in numbers. But the Oude artillerymen and drivers were traitors. They overturned the guns into ditches, cut the traces of their horses, and abandoned them, regardless of the remonstrances and exertions of their own officers, and of those of Sir Henry Lawrence's staff, headed by the brigadier-general in person, who himself drew his sword upon these rebels. Every effort to induce them to stand having proved ineffectual, the force, exposed to a vastly superior fire of artillery, and completely outflanked on both sides by an overpowering body of infantry and cavalry, which actually got into our rear, was compelled to retire with the loss of three pieces of artillery, which fell into the hands of the enemy, in consequence of the rank treachery of the Oude gunners, and with a very grievous list of killed and wounded. The heat was dreadful, the gun ammunition was expended, and the almost total want of cavalry to protect our rear made our retreat most disastrous.

“All the officers behaved well, and the exertions of the small body of volunteer cavalry—only forty in number—under Captain Radcliffe, 7th light cavalry, were most praiseworthy. Sir Henry Lawrence subsequently conveyed his thanks to myself, who had, at his request, accompanied him upon this occasion (Colonel Case being in command of her majesty's 32nd.) He also expressed his approbation of the way in which his staff—Captain Wilson, officiating deputy assistant-adjutant-general; Lieutenant James, sub-assistant-commissary-general; Captain Edgell, officiating military secretary; and Mr. Couper, C.S.—the last of whom had acted as Sir Henry Lawrence's A.D.C. from the commencement of the disturbances—had conducted themselves throughout this arduous day. Sir Henry further particularly mentioned that he would bring the gallant conduct of Captain Radcliffe and of Lieutenant Bonham, of the artillery (who worked the howitzer successfully until incapacitated by a wound), to the prominent notice of the government of India. The manner in which Lieutenant Birch, 71st native infantry, cleared a village with a party of Sikh skirmishers, also elicited the admiration of the brigadier-general. The conduct of Lieutenant Har-

dinge, who, with his handful of horse, covered the retreat of the rear-guard, was extolled by Sir Henry, who expressed his intention of mentioning the services of this gallant officer to his lordship in council. Lieutenant-colonel Case, who commanded her majesty's 32nd regiment, was mortally wounded whilst gallantly leading on his men. The service had not a more deserving officer. The command devolved on Captain Steevens, who also received a death-wound shortly afterwards. The command then fell to Captain Mansfield, who has since died of cholera.

"It will be in the recollection of his lordship in council that it was the original intention of Sir Henry Lawrence to occupy not only the residency, but also the fort called Muchee Bhowun—an old dilapidated edifice, which had been hastily repaired for the occasion, though the defences were, even at the last moment, very far from complete, and were, moreover, commanded by many houses in the city. The situation of the Muchee Bhowun, with regard to the residency, has already been described to the government of India.

"The untoward event of June the 30th so far diminished the whole available force, that we had not a sufficient number of men remaining to occupy both positions. The brigadier-general, therefore, on the evening of July the 1st, signalled to the garrison of the Muchee Bhowun to evacuate and blow up that fortress in the course of the night. The orders were ably carried out, and at 12 P.M. the force marched into the residency with their guns and treasure, without the loss of a man; and, shortly afterwards, the explosion of 240 barrels of gunpowder, and 6,000,000 ball cartridges, which were lying in the magazine, announced to Sir Henry Lawrence and his officers, who were anxiously waiting the report, the complete destruction of that post and all that it contained. If it had not been for this wise and strategic measure, no member of the Lucknow garrison, in all probability, would have survived to tell the tale; for, as has already been stated, the Muchee Bhowun was commanded from other parts of the town, and was, moreover, indifferently provided with heavy artillery ammunition; while the difficulty, suffering, and loss, which the residency garrison, even with the reinforcement thus obtained from the Muchee Bhowun, has undergone in holding the position, is sufficient to show that,

if the original intention of holding both posts had been adhered to, both would have inevitably fallen.

"It is now my very painful duty to relate the calamity which befel us at the commencement of the siege. On the 1st of July an 8-inch shell burst in the room in the residency in which Sir H. Lawrence was sitting. The missile burst between him and Mr. Couper—close to both; but without injury to either. The whole of his staff implored Sir Henry to take up other quarters, as the residency had then become the special target for the round shot and shell of the enemy. This, however, he jestingly declined to do, observing that another shell would certainly never be pitched into that small room. But Providence had ordained otherwise; for on the very next day he was mortally wounded by the fragment of another shell which burst in the same room, exactly at the same spot. Captain Wilson, deputy assistant-adjutant-general, received a contusion at the same time.

"The late lamented Sir H. Lawrence, knowing that his last hour was rapidly approaching, directed me to assume command of the troops, and appointed Major Banks to succeed him in the office of chief commissioner. He lingered in great agony till the morning of the 4th of July, when he expired; and the government was thereby deprived, if I may venture to say so, of the services of a distinguished statesman and a most gallant soldier. Few men have ever possessed, to the same extent, the power which he enjoyed of winning the hearts of all those with whom he came in contact, and thus ensuring the warmest and most zealous devotion for himself and for the government which he served. The successful defence of the position has been, under Providence, solely attributable to the foresight which he evinced in the timely commencement of the necessary operations, and the great skill and untiring personal activity which he exhibited in carrying them into effect. All ranks possessed such confidence in his judgment and his fertility of resource, that the news of his fall was received throughout the garrison with feelings of consternation only second to the grief which was inspired in the hearts of all by the loss of a public benefactor and a warm personal friend. Feeling as keenly and as gratefully as I do the obligations that the whole of us are under to this great and good man, I trust the government of

India will pardon me for having attempted, however imperfectly, to pourtray them. In him every good and deserving soldier lost a friend and a chief capable of discriminating, and ever on the alert to reward merit, no matter how humble the sphere in which it was exhibited.

“The garrison had scarcely recovered the shock which it had sustained in the loss of its revered and beloved general, when it had to mourn the death of that able and respected officer, Major Banks, the officiating chief commissioner, who received a bullet through his head while examining a critical outpost on the 21st of July, and died without a groan. The description of our position, and the state of our defences when the siege began, are so fully set forth in the memorandum furnished by the garrison engineer, that I shall content myself with bringing to the notice of his lordship in council the fact, that when the blockade was commenced, only two of our batteries were completed, part of the defences were yet in an unfinished condition, and the buildings in the immediate vicinity, which gave cover to the enemy, were only very partially cleared away. Indeed, our heaviest losses have been caused by the fire from the enemy’s sharpshooters stationed in the adjoining mosques and houses of the native nobility, the necessity of destroying which had been repeatedly drawn to the attention of Sir Henry by the staff of engineers. But his invariable reply was, ‘Spare the holy places, and private property too, as far as possible;’ and we have consequently suffered severely from our very tenderness to the religious prejudices and respect to the rights of our rebellious citizens and soldiery. As soon as the enemy had thoroughly completed the investment of the residency, they occupied these houses—some of which were within easy pistol-shot of our barricades—in immense force, and rapidly made loopholes on those sides which bore on our post, from which they kept up a terrific and incessant fire day and night, which caused many daily casualties, as there could not have been less than 8,000 men firing at one time into our position. Moreover, there was no place in the whole of our works that could be considered safe; for several of the sick and wounded who were lying in the banquetting-hall, which had been turned into an hospital, were killed in the very centre of the building; and the widow of Lieute-

nant Dorin, and other women and children, were shot dead in rooms, into which it had not been previously deemed possible that a bullet could penetrate. Neither were the enemy idle in erecting batteries. They soon had from twenty to twenty-five guns in position, some of them of very large calibre. These were planted all round our post at small distances, some being actually within fifty yards of our defences, but in places where our own heavy guns could not reply to them; while the perseverance and ingenuity of the enemy in erecting barricades in front of, and around their guns in a very short time, rendered all attempts to silence them by musketry entirely unavailing. Neither could they be effectually silenced by shells, by reason of their extreme proximity to our position, and because, moreover, the enemy had recourse to digging very narrow trenches, about eight feet in depth, in rear of each gun; in which the men lay while our shells were flying, and which so effectually concealed them, even while working the gun, that our baffled sharpshooters could only see their hands while in the act of loading.

“The enemy contented themselves with keeping up this incessant fire of cannon and musketry until the 20th of July, on which day, at 10 A.M., they assembled in very great force all round our position, and exploded a heavy mine inside our outer line of defences at the Water gate. The mine, however, which was close to the Redan, and apparently sprung with the intention of destroying that battery, did no harm. But as soon as the smoke had cleared away, the enemy boldly advanced under cover of a tremendous fire of cannon and musketry, with the object of storming the Redan. But they were received with such a heavy fire, that after a short struggle they fell back with much loss. A strong column advanced at the same time to attack Innes’ post, and came on to within ten yards of the palisades, affording to Lieutenant Loughnau, 13th native infantry, who commanded the position, and his brave garrison (composed of gentlemen of the uncovenanted service, a few of her majesty’s 32nd foot, and the 13th native infantry), an opportunity of distinguishing themselves, which they were not slow to avail themselves of, and the enemy were driven back with great slaughter. The insurgents made minor attacks at almost every outpost, but were invariably defeated; and at 2 P.M. they

ceased their attempts to storm the place, although their musketry fire and cannonading continued to harass us unceasingly as usual. Matters proceeded in this manner until the 10th of August, when the enemy made another assault, having previously sprung a mine close to the brigade mess, which entirely destroyed our defences for the space of twenty feet, and blew in a great portion of the outside wall of the house occupied by Mr. Schilling's garrison. On the dust clearing away, a breach appeared, through which a regiment could have advanced in perfect order, and a few of the enemy came on with the utmost determination, but were met with such a withering flank fire of musketry from the officers and men holding the top of the brigade mess, that they beat a speedy retreat, leaving the more adventurous of their numbers lying on the crest of the breach. While this operation was going on, another large body advanced on the Cawnpore battery, and succeeded in locating themselves for a few minutes in the ditch. They were, however, dislodged by hand-grenades. At Captain Anderson's post they also came boldly forward with scaling-ladders, which they planted against the wall; but here, as elsewhere, they were met with the most indomitable resolution; and the leaders being slain, the rest fled, leaving the ladders, and retreated to their batteries and loopholed defences, from whence they kept up, for the rest of the day, an unusually heavy cannonade and musketry fire. On the 18th of August the enemy sprung another mine in front of the Sikh lines with very fatal effect. Captain Orr (unattached), Lieutenants Mecham and Soppitt, who commanded the small body of drummers composing the garrison, were blown into the air; but providentially returned to earth with no further injury than a severe shaking. The garrison, however, were not so fortunate. No less than eleven men were buried alive under the ruins, from whence it was impossible to extricate them, owing to the tremendous fire kept up by the enemy from houses situated not ten yards in front of the breach. The explosion was followed by a general assault of a less determined nature than the two former efforts, and the enemy were consequently repulsed without much difficulty. But they succeeded, under cover of the breach, in establishing themselves in one of the houses in our position, from which they were driven

in the evening by the bayonets of her majesty's 32nd and 84th foot. On the 5th of September the enemy made their last serious assault. Having exploded a large mine, a few feet short of the bastion of the 18-pounder gun, in Major Apthorp's post, they advanced with large heavy scaling-ladders, which they planted against the wall, and mounted, thereby gaining for an instant the embrasure of a gun. They were, however, speedily driven back with loss by hand-grenades and musketry. A few minutes subsequently they sprung another mine close to the brigade mess, and advanced boldly; but soon the corpses strewed in the garden in front of the post bore testimony to the fatal accuracy of the rifle and musketry fire of the gallant members of that garrison, and the enemy fled ignominiously, leaving their leader—a fine-looking old native officer—among the slain. At other posts they made similar attacks, but with less resolution, and everywhere with the same want of success. Their loss upon this day must have been very heavy, as they came on with much determination, and at night they were seen bearing large numbers of their killed and wounded over the bridges, in the direction of cantonments. The above is a faint attempt at a description of the four great struggles which have occurred during this protracted season of exertion, exposure, and suffering. His lordship in council will perceive that the enemy invariably commenced his attacks by the explosion of a mine, a species of offensive warfare, for the exercise of which our position was unfortunately peculiarly situated; and had it not been for the most untiring vigilance on our part, in watching and blowing up their mines before they were completed, the assaults would probably have been much more numerous, and might, perhaps, have ended in the capture of the place. But by countermining in all directions, we succeeded in detecting and destroying no less than four of the enemy's subterranean advances towards important positions, two of which operations were eminently successful, as on one occasion not less than eighty of them were blown into the air, and twenty suffered a similar fate on the second explosion. The labour, however, which devolved upon us in making these countermines, in the absence of a body of skilled miners, was very heavy. The right honourable the governor-general in council will feel that it would be impos-

sible to crowd within the limits of a despatch, even the principal events, much more the individual acts of gallantry which have marked this protracted struggle. But I can conscientiously declare my conviction, that few troops have ever undergone greater hardships, exposed as they have been to a never-ceasing musketry fire and cannonade. They have also experienced the alternate vicissitudes of extreme wet and of intense heat, and that, too, with very insufficient shelter from either, and in many places without any shelter at all. In addition to having had to repel real attacks, they have been exposed night and day to the hardly less harassing false alarms which the enemy have been constantly raising. The insurgents have frequently fired very heavily, sounded the advance, and shouted for several hours together, though not a man could be seen; with the view, of course, of harassing our small and exhausted force—in which object they succeeded; for no part has been strong enough to allow of a portion only of the garrison being prepared in the event of a false attack being turned into a real one. All, therefore, had to stand to their arms, and to remain at their posts until the demonstration had ceased; and such attacks were of almost nightly occurrence. The whole of the officers and men have been on duty night and day during the eighty-seven days which the siege had lasted, up to the arrival of Sir J. Outram, K.C.B. In addition to this incessant military duty, the force has been nightly employed in repairing defences, in moving guns, in burying dead animals, in conveying ammunition and commissariat stores from one place to another, and in other fatigue duties too numerous and too trivial to enumerate here. I feel, however, that any words of mine will fail to convey any adequate idea of what our fatigue and labours have been—labours in which all ranks and all classes, civilians, officers, and soldiers, have all borne an equally noble part. All have together descended into the mine; all have together handled the shovel for the interment of the putrid bullock; and all, accoutred with musket and bayonet, have relieved each other on sentry, without regard to the distinctions of rank, civil or military. Notwithstanding all these hardships, the garrison has made no less than five sorties, in which they spiked two of the enemy's heaviest guns, and blew up several of the houses from which they had

kept up their most harassing fire. Owing to the extreme paucity of our numbers, each man was taught to feel that on his own individual efforts alone depended in no small measure the safety of the entire position. This consciousness incited every officer, soldier, and man, to defend the post assigned to him with such desperate tenacity, and to fight for the lives which Providence had intrusted to his care with such dauntless determination, that the enemy, despite their constant attacks, their heavy mines, their overwhelming numbers, and their incessant fire, could never succeed in gaining one single inch of ground within the bounds of this straggling position, which was so feebly fortified, that had they once obtained a footing in any of the outposts, the whole place must inevitably have fallen.

“If further proof be wanting of the desperate nature of the struggle which we have, under God's blessing, so long and so successfully waged, I would point to the roofless and ruined houses, to the crumbled walls, to the exploded mines, to the open breaches, to the shattered and disabled guns and defences; and, lastly, to the long and melancholy list of the brave and devoted officers and men who have fallen. These silent witnesses bear sad and solemn testimony to the way in which this feeble position has been defended. During the early part of these vicissitudes, we were left without any information whatever regarding the posture of affairs outside. An occasional spy did indeed come in with the object of inducing our sepoys and servants to desert; but the intelligence derived from such sources was, of course, entirely untrustworthy. We sent our messengers, daily calling for aid and asking for information, none of whom ever returned until the 26th day of the siege, when a pensioner named Ungud came back with a letter from General Havelock's camp, informing us that they were advancing with a force sufficient to bear down all opposition, and would be with us in five or six days. A messenger was immediately dispatched, requesting that, on the evening of their arrival on the outskirts of the city, two rockets might be sent up, in order that we might take the necessary measures for assisting them while forcing their way in. The sixth day, however, expired, and they came not; but for many evenings after, officers and men watched for the ascension of the expected rockets, with hopes such as make the

heart sick. We knew not then, nor did we learn until the 29th of August—or thirty-five days later—that the relieving force, after having fought most nobly to effect our deliverance, had been obliged to fall back for reinforcements; and this was the last communication we received until two days before the arrival of Sir James Outram on September the 25th.

“ Besides heavy visitations of cholera and smallpox, we have also had to contend against a sickness which has almost universally pervaded the garrison. Commencing with a very painful eruption, it has merged into a low fever, combined with diarrhœa; and although few or no men have actually died from its effects, it leaves behind a weakness and lassitude which, in the absence of all material sustenance, save coarse beef and still coarser flour, none have been able entirely to get over. The mortality among the women and children, and especially among the latter, from these diseases and from other causes, has been perhaps the most characteristic of the siege. The want of native servants has also been a source of much privation. Owing to the suddenness with which we were besieged, many of these people who might perhaps have otherwise proved faithful to their employers, but who were outside of the defences at the time, were altogether excluded. Very many more deserted, and several families were consequently left without the services of a single domestic. Several ladies have had to tend their children, and even to wash their own clothes, as well as to cook their scanty meals, entirely unaided. Combined with the absence of servants, the want of proper accommodation has probably been the cause of much of the disease with which we have been afflicted. I cannot refrain from bringing to the prominent notice of his lordship in council, the patient endurance and the Christian resignation which have been evinced by the women of this garrison. They have animated us by their example. Many, alas! have been made widows, and their children fatherless, in this cruel struggle. But all such seem resigned to the will of Providence; and many, among whom may be mentioned the honoured names of Birch, of Polehampton, of Barbor, and of Gall, have, after the example of Miss Nightingale, constituted themselves the tender and solicitous nurses of the wounded and dying soldiers in the hospital.

“ It only remains for me to bring to the favourable notice of his lordship in council the names of those officers who have most distinguished themselves, and afforded me the most valuable assistance in these operations. Many of the best and bravest of these now rest from their labours. Among them are Lieutenant-colonel Case and Captain Radcliffe, whose services have already been narrated; Captain Francis, 13th native infantry—who was killed by a round shot—had particularly attracted the attention of Sir H. Lawrence for his conduct while in command of the Muchee Bhowun; Captain Fulton, of the engineers, who also was struck by a round shot, had, up to the time of his early and lamented death, afforded me the most invaluable aid; he was indeed indefatigable; Major Anderson, the chief engineer, though, from the commencement of the siege, incapable of physical exertion from the effects of the disease under which he eventually sank, merited my warm acknowledgments for his able council; Captain Simons, commandant of artillery, distinguished himself at Chinhut, where he received the two wounds which ended in his death; Lieutenants Shepherd and Archer, 7th light cavalry, who were killed at their posts; Captain Hughes, 57th native infantry, who was mortally wounded at the capture of a house which formed one of the enemy's outposts; Captain McCabe, of the 32nd foot, who was killed at the head of his men while leading his fourth sortie, as well as Captain Mansfield, of the same corps, who died of cholera—were all officers who had distinguished themselves highly. Mr. Lucas, too, a gentleman volunteer, and Mr. Boyson, of the uncovenanted service—who fell when on the look-out at one of the most perilous outposts—had earned themselves reputations for coolness and gallantry.

“ The officers who commanded outposts—Lieutenant-colonel Master, 7th light cavalry; Major Apthorp, and Captain Saunders, 41st native infantry; Captain Boileau, 7th light cavalry; Captain Germon, 13th native infantry; Lieutenant Aitken, and Lieutenant Loughnan, of the same corps; Captain Anderson, 25th native infantry; Lieutenant Graydon, 44th native infantry; Lieutenant Langmore, 71st native infantry; and Mr. Schilling, principal of the Martinière college—have all conducted ably the duties of their onerous position. No further proof of this is necessary than the fact which I

have before mentioned, that throughout the whole duration of the siege, the enemy were not only unable to take, but they could not even succeed in gaining one inch of the posts commanded by these gallant gentlemen. Colonel Master commanded the critical and important post of the brigade mess, on either side of which was an open breach, only flanked by his handful of riflemen and musketeers. Lieutenant Aitken, with the whole of the 13th native infantry, which remained to us with the exception of their Sikhs, commanded the Bayley Guard—perhaps the most important position in the whole of the defences; and Lieutenant Langmore, with the remnant of his regiment (the 71st), held a very exposed position between the hospital and the Water gate. This gallant and deserving young soldier and his men were entirely without shelter from the weather, both by night and by day.

“My thanks are also due to Lieutenants Anderson, Hutchinson, and Innes, of the engineers, as well as Lieutenant Tulloch, 58th native infantry, and Lieutenant Hay, 48th native infantry, who were placed under them to aid in the arduous duties devolving upon that department. Lieutenant Thomas, Madras artillery, who commanded that arm of the service for some weeks, and Lieutenants Macfarlane and Bonham, rendered me the most effectual assistance. I was, however, deprived of the services of the two latter, who were wounded, Lieutenant Bonham no less than three times, early in the siege. Captain Evans, 17th Bengal native infantry, who, owing to the scarcity of artillery officers, was put in charge of some guns, was ever to be found at his post.

“Major Lowe, commanding her majesty’s 32nd regiment; Captain Bassano, Lieutenants Lawrence, Edmonstoune, Foster, Harmar, Cooke, Cery, Browne, and Charlton, of that corps, have all nobly performed their duty. Every one of these officers, with the exception of Lieutenants Lawrence and Cery, have received one or more wounds of more or less severity. Quartermaster Stribbling, of the same corps, also conducted himself to my satisfaction. Captain O’Brien, her majesty’s 84th foot; Captain Kemble, 41st native infantry; Captain Edgell, 53rd native infantry; Captain Dinning, Lieutenant Sewell, and Lieutenant Worsley, of the 71st native infantry; Lieutenant Warner, 7th light cavalry; Ensign Ward, 48th native infantry (who, when most of our

artillery officers were killed or disabled, worked the mortars with excellent effect); Lieutenant Graham, 11th native infantry; Lieutenant Mecham, 4th Oude locals; and Lieutenant Kier, 41st native infantry, have all done good and willing service throughout the siege, and I trust that they will receive the favourable notice of his lordship in council.

“I beg particularly to call the attention of the government of India to the untiring industry, the extreme devotion, and great skill which have been evinced by Surgeon Scott (superintending surgeon), and Assistant-surgeon Boyd, of her majesty’s 32nd foot; Assistant-surgeon Bird, of the artillery; Surgeon Campbell, 7th light cavalry; Surgeon Brydon, 71st native infantry; Surgeon Ogilvie, sanitary commissioner; Assistant-surgeon Fayer, civil surgeon; Assistant-surgeon Partridge, 2nd Oude irregular cavalry; Assistant-surgeon Greenhow; Assistant-surgeon Darby, and by Mr. Apothecary Thompson, in the discharge of their onerous and most important duties.

“Messrs. Thornhill and Capper, of the civil service, have been both wounded; and the way in which they, as well as Mr. Martin, the deputy-commissioner of Lucknow, conducted themselves, entitles them to a place in this despatch. Captain Carnegie, the special assistant-commissioner, whose invaluable services previous to the commencement of the siege I have frequently heard warmly dilated upon, both by Sir H. Lawrence and by Major Banks, and whose exertions will probably be more amply brought to notice by the civil authorities on some future occasion, has conducted the office of provost-marshal to my satisfaction. The Rev. Mr. Harris and the Rev. Mr. Polehampton, assistant chaplains, vied with each other in their untiring care and attention to the suffering men. The latter gentleman was wounded in the hospital, and subsequently unhappily died of cholera. Mr. McCrae, of the civil engineers, did excellent service at the guns, until he was severely wounded. Mr. Cameron, also, a gentleman who had come to Oude to inquire into the resources of the country, acquired the whole mystery of mortar practice, and was of the most signal service until incapacitated by sickness. Mr. Marshall, of the road department, and other members of the uncovenanted service, whose names will, on a subsequent occasion, be laid before the government of India, conducted themselves

bravely and steadily. Indeed, the entire body of these gentlemen have borne themselves well, and have evinced great coolness under fire.

“I have now only to bring to the notice of the right honourable the governor-general in council the conduct of the several officers who composed my staff:—Lieutenant James, sub-assistant-commissary-general, was severely wounded by a shot through the knee at Chinlut, notwithstanding which he refused to go upon the sick-list, and carried on his most trying duties throughout the entire siege. It is not too much to say that the garrison owe their lives to the exertions and firmness of this officer. Before the struggle commenced, he was ever in the saddle, getting in supplies; and his untiring vigilance in their distribution after our difficulties had begun, prevented a waste which otherwise, long before the expiration of the eighty-seven days, might have annihilated the force by the slow process of starvation.

“Captain Wilson, 13th native infantry, officiating deputy assistant-adjutant-general, was ever to be found where shot was flying thickest; and I am at a loss to decide whether his services were most invaluable owing to the untiring physical endurance and bravery which he displayed, or to his ever-ready and pertinent counsel and advice in moments of difficulty and danger. Lieutenant Hardinge—an officer whose achievements and antecedents are well-known to the government of India—has earned fresh laurels by his conduct throughout the siege. He was officiating as deputy assistant-quartermaster-general, and also commanded the Sikh portion of the cavalry of the garrison. In both capacities his services have been invaluable, especially in the latter; for it was owing alone to his tact, vigilance, and bravery, that the Sikh horsemen were induced to persevere in holding a very unprotected post under a heavy fire. Lieutenant Barwell, 71st native infantry, the fort-adjutant and officiating major of brigade, has proved himself to be an efficient officer. Lieutenant Birch, of the 71st native infantry, has been my aide-de-camp throughout the siege. I firmly believe there never was a better aide-de-camp. He has been indefatigable, and ever ready to lead a sortie, or to convey an order to a threatened outpost under the heaviest fire. On one of these occasions he received a slight wound on the head. I

beg to bring the services of this most promising and intelligent young officer to the favourable consideration of his lordship in council.

“I am also much indebted to Mr. Cooper, civil service, for the assistance he has on many occasions afforded me by his judicious advice. I have, moreover, ever found him most ready and willing in the performance of the military duties assigned to him, however exposed the post or arduous the undertaking. He commenced his career in her majesty's service, and consequently had had some previous experience of military matters. If the road to Cawnpore had been made clear by the advent of our troops, it was my intention to have deputed this officer to Calcutta, to detail in person the occurrences which have taken place, for the information of the government of India. I still hope, that when our communications shall be once more unopposed, he may be summoned to Calcutta for this purpose.

“Lastly, I have the pleasure of bringing the splendid behaviour of the soldiers—viz., the men of her majesty's 32nd foot, the small detachment of her majesty's 84th foot, the European and native artillery, the 13th, 48th, and 71st regiments of native infantry, and the Sikhs of the respective corps, to the notice of the government of India. The losses sustained by her majesty's 32nd, which is now barely 300 strong; by her majesty's 84th, and by the European artillery, show at least they knew how to die in the cause of their countrymen. Their conduct under the fire, the exposure, and the privations which they had to undergo, has been throughout most admirable and praiseworthy.

“As another instance of the desperate character of our defence, and the difficulties we have had to contend with, I may mention that the number of our artillerymen was so reduced, that on the occasion of an attack, the gunners, aided as they were by men of her majesty's 32nd foot, and by volunteers of all classes, had to run from one battery to another, wherever the fire of the enemy was hottest, there not being nearly enough men to serve half the number of guns at the same time. In short, at last, the number of European gunners was only twenty-four; while we had, including mortars, no less than thirty guns in position.

“With respect to the native troops, I am of opinion that their loyalty has never been surpassed. They were indifferently fed and

worse housed. They were exposed—especially the 13th regiment, under the gallant Lieutenant Aitken—to a most galling fire of round shot and musketry, which materially decreased their numbers. They were so near the enemy that conversation could be carried on between them; and every effort, persuasion, promise, and threat was alternately resorted to, in vain, to seduce them from their allegiance to the handful of Europeans, who, in all probability, would have been sacrificed by their desertion. All the troops behaved nobly; and the names of those men of the native force who have particularly distinguished themselves, have been laid before Major-general Sir James Outram, K.C.B., who has promised to promote them. Those of the European force will be transmitted in due course for the orders of his royal highness the general commanding-in-chief.

“In conclusion, I beg leave to express, on the part of myself and the members of this garrison, our deep and grateful sense of the conduct of Major-general Sir J. Outram, K.C.B., of Brigadier-general Havelock, C.B., and of the troops under those officers who so devotedly came to our relief at so heavy a sacrifice of life. We are also repaid for much suffering and privation by the sympathy which our brave deliverers say our perilous and unfortunate position has excited for us in the hearts of our countrymen throughout the length and breadth of her majesty’s dominions.—I have, &c.,

“(Signed) T. INGLIS,

“Colonel, her Majesty’s 32nd, Brigadier.”

The following minute was issued by the governor-general of India, dated “Fort William, September 8th:”—

“Although intelligence of Sir H. Lawrence’s death reached the government long ago, no official announcement of this sad event, and none of the particulars connected with it, were received until some time after the first reports; and the details are not even now very fully known. A wound received while leading an attack, on the 2nd of July, against the insurgents, and believed to have been slight in itself, but acting doubtless on a constitution impaired by protracted labours in an exhausting climate, and on a frame weakened by the unusual fatigues, anxieties, and responsibilities of the preceding month, sufficed to close the career of one of the most valued and best-loved men whom India has counted among her servants and benefactors. In the course of his service, extending over thirty-five years, in Burmah, in Afghanistan, in Nepal, in the Punjab, and in Rajpootana, Sir Henry Lawrence was distinguished for eminent ability, devoted zeal, and generous and self-denying exertions for the welfare of the people among whom he was placed. As a soldier, an

administrator, and a statesman, he has deservedly earned an exalted reputation among the foremost, and has been an honour to the government he served.

“Impressed with a sense of his qualifications, I selected him to be chief commissioner in the province of Oude. In that position, from the first appearance of disaffection among the troops quartered in the province, his conduct of affairs was marked by foresight, calm judgment, and courage. If anything could have averted the calamitous outbreak which has been followed by the temporary subversion of our authority in Oude, I believe that the measures which were taken by Sir Henry Lawrence, and the confidence which all men, high and low, native and European, felt in his energy, his wisdom, and his spirit of justice and kindness, would have accomplished that end. As long as there was any hope of restraining the wavering soldiery by appeals to their sense of duty and honour, he left no becoming means untried to conciliate them. When violent and open mutiny called for stern retribution, he did not shrink from the (to him) uncongenial task of inflicting severe punishment. When general disorder and armed rebellion threatened, he was undaunted, and completed rapidly and effectively the precautionary preparations which, from the beginning, he had had in view; and, though he had been prematurely removed from the scene, it is due mainly to his exertions, judgment, and professional skill, that the Lucknow garrison has been able to defy the assaults of its assailants, and still maintains its ground. There is not, I am sure, an Englishman in India, who does not regard the loss of Sir Henry Lawrence, in the present circumstances of the country, as one of the heaviest of public calamities. There is not, I believe, a native of the provinces where he has held authority, who will not remember his name as that of a friend and generous benefactor to the races of India.

“For myself, short as has been my personal intercourse with that distinguished man, it is a grateful, though a mournful duty, to record my appreciation of his eminent services to this government, my admiration of his high character, and my affectionate respect for his memory.—CANNING.”

The honours deservedly conferred upon the garrison of Lucknow, and its valiant commandant, were prompt and appropriate. The latter had, a few months previously, entered the rebel city a lieutenant-colonel, but he left it as Major-general Sir John Eardley Wilmot Inglis, K.C.B. Promotion, in various grades, awaited other of the officers; but the immediate recognition, by the governor-general, of the services of the entire garrison, was expressed in a general order, which declared, that “Every officer and soldier, European and native, who has formed part of the garrison of the residency, between the 29th of June and the 25th of September, 1857, shall receive six months’ batta. Every civilian in the covenanted service of the East India Company, who has taken part in the defence of the residency within the above-named dates, shall

receive six months' batta, at a rate calculated according to the military rank with which his standing corresponds. Every uncovenanted civil officer, or volunteer, who has taken a like part, shall receive six months' batta, at a rate to be fixed according to the functions and position which may have been assigned to him. Every native commissioned and non-commissioned officer and soldier, who has formed part of the garrison, shall receive the 'Order of Merit,' with the increase of pay attached thereto, and shall be permitted to count three years of additional service. The soldiers of the 13th, 48th, and 71st regiments of native infantry, who have been part of the garrison, shall be formed into a regiment of the line, to be called 'The Regiment of Lucknow;' the further constitution of which, as regards officers and men, will be notified hereafter."

Throughout the whole course of this remarkable siege, so pregnant with extraordinary facts, nothing perhaps was more truly astonishing than the conduct of some men within the residency enclosure, belonging to the native regiments that had muti-

nied, or were dismissed to their homes in the early part of the troubles at Lucknow. It will be recollected, that when, on the 30th of May, the three native corps mutinied at the cantonment, some of the sepoys in each remained faithful, and would not take part with their misguided comrades.* These exceptions to a bad rule shared all the labours, and perils, and privations of the siege with the British garrison and residents; and despite scanty food, little and broken rest, harassing exertions, and daily fightings, they remained steadfast to the last. Though sorely tempted by the mutineers, who would frequently hold converse with them over the palisades of the intrenchment, these men never wavered in their loyalty, or flinched from their duty. What they were in the proudest days of the Company's ascendancy, such they were in the gloomiest period of its shattered power; and the honour that stood firm on the 30th of May, came from the fiery ordeal untarnished on the 25th of September. It was right such men should be specially rewarded; and it was politic that such reward should not be deferred.

CHAPTER II.

DEPARTURE OF MOVABLE COLUMNS FROM DELHI, UNDER BRIGADIER SHORT AND LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GREATHED; CAPTURE OF TWO PRINCES AT THE TOMB OF HUMAYOON; THEIR EXECUTION; DESTRUCTION OF SEKUNDERABAD; JHANSIE REBELS AT BOLUNDSHUHUR; BATTLES OF ALLYGURH AND AGRA; DESPATCHES AND CORRESPONDENCE; DEATH OF MR. COLVIN, LIEUT.-GOVERNOR OF THE NORTH-WEST PROVINCES; GOVERNMENT NOTIFICATION; DIFFICULTIES AS TO THE COMMAND OF TROOPS; LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GREATHED SUPERSEDED BY BRIGADIER GRANT; MEMORANDUM OF CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF AGRA; PROGRESS OF GRANT'S COLUMN; DESTRUCTION OF THE FORT AT MYNPOORIE; CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS AT CAWNPORE PREPARATORY TO ADVANCE ON LUCKNOW; THE NAVAL BRIGADE; PROGRESS FROM CALCUTTA; ARRIVAL AT ALLAHABAD; DEPARTURE FOR CAWNPORE; JUNCTION WITH COLONEL POWELL'S FORCE; BATTLE OF KUDJWA; DEATH OF COLONEL POWELL; MILITARY DESPATCHES; THE NAVAL BRIGADE LEAVES CAWNPORE FOR ALUMBAGH.

BEFORE proceeding with the details immediately connected with the operations of Sir Colin Campbell for the relief of the garrison at Lucknow, it is necessary, for the continuity of the narrative, that we should previously refer to the movements of troops under other officers, having the same object in view.

Many of the principal incidents connected with the recapture of Delhi have already been fully recorded;† and we

* See vol. i., p. 182. † *Ibid.*, pp. 497—513.

therefore resume the subject from the time Lieutenant-colonel Greathed, of the 32nd regiment, was dispatched by General Wilson in pursuit of the bands of rebels who had fled the city, with an intent to cross the Jumna at Muttra, and thence, if possible, make their way to join the rebel host at Lucknow.

But few weeks had elapsed prior to this ignominious flight, since the last of the kings of Delhi had proclaimed himself the imperial ruler of millions, and acknow-

ledged chief of the warriors of Hindostan, whose hearts were burning with fanatic hatred against the Christian race, by whom they had been trained to arms, and from whose too indulgent rule they had madly turned aside to rush upon destruction. Surrounded by tens of thousands of the recreant soldiers of the army of Bengal, he beheld the outstretched arm of British vengeance in the few battalions that clustered on the heights before his stronghold, and trembled in his state as the retributive thunders of the resistless power whose anger he had provoked, echoed through the halls of his palace, and with every crash proclaimed the advent of his ruin.

From the date of the occupation of the city by General Wilson, on the 20th of September, everything remained quiet and orderly around Delhi. Deserted as it was by its mutinous garrison, and by a vast majority of its inhabitants—its king a miserable captive, and three of the princes of his race in their untimely graves—it was considered unnecessary to detain the whole British force within the city, while revolt had yet to be trampled down in other places, and bands of armed plunderers were ravaging the country, and revenging their defeat by rapine and slaughter. On the 23rd of September, therefore, two columns of the victorious troops started in pursuit of the insurgents—the one under Brigadier Showers taking the right bank of the Jumna; the other, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Greathed, commencing its operations on the left. The party commanded by the former officer was, at first, but a small one, and was employed for a special purpose. Moving out of the camp on or about the 26th of September, it proceeded to the tomb of the emperor Humayoon, where Captain Hodgson had previously captured and shot three of the princes of the house of Delhi; and to the neighbourhood of the Cuttub Minar, which was now swarming with the loose disorderly rabble that had managed to escape from the city. At the tomb, Brigadier Showers was fortunate enough to capture two more sons of the king—the Mirza Mendoo and Mirza Bukhtowar Shah, both of whom were conveyed into Delhi, tried by a military commission, and sentenced to be shot—a fate they met on the 13th of October; after which their bodies were exposed at the Khotwal for three days, and were then cast into the Ganges. Shortly after

this first successful raid, a larger force, consisting of the 2nd fusiliers, 1st Punjab infantry and Kumaon battalion, with the carabinieri, guides, and other irregular horse, and a field battery, was assembled for service under the brigadier; and on the 1st of October, this force marched out of camp, for the districts east and west of Delhi. At Goorgaon—a small fortified town, about twenty miles west from the city—a leader of the rebels, named Buktar Sing, was captured, and forthwith hanged out of the way of further mischief; and the same process was adopted wherever fortune threw the insurgent leaders into the hands of the troops, although not actually in the field.

The following extract from a letter of an officer attached to the column under Brigadier Short, dated "Bullumghur, November 7th," will afford some idea of the operations of this division of the Delhi army. The writer says—"I wrote to you last from Kanoond: from that place we returned to Rewaree, where we found a subahdar and a company of the guides in charge of the town. Some report about the Jodhpore legion being at Naud was current in camp, and this was the reason assigned for our looking-up Rewaree. Thence to Goorgaon, twenty miles from Delhi. We were there sent off with the carabinieri, leaving the column halted, to Furrucknuggur. Twenty of the nawab's sowars were shot. After this we entered quite a new style of country. Instead of skirting the hills, we entered them; indeed, crossed a tract of hills running without order and at a range from 200 to 300 feet high, with here and there a peak of 500, until we quitted them again at Sonah. Our object was to punish the wild devils of Mewattees who inhabit these hills, and whose natural trade is plunder. Marwar, the district after which they are called, is far away to the west and south-west; but these people cling to this irregular range of hills in all its length and breadth. As we found every town had been burnt and gutted by these scamps, we returned the compliment by setting their villages on fire; and at Taroo, as I sat smoking my weed in the evening, I counted no less than five huge bonfires, whose lights stretched almost round the horizon. At Taroo, among the ruins of what was a substantial stone-built town, only seven months ago, and which we were ordered to clear, we found and shot thirty fair-skinned Delhi fellows. One day was spent between Taroo

and Sonah (five miles) in hunting the hills for Mewattees; we were fired upon by one village—less, I believe, because those gentlemen like fighting, than because they were anxious to cover the removal of their cattle. Here is the only point at which they are vulnerable; catch them you cannot; burn their villages you may; and in a week they are re-thatched. All this is idle; seize their cows and goats, if you want to bring them to their senses. The guides—such active fellows!—beat for Mewattees up the khuds, down the khuds, and over the most dangerous ground, just as we should for chikore, in a way which Europeans could not have done. About sixty of our friends were killed. A hand-to-hand fight took place, which excited a good deal of fun. A Mewattee, a huge fellow, armed with shield and sword, was put up half-way down the khud at our feet. Twenty shots were fired; but no, the bold fellow held steadily on, springing from rock to rock, descending to the bottom of the dell, and then mounting the opposite face. He was so close that we could distinguish the rope fastened round his body, which these people use in climbing about the ravines in which they live. Just as he was reaching the crest of the khud, a man of the guides suddenly came round an elbow of the ravine, and five words explained to him the proximity of the Mewattee. There was not four yards between them when they met. The guide fired—down ducked his friend, the shot missed, and then followed the sweep of the Mewattee's sword upon the guide's head—at the same moment the guide giving him the bayonet. A second flash of the sword, and down went the guide, as we thought—a howl of rage rose from the lookers-on. In another minute the guide was seen standing over his foe. His head had been saved by a thick puggree; and the second cut was, thanks to his lunge of the bayonet, of no great strength: when he stooped it was to pick up his puggree. From Sonah we had another day's hunt; such hard work I have never had in the hills. Falls I had at least a dozen. At Sonah we left the Ghoorkas to keep the district quiet, and then came on here. The rajah of this place has been sent a prisoner into Delhi. The fort here is full of sepoy uniforms: uniforms, too, of the poor fellows of the 32nd foot, and officers of the 6th native infantry, have been found. Bullumghur could not hold out against the force, which kept us at bay for

months, it is true; but the rajah, with his men and money, ought to have joined us when the outbreak first took place. Twenty fellows, some of them Pandies, some of them Delhi court men, were shot yesterday. The villagers tell us, that when they asked the retreating Pandies where they were going, they answered, 'We have killed all the Feringhees in the north, leaving only one lame man and two boys, and now we are going to *safkur* them in the south.' The word 'attention!' takes our Pandies in most curiously. A fellow, a poor villager apparently, without whisker or moustache, is brought up, and that mystic trisyllable uttered sharply and suddenly, behold the fellow's heels brought smartly together, the hands pressed to the side, and—the individual is taken out—and shot. At Taroo, a Mohammedan padra offered off hand, in the most handsome way, to change his religion: it was changed—he was shot through the head."

The columns sent out east and west of Delhi, to settle the country, were as successful in their operations as that led by Lieutenant-colonel Greathed. The Meerut force, which had for some time occupied Haupper, being no longer necessary there, moved northward on the 21st of September, to Jhanna Bowun, a Mohammedan city, in the Moozufferuuggur district; but, on its arrival, the column found the place evacuated, and learnt that the English officials at Shamlee had been murdered by the rebels of Jhanua Bowun, as they passed on their way towards Rohilcund. Jhanna, a city almost as large as Meerut, was consequently, for two days, given up to be plundered, and then burnt; as were several villages round it, one of which had been rendered specially notorious by the violence of its inhabitants. Of this den of iniquity, a Meerut letter says—"The inhabitants had committed upwards of 200 robberies and murders. They had broken the dyke of a canal, and, by this means, swamped the road. Every traveller was compelled to pass through the village, and was there garotted. If he paid the price of redemption (*taut mieux*), he escaped with life; if not (*taut pis*), he was lynched. We caught the villains napping, with their arms under their heads; and they slept the sleep which knows no waking. But why give a daily account of our doings? Suffice it to say, we harried all the rebellious villages, and taught them the might and majesty of British retributive justice. A large amount of

revenue was collected from villages which, since the outbreak, had completely disowned their allegiance, and our force returned to Meerut on the 5th of October."

The second movable column, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Greathed, consisted of 1,600 infantry and 500 cavalry, with three troops of horse artillery and eighteen guns. This force, also, on the 23rd of September, moved out of camp, and crossing to the left bank of the river, took the direction of Allygurh—a strong fort, situated in the midst of swamps and marshes, equidistant about fifty miles from Agra and from Delhi. For the first three marches nothing particular occurred, with the exception of burning the notorious Goojur towu of Sekunderabad, where a vast amount of English property was found, amongst which ladies' wearing apparel was conspicuous. The fourth march brought the column to the stronghold of the nawab Maludad, of Malaghur—a relative of the ex-king of Delhi; who, on the strength of a mud fort and some few guns (the reward of his grandfather's good service to the government in former days), had insanely made common cause with the insurgents. This chief had recently been joined by the mutineers from Jhansie, consisting of the 12th native infantry, the 14th irregular cavalry, and three 9-pounder guns; the whole concentrated in a strong position near the town of Bolundshukur, which they seemed inclined to defend, until the artillery of the English troops opened upon them, when they almost immediately abandoned their intrenchments, and fled. The cavalry hastened in pursuit; and some of their horse having formed a line, to cover the retreat and receive the attack of Watson's irregulars, were quickly dispersed. The 9th lancers then made a brilliant charge, and, dashing down the street amidst a shower of bullets from loopholed houses, by which they sustained severe loss, drove the enemy through and beyond the town. In this affair, it was observed that the rebels appeared to select the officers for attack, in preference to a general engagement; and thus, in the advance of the troops, several of them were severely wounded in consequence. About a hundred of the enemy were left dead upon the field; seven light guns, with shot (all of hammered iron), were captured, with twenty-five boxes of powder, and large quantities of musket ammunition.

On the morning of the 29th, the force marched on Malaghur (the fort belonging to the nawab), which was found to be abandoned; and as it was useless to the advancing column, it was at once destroyed, but, unfortunately, not without the sacrifice of a valuable life—Lieutenant Home, of the engineers, who had assisted Lieutenant Salkeld in the destruction of the Cashmere gate at Delhi, being killed by the premature explosion of a mine.* At this place the column halted for a couple of days, near the junction, and in command of four cross-roads, by which it could pursue the mutineers in whatever direction they appeared; and from thence Colonel Greathed sent the wounded officers and men, with such camp-followers as could be spared, to Meerut. On the 2nd of October the force was once more in motion, and on the following day reached Koorga, a distance of twelve miles. The enemy had passed through this place only two days previous, and not more than about a dozen stragglers from their body were found in the village; but these were immediately captured and shot. On the 4th of the month the column encamped at Soomlah, and on the 5th it reached Allygurh, where it was opposed by some Mohammedan fanatics and the rabble of the town, by whom Ghobind Sing and his followers had shortly before been expelled. They were quickly dispersed in all directions, the cavalry cutting up about 400; and here two 5-pounder guns became the spoil of the British troops. Captain Burchier's battery, with the cavalry, then made a circuit of the town, and, scouring the corn-fields and gardens, pushed on by the Cawnpore-road to the 87th milestone from Delhi. Here they opened out for skirmishing, and then swept back again, clearing the villages, and cutting down the enemy hid amongst the high crops of millet and maize; and thus, of some four or five hundred troopers of the Gwalior contingent found in the neighbourhood, very few, if any, escaped the sabre or the bullet. On the 6th, the force marched on to Akbarabad, another stronghold of fanaticism and revolt, the cavalry moving rapidly in advance. Upon this occasion two distinguished rebel chiefs, named Mougul Sing and Methab Sing, with about a hundred of their followers, were put to the sword; and several guns, with a large quantity of powder and shot, were cap-

* See vol. i., p. 500.

tured. The town was then plundered, and afterwards destroyed.

While engaged in these operations, a rumour spread that a large body of mutineers from various distant places, but principally from Indore, had congregated at Dholeporc, a town about thirty-six miles from Agra, on the Gwalior-road; and, on the 7th, it was ascertained that the rebels were pushing on rapidly, with an intention of surprising the little pent-up garrison at Agra.* The enemy's force consisted of 5,000 disciplined troops, with about 10,000 rabble followers, three siege guns, and twelve or fifteen light field-pieces. On the 9th, it had crossed the Kharee river, about twelve miles north of Agra; and at noon on that day, their advanced guard was within four miles of the cantonments, where they fired upon the militia cavalry sent out to watch their movements. The force under Lieutenant-colonel Greathed had, on the same date, reached Hattras, on the western side of the river, where the above intelligence met him. He accordingly set forward with all speed for Agra, where he arrived on the 10th, after a fatiguing night march of twenty-four miles. His advanced guard, consisting of 500 cavalry and two batteries of artillery, crossed the pontoon bridge into the city shortly after daybreak; and, by eight o'clock on the morning of the 10th of October, the entire column had assembled on the brigade parade-ground at Agra.

An extraordinary circumstance is related in connection with the arrival of this force; namely, that "portions of the rebel troops were actually in Agra, concealed in ice-pits and houses, at the very moment of Colonel Greathed's arrival, and that the officer in command of the fort was unaware of the fact, although it was well known the enemy was in the immediate neighbourhood." It was also known that parties of strange horsemen had been seen prowling about the cantonments during the evening of the 8th and 9th: yet, it is alleged, no pains were taken to reconnoitre the movements of the enemy, or to ascertain his exact position; and the result of such neglect was as might have been anticipated. Thus, about half-past ten o'clock, the wearied soldiers having then breakfasted, were quietly resting themselves after their long night march, the horses being unsaddled, and the camp in all the confusion of pitch-

ing tents, when, to their utter amazement, a battery of guns in the rear of the burial-ground opened upon the right flank of the camp, and, at the same time, a numerous body of horse galloped into the midst of it, and cut down several of the men. Never was a surprise more complete, and never did soldiers rally with more rapidity, and prepare for resistance with greater coolness and courage, than did our gallant fellows on this occasion.

Simultaneously with this sudden attack, four Ghazees with tom-toms entered the camp, and cut down an officer and a sergeant-major, the one while he was washing, and the other asleep. In five minutes, the lancers and Sikhs were in their saddles, and after the fifth shot had been fired by the enemy, our horse artillery guns were ready, and replied to them with splendid effect. In a very short time the enemy began to retreat; and Lieutenant-colonel Cotton, who happened to be on the ground at the time, and assumed command as senior officer, immediately ordered the advance. For a short distance the enemy showed fight, and seemed disposed to dispute the ground with us; but on the cavalry and artillery approaching nearer and nearer, they changed their mind, and what at first was an orderly retreat, soon became a most disorderly flight. They scoured down the Gwalior-road, and scattered themselves amidst the fields on either hand, in hopes of being concealed by the lofty jowar and bajrah cultivation (as high, strong, and nearly as thick as sugar-cane) with which all the surrounding country is covered; but the 9th lancers and Sikh cavalry kept at their heels, and cut them down right and left; while the horse artillery, always in front, mowed them down with grape. In the fields, too, they were well followed by her majesty's 8th and 75th regiments, and the 2nd and 4th Punjab infantry; so there was no escape for them on either side: whichever way they attempted to flee, the avenger was always behind them; and the road and the fields between the ice-pits and the Kharee Nuddee—a distance of ten miles—tell, in letters of blood, of the slaughter that ensued. The tired horses of the artillery and cavalry seemed to acquire strength from the excitement of the chase, and the mutineers were followed up to the Kharee Nuddee at full speed with tremendous effect. Every gun the enemy possessed—fourteen in number

* See vol. i., p. 552.

—was captured; and their tents, after being stripped of the plunder the robbers had amassed, were burnt. The troops also recovered treasure to the value of about a lac and sixty thousand rupees; while several of the European soldiers, and almost all the Sikhs, obtained more or less money and other valuables from the bodies of the slain, in some instances as much as two hundred rupees being found on the person of a dead sepoy, and very rarely less than thirty or forty.

When the firing was heard in the fort, the 3rd European regiment (which early in the morning had been warned to hold itself in readiness for service at two o'clock) immediately got under arms, and into their red cloth jacket, the rest of the force being attired in drab Holland; and shortly after eleven, it marched at a rapid pace to the assistance of their comrades in cantonments, cheering enthusiastically. The regiment was delayed for a minute at the Ummer Sing gate, in consequence of its advance being checked by a crowd of panic-stricken fugitives from cantonments. It is said, that a small party of the enemy's horse, dressed in light cavalry uniform, pursued them to within a very short distance of the fort. Every officer and gentleman who had horses, and could get ready in time, rushed out of the fort to accompany the 3rd Europeans; and had not an order been issued to stop the egress, the fort might have been left solely under the charge of the ladies and children.

The men of the 3rd were so anxious to get into action, that, of their own accord, they went at the "double," which had the effect of soon knocking many of them up; and by the time they had advanced five miles, the stragglers were very numerous. Many preceding days had been tolerably cool and cloudy; but on this day the sun shone in its full glory, and there was hardly a breath of air stirring, so that the men suffered exceedingly, and many poor fellows, unable to move from the effects of the sun, were obliged to be left on the road-sides.

The 3rd, about 550 strong, accompanied by some Sikh cavalry and infantry, and by the new militia rifle company, were led by Lieutenant-colonel Cotton seven or eight miles out; but although they prevented the enemy escaping to the left, they had no opportunity of encountering them, or of performing any deeds of daring entitled to special notice.

It is difficult to estimate the number slain; but when it is considered that the enemy numbered at least 7,000 men in action, and that they were pursued and slaughtered for more than ten miles, it is not unreasonable to estimate their loss at 1,000 men; for it must be recollected, that no prisoners were taken, and, as far as could be ascertained, none were merely wounded.

Thus, then, terminated the action fought at Agra on Saturday the 10th of October, which resulted in the total rout of the enemy, and the complete restoration, for a time, of British influence in the district around Agra.

One of the individuals engaged in this dangerous but exciting *mêlée*, writes thus of the event:—"Early in the morning, Colonel Greathed's column was seen, from the walls of Agra, crossing the bridge of boats on the Jumna, and streaming into the town. No more gratifying sight had greeted the eyes of the occupants of the fort for many days, than that of the bayonets and red uniforms of our men as they marched across the river. The soldiers of the 3rd Europeans and artillery knew that, after a short rest, the column would proceed against the enemy. They had been ordered for parade that day at one o'clock in the afternoon; and their hearts beat high, you may be sure, at the prospect of meeting the rebels. About ten, the wearied soldiers in cantonments had breakfasted; the horses of the artillery and cavalry, about 1,000 in number, were picketed in cantonments; tents were pitched, or in the act of being pitched; some men were asleep, wearied with the night's exertion—all were more or less in undress, when suddenly the booming of cannon was heard. Round after round of balls came bowling amongst the men from a battery on the edge of the parade, and in rear of the burial-ground. A body of rebel cavalry was rushing about the camp, and beating up our quarters. Fanatics with tom-toms were in the midst of the men, killing some asleep, others whilst performing ablutions. Artillery guns, unlimbered, were partially in the hands of the enemy. Never was surprise more complete. But, on the other hand, never was rally so swift. The artillery was harnessed, horses saddled, and the 9th lancers started to charge in their shirts in less than five minutes. The first effort made was for the recapture of a gun remaining in possession of the rebels.

Lieutenant-colonel Cotton (then on the ground) drew up his men, ordered the advance, and the 9th lancers charged. The attack was fierce; resistance for a time equally so. Captain French fell mortally wounded; Lieutenant Jones severely hit; Lieutenant J. S. P. Younghusband, in command of the 5th Punjab irregulars, dropped into a well as he dashed headlong forward. Several men at the same time came to the earth; but the gun was retaken with speed unrivalled. The rebels had been held at bay, meanwhile, in other places, by our infantry, which soon advanced; and now the enemy began to yield. As they retired, the artillery moved forward—the cavalry made rapid successive charges at them; gun after gun was abandoned in a flight which gradually became more precipitate, until at last it ended in a complete rout. The rebels fled along the Gwalior-road to the Kharee river, flinging themselves into the high vegetation that covered the ground on each side, and seeking shelter where they could find it, falling ultimately under the bayonets of the 8th and 73th, and the 2nd and 4th Punjab infantry. The main body having abandoned all its guns (fourteen in number), unfortunately overmatched even our cavalry at running; the horses feeling the want of rest necessary after many long marches. Accordingly, the pursuit ended at the passage of the Kharee, which the rebels succeeded in crossing. Each side had leisure now to count its losses. We had lost, in all, sixty-seven killed and wounded; amongst the latter, besides Jones and Younghusband, Lieutenant A. Pearson, of the artillery, and Lieutenant C. S. Maclean, of the 3rd Europeans, attached to the 1st Punjab cavalry, and twenty-two Europeans. Five hundred of the rebels were killed; fourteen guns taken; a standing camp and innumerable tents were plundered and burnt. Such was the fortunate termination of an affair which might have ended in a disaster of no ordinary magnitude.”

An official report of this extraordinary engagement, and its fortunate result, is contained in the following despatch from Lieutenant-colonel Greathed to the adjutant-general's department at Delhi; and in the letter of Colonel Cotton, commanding at

* This officer superseded Brigadier Polwhele in the command of Agra, after the battle of Futteh-pore Sikree, on the 5th of July. See vol. i., p. 552.

Agra,* to the secretary to the government of the North-West Provinces:—

“Camp, Agra, October 11th, 1857.

“Sir,—I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the major-general commanding, that in consequence of urgent letters from Agra, I marched from Hattras at 6 P.M. on the 9th, carrying the European infantry on elephants and carts, and encamped on the brigade parade-ground at this place, about 8 A.M. yesterday. At half-past ten o'clock, my camp was suddenly attacked on the front and right flank. I galloped to the front, and found the artillery getting into action, and her majesty's 9th lancers in the saddle. I proceeded myself with her majesty's 8th regiment and the 4th Punjab infantry to the right flank, for the purpose of dislodging the enemy and taking their guns, which were raking our camp. On the way I took with me the 1st, 2nd, and 5th Punjab cavalry, extending the infantry in skirmishing order, with their supports. I took the cavalry to the open space near the European infantry barracks, with directions to move as circumstances would permit. The 9-pounder, Agra battery, had by this time come up; I advanced them in support of the infantry, on the road leading from the artillery parade-ground to the Dholepore road, and the skirmishers advanced and cleared the compounds to their front; the Punjab cavalry, under Lieutenant Watson, had then the opportunity of making a most gallant charge, driving off the enemy's sowars and capturing four guns. After this, the rebels made no stand on the right, but the left continued to be hotly engaged, and the enemy's sowars advanced, with great determination, on the guns, one of which was disabled, from its gunners having been cut down, and, for the moment, in the possession of the enemy; it was, however, instantly recaptured, and the 9th lancers charged the sowars and drove them from the field. I regret to say, that two most excellent officers, Captain French and Lieutenant Jones, were wounded, the former mortally, and I fear that little hope can be entertained of the recovery of the latter. I advanced during this time on the Dholepore-road, capturing guns as we went on; and the 9th lancers and artillery, supported by the 75th and 2nd Punjab infantry, advanced on the left, taking four guns on their way. The whole line now moved to the front, the Punjab cavalry, as usual, performing most excellent service on the flanks, till we reached a village three miles from hence, where we halted for a short time, the whole of the enemy being then in full flight: we were now joined by the 3rd Europeans; and Colonel Cotton, commanding at Agra, came up and took the command of the whole of the troops. The enemy's camp was descried about two miles in advance, and we marched upon it, the road strewn in all directions with baggage and carts. The infantry was ordered to halt at the camp, and the cavalry and artillery pursued the enemy to the Kharee Nuddee, ten miles and a-half from Agra. The enemy had crossed the river before we reached it, leaving behind him all his guns. The artillery fired grape and round shot at the retreating enemy across the river, with good effect. The country all round was covered with fugitives, of whom a large number were cut up. They have all now crossed the Kharee Nuddee. After a short halt we returned to camp, and the captured guns were all brought in during the night. I have not been able to estimate the enemy's number, as, in addition to the Indore force, and the Neemuch and Nusseerabad

brigades, sepoys were found killed belonging to the 16th grenadiers, Hurreena light infantry, Gwalior contingent, and several others. The whole country, as far as one could see, was covered with fugitives, but of these many were probably camp-followers and rabble. I have never seen such a rout; and had our artillery and cavalry been fresh, few would have crossed the Kharee Nuddee; but they had marched forty-one miles in less than thirty hours before arriving at Agra. It is impossible to say too much of the excellent conduct of the whole of the troops, officers and men, and I trust it will meet with the approbation of the major-general commanding the field force at Delhi.

"It is my intention, as soon as I have been joined by the detachment now on its way from Delhi, to proceed towards Futteghur, with the view of effecting a junction with General Havelock's force, subject to the approbation of General Penny.—I have, &c.

"E. H. GREATHED, Lieutenant-colonel,
"Commanding Movable Column."

"Fort, Agra, October 13th, 1857.

"Sir,—I have the honour to forward, for the information of the chief commissioner, and transmission to government, the following account of the action which took place at this station, on the 10th instant, with the mutinous troops from Mhow (23rd native infantry and 1st light cavalry), increased by part of the fugitive forces from Delhi, and malcontents from Dholepore and the neighbourhood, and which resulted in the most complete rout of the enemy, with the loss of all their guns, camp equipage, baggage and plunder. The chief commissioner is aware of the very imperfect information we have from time to time received of the movements of this body, and that it was not until about ten o'clock on Saturday morning, when I was arranging with him for moving out the troops to the Kharee river, that intelligence was brought in that a sudden attack had been made on the camp of the movable column under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Greathed, which had arrived that morning.

"I lost no time in repairing to the camp, when I took command, and found that the enemy, who were now completely hidden by the high standing crops, had opened a heavy fire from a strong battery in the centre, supported by several guns on each flank, and were sweeping our position with a powerful cross-fire. Our troops had been drawn up by Colonel Greathed in a most judicious manner; a flank attack made by a large body of cavalry, under cover of the Khelatee Ghilzie lines, had been effectually repulsed, with great loss to them, by a brilliant charge of the picket of her majesty's 9th lancers, led by Captain French and Lieutenant Jones. Their attack was then soon overpowered and turned into a complete rout, notwithstanding several ineffectual attempts to make a stand; our guns following them up steadily, and the cavalry cutting up all within their reach on both sides of the road. The pursuit was

* Of Colonel Greathed's successful campaign, the following high eulogium was passed by an eminent authority:—"Colonel Greathed has again distinguished himself. He has passed like a flame of fire from Delhi to the borders of Oude, smiting the rebel armies wherever he encountered them; laying open the ramparts of immense fortifications at a blow; accelerating his pace almost daily; and at Agra gaining a battle which was a miniature Waterloo. The English were breakfasting in the cantonments

continued during the rest of the day, for a distance of eleven miles, until the enemy had been driven across the Kharee, and thoroughly dispersed with the loss of all their guns, twelve in number, camp equipage, baggage and plunder.

"Considering that the attack was made before the camp was pitched, and after the troops (with the exception of the 3rd European regiment, and Lieutenant Pearson's battery) had performed a long and harassing forced march, and been under arms for fully twenty-six hours, too much praise cannot be bestowed in this brilliant affair; but especially is praise due to the detachment of her majesty's 9th lancers, whose charge I have noticed above, and who, in addition to several of their men disabled, and to Lieutenant Jones, who was very severely wounded, had the misfortune to lose their commanding officer, Captain French, whose untimely death is a great loss to the service."

After enumerating the officers who had particularly distinguished themselves in this affair, the despatch of Lieutenant-colonel Cotton concludes thus:—"To Colonel Greathed, commanding the movable column, who apparently was not aware of my being on the field until I had ordered the advance, my thanks are due for the assistance rendered in the pursuit."

The officiating secretary to the government of the North-West Provinces, in transmitting the foregoing details to the governor-general in council, expressed the high opinion of his government in reference to the chief actors in the affair as follows:—

"The chief commissioner would observe, that to Colonel Cotton's high personal qualifications, both as a soldier and commander, we owe the completeness of this success. Led by him, the tired troops were inspirited to continue the pursuit of the flying enemy, until the capture of all his guns, camp, and plunder, deprived him of the means of further aggression, and rendered the dissolution of his army inevitable.

"Lieutenant-colonel Greathed, commanding the movable column, brought his men into action with a rapidity and precision that entitle him to the highest praise; and when it is remembered that the column had only just come off a long and harassing forced march, the steadiness of the men and the coolness of the officers entitle all to the warmest commendation."*

when the powerful Mahratta army came upon them: scarcely a horse was saddled, not a dragoon was under arms; but before the enemy had fired the sixth shot the artillery was in position: in five minutes the squadrons had mustered, and in another the great fight of Agra had begun. Two hours did the rebel hordes maintain their position; but at length the volleying lines, the deadly batteries, the wheeling troops of horse broke through the living rampart; and then, upon Greathed's signal, a gen-

The following extract from the letter of a civilian acting with the troops, affords a graphic view of the circumstances attending the spirited affair of the 10th of October. After noticing some unsuccessful movements of the enemy about the district of Allygurh, the writer continues his narrative thus:—

“Meantime the main body of the beaten mutinous army from Delhi, which had made some stay at Muttra and set up a bridge of boats there, had crossed into the Doab, and consequent on the delay in our progress, we found that they were here two long marches ahead of us. They had twenty-two guns; but (as we are told) very little ammunition and a vast quantity of plunder. They were in a very confused and undisciplined state, though their numbers were undoubtedly very large. They were understood to be going, part of them to Bareilly and part into Oude—to Lucknow and Cawnpore, they said. They showed no disposition whatever to fight us; on the contrary, the direct road to Bareilly was given up, and they hurried down the Grand Trunk-road in a body. There remained of the regiments which retreated from Delhi only the Ncemuch brigade (which had formerly attacked Agra.) These, under one Beera Sing, declined to join the others, and they marched to meet the Mhow brigade, which had never been at Delhi, but, after some stay at Gwalior, had separated from the Gwalior contingent and crossed the Chumbul to Dholepore, where they had obtained or taken from the rajah three large brass guns to add to their own field-pieces. The two brigades uniting, formed a considerable force, with much cavalry and thirteen guns, and they threatened Agra with a second attack. The movable column was therefore urgently called for, and, making a very long forced march, it wound under the fort—a gallant spectacle, gladdening the eyes of the long-isolated garrison, amid their hearty plaudits. The troops bivouacked on the cantonment parade-ground, awaiting the gradual arrival of their tents and baggage, on the morning

eral advance took place, and for the space of ten miles the earth was dented by the troops of cavalry, strewn with dead, and encumbered with abandoned guns and plunder. Nothing more glorious has taken place since the rebellion began. The carnage was such as to spread panic through the enemy's ranks: as an army they were utterly destroyed. Some of them fled to Bhurtpore, but in vain; for the gates of that celebrated fortress were closed against

of the 10th of October, and the greater portion of the officers dispersed to see and breakfast with their friends in the fort. Now, Agra, the head-quarters of the civil government and of a crowd of refugees, was full of purveyors of intelligence, official and non-official. There was nothing that happened for a long way round, of which fifty safe people had not their own particular and circumstantial intelligence. The military arrangements for guarding against surprises, stratagems, and treacherous enemies, were also the most perfect ever known. The authorities managed to make the lives of their friends thoroughly miserable by the excess of their precautions. It was impossible to go anywhere or do anything without being harassed out of one's patience.

“Well, on this morning of the 10th, for the first time in the history of beleaguered Agra, *all* the newsmongers were of one accord—they had all certain intelligence that the mutineers, after threatening to cross the small Kharee river (ten miles distant), had failed to do so, and retreated, and were then six miles on the other side. It was also found that they were unable to get the big guns over the river. They were clearly making off on hearing of the approach of the column. So, friends arrived, enemies flying, an impassable stream between, and military precautions unrivalled, it well might be that all Agra breakfasted that morning in peace and security, with relieved minds and grateful hearts. But suddenly, while breakfast was in every man's mouth, a big gun was heard, and another, and another, and many more: people started—‘Oh, no; it must be a salute, though rather irregular.’ Still more guns; then people were seen hurrying from cantonment—the camp was attacked. Yes, so it was. Among their many ingenious precautions, the Agra authorities had neglected one very simple one—viz., to send some one with his eyes open to look down the road; and the enemy had quietly marched in, big guns and all; and there was not one signal of alarm till they actually opened fire on our disordered camp, and

them: others sought shelter at Bareilly and Mynpoorie, but were instantly repelled. A sepoy camp in the neighbourhood to which they brought the news, was so precipitately broken up and deserted, that not even the treasure was carried away: in a word, the victory was complete, and must have taught the mutineers how feeble are their arms in comparison with the English, and how hopeless is their cause.”

knocked down several men and horses. Then there was, of course, a scene of wild confusion. There was no command, and no anything, and camp-followers and horses fled in all directions. If the enemy's cavalry and infantry had then pushed in, the result might have been most disastrous; but, native like, they first waited to see the effect of their big guns. That delay was fatal to them. Our guns got into action, our cavalry mounted, and when I galloped up to the ground we were returning their fire. Then their cavalry did charge right into the parade in a great 'gol.' But they were too late. They took a detached and disabled gun for a moment; and they were so completely among us that the artillery could not fire on them. But the tired Sikhs sitting on the ground formed square with the utmost coolness, and fired well into them. The laneers were ready, and charged at them as the laneers can charge. They were broken and defeated; yet some of them did actually sweep right round the camp and cantonments, and created such a panic among the general population as scarce was seen—every one riding over every one else in the most indiscriminate manner; in fact, there never was, and never will be, so complete a surprise. But by this time commanding officers had come on the field, and every arm was in action. Our artillery fought nobly—in fact, all did; and though it was some time before we could find exactly where we were and where the enemy was (and they attacked on three sides at once), eventually they were repulsed, and began to retreat. In fact, I think it must be, that in surprising us they surprised themselves. They could hardly have known what they were attacking, or surely they would have made a better stand. Once they were repulsed it was all over with them. After the charge their cavalry never showed but in the distance. As soon as they were clearly in retreat we followed; and before we had gone very far they had abandoned their three big guns, and their retreat approached to a flight. Here was enough for a moderate man. Our troops, it might be fairly said, had had enough of it; a halt was ordered. But another sort of men came into play in the right place. In Agra, the command was taken by Brigadier Cotton, called 'Gun Cotton.' He would not halt, and pushed on with fortunate dash. Speedily the enemy were completely dispersed and

routed, and they hardly returned our fire. Their infantry merely showed at the edges of the fields, and then fled through them. Soon we found and took their camp; then we came on their baggage, which they gradually abandoned. Our horse artillery, from time to time, galloped up and opened fire; then that became unnecessary, and small bodies of cavalry continued the chase. Eventually, ten or twelve well-mounted officers made everything fly from the road; while the cavalry hunted up the fugitives on either side. Never was dispersion more complete. All the guns (thirteen) and baggage were taken, and no six of the infantry went away together. Those who saved themselves did so by hiding in the high fields, and they were no doubt numerous. There was, in fact, an end of the Mhow and Neemuch brigades, excepting the fugitive cavalry; and, after a ten-mile chase, the troops returned to relieve Agra."

A short time previous to the events above reorded, the North-Western Provinces of Bengal had sustained a severe and irreparable loss by the death of their most able and indefatigable chief commissioner, the Hon. John Russell Colvin, lieutenant-governor of the province of Agra. In the exalted sphere of action occupied by this valuable public officer, he had ever exhibited a spirit of industry, and a mastery of the details of government, that were perfectly astonishing; and his efforts for the advantage of the people under his charge, were the constant theme of eulogy by those best qualified to judge of his administration. Of the unfortunate collision between himself and the governor-general, on the subject of his proclamation of conditional pardon to the mutinous sepoys, the details have already been given.* That proclamation, however unpopular at Calcutta, was universally approved at Agra, the seat of his government; for there the vast extent of the danger that menaced European society, and the thorough delusion which possessed the mass of the sepoys as to the intentions of government, were well understood. At the time that proclamation was issued by Mr. Colvin, upon his own authority, the native regiments were falling into revolt in all directions; and to prevent the fatal mischief from further spreading, it seemed to him that the wisest thing which could be done, was to make known that the government desired to be

* See vol. i., p. 137.

just, to discriminate between the wilfully guilty and the mere victims of a delusion, by offering the means of retreat to those not already desperately committed; to those especially who had been betrayed into the rebel ranks by their apprehensions about religion, or by the impossibility of separating themselves, at the moment, from the corps to which they belonged; and thus, through them, to appeal to the loyal feelings of the regiments yet in obedience. But his views were either not appreciated, or were objectionable on individual grounds; and the most mortifying result followed that could have been desired by his worst enemy—namely, the peremptory recall of his proclamation, and the substitution of another from the supreme government in its stead.* But the new proclamation, issued by the governor-general, was found utterly unavailing to stem the progress of disaffection and revolt. The crush of regiments advanced so fast, that a new idea—that of entire mastery and expulsion of all Europeans from India—seized all minds, and, spreading like wildfire through the ranks of the native army, terms of accommodation were no longer listened to.

Mr. Colvin, it will be remembered, earnestly protested against his proclamation being interpreted as offering pardon to those who had murdered or injured their officers;† but his efforts to convince the government of his actual meaning were fruitless; and he at length ceased to remonstrate against the arbitrary and offensive act by which his influence, as lieutenant-governor of the disturbed province, was fatally assailed. To the *brusque* message of the governor-general, of the 31st of May,‡ he offered no reply; but to his own family he wrote, that “although the proclamation remained a mere trifling incident in the great series of events, and he would give no further trouble to others on the subject, he wished his own relatives to understand the grounds of his conduct.” “That those,” he said, “who had taken a leading, or a deliberately malignant part in the revolt, would ever seek to take advan-

tage of the notification, we knew to be quite out of the question. The chance that seemed open, through the proclamation, of escape to such persons, was what called forth the heavy censure at many distant points; but we, who are nearer the scene, and know the real spirit of the revolt, could not entertain such a suspicion.” Had the unfortunate gentleman lived but a few months longer, he would have seen the principle upon which his supposed proclamation of the 27th of May, 1857, was grounded, not only adopted by the governor-general himself, but also insisted upon by the British legislature, and proclaimed by the imperial government.

But, at this time, Mr. Colvin's active and useful life was rapidly drawing to a close. The approach of a hostile force from Neemuch, within a short march of Agra, on the 5th of July, and its subsequent operations, have already been mentioned.§ Early in that month, the entire Christian population of the town and cantonments went into the quarters prepared for them in the old royal residence, which had the name, but very little of the character, of a fort; and, by the 25th of the following August, it contained 4,289 inmates, of whom 2,514 were women and children. As every contingency had been foreseen and prepared for, the bad effects which might be expected from the compression of this multitude into a narrow space, at the worst season of the year, were not experienced; but the chief among the beleaguered host had, nevertheless, received his death-stroke. His government (the improvement of which was the cherished object of his life) had been reduced to the space commanded by the guns of the fort; and even this remnant was threatened by a war-cloud from the direction of Gwalior: and thus John Russell Colvin may justly be reckoned among the victims of the revolt, by a more intense and protracted agony than if he had fallen by the swords of the mutinous soldiers.|| His first attack of physical ailment immediately preceded the removal of the Europeans, &c., into the fort; and his friends

My authority is now confined to a few miles near this fort. The city is quiet, and gives supplies. Collection of revenue quite suspended. The bankers will give small sums at very high rates in loan. I send my affectionate regards to all my old friends. I cannot shut my eyes to what is probably before me. If I have erred in any step, hard has been my position; and you will all bear lightly on my memory, and help my family as far as you can.”

* See vol. i., p. 138.

† *Ibid.*, p. 141.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 552.

|| There can be no doubt that Mr. Colvin never recovered from the intense feeling of mortification he was subjected to on account of his proclamation; and the following extract from the last letter written by him to Europe, confirms the impression of the fact. He says—“I have gone round the sad course of my review of the provinces I so lately governed.

frequently and earnestly, but unavailingly, pressed upon him the necessity for a temporary cessation from work; to ensure which, as soon as it was safe to do so, they transferred him to the purer air of the cantonments. Mrs. Colvin and his younger children were at this time residing at Geneva; but his eldest son, Elliot, was out on command in the revolted districts, fortunately near enough to be recalled in time to see and be recognised by his father; who, in the afternoon of Wednesday, the 9th of September, sank quietly, and without pain, into his last sleep. As rumours of the perpetration of gross acts of desecration on the bodies of Europeans, had reached Agra, it was deemed prudent to bury him inside the fort, where the funeral accordingly took place on the morning of the 10th of September; and the following notification was issued in due course, upon the occasion, by the governor-general in council:—

“Fort William, Home Department, Sept. 19th

“It is the melancholy duty of the right honourable the governor-general in council to announce the death of the Hon. John Russell Colvin, the lieutenant-governor of the North-Western Provinces. Worn by the unceasing anxieties and labours of his charge, which placed him in the very front of the dangers by which of late India has been threatened, health and strength gave way; and the governor-general in council has to deplore, with sincere grief, the loss of one of the most distinguished among the servants of the East India Company.

“The death of Mr. Colvin has occurred at a time when his ripe experience, his high ability, and his untiring energy would have been more than usually valuable to the state. But his career did not close before he had won for himself a high reputation in each of the various branches of administration to which he was at different times attached, nor until he had been worthily selected to fill the highest position in Northern India; and he leaves a name which not friends alone, but all who have been associated with him in the duties of government, and all who may follow in his path, will delight to honour. The right honourable the governor-general in council directs that the flag shall be lowered half-mast high, and that seventeen minute-guns shall be fired at the seats of government in India upon the receipt of the present notification.—By order of the governor-general of India in council.—C. BEADON,

“Secretary to the Government of India.”

The late Mr. Colvin was the second son of James Colvin, of the mercantile house of Colvin and Co., of London and Calcutta, at which latter place he was born in May, 1807; being, consequently, at the time of his death, in the fifty-first year of his age, and the fourth of his lieutenant-governorship. As an Indian officer, who rose by his own deserts to the government

of forty millions of people (for such was the numerical population under his charge); who maintained his position, if not his authority, in the very focus of insurrection; who expired at his post without surrender or defeat; and whose merits obtained for him the affection and admiration of a large circle of friends—John Russell Colvin is entitled to more than a mere brief record of his death; and the few preceding pages could hardly have been better occupied than by a tribute due to his worth.

Resuming the narrative of events connected with the operations of the movable column at Agra, it is to be observed, that the exertions of the force under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Greathed, were recognised by that officer in the following general order from the camp at Agra, on the 13th of October, three days subsequent to the battle:—

“Lieutenant-colonel Greathed begs to congratulate the officers and men of the movable column, on the most successful result of their gallantry and untiring exertions on the 10th. He has had the greatest pleasure in bringing to the favourable notice of the major-general commanding the field force at Delhi, the admirable conduct of the whole of the troops, who, after marching forty-four miles in twenty-eight hours, encountered with a steadiness that could not be surpassed, the sudden attack of a formidable enemy, drove them from the position they had taken up, and pursued them for 10½ miles, taking from them every gun, besides all their carts and ammunition, and scattering them in all directions in utter rout.

“Lieutenant-colonel Greathed requests that the officers commanding the Punjab cavalry and infantry regiments, will convey to their men the assurance of his appreciation of the qualities they displayed during the whole day, from first to last. He was witness to many acts of heroism; and he particularly adverts to the charge of the cavalry under Lieutenant Watson, when three guns and five standards were captured; and to the brilliant manner in which the 4th Punjab infantry, under Lieutenant Paul, drove the enemy out of the enclosures of the cantonment. The steadiness of the 2nd Punjab infantry, under most trying circumstances, reflects equal credit upon Captain Green and the regiment he commands. The gallant manner in which the

Punjab regiments behaved—their untiring exertions after a march, without a halt, of thirty miles, deserves the highest admiration.”

The Indore force having been dispersed by the above successful operations, and Agra being now freed from apprehension of immediate danger, it became necessary to determine the line of operations to be carried into effect by Colonel Greathed, with the movable column under his command; and as applications of the most urgent nature had been received from Cawnpore for reinforcements to assist the force then at Lucknow, it was considered expedient by the chief commissioner at Agra, that the colonel should immediately transfer his services in the direction of Oude; and, on the 14th of October, the following instructions were issued for his guidance:—

“Colonel Greathed will march immediately for Cawnpore by the Grand Trunk-road. He will put down any opposition which may be shown at Mynpoorie; but otherwise he will not, unless attacked or menaced from the direction of Furruckabad, diverge from his straight route to Cawnpore. The chastisement of the nawab of Furruckabad can, without present inconvenience, be deferred for a future opportunity.

“While the chief commissioner cheerfully yields to the imperious necessity of reinforcing General Havelock’s army at the present moment, he does so upon the understanding that the moment spare troops are available at Cawnpore, in consequence of the arrival of soldiers from below, a portion of Colonel Greathed’s column, or others in their stead, shall be sent, without loss of time, to Agra.

“This important city, the seat of government, is left now with only a weak European regiment, and one horse artillery battery. From this small force a party has to be detached for the occupation of Allygurh. The populous towns of Muttra and Bindrabun must be protected, in case they are threatened. Early measures are necessary for the reoccupation of Etawah. The mutinous contingent still lingers with its siege-train at Gwalior; and although likely to march in another direction, Agra cannot be regarded as secure as long as a strong brigade, with thirty field-pieces and a siege-train, hangs within eighty miles. It is with a strong conviction of the considerable risk which he runs, that the chief commissioner has permitted Colonel Greathed’s force to

leave; and he does so, consequently, in the confident expectation that the urgent wants of the station will be recognised, and met at the earliest possible moment. Colonel Greathed’s column will move forward towards Mynpoorie on the 15th instant.”

At this time, it was represented to the government by the magistrate and collector of Azimghur, that from letters, reports, and rumours then current, it was evident “a storm of a serious nature was brewing amongst the zemindars in Oude; and that it was intended to burst simultaneously upon Lucknow, Jounpore, and Azimghur.” The greater portion of the fighting population of Oude were represented as gathered round Lucknow; and intercepted native letters from that place described their numbers as incalculable. To add to the difficulties thus “looming in the distance,” the chief commissioner of the Central Provinces was incessant in his application to the governor-general for increased military strength, to repress an expected outbreak in the Rewah and Bundelcund states—such increase being only obtainable by weakening the force collecting for the relief of Lucknow; the great importance of which object was thus described, on the 30th of October, in a despatch of the secretary to the government of India, addressed to the government of the Central Provinces:—

“The reasons adduced for an increase of the military strength of the Central Provinces, are thoroughly appreciated by the governor-general in council; but interests of still greater value are at stake at Lucknow. The lieutenant-governor is probably not fully aware of the helpless condition in which Sir James Outram’s force, joined to the original garrison and inmates of the residency, now finds itself; that they are powerless to procure any supplies; that their stock is barely sufficient, with reduced rations, to last for three weeks from this time; that the nature of the desperate struggle by which General Havelock reached the residency, was such as to show that Sir James Outram has not exaggerated his need in asking for two brigades of 2,500 men each, as a means of rescue; and that it is physically impossible for the government of India to collect a force of more than 4,000 in all, for that purpose, within the time allowed. Meanwhile, each day confirms the account of the conveyance of some thousands of mutineers and rebels, with artillery, towards Cawnpore; and the

aspect of things, as well as the value of the stake, is such, that the commander-in-chief has felt it to be a duty, and the governor-general in council has readily acquiesced in his excellency's view, to proceed to take the command of the relieving column in person. The governor-general in council could not, in such an exigency, consent to any withholding of troops for purposes which will have no effect at Lucknow.

"The governor-general in council desires to say, broadly and plainly, that he would consider the sacrifice of the garrison in Lucknow as a far greater calamity and reproach to the government than an outbreak of the Rewah or Bundelcund states, even if followed by rebellion and temporary loss of our authority in our own territories on the Nerbudda. Moreover, the fate of the Europeans at Lucknow, if they are not rescued speedily and effectually, is certain."

Of the determination of government, that Lucknow and its suffering garrison should be relieved in the face of whatever difficulties might arise, there could be no doubt; but while its attention was thus concentrated upon one great object, the agents by whom that relief was to be effected, had occasionally sources of embarrassment and discouragement developed in their path, from which, assuredly, at such a crisis, they ought to have been protected. Thus, it frequently occurred during the war of the mutinies, that gallant and energetic officers, while engaged in the desperate struggle for life with rebellious troops, were exposed to annoyance by the conflicts of rival authorities, and by the obtrusion of questions of seniority as it regarded the command of troops in the field—urged at times and places when it was not possible to refer them for solution either to the commander-in-chief or to the governor-general—a fact amply testified by the military correspondence laid before parliament, in connection with the Indian revolt; and from the perplexities consequent upon such fact, the column hitherto led to victory by Lieutenant-colonel Greathed was not exempt. In the North-Western Provinces, to which the scene of its operations had been confined, no less than three rival authorities claimed a discretionary power to direct the movements of the troops within the district. Thus, General Gowan at Sirhind, General Penny at Delhi, and the chief civil commissioner at Agra, alike assumed authority over the military arrangements of

the province; and collisions were inevitable. Then, as regarded the command of troops, we have seen that, at Agra, Colonel Cotton finished the battle which Greathed had already won; not because it had been badly fought, but because Cotton was the *senior* officer, and as such, ignored the victory already achieved, and facetiously tendered his thanks to Colonel Greathed "for the assistance rendered in the pursuit."* Again, while Greathed was marching quickly, and fighting valiantly, on the road to Cawnpore after the battle of Agra, Colonel Hope Grant, of the 9th lancers, was sent out from Delhi to supersede him in the command of his column; not because he was a more efficient officer, but because he was his senior in rank, being made a brigadier for the special purpose. The inconvenience and confusion occasioned by these complications, may be inferred from the tone of the following memorandum of the chief commissioner at Agra, in reference to General Penny's appointment of Brigadier Grant to the command of Greathed's movable column, and to the order of Major-general Gowan, cancelling such appointment:—

"Fort, Agra, October 22nd, 1857.

"The chief commissioner has received, through a letter written by Mr. Saunders at the desire of General Penny, at Delhi, intimation of the orders of Major-general G. E. Gowan, C.B., cancelling General Penny's appointment of Brigadier H. Grant, C.B., to the command of the movable column moving down the Doab. As that appointment was made in consequence of the receipt of a letter by Brigadier Grant, written at the chief commissioner's desire, the chief commissioner thinks it necessary to place the circumstances attending the dispatch of that letter upon record. When the movable column approached Agra, considerable embarrassment was experienced in consequence of its being commanded by an officer junior to others on the spot. Lieutenant-colonel Cotton, commanding at Agra, was the senior of Lieutenant-colonel Greathed, and so also was Lieutenant-colonel Riddell, commanding the 3rd Europeans.

"The appointment of Lieutenant-colonel Greathed having, however, been made by the general commanding at Delhi, Colonel Fraser had determined that the arrangement should continue, unless, indeed, the material of the column was changed. It seemed, for some time, likely that the fatigued condition of the European troops in the column, caused by their long exposure to the very heavy duty before Delhi, would render it necessary to withdraw them, and send the 3rd Europeans in their stead into the field. It was for some time highly probable that operations against Dholepore would be necessary; in which case, besides the entire column, it would have been necessary to have added

* See despatches of Greathed and Cotton, *ante*, pp. 63, 64.

to it every available man from the 3rd Europeans. Had this been done, the chief commissioner had determined that Colonel Cotton should command the column thus composed, to a considerable extent, of troops from his own garrison. That contingency, however, did not occur, but a similar contingency occurred unexpectedly, which, in the end, led to Colonel Cotton's necessarily assuming command of the column while in action.

"On the 10th, when the column was attacked in its camp, Colonel Cotton hastened to the spot. He arrived at the critical point caused by the first alarm, and he wisely determined that the 3rd Europeans should be ordered immediately to the scene of action, to aid in the repulse and support the advance. The enemy were driven victoriously before our troops; but about half-way to the Kharee river, Lieutenant-colonel Greathed ordered a halt. Had the halt been allowed, the victory would have been imperfect, and only a portion of the enemy's guns captured; but Colonel Cotton, assuming command, directed the advance to be continued; and the result was, that the victory was followed up in the most complete and successful manner. The day previous to the action, it was currently reported in the camp, that Brigadier Grant was on his way from Delhi to assume command. The chief commissioner received from Major Ouvry an urgent despatch, to be forwarded to Brigadier Grant, as at Allygurh, or shortly to be there. The chief commissioner, perhaps without sufficient further inquiry, was under the impression that Brigadier Grant was on his way hither, and he saw, in his early arrival at Agra, a convenient and happy deliverance from his embarrassments; for Brigadier Grant was greatly the senior of any one of the officers who could have aspired to the command. It was under these circumstances, that the chief commissioner requested Mr. Muir to write a letter to Colonel Grant at Allygurh, and to urge that he should push forward as rapidly as he could. It was thought possible that Brigadier Grant might be at Somna, beyond Allygurh, or even Khoorja, and the letter was directed to be forwarded so as to meet him at the earliest point. It was forwarded in effect to Delhi, and found Brigadier Grant in his former position there. It was shown to General Penny, and was believed by him to form a sufficient ground for the appointment of Brigadier Grant to the command of the column. Brigadier Grant joined the column on the 19th instant, twenty-three miles on this side of Mynpoorie; and his operations since that period, so far as reported to the chief commissioner, have been characterised by energy, promptitude, and judgment.

The post which brought Mr. Saunders' letter, brings also despatches for Brigadier Grant, marked 'immediate,' which the chief commissioner does not doubt contain the order for his recall; but they will not reach the column till after it has arrived at Cawnpore. The chief commissioner sees sufficient ground to hold back these orders, and he believes himself authorised by the authority conferred upon him by the governor-general in council so to do. His reasons are briefly these:—The same difficulty which occurred at Agra with so junior an officer as Lieutenant-colonel Greathed, commanding the column, is likely to occur again. It may occur at Cawnpore. Where, at the least, equal fitness and experience can be secured, with much higher rank, the advantage appears to the chief commissioner to be undoubted

and great. Brigadier Grant, C.B., the chief commissioner further holds to be an officer peculiarly qualified, by long experience in the country, for the efficient command of the column.

"The chief commissioner has had no personal previous acquaintance or friendship with either Brigadier Grant or Lieutenant-colonel Greathed. He judges simply on the above grounds for the interest of the public service, and his decision is in some degree affected by the circumstances detailed in the early part of this memorandum. The chief commissioner has accordingly determined to keep back the packet marked 'immediate.' It will be returned, with a copy of this memorandum, to General Penny; and a copy of the memorandum will also be forwarded to Major-general Gowan, C.B. A copy will also be submitted to the government of India, in the military department; and a copy, confidentially, to General Outram at Lucknow.

"H. FRASER."

In a communication to the governor-general in council, on the 22nd of October, the chief commissioner informs his lordship, that a memorandum (presumed to be the foregoing) would be forwarded to him in explanation of his (the commissioner's) reasons for intercepting and returning certain letters of General Penny's, written by direction of General Gowan, ordering the restoration of Colonel Greathed to the command of the movable column, and the return of Brigadier Grant. He concludes by saying—"I feel satisfied, in my own mind, that, in this instance, I have acted for the good of the service."

In a subsequent paragraph, dated the 25th, the commissioner says—"I am happy to say that the column, nearly 3,000 strong, will be at Cawnpore to-morrow; but regret much to find that Colonel Wilson, of her majesty's 64th, who commands at Cawnpore, is senior to, and may embarrass, Brigadier Grant, upon whose judgment and soldierlike qualities great reliance may be placed."

The uncalled-for interference of the civil power with the military arrangements of officers in high command, was, throughout the course of the sepoy war, a cause of frequent embarrassment to those charged with, and responsible for, the proper execution of important military operations; and, in more than one instance, the anomalous authority interposed, had the effect of at least retarding the efforts of officers in command of troops for the suppression of the revolt. The vital principle upon which correct military government, and the subordination and discipline of armies is based, seems directly opposed to such interference, which would not for a moment be tolerated

in the prosecution of European warfare; nor, since the early wars of the French republic, has it been attempted among European armies. The constitution of the East India Company's military government seems, however, to have recognised and perpetuated an invidious system of civil supervision over the operations of its troops in the field; and, for the sake of the country, as well as for the future efficiency of the forces henceforth to be employed in the Eastern territories of the crown of England, it may be desirable that, with the cessation of the Company's political authority, many of its peculiar systems, and especially the one by which the functions of its military commanders have been regulated by the will of its civil authorities, should also cease to exist.

Brigadier Hope Grant, the officer referred to by the acting commissioner at Agra, in the foregoing memorandum, joined the column of Lieutenant-colonel Greathed on the 18th, near Mynpoorie, 107 miles from Cawnpore; and, on the following day, he reached Mynpoorie, where he blew up the fort, and destroyed the guns belonging to the rajah. From this place, an officer, dating 26th October, writes as follows:—

"We reached Mynpoorie on the 19th, where a scene of desolation, similar to others we had witnessed elsewhere in our progress down the country, met our view. The bungalows had been completely destroyed. Of the pretty little station church, the bare walls alone remain; the vestry, pulpit, font, and furniture having been thoroughly smashed. The rajah had fled to Futteghur the day before our arrival; but a large quantity of property found in his fort was confiscated; and our only regret in leaving Mynpoorie, was the want of leisure to follow up this worthy to Futteghur, with the nawab of which place we have also an account to settle."

On the 21st, the column moved on to Rewah, where the fort was destroyed; and £23,000 of revenue, left there when the mutiny broke out in May, was recovered. On the 22nd, Brigadier Grant, with his troops, reached Gorasahaganj, where they halted; and, on the 23rd, they arrived at Kanouge, where they fell in with a body of the Delhi fugitives, of whom they cut up about 200, and captured five guns. Having disposed of this obstruction in the way, the column continued its march, and arrived at Cawnpore on the morning of the 26th, without further molestation, and a day

earlier than it was expected. The force under Brigadier Grant, thus brought into Cawnpore, consisted of two companies of sappers and miners, three troops of horse artillery and two 18-pounder guns, 600 of her majesty's 9th lancers, the 8th and 75th regiments of foot, two regiments of Sikh cavalry, and the like amount of infantry; altogether amounting to about 3,500 men, all of whom were in high health and spirits, and had been in every action (nearly thirty in number) since the commencement of the siege of Delhi; and, as we have seen, had swept all before them on the way from that city. On the following day, the 93rd highlanders, and 200 of the naval brigade, also arrived at Cawnpore; and of these augmentations to the European force, the most extraordinary reports were prevalent through the country. The sailors were represented as being four feet high and four feet across the shoulders, and as carrying a field-piece under each arm with as much ease as a porter could carry a bundle. The highlanders, described as men in petticoats, were believed to have been sent out by the Queen of England, so attired especially to avenge the slaughter of the English women and children. The strength of the garrison at Cawnpore, on the 28th of October, was little less than 5,000 men; who there awaited the arrival of reinforcements, known to be on the way, preparatory to a final advance for the relief of Lucknow.

The arrangements by which the various regiments reached Cawnpore, need not here be enlarged upon; but, as they passed up the country, so did a degree of comparative tranquillity succeed to anarchy. The English troops originally destined for China, as well as the reinforcements from other quarters, were sent up, by road or river, from Calcutta as fast as they arrived; and for these, Benares was the converging point. From that place, the troops went up by Mirzapore to Allahabad; thence, by rail, to Lohunda; and, lastly, to Futtehpore and Cawnpore, by road march or bullock-carts. By the end of October, a column under Colonel Berkeley was on its way from Calcutta; another, under Colonel Hind, was in or near Rewah; another, under Colonel Longdon, was near Jounpore; while Colonel Wroughton, with the Ghoorkas, supplied by Jung Bahadoor of Nepaul, was on the Goruckpore frontier of Oude. It was true, that some of these so-called "columbus"

were scarcely equal to one regiment in numerical strength; but each formed a nucleus round which other troops might accumulate. Lieutenant-colonel Greathed's column, now under the command of Brigadier Hope Grant, as already mentioned, was, however, the main element in the congregated force destined by the commander-in-chief to accomplish the relief of Lucknow. This division, which had already so eminently distinguished itself since it left Delhi, crossed the Ganges at Cawnpore, into Oude, on the 30th of October, 1857, 3,500 strong, with eighteen guns, having under its protection a valuable convoy of 2,500 camels, and 500 carts laden with supplies for the beleaguered garrisons at Alumbagh and the residency. On the 3rd of November, it reached a position about six miles from the former place, and there encamped pursuant to orders from the commander-in-chief, and to await his arrival.

The following extracts are from letters of officers belonging to Greathed's (or rather Hope Grant's) column:—

"October 30th.—We have joined the Delhi column, under Colonel Hope Grant. We are allowed a tent and a pair of camels between two officers, which we find sufficient for our trifling baggage, although we generally possess more than the piece of soap and flannel banian which old Napier deemed sufficient. Few of the officers have succeeded in getting horses, so we must be content to trudge along. Grant's force marched onwards in the morning, and we followed in the afternoon. It is now just gunfire, and the bagpipes of the 93rd highlanders are playing; the first time, perhaps, such an instrument was ever sounded in Oude. The regiment played marching out in their kilts this morning. It is a glorious sight to see them marching proudly along, one solid mass of stalwart fellows, of robust and vigorous frames, but active and energetic; under thorough discipline, and every man having an air of firm determination on his grim highland countenance. The natives gaze at the highlanders with astonishment and dread, and style them (with reference to their garb) '*the ghosts of the murdered Englishwomen risen to revenge!*' The Delhi column certainly looked as if they had had hard fighting and great exposure, but the men are in capital spirits. The 8th and 75th are in mouse-coloured dresses, which looks odd at first; but un-

questionably it must be a capital colour to fight in, as it is so difficult to perceive it at a distance. The Sikhs are dressed in the same way. We have a column of about 3,500 strong in all. Two of our guns are drawn by elephants, which somewhat astonishes our royals, and would indeed create a sensation at Woolwich. We have just been warned that we may have a brush to-morrow morning, as 1,500 sepoys, with three guns, are not far off."

"Camp six miles from Alumbagh, 3rd November.—We had our first fight in Oude yesterday, but it was the mildest affair that has taken place since we left Delhi. We marched from our last ground at seven o'clock, with the intention of encamping on a large plain one mile and a-half nearer Lucknow, there to await Sir Colin Campbell. We had not gone a mile before our advanced guard was fired upon by the enemy, who had taken up a position in a large village near the road. We were soon in the thickest of it, and were not long in turning our friends the Mattadeens out of their position, after which we could not persuade them to come within musket shot. It was with great difficulty our cavalry managed to come up with their rear. We bagged upwards of a hundred of them in the village, and afterwards took the only two guns they had. Our loss amounted to one killed and about ten wounded. Some of the 44th native infantry men were killed, fighting against us, and actually had their leave certificates on them. We have taught the zemindars (a number of whom were opposed to us yesterday) a lesson they are not likely to forget in a hurry. Every village for miles round has been burnt to the ground, and the whole country seems as if it was on fire. After pursuing the fugitives to within two miles of Alumbagh, we retired to this place. Sir Colin is expected out to-day, and if he arrives, we shall most probably move on to Alumbagh to-morrow morning. We can hear the Lucknow guns quite distinctly. There has been very heavy firing there this morning. The men of the Punjab regiments are delighted with the 93rd highlanders, who are certainly splendid men, and always march with their kilts and bonnets. The Punjabees call them 'Topewallahs,' and 'Tumasha ka Pultun.' They admire the bagpipes more than anything, and want to have a bajah like it."

"Camp about twelve miles from Lucknow,

4th November.—We have been encamped here for three days, waiting for Sir Colin, who is expected in camp to-day. We have hitherto met with no opposition, though our movements were most narrowly watched by the evaporating enemy. On the 3rd, they expected us to march, as we always do, at three or four in the morning, and had filled a village on the road with infantry, intending, it is supposed, to allow our column to pass, and then to attack and to loot our baggage. As luck would have it, an order came which caused us to break up our camp and march at daylight; so we disappointed our friends; and instead of plundering, as they expected, they were killed and burned themselves. Yesterday some sixteen villages were burnt round our camp. We have never done this where unopposed; but opposition riles the men, and incendiarism is the sure consequence. Now we are in Oude we can scarcely make a mistake. The whole country has risen under their chiefs against us, and unless we show that to be a losing game, they will fancy that we are weak and unable to punish. From what I saw on the 3rd, the enemy we have to deal with here is utterly to be despised, away from their loopholed walls and cover. I never saw large bodies of men disappear so suddenly in my life. Like figures in a magic lantern, they are here, and in a moment vanish entirely. This is a good deal to be accounted for by the fact of the greater part of the country being covered by high jowar crops, so high that an army can hide itself though close to you; the sugar-cane khets are also splendid cover, and save hundreds of wretches from the sabres of our cavalry."

"November 5th.—Brigadier Grant's column is still encamped at Nuwabgunge, on an open plain about five miles beyond Bunnee. On their way to occupy this position, the enemy, posted about in villages some little way off the road, gave trouble. But the villages were soon cleared, some of the enemy's cavalry cut up, and the rest of the forces, as usual, made off. There was an encounter on the ground on which our force is now encamped. About 1,000 or 1,200 of the rebels had advanced with the expectation of attacking our rear and baggage; but, as the column did not march that day, they found themselves, without guns, in front of our army. They were of course soon cut up and dispersed. Another party, supposed to come from Jellalabad, in

the vicinity, brought up a 9-pounder of our own, which they opened upon us. We killed about a hundred, and put the remainder to flight."

"November 6th.—Yesterday the greater part of the force escorted the convoy we brought with us to Alumbagh, and returned. The sick, and those wounded before General Havelock's force reached Lucknow, were brought back by our force, and have been sent with an escort to Cawnpore."

"November 9th, five miles from Alumbagh.—To-day we have shifted our camp one mile nearer Lucknow, and our main picket must be within three miles of Alumbagh, into which our large convoy was safely escorted two or three days ago. Part of the naval brigade, with four 24-pounders, arrived yesterday. The sight of the tars was most refreshing and encouraging."

"Nuwabgunge, November 10th.—We are still near Bunnee bridge; but the commander-in-chief has arrived, and we move on Thursday, the day after to-morrow."

With respect to the formation of the naval brigade (of which honourable mention must frequently be made, in recognition of the important services rendered by it), we may observe, that upon the arrival of Lord Elgin at Calcutta, in August, on his mission to China, the necessity for strengthening the hands of the Indian government by every possible augmentation of force, became obvious to his lordship, who at once placed at the disposal of Lord Canning two magnificent war steamers, the *Shannon* and the *Pearl*; and from the effective strength of the crew of each, a splendid naval brigade was organised, consisting of 400 British seamen, with ten of the enormous 68-pounder guns, which seamen know so well how to handle. This gallant band, under the command of Captain Peel, of the *Shannon*, who had bravely managed a naval battery during the siege of Sebastopol, started from Calcutta up the Hooghly and the Ganges. The voyage was one of intolerable duration, owing to the shallow navigation of the rivers; and week after week elapsed without the brigade reaching the district where its presence was most urgently needed. Half of August, and the whole of September, passed wearily away in this most tedious voyage. The upward passage, which is always tardy against the stream, and the ponderous artillery in charge of the brigade, rendering slowness still more slow. At length, on the 30th of

September, Captain Peel, with 286 of his men, reached Benares, from whence he pushed forward towards Allahabad; the chief of the staff, in the meanwhile, announcing his approach to the officer commanding the fort at that place, in the following telegraphic message:—

“Calcutta, October 1st, 1857.

“Captain Peel will join the garrison of Allahabad, with his first party, in two or three days by the river. His excellency desires you to recollect, that that officer is under the orders of the governor-general only.”

On the 3rd of October, the gallant sailor, with ninety-four of his officers and men, arrived at Allahabad per *Koel* steamer, and reported the approach of the remainder of his brigade by the *Mirzapore*, and a fleet, on the following day. The reply of the commander-in-chief to this announcement was as follows:—

“Calcutta, October 4th, 1857.

“I am very glad to hear that you are at last at Allahabad, after all your troubles; and I have directed Colonel O'Brien to make over the command to you for the present. You will oblige me very much by making yourself master of all the circumstances of this very important command, before Colonel O'Brien departs with his movable column. As nothing must be left to chance with Allahabad, Colonel O'Brien must not go till the great bulk of your brigade has arrived.

“In the course of about a week, there will be a continuous stream of troops pouring into Allahabad, which, I trust, will not cease for the next three months. As it is very important for me to know the exact state of the garrison, pray have the goodness to continue Colonel O'Brien's system of a daily telegraphic report on the subject, which may be addressed to General Mansfield (chief of the staff.) Address me, or the chief of the staff, in the most unreserved manner, on every subject on which you require information or guidance.”

The awkwardness resulting from questions of command was again revived by this appointment at Allahabad, the officer commanding there informing the chief of the staff at Calcutta, that “there is a complication about Captain Peel, as a naval officer, commanding military officers on land.”

On the 5th of October, Colonel O'Brien relinquished the command of the fort at Allahabad to Captain Peel; but, on the

following day, in consequence of some obstruction to the intended operations of Colonel O'Brien, he announced to the chief of the staff, that he had resumed the command. Captain Peel also telegraphed, on the same day, as follows:—“The demand for reinforcements at Cawnpore stops Colonel O'Brien's expedition. He therefore retains the command, and I serve under him, or any officer you please, most cheerfully.”

During the month of October, Captain Peel was busily occupied in facilitating the passage of troops and artillery up to Cawnpore. On the 20th, he was joined by Lieutenant Vaughan, of his ship, who brought with him 126 more naval officers and seamen, thereby raising the strength of the naval brigade to 516 men—many of the new arrivals being sailors of the merchant service at Calcutta, who had volunteered with much alacrity for the naval service. On the 23rd of October, Captain Peel sent off a hundred seamen to Cawnpore, in charge of four siege-train 24-pounders; and, on the 25th of the month, he received the following communication from the chief of the staff:—

“Calcutta, October, 25th, 1857.

“Sir,—The commander-in-chief desires me to inform you, that he purposes transferring the head-quarters of the army to Cawnpore immediately, and that he hopes to have the pleasure of taking you with him. His excellency leaves Calcutta, by rail, on the evening of the 27th instant, and proceeds by horse-dāk, with all expedition, to Allahabad. Have the goodness to communicate the substance of this to Brigadier Campbell, and desire him, from the commander-in-chief, to forward the heavy ordnance wanted for Cawnpore, gun by gun, as it can be got ready. Every means of carriage must be pressed into the service. The lieutenant-governor of the Central Provinces has been directed to urge forward 2,000 carts to the assistance of Brigadier Campbell; but he must not relax his own efforts in the collection of carriage.”

Upon the receipt of this message, four 24-pounders, with some howitzers, in charge of 174 men of the brigade, were dispatched to Cawnpore, as also a strong military escort, with a large amount of ammunition. Captain Peel then himself started for the general rendezvous, and was joined on the road by Colonel Powell, with the head-quarters of the 53rd regiment. The two

arms of the force proceeded together; and, on the 31st of October, intelligence reached them, that the Dinapore mutineers, with three guns, had crossed the Jumna, and were about either to attack Futtehpore or to march towards Oude. The strength of the united force now under Colonel Powell, consisted of about 700 men, having in their charge a large and valuable convoy of siege and other stores. They marched the same evening to the camping-ground of Futtehpore, where they were joined by some of the 93rd highlanders; and, on the morning of the 1st of November, a column of about 500 men marched to Kudjwa, with a view to intercept the progress of the rebels. The enemy was in a strong position at this place, with guns commanding the road, its right occupying a high embankment screened by a grove, and its left formed on either side of the road. Part of the British column at once advanced against the guns, while the rest supported either flank. A sharp conflict, of two hours' duration, ensued, during which the enemy kept up so severe a fire of musketry, that many of the English fell, and among them Colonel Powell, who received a musket-ball in his forehead, and died instantly. Captain Peel, although a naval officer, then took the command; and leading a portion of his men round the upper end of the embankment, he cleverly divided the enemy's forces, and drove them from all their positions, eventually capturing two guns, some tumbrils with ammunition, and the whole of their camp.

Exhausted by a march of seventy-two miles in three days, it was impossible the men could do anything in the way of pursuit. Collecting, therefore, his dead and wounded (which amounted in number to no less than ninety-five men), he marched back to join the reserve, left in charge of the convoy at a village called Binkee; and, after a brief halt, resumed his march to Cawnpore, which he reached on the 1st of November, without any further interruption by the enemy. It will be seen by the following report of the action, that the force of the rebels at Kudjwa was not less than 4,000 men, of whom half at least were mutinous sepoys from the Bengal army, and the remainder armed fanatics and rabble, picked up by the mutineers on their march through the country.

The despatch forwarded to the chief of the staff at Cawnpore, by Captain Peel, in

reference to the battle of Kudjwa, ran as follows:—

“Camp, Futtehpore, November 3rd, 1857.

“Sir,—I have the honour to lay before his excellency the commander-in-chief the details of the battle of Kudjwa, with the circumstances which preceded it. Detachments amounting to 700 men, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Powell, of her majesty's 53rd regiment, in charge of siege-train, guns, and a large convoy, were proceeding from Allahabad to Cawnpore, and had arrived on the 31st of October, after a march of twelve miles, at the camping-ground at Thurrea. The same afternoon, intelligence was received from Futtehpore that the sepoy mutineers of the Dinapore regiments, with three guns, had passed the Jumna, with the intention of either attacking Futtehpore, or crossing over into Oude. The camp was immediately struck, and we arrived at the camping-ground of Futtehpore at midnight. Colonel Powell then made arrangements for marching at daylight upon the enemy, who were reported to be about twenty-four miles distant, at Kudjwa, beyond the village of Binkee. The column of attack consisted of 162 men of her majesty's 53rd regiment, under Major Clarke; 68 of the royal engineers, under Captain Clerke; 70 of a dépôt detachment, under Lieutenant Fanning, of her majesty's 64th regiment; and 103 of the naval brigade, under Captain Peel.

“It marched at daylight, and was joined from the garrison of Futtehpore by a company of the 93rd highlanders, 100 in number, under Captain Cornwall, and two 9-pounder guns, under Lieutenant Anderson, Bengal artillery. After proceeding for sixteen miles the column halted for refreshment, and then resumed the march at a rapid pace, passing through the village of Binkee at about 1.30 P.M., where the intelligence was confirmed that the enemy were at hand.

“The troops pressed on without interruption, the highlanders advancing in skirmishing order, supported by the royal engineers, and followed by the 53rd regiment, in column, and then by the naval brigade. The dépôt detachment was with the baggage. We advanced along the road which led straight for the village of Kudjwa, and saw that the enemy's right occupied a long line of high embankments on our left of the road; which embankment, screened by a grove, continued towards the village; and that their left was higher up on the other side, with their guns posted in the centre on the road—two of them in advance, and one on a bridge near the village. A round shot coming down the road, opened the battle at about 2.20 P.M., and the column was ordered to edge to the right, and advance on the guns through the corn-fields; the skirmishers of the 93rd and royal engineers pushing on, on both sides of the road. The enemy's artillery was well served, and did great execution, and the flank fire of musketry from the embankment was very severe. The gallant Colonel Powell himself, on the left of the road, pressed on the attack, and had just secured the guns of the enemy, when he fell dead with a bullet through his forehead. In the meanwhile the naval brigade had advanced on the right of the 53rd, and carried the enemy's position in their front; it was then that the death of Colonel Powell was reported to me, and I was requested to assume the command. The great force of the enemy, the long line of their defences, and the exhaustion of both officers and men after such long marches, rendered

our position truly critical. The front of the battle had become changed to the line of the road, and the enemy, with all their force behind their embankment, threatened to intercept our rear. I left Lieutenant Hay, R.N., supported by the two 9-pounder guns, to hold the position which his party had gallantly carried, and which secured our flank; and collecting as many fresh troops as were available, assisted principally by Lieutenant Lennox, royal engineers (Captain Clerke being unfortunately severely wounded), and by Ensign Traill, 53rd regiment, we rushed across the road, and passing round the upper end of the embankment, divided the enemy's force, and drove them successively from all their positions. The enemy then retired in confusion, leaving us masters of their camp, and with two of their guns, and a tumbril, in our possession.

"The late hour of the evening (it was half-past four when the enemy fired their last shot), and the excessive fatigue of the troops, prevented any pursuit; we therefore spoiled their camp, and leaving it with cheers, formed on the road by the bridge near the village, and sent parties to collect our dead and wounded. With the body of the colonel on the limber of the gun he had so gallantly captured, we then returned, and encamped near the village of Binkee. Our loss in the action was very severe, amounting to ninety-five killed and wounded. Inclosed are the returns of the detachments forming the column of attack. The behaviour of the troops, and of the naval brigade, was admirable, and all vied with each other, and showed equal courage in the field. The marching of the 53rd, and the accurate firing of the highlanders, deserve especial commendation. I received the greatest assistance from Captain Cox, of her majesty's 75th regiment, whom I would wish to bring to the favourable notice of his excellency the commander-in-chief; and the arrangements of the field hospital, under Dr. Grant, of her majesty's 53rd, and those of the quartermaster's department, under Captain Marshall, were everything that I could wish.

"The total number of the enemy was reported to be about 4,000; 2,000 of whom were sepoys, who fought in their uniform. Their loss was estimated at about 300 killed.—I have, &c.

"WILLIAM PEEL."

"P.S.—I have the pleasure to inform his excellency that the remaining gun of the enemy, with three tumbrils, was brought in this evening by the police, having been abandoned by the rebels in their flight, about eight miles beyond Kudjwa; and that the sepoys have dispersed in all directions, pursued by the villagers."

The remarks of the commander-in-chief upon this report, were communicated by the deputy-adjutant-general of the army, to the secretary to the government of India, in the following despatch:—

"Calcutta, November 12th, 1857.

"Sir,—In forwarding the inclosed despatch, and the annexed returns to government, I am instructed by the commander-in-chief to remark, that the action of which it gives an account was peculiarly severe, the loss of the force engaged being at the rate of one to five. Success crowned the desperate efforts of the assailants; but it is evident, from the very lucid report of Captain Peel, C.B., R.N., that the attack was most hazardous, and that at one time the force

was in the greatest danger. The troops had been harassed by very long marches, and they were not in a state to attack, much less to follow up an attack.

"It is most providential that the 5th irregular cavalry, owing to some accidental cause, had not advanced with the rebel infantry from Banda. Had they done so, not a man of the detachment would have escaped to tell the tale. Although the late gallant Colonel Powell, C.B., fell gloriously at the head of his troops, the commander-in-chief conceives that he in some measure imperilled his most important charge, viz., that of the siege-train, and therefore exceeded his duty.

"A company of the royal engineers was taken out in this affair, and incurred loss; and this in the face of the repeated instructions of the commander-in-chief, that they should not on any account be employed on such duties: and what is more, instead of being used as a last reserve, they were pushed forward in the front, to support the skirmishers.

"The result, however, of all, was success; and although obliged to criticise the disposition of the force, his excellency gladly bears testimony to the brilliant courage and the untiring energy displayed by all ranks in conflict with the enemy, and in the great efforts made to come up with him. This fight affords one more instance of what the British soldier will perform, in spite of every disadvantage and extraordinary fatigue. This was a soldier's fight, if ever there was one.

"The commander-in-chief would especially direct the attention of the government to the manner in which the command was conducted by Captain Peel, C.B., R.N., after the death of Colonel Powell, C.B., at a moment of extreme danger and difficulty.

"I have, &c.—W. MAYHEW."

The state of affairs at Cawnpore, which had now become the base of operations for the relief of Lucknow, is pleasantly described in the following extracts from a letter dated "Intrenched Camp, Cawnpore, November 2nd:—

"Here our position is daily becoming stronger. We have some 800 men in garrison, plenty of guns mounted, sufficiency of gunners, loads of ammunition, and, thanks to the unwearying exertions of our commissariat officers, provisions in abundance. Troops are pouring in daily. On the 1st of November, came 160 men of Peel's naval brigade, 200 of her majesty's 98th foot, and 200 more details of various regiments.

"Peel's Jacks are roaming about the camp in a remarkably free and easy manner. Queer fish these amphibious gentlemen are! One, *Crusoe*-like, has quite a menagerie in his cabin, as he calls his *palki* (or cot.) Rough and ready, rollicking boys they are, and present a striking contrast to the prim dragoons you now and then meet striding majestically along. I hear that the 'niggers' have a horrible dread of them, having been told by some inventive individual, that 'they are cannibals, and

that it is their habit to eat their fill of the slain, and salt the remainder down for future use—which accounted for each man carrying a clasp-knife by his side.' Next to the Jacks, such of the highlanders as wear kilts seem to stand highest in the fear and reverence of the natives.

"Hanging still goes on pretty freely. The other day, Colonel Bruce discovered, that one of the men actually in his employ, had been engaged during the Nana's time in hunting up Europeans, and handing them over to that butcher. As he had played the part of a stealth-hound, so he

died a dog's death; having been hung on the gallows which stands alongside the house where our poor women were murdered."

After remaining some days at Cawnpore, for the necessary purposes of the garrison, Captain Peel, and 300 of his gallant blue-jackets, left the station, taking with them their enormous guns, which they are described as "handling like toys;" and, full of vigour and high spirits, proceeded on their way towards Alumbagh, at a convenient distance from which they halted to await the arrival of the commander-in-chief.

CHAPTER III.

LUCKNOW; THE RESIDENCY AND ALUMBAGH; IMPROVED CONDITION OF THE INMATES; DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS OF THE GARRISONS; SORTIES AND SUCCESSES; DIVISIONAL ORDERS BY SIR J. OUTRAM; A NEW KING OF OUDE; NOVEMBER AT THE RESIDENCY; MOVEMENTS OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; NARROW ESCAPE; JOINS THE FORCE AT BUNNEE BRIDGE; INTELLIGENCE FROM THE BESIEGED; MR. KAVANAGH'S REPORT; ADVANCE OF THE TROOPS; THE ALUMBAGH RELIEVED; STORMING OF DIL KOOSHA AND THE MARTINIÈRE; CAPTURE OF SECUNDERBAGH, AND THE SHAH NUJEEFF; CAPTAIN PEEL AND THE NAVAL BRIGADE; THE MESS-HOUSE AND CHUTTUR MUNZIL CARRIED; JUNCTION OF THE RELIEVED AND THE RELIEVING FORCES; ORDER FOR THE ABANDONMENT OF THE RESIDENCY; REMOVAL OF THE FEMALES AND WOUNDED TO DIL KOOSHA; RETIREMENT OF THE TROOPS; AN ADVENTURE; GENERAL ORDERS; MASSACRE OF ENGLISH PRISONERS AT THE KAISERBAGH; DEATH OF GENERAL HAVELOCK; THE CONVOY ON ITS WAY TO CAWNPORE; DISASTROUS INTELLIGENCE; DEPARTURE FOR CALCUTTA; GOVERNMENT ORDER FOR THE RECEPTION OF THE LADIES AND WOUNDED.

WE retrace our steps to the residency at Lucknow. It will be remembered, that the force under Sir Henry Havelock succeeded in penetrating to the fortified position so gallantly held by Brigadier Inglis and his devoted band, on the 25th of September, with the intention of removing, or at least effectually releasing from durance and suffering, the unfortunate individuals who had so long been confined to the narrow and dangerous limits of the residency. But the time had not yet arrived for the accomplishment of that much-desired object.

Immediately after the arrival of the relieving force at the beleaguered position, Major-general Havelock surrendered, as we have already stated,* the command so generously left in his hands by Sir James Outram, to that officer; and, at the same time, the command of the residency, so worthily held by Brigadier Inglis after the death of Sir Henry Lawrence, also passed into the hands of General Outram, who now became chief military authority in

* See *ante*, p. 42.

Oude. At this juncture, the territory under the command of the eminent soldier was but of limited extent, as it embraced little more of the province than the area occupied by the intrenched enclosure of the residency and the Alumbagh. Contrary to expectation, the enemy, so far from abandoning the city or suing for terms after the arrival of General Havelock, continued their blockade, and were unceasing in their attacks at every point. Of the 2,500 troops of all arms that, concentrated under Havelock, Neill, and Outram, had left Cawnpore on the 19th of the month, nearly a third had been stricken down by the sword or by disease before the residency at Lucknow was gained; and, as the survivors were too few in number to afford an escort for the protection and defence of the host of women, children, and wounded soldiers—for whom it would be necessary to cut a passage through the rebel mass that had gathered around them—it became evident that the only chance of preservation for the whole, would be

found in a determination to hold the intrenchments until the arrival of a much superior force should effectually relieve them. No time, therefore, was lost in preparations for a continued defence. All the old "garrisons" were strengthened, and new ones formed; the guns and mortars were again placed in positions most likely for effective work; and the soldiers and civilians were again told-off to regular garrison duty. The residency, as now described by Mr. Rees, again wore an animated aspect. Every now and then fresh troops were moving about, new faces were seen, and the horses and camels belonging to the relieving column were lying about the enclosure in all directions. It was not possible for the residents to leave the intrenchments, or venture into the city; but the position held was far more extended than before the 25th of September, as the troops had now possession of the Tehree Kothee, the Furreed Buksh, and the Chuttur Munzil—three palaces situated next the river, and bounding the north side of the enclosure. The occupation of these buildings was productive of immense advantage to the garrison, as the enemy's fire, which had hitherto been very destructive from them, could of course no longer annoy it.

One of the strongest batteries of the rebels had been placed near a gateway of one of these palaces, distinguished as the "clock tower," from there being a dial painted upon it; and in this tower, one of the late king's sharpshooters, an African eunuch, delighted to take his stand, and from thence, like his expert countryman at Johanne's house,* would send his unerring balls among the defenders of the residency. By the capture of this post, "Othello found his occupation gone," and a great source of annoyance was removed.

For several days after the arrival of Havelock's force, the people in the residency were gratified by a vast improvement in the quality, as well as quantity of their diet, and are described as being somewhat profuse in their indulgences; but this season of gastronomic enjoyment was purely transient. It soon became painfully evident to all, that the "relief" so ardently prayed for, and so enthusiastically welcomed, was, as far as personal freedom or comforts were concerned, a relief but in name only. It had certainly brought with it a valuable accession of brave men for the defence of

the place and its unfortunate occupants; and, to some considerable extent, had enlarged the limits of the enclosure to which the garrison and its charge were confined. But there the immediate advantage, beyond personal safety, stopped; for, with the accession of numbers ill-provided with food or stores, the increased daily strain upon the scanty resources of the residency commissariat very soon became an object of painful solicitude, and stringent rules had to be enforced in regard to the daily rations, which gradually became diminished in quantity and deteriorated in quality. At length, the rations, which had previously been reduced by one quarter, were brought down to the half of the quantity originally issued. Instead of *attah* (flour), wheat was served out, which the recipients themselves had to grind how they could: *dhal* (peas) was stopped entirely; and the allowance of salt was reduced. The allowance of meat (commissariat beef) was six ounces a-day, bones included, and no distinction was made in regard to the rank or sex of the parties rationed.

By the disposition of the rebel forces in the southern and eastern portions of the city, over which they had undisturbed control, all intercourse with the Alumbagh was effectually cut off, and the supplies and stores brought to that place by the relieving column, were consequently unavailable for the necessities of the garrison at the residency. At the Alumbagh, it will be also remembered, the baggage and ammunition of the relieving force had been left, together with an immense convoy of elephants, camels, horses, and camp-followers, with hundreds of carts laden with stores and provisions—it not having been imagined for a moment, but that, upon storming the city, the rebels would have fled across the Goomtee. This anticipation was unfortunately not realised; and, in a very short time, both the Alumbagh and the residency were surrounded by hostile masses. The system of communicating by signals of various-coloured flags, had not then been organised between the stations; and, consequently, each party was dependent for information as to the events around them, upon the precarious assistance of spies.

It seems, that the fact of a renewed siege being more than probable, was contemplated by the original defenders of the residency from the moment the actual numbers of the relieving force became

* See *ante*, p. 8.

known to them. They had already had sufficient experience of the indomitable perseverance of the enemy, to be assured that, however their courage might fail upon the open field, they would never think of leaving the city until driven out of it at the point of the bayonet; and that, until each fortified house and battery yet in their possession was stormed and cleared out, no portion of the city of Lucknow could be securely held. They knew that every man of the rebel host that swarmed around them, would fight, be beaten, and, if not killed, would return and fight again; for they were acknowledged rebels and murderers: and they knew, that for them to fall into the hands of the Europeans, was to meet with death in its most ignominious shape, unless they met it in the field. They fought, therefore, with the recklessness of a despair for which there was no remedy but extermination.

On the day following the entry of the relieving column, under General Havelock, it was found requisite to dislodge the enemy from some of the posts occupied by them, in too close proximity to the enclosure; and, with this view, 150 men of the 32nd regiment, under Major Lowe, of that corps, made a sortie, for the purpose of clearing the Captanka bazaar in front of the residency kitchen-garden, and the adjacent houses. Two detachments of this small force, led by Captain Bassano and Captain Hughes, issued out, under cover of some long grass and shrubs, near the Redan battery; while a third party, under Captain Lawrence, passing out by Innes' garrison, suddenly rushed upon the surprised enemy, captured a battery of three guns, and drove the panic-stricken rebels into the river, where those who were not drowned were shot down to a man.

The party led by Captain Hughes took the direction of the iron bridge, near which they spiked two mortars; and, before retiring, blew up a powder-magazine belonging to the enemy. Unfortunately, the gallant commander was mortally wounded in the daring exploit. As trophies of the success of his expedition, Major Lowe brought back to the intrenchments with him, one 18-pounder, one 9-pounder, one 6-pounder, and four smaller guns.

On the 27th, another sortie was made by Major Stephenson, with the whole of the 1st Madras fusiliers, the object being to destroy the Garden battery. The enemy,

on their approach, at first abandoned the post, but still fired on their assailants from all points; and at length collected in such force, that the English were compelled to return to the shelter of the intrenchments; first, however, spiking three guns, and destroying the battery. The object of the sortie was partly frustrated by the delay of the blasting party, who were to have burst the guns; besides which, the water intended for the purpose had been drunk by the men as they came along. This affair was attended with the loss of valuable lives, as well as some degree of disappointment.

The attention of the enemy was kept alive by continuous sorties from the garrison, in most of which the object of the assailants was successfully accomplished; and it was attempted to make the Cawnpore-road a line of communication by openings from house to house along the direct route; but the idea had to be abandoned when, in the course of the progress, a mosque intervened, so strongly fortified and garrisoned with native riflemen, that it could not be taken without an immense sacrifice of life. The houses progressively occupied as a covered way were therefore rendered untenable for the enemy, and abandoned; and redoubled exertions were made in repairing the defences of the old position, and in constructing batteries, and forming intrenchments within and before the new one. Owing to the great number of camp-followers who had come in with the Oude field force, the requisite labour was supplied far more readily than before; and the sepoys still in the garrison, who, in time of peace, would have urged their *caste* as a reason for not handling a spade, now worked for the common safety without remonstrance.

In this way, between sorties of the garrison, repelling attacks by the rebels, and strengthening the fortifications of the residency and its outposts, time sped on through the month of October. No reliable communication could yet be held with the world beyond the limits of the position held by the troops, and nothing remained for the inhabitants of the enclosure but to await with patience the arrival of a force that should really restore them to liberty.

Early in October, a division order, highly and deservedly complimentary to the garrison, was issued by Major-general Sir James Outram. By that document, the general tendered to Brigadier Inglis, and "to every

individual member of the garrison, the assurance of his confidence, that their services would be regarded by the government under which they were immediately serving, by the British nation, and by her gracious majesty, with equal admiration to that with which he was himself impressed." The order then proceeds as follows:—"The major-general believes that the annals of warfare contain no brighter page than that which will record the bravery, fortitude, vigilance, and patient endurance of hardships, privation, and fatigue, displayed by the garrison of Lucknow; and he is very conscious that his unskilled pen must needs fail adequately to convey to the right honourable the governor-general of India, and his excellency the commander-in-chief, the profound sense of the merits of that garrison, which has been forced on his mind by a careful consideration of the almost incredible difficulties with which they have had to contend.

"The term 'illustrious' was well and happily applied by a former governor-general of India, to the garrison of Jellalabad; but some far more laudatory epithet (if such the English language contains) is due, the major-general considers, to the brave men whom Brigadier Inglis has commanded with undeviating success, and untarnished honour, through the late memorable siege; for while the devoted band of heroes who so nobly maintained the honour of their country's arms, under Sir R. Sale, were seldom exposed to actual attack, the Lucknow garrison, of inferior strength, have, in addition to a series of fierce assaults gallantly and successfully repulsed, been for three weeks exposed to a nearly incessant fire from strong and commanding positions, held by an enemy of overwhelming force, possessing powerful artillery, having at their command the whole resources of what was but recently a kingdom, and animated by an insane and bloodthirsty fanaticism.

"It is a source of heartfelt satisfaction to the major-general, to be able, to a certain extent, to confer on the native portion of the garrison an instalment of those rewards which their gallant and grateful commander has sought for them, and which he is very certain the governor-general will bestow in full; and though the major-general, as regards the European portion of the garrison, cannot do more than give his most earnest and hearty support to the recommendations of the brigadier, he feels assured that the

governor-general of India will fully and publicly manifest his appreciation of their distinguished services, and that our beloved sovereign will herself deign to convey to them some gracious expression of royal approbation of their conduct.

"Brigadier Inglis has borne generous testimony to the bravery, vigilance, devotedness, and good conduct of all ranks; and to all ranks, as the local representative of the British Indian government, the major-general tenders his warmest acknowledgments. He would fain offer his special congratulations and thanks to the European and Eurasian portion of the garrison, whom Brigadier Inglis has particularly noticed; but, by doing so, he would forestal the governor-general in the exercise of what the major-general is assured will be one of the most pleasing acts of his official life."

Soon after the promulgation of the above divisional order, the tide of promotion set in upon the heroic defenders of Lucknow, and most of the officers obtained a step in rank. The immediate recognition, by the governor-general, of the services rendered by the men, was embodied in a general order already referred to;* the effect of which was, that until their numbers were augmented by the native troops with Sir Colin Campbell, there was no longer a private among the native soldiers of the residency garrisons. Such recognition was prompt and generous on the part of the Indian government; but the honours at the disposal of the authorities at home were more tardily dispensed, so far as the troops in her majesty's service were concerned.

During the interval that had elapsed since the first investment of the English position by the rebels, the latter had chosen for themselves a king, by way of a rallying point for Indian loyalty. This puppet was, a natural son of the deposed king of Oude, then in captivity at Fort William, whose successor his adherents proposed to recognise as a sort of tributary prince to the king of Delhi. Being a child only eight or ten years old, the real power was vested in a minister and a council of state. The office of the former was conferred upon a dignitary of the late court, named Shirreff-u-Dowlah. The post of commander-in-chief of the army of Oude was assumed by Hissamut-u-Dowlah; and the council of state was formed of the late king's principal servants, the chiefs and talookdars,

* See *ante*, p. 56.

and the self-elected leaders of the rebel army—the subordinate officers of which were elected by the sepoys; and they, in turn, chose their commander: and thus a framework for the future native government of Oude was presumed to be established.

The month of November dawned but gloomily upon the careworn inhabitants of the residency. Their resources were rapidly diminishing; their means of supply uncertain, and probably more distant than ever. But they were not without hope; for vague rumours had reached them of a powerful effort that would be made for the final relief of the garrison by the commander-in-chief in person; and they were compelled to endure the prolonged torture of suspense for a while, that they might the more enjoy the blessing of a glorious reality.

But while, during this tedious interval, the British residents at Lucknow were stoutly maintaining their ground against the merciless traitors by whom they had been so long surrounded, the position of the small detachment, with its helpless charge of sick and wounded left at Alumbagh, was at first almost as desperate. When General Havelock left 200 men at that post, with four guns, to protect the sick and wounded of his force, with a large convoy of vehicles, animals, baggage, ammunition, and stores, besides a crowd of camp-followers, he did not for an instant imagine, that he would be cut off from them, and that the residency and the Alumbagh would presently become objects of two separate and distinct sieges. Such, however, was the case. Not a soldier could pass from the one place to the other; and it was with the greatest difficulty that a messenger could convey a small note rolled up in a quill, or concealed between the soles of his shoe. The place was known to be tolerably well fortified, and capable of resisting an assault; but still, as far as mutual support was concerned, it was perfectly isolated and inaccessible. Fortunately, the enemy preferred to concentrate his numbers in and immediately around Lucknow, and, consequently, did not appear in any great numbers on the Cawnpore side of Alumbagh; and the effect of this arrangement was, that reinforcements were enabled ultimately to reach the Alumbagh, although they could not yet penetrate the armed masses that occupied the three miles of distance between the latter and the residency.

Thus, on the 3rd of October, a convoy of provisions, with 300 men of the 64th regiment, under Major Bingham, started from Cawnpore, and reached the Alumbagh without obstruction by the enemy; but could advance no further. On the 14th, a second convoy, under Major Barnston, of the 78th highlanders, was also dispatched from Cawnpore; but, on the way, it was attacked in such force that it could not reach the Alumbagh, and therefore returned—having, with great difficulty, and the loss of some valuable lives, prevented the supplies from falling into the hands of the enemy. A subsequent attempt was more successful; and, upon the whole, the Alumbagh was comparatively unmolested during the entire period: but much sickness prevailed within the place, owing to the deficiency of space and fresh air, as well as from scanty food in the intervals between the arrival of the different convoys of provisions, &c.

We must now direct attention to the movements of the commander-in-chief, who, it will be recollected, had remained at the seat of government after his arrival in India, for the purpose of concerting measures with the governor-general for the suppression of the revolt and the resettlement of the country, and also to mature the plan of operations for the campaign before him. That the delay in assuming the command in the field was not without beneficial result, as regarded the welfare of the future native army, may be conjectured from the promulgation of a most important order, in which the commander-in-chief observes, that “it is obviously necessary that all officers serving in India should make themselves acquainted with the Hindostani language;” and he desires that commanding officers of regiments will take measures for urging forward the instruction of their officers, and more particularly of the younger captains and subalterns of their respective corps. The order then proceeds thus:—

“The interpreter of the regiment, whose office has hitherto been almost a sinecure, will institute a class under the orders of the commanding officer, and will give, when it is possible, one lecture a-day on the Hindostani language. The subalterns and younger captains are to be ordered to attend these lectures. Commanding officers are directed to support the interpreter by occasional attendance at the lectures, as at an instruction parade; and they will assist

the officers whom it is proposed to instruct, in procuring moonshees, with the help of the interpreter."

The commander-in-chief then declares his intention of acting up to the spirit of the instructions of his royal highness the Duke of Cambridge, as expressed in the government general order (No. 538, of 1857), by which the staff of the army in India was opened to her majesty's service; and observes, that "an officer is clearly not fitted for the lowest staff appointment in India, who has not at least a colloquial knowledge of the Hindostani language." Sir Colin then directed, that at the expiration of six months after their arrival in India, divisional generals should report as to the progress made by their aides-de-camp; and officers then in India, were not to be taken on the personal staff of any general, until they were declared to have acquired such colloquial facility.

Returns were to be sent in, on the 1st of January and the 1st of July, to headquarters, from regiments, showing the names of all the officers, and the progress made by them according to the order; such return being signed by the interpreter, and countersigned by the commanding officer of the regiment. Sir Colin then observes, in conclusion—"There is no time so favourable for the colloquial study of the Hindostani language, as when a regiment is encamped; and the commander-in-chief, therefore, will hear of no delay in the execution of this order, because the corps are not in quarters."

Had this regulation been in force only two years earlier, in all probability the tremendous conspiracy that has convulsed India would not have reached maturity; since, if the European officers of the native regiments had been able to understand the language of the men under their command, it is impossible but that the wide-spread plot must have been discovered before it was ripe for execution, and the evil could have been nipped in the bud. The promulgation of this order was a positive condemnation of the system hitherto tolerated, as regards the intercourse between the European officers and the native soldiers.

After having arranged with the governor-general the plans to be followed in the existing emergency, and provided for the transport of reinforcements as fast as they should arrive at Calcutta, Sir Colin Campbell himself left the capital on the 28th of

October, to take command of the army in the field for the relief of Lucknow.

The progress of the commander-in-chief from Calcutta to the scene of operations was unattended by any of the pomp or parade that had hitherto characterised the movements of personages holding distinguished rank in India. Merely accompanied by three or four officers of his staff, he rapidly pursued his course towards Oude, *via* Benares and Cawnpore; and, in his haste and recklessness of personal danger, had nearly rushed into a dilemma that might have materially influenced the future fortune of the rebels. On the 31st of October he arrived at Benares, where he held a military *levée*, and afterwards had an interview with the lieutenant-governor of the province. After these formalities had been disposed of, Sir Colin and his attendants left for Allahabad at one in the afternoon. Shortly after leaving, and while yet on the Benares side of Shergotty, the party suddenly came within view of a detachment of the fugitive and mutinous 32nd, who were leisurely crossing the country from Deoghur, in the Santhal district. The rebels had with them fourteen elephants, and a strong body of the 12th irregular cavalry, some of whom appeared to be inclined to approach the carriages in which the commander-in-chief and the officers accompanying him were riding. The discovery of the peril was fortunately made while there was yet time to escape by turning back, which the party did with all speed for a distance of ten miles, when they met with some soldiers in a bullock-train, by whom the commander-in-chief was then safely escorted on his route to Allahabad, from whence he proceeded with all possible dispatch to Cawnpore.

Remaining at the latter place no longer than was necessary to perfect his arrangements, Sir Colin, on the 9th of November, crossed the Ganges; and, on the same day, joined the force under the command of Brigadier Hope Grant, which awaited his arrival in camp at Bunnee bridge, about seven miles from the Alumbagh. The troops here collected by the 12th of November, consisted of her majesty's 8th, 53rd, 75th, and 93rd regiments of infantry; two regiments of Punjab infantry, and a small party of native sappers and miners; her majesty's 9th lancers, and detachments of Sikh cavalry and Hodson's horse. Here, also, awaited the commander-in-chief, Cap-

tain Peel's naval brigade, with eight guns, ten guns of the horse artillery, six light field-pieces, and a heavy field battery of the royal artillery; the whole force numbering about 2,700 infantry, and 700 cavalry.

It had become known to Sir James Outram, that the force commanded by Sir Colin Campbell was approaching Lucknow, and it was deemed essential that a plan of the city and residency should be forwarded to him for his guidance in the advance: it was also important that some intelligent person, well acquainted with the locality of both, who could explain the relative positions, and act as guide if required, should be employed on the hazardous mission. For this purpose, a civilian named Kavanagh, who had distinguished himself in several sorties he had accompanied in the capacity of assistant-field-engineer, volunteered to go to the commander-in-chief's camp; and, his offer being accepted, he set out, and fortunately succeeded in accomplishing his object. Mr. Kavanagh's narrative of his adventure is interesting; and the exploit altogether is entitled to more than passing notice, for its daring and its successful result. He says—

"While passing through the intrenchment of Lucknow about 10 o'clock A.M. on the 9th instant, I learnt that a spy had come in from Cawnpore, and that he was going back in the night as far as Alumbagh with despatches to his excellency Sir Colin Campbell, the commander-in-chief, who, it was said, was approaching Lucknow with five or six thousand men.

"I sought out the spy, whose name is _____, and who was in the court of the deputy-commissioner of Duriabad before the outbreak in Oude. He had taken letters from the intrenchment before, but I had never seen him till now. I found him intelligent, and imparted to him my desire to venture in disguise to Alumbagh in his company. He hesitated a great deal at acting as my guide, but made no attempt to exaggerate the dangers of the road. He merely urged that there was more chance of detection by our going together, and proposed that we should take different roads and meet outside of the city, to which I objected. I left him to transact some business, my mind dwelling all the time on the means of accomplishing my object.

"I had, some days previously, witnessed the preparation of plans which were being made by direction of Sir James Outram, to assist the commander-in-chief in his march into Lucknow for the relief of the besieged; and it then occurred to me that some one with the requisite local knowledge ought to attempt to reach his excellency's camp beyond or at Alumbagh. The news of Sir Colin Campbell's advance revived the ideas, and I made up my mind to go myself, at two o'clock, after finishing the business I was engaged upon. I mentioned to Colonel R. Napier, chief of Sir James Outram's staff,

that I was willing to proceed through the enemy to Alumbagh, if the general thought my doing so would be of service to the commander-in-chief. He was surprised at the offer, and seemed to regard the enterprise as fraught with too much danger to be assented to; but he did me the favour of communicating the offer to Sir James Outram, because he considered that my zeal deserved to be brought to his notice.

"Sir James did not encourage me to undertake the journey, declaring that he thought it so dangerous that he would not himself have asked any officer to attempt it. I, however, spoke so confidently of success, and treated the dangers so lightly, that he at last yielded, and did me the honour of adding, that if I succeeded in reaching the commander-in-chief, my knowledge would be a great help to him.

"I secretly arranged for a disguise, so that my departure might not be known to my wife, as she was not well enough to bear the prospect of an eternal separation. When I left home, about seven o'clock in the evening, she thought I was going on duty for the night to the mines, for I was working as an assistant-field-engineer by order of Sir James Outram.

"By half-past seven o'clock my disguise was completed; and when I entered the room of Colonel Napier, no one in it recognised me. I was dressed as a budmash, or as an irregular soldier of the city, with sword and shield, native-made shoes, tight trowsers, a yellow silk koortah over a tight-fitting white muslin shirt, a yellow-coloured chintz sheet thrown round my shoulders, a cream-coloured turban, and a white waistband or kumurbund. My face down to the shoulders, and my hands to the wrists, were coloured with lamp-black, the cork used being dipped in oil to cause the colour to adhere a little. I could get nothing better. I had little confidence in the disguise of my features, and I trusted more to the darkness of the night: but Sir James Outram and his staff seemed satisfied, and, after being provided with a small double-barrelled pistol, and a pair of broad pyjamahs over the tight drawers, I proceeded, with Kunoujee Lal, to the right bank of the river Goomtee, running north of our intrenchment, accompanied by Captain Hardinge of the irregular cavalry.

"Here we undressed and quietly forded the river, which was only about four feet and a-half deep, and about a hundred yards wide at this point. My courage failed me while in the water, and if my guide had been within reach, I should, perhaps, have pulled him back and abandoned the enterprise. But he waded quickly through the stream, and, reaching the opposite bank, went crouching up a ditch for three hundred yards, to a grove of low trees on the edge of a pond, where we stopped to dress. While we were here, a man came down to the pond to wash, and went away again without observing us.

"My confidence now returned to me, and, with my tulwar resting on my shoulder, we advanced into the huts in front, where I accosted a matchlockman, who answered to my remark, that the night was cold, 'It is very cold; in fact, it is a cold night.' I passed him, adding that it would be colder by-and-bye.

"After going six or seven hundred yards further, we reached the iron bridge over the Goomtee, where we were stopped and called over by a native officer, who was seated in an upper-storied house, and

seemed to be in command of a cavalry picket, whose horses were near the place, saddled. My guide advanced to the light, and I stayed a little back in the shade. After being told that we had come from Mundeon (our old cantonment, and then in the possession of the enemy), and that we were going into the city to our homes, he let us proceed. We continued on along the left bank of the river to the stone bridge, which is about eight or nine hundred yards from the iron bridge, passing unnoticed through a number of sepoy and matchlockmen, some of whom were escorting persons of rank in palanquins preceded by torches.

"Recessing the Goomtee by the stone bridge, we went by a sentry unobserved, who was closely questioning a dirtily-dressed native, and into the chok, or principal street of the city of Lucknow, which was not illuminated as much as it used to be previous to the siege, nor was it so crowded. I jostled against several armed men in the street without being spoken to, and only met one guard of seven sepoy, who were amusing themselves with some women of pleasure.

"When issuing from the city into the country, we were challenged by a chowkeedar or watchman, who, without stopping us, merely asked us who we were. The part of the city traversed that night by me, seemed to have been deserted by at least a third of its inhabitants.

"I was in great spirits when we reached the green fields, into which I had not been for five months. Everything around us smelt sweet, and a carrot I took from the road-side was the most delicious I had ever tasted. I gave vent to my feelings in a conversation with Kunoujee Lal, who joined in my admiration of the province of Oude, and lamentation that it was now in the hands of wretches whose misgovernment and rapacity were ruining it.

"A further walk of a few miles was accomplished in high spirits. But there was trouble before us. We had taken the wrong road, and were now quite out of our way in the Dil Koosha park, which was occupied by the enemy. I went within twenty yards of two guns to see what strength they were, and returned to the guide, who was in great alarm, and begged I would not distrust him because of the mistake, as it was caused by his anxiety to take me away from the pickets of the enemy. I bade him not to be frightened of me, for I was not annoyed, as such accidents were not unfrequent even when there was no danger to be avoided. It was now about midnight. We endeavoured to persuade a cultivator, who was watching his crop, to show us the way for a short distance, but he urged old age and lameness; and another, whom I peremptorily told to come with us, ran off screaming, and alarmed the whole village. We next walked quickly away into the canal running under the Charbagh, in which I fell several times, owing to my shoes being wet and slippery, and my feet sore. The shoes were hard and tight, and had rubbed the skin off my toes, and cut into the flesh above the heels.

"In two hours more we were again on the right direction, two women in a village we passed having kindly helped us to find it. About two o'clock we reached an advanced picket of sepoy, who told us the way, after asking where we had come from and whither we were going. I thought it safer to go up to the picket than to try to pass them unobserved.

"Kunoujee Lal now begged I would not press him to take me into Alumbagh, as he did not know

the way in, and the enemy were strongly posted around the place. I was tired and in pain from the shoes, and would therefore have preferred going into Alumbagh; but as the guide feared attempting it, I desired him to go on to the camp of the commander-in-chief, which he said was near Bunnee (a village eighteen miles from Lucknow), upon the Cawnpore-road. The moon had risen by this time, and we could see well ahead.

"By three o'clock we arrived at a grove of mango trees, situated on a plain, in which a man was singing at the top of his voice. I thought he was a villager, but he got alarmed on hearing us approach, and astonished us too by calling out a guard of twenty-five sepoy, all of whom asked questions. Kunoujee Lal here lost heart for the first time, and threw away the letter entrusted to him for Sir Colin Campbell. I kept mine safe in my turban. We satisfied the guard that we were poor men travelling to Umroula, a village two miles this side of the chief's camp, to inform a friend of the death of his brother by a shot from the British intrenchment at Lucknow, and they told us the road. They appeared to be greatly relieved on discovering that it was not their terrible foe, who was only a few miles in advance of them. We went in the direction indicated by them, and after walking for half-an-hour, we got into a jheel or swamp, which are numerous and large in Oude. We had to wade through it for two hours up to our waists in water, and through weeds; but before we found out that we were in a jheel, we had gone too far to recede. I was nearly exhausted on getting out of the water, having made great exertions to force our way through the weeds, and to prevent the colour being washed off my face. It was nearly gone from my hands.

"I now rested for fifteen minutes, despite of the remonstrances of the guide, and went forward, passing between two pickets of the enemy, who had no sentries thrown out. It was near four o'clock in the morning when I stopped at the corner of a tope, or grove of trees, to sleep for an hour, which Kunoujee Lal entreated I would not do; but I thought he overrated the danger, and, lying down, I told him to see if there was any one in the grove who would tell him where we then were.

"We had not gone far when I heard the English challenge, 'Who comes there,' with a native accent. We had reached a British cavalry outpost. My eyes filled with joyful tears, and I shook the Sikh officer in charge of the picket heartily by the hand. The old soldier was as pleased as myself when he heard from whence I had come, and he was good enough to send two of his men to conduct me to the camp of the advanced guard. An officer of her majesty's 9th lancers, who was visiting his pickets, met me on the way, and took me to his tent, where I got dry stockings and trowsers, and, what I much needed, a glass of brandy, a liquor I had not tasted for nearly two months.

"I thanked God for having safely conducted me through this dangerous enterprise, and Kunoujee Lal for the courage and intelligence with which he had conducted himself during this trying night. When we were questioned, he let me speak as little as possible. He always had a ready answer; and I feel that I am indebted to him in a great measure, more than to myself, for my escape. It will give me great satisfaction to hear that he has been suitably rewarded.

"In undertaking this enterprise, I was actuated

by a sense of duty, believing that I could be of use to his excellency the commander-in-chief, when approaching, for its relief, the besieged garrison, which had heroically resisted the attack of thirty times its own number for five months, within a weak and irregular intrenchment; and secondly, because I was anxious to perform some service which would ensure to me the honour of wearing our most gracious majesty's cross.

"My reception by Sir Colin Campbell and his staff was cordial and kind to the utmost degree: and if I never have more than the remembrance of their condescension, and of the heartfelt congratulations of Sir James Outram and of all the officers of his garrison, on my safe return to them, I shall not repine; though, to be sure, having the Victoria Cross would make me a prouder and a happier man.

"JAMES KAVANAGH.

"Camp, Alumbagh, 24th November, 1857."

At length, on the 13th of November, the troops were put in motion *en route* for the Alumbagh; but on approaching a small fort to the right of the position, named Jellalabad, the advanced column was suddenly attacked by a strong body of the rebels, who were there posted. A very short time sufficed to dispose of this obstruction, as they were broken up and dispersed by a brilliant charge of Hodson's irregular horse, led by Lieutenant Gough; and the fort being immediately taken possession of, was dismantled and rendered untenable by the enemy. This affair having been disposed of, Sir Colin proceeded to the Alumbagh, where he deposited his baggage under charge of the 75th regiment; and further reinforcements having come up, he availed himself of the information afforded by the plan and Kavanagh's explanations, and determined to approach the city by skirting the eastern and northern suburbs, and thus avoid the fortified buildings and street obstructions that lay in the direct route to the residency from the Alumbagh. His plan of operation in the direction chosen, was to batter down the enemy's defences step by step and day by day, so as to form a passage for his troops with comparatively trifling loss of life. He saw, by the plan, that at the eastern extremity of the town there was a large open space, in which the troops could act; and which, although sprinkled with mosques, palaces, and other large buildings, was free from those deep narrow lanes or defiles that had been so perilous in the advance of Havelock and Outram, and he proposed to make the capture of each of these buildings the base of operations for attacks on other posts nearer the heart of the city, until at length the residency could be reached.

On the morning of the 14th, Sir Colin

advanced from the Alumbagh, his first point of attack being a hunting-palace of the late kings of Oude, called Dil Koosha (Heart's Delight), situated on an eminence, in a beautiful and extensive park. As he approached the latter, his leading column was met by a long line of musketry fire: reinforcements were sent to the front, and, after a running fight of about two hours, the position was abandoned by the enemy, who were driven down the hill to the Martinière college, about half a mile distant, from whence they were speedily ejected, and pursued across the garden and park of that establishment, and thence beyond the canal into the streets of the city. The commander-in-chief then made the Dil Koosha palace his head-quarters, and some heavy guns being placed at the side of the canal, the enemy was kept in check for that night. The result of this day's operations was most propitious; for not only had an advantageous post been secured, which commanded the whole eastern suburb, but he had brought thus far in safety a large supply of provisions and stores for the use of the beleaguered garrison, of which he was now within view.

After completing his arrangements, and exchanging signals with Havelock and Outram on the 15th, the commander-in-chief resumed active operations on the following day. Leaving every description of unnecessary baggage at the Dil Koosha, and supplying every soldier of his force with food in his havresack for three days, he crossed the canal, and advanced to the Secunderbagh (Alexander's Garden), a very extensive building of strong masonry, in the midst of a large garden encircled by a high wall, and loopholed in all directions for musketry. Its natural advantages for defence were made the most of by the enemy, who had now become desperate, and were evidently resolved to defend it to the last. The post was strongly garrisoned by the insurgents, who also occupied a fortified village about a hundred yards distant from it, and through which the passage of the troops lay.

The attack upon the Secunderbagh was first made by the column under Brigadier Hope. As it advanced, a murderous fire was kept up on the troops, who were, consequently, ordered to move on in skirmishing order. The horse artillery and heavy field guns were quickly brought up to answer the enemy's fire, which they did effec-

tually; and the brigadier gallantly dashing forward with his advance, after overcoming a well-sustained resistance, drove the enemy out of the village into the main building, which was then ordered to be stormed.

The 4th Sikhs had been directed to lead the attack; while the 93d highlanders, and detachments from the 53rd and other regiments, were to cover their operations. The Europeans, however, had not patience enough for this; and jealous and fearful lest the Sikhs should gain the greatest honour, they all rushed forward, vying with each other who should be first in.

A small breach had been effected in one of the walls, but only a small body could enter at once. Fortunately, the enemy had expected the attack from a different quarter, and this breach was in one of the most weakly-guarded points. A considerable number of men had therefore contrived to get in before the guard could obtain reinforcements; yet numbers fell. The men dashed in as quickly as the narrow breach permitted, but could not pass fast enough for their ardour. They approached under the very loopholes of the enemy, and, hoisting their caps on their bayonets as a decoy, lay down, while the insurgents fired a volley at their supposed heads; and then, before they could again load, started up, tore down the iron bars from the windows, and sprang into the midst of their enemies.

The rebels fought desperately, but vainly, against the stalwart avengers of Englishwomen and children. The slaughter was terrific; for nothing but blood would appease the infuriated soldiers. On the following day, 2,000 carcasses of the rebel host were counted within the walls of that fearful house of vengeance; and the gateway, the principal room, and the side chambers, were literally saturated with blood, and piled up with the dead and dying. No mercy was shown; and when some wretch had cowardice enough (which was rarely the case) to throw down his arms and sue for life, "Cawnpore" was hissed into his ear, and a thrust of the bayonet put an end to his existence.

These terrible operations occupied nearly three hours, and there was yet more work in store for the wearied troops, ere they could desist from the sanguinary labours of that day. While the attack on the Secunderbagh was at its height, the troops had been annoyed by a murderous fire, poured upon them from an extensive building,

from which it became necessary to dislodge the enemy. This was the Shah Nujeeff, consisting of a large mosque, having a domed roof, with a loopholed parapet; and four minarets, commanding the whole edifice, were filled with riflemen. This building was situated in a fine garden surrounded by high walls, loopholed, and filled with insurgent troops. The entrance had been blocked up with masonry, and, in every point, the Shah Nujeeff was carefully barricaded and fortified.

Against these buildings Captain Peel now advanced with the naval brigade, bringing his heavy 68-pounders within a few yards of the walls; and, aided by a mortar battery and a field battery of Bengal artillery, he commenced a heavy cannonade, which, during several hours, was answered by a well-sustained fire from the enemy. The moment for the assault having arrived, Brigadier Hope led on his highlanders, supported by the battalion under Major Barnston, who rushed through the breaches made by the heavy guns, and, in a comparatively short period, filled the Shah Nujeeff with the corpses of its defenders. The troops then ceased operations for the day, and, for the next few hours, reposed on the bloody scene of their triumphs. In his despatches relating to this spirited affair, the commander-in-chief said—"Captain Peel led up his heavy guns with extraordinary gallantry to within a few yards of the building, to batter the massive stone walls. The withering fire of the highlanders effectually covered the naval brigade from great loss; but it was an action almost unexampled in war. Captain Peel behaved very much as if he had been laying the *Shannon* alongside an enemy's frigate."

On the next day (the 17th), the building denominated the Mess-house was cannonaded by the heavy guns of the naval brigade. The building, which stood on a considerable eminence, consisted of a large two-storied flat-terraced house, flanked by two square turrets, and protected by a deep ditch and a loopholed mud wall. After the 68-pounders, aided by some shells from a mortar battery in the Fureed Buksh palace, had inflicted some damage, orders were given to storm the place; and the men of the 53rd and 90th regiments, followed by some Sikhs, rapidly stepping forward, surmounted all obstacles, and rushing into the building, carried dismay and death among the enemy. The Observatory, or Banks'

house, in the rear of the mess-house, was next taken by a party of Sikhs, who vied with British soldiers in valour and determination; and on that day, and the following one, Sir Colin Campbell from one side, and General Havelock on the other, obtained possession of all the houses between the new intrenchments, the mess-house, and the Motee Mahal (Pearl Palace.) To effect this co-operation by the forces, it had been agreed, by signal and messages, that as soon as Sir Colin should reach the Secunderbagh, the outer wall of the eastern garden of the Fureed Buksh, in which the enemy had already attempted several breaches, should be thrown down by mines previously prepared; that two powerful batteries, erected in the enclosure, should then open on the insurgents in front; and that, after the effect desired had been produced, the troops should storm two buildings, known as the Hern Khana, or deer-house, and the Engine-house. This was successfully accomplished. At about eleven o'clock the operations began. The mines were exploded, the wall demolished; the works beyond were shelled by mortars; two of the mines at the Hern Khana were charged with destructive effect; and the infantry, eager for a little active work after being many weeks pent up within their intrenchments, dashed through the Chuttur Munzil, and carried all before them at the point of the bayonet.

Every obstacle to the junction of the forces was now removed; and on the afternoon of the 17th of November, Sir Colin Campbell, while the fire was still heavy, was met by Generals Outram and Havelock: a loud, long-continued cheer burst from the troops, as the latter, with their staff, cordially shook hands with the commander-in-chief, and welcomed him as the deliverer of Lucknow.

The important operations in connection with this gratifying event were, during the second and third weeks of November, under the immediate personal control of Sir Colin Campbell, as commander-in-chief, General Mansfield officiating as chief of his staff. Brigadier Hope Grant was in command of the column formerly distinguished as Greathead's, which constituted the nucleus of Sir Colin's force. Colonel Greathead, raised to the rank of brigadier-general, in recognition of his services, commanded one of the brigades of infantry; and Brigadiers Russell and Adrian Hope were at

the head of two others. Brigadier Little commanded the cavalry; Brigadier Crauford the artillery; Lieutenant Lennox the engineers; and Captain Peel the naval brigade. The result of the operations in this quarter produced to Grant and Peel the honorary distinctions of K.C.B., and they consequently became Sir James Hope Grant, and Sir William Peel. The whole of the officers and troops employed were the objects of warm eulogium by the government, and of well-deserved admiration by all classes of their fellow-countrymen.

The commander-in-chief's crowning success at Lucknow was not obtained without severe loss; as 122 officers and men were killed, and 345 wounded; of whom many afterwards died of their wounds. Sir Colin himself received a slight wound, which did not incapacitate him from duty. The loss of the enemy was known to have been frightfully severe, and not less than from three to four thousand. They fought at the Secunderbagh and the Shah Nujeeff with a reckless desperation, which rendered immense slaughter inevitable; and the powerful artillery of the naval brigade mowed them down like grass.

The delight with which the unfortunate *détenus* of the residency welcomed Sir Colin Campbell and his noble band, was only equalled by that with which the arrival of General Havelock's heroes had been greeted two months previous. The assurance of positive safety, and of freedom from the terrible thralldom in which they had existed for nearly six months, cheered all hearts; and the bodings of the most desponding were changed to aspirations of thankfulness and joy. They knew they were soon to be free; that they would once more taste the sweets of liberty, and realise the enjoyments that life had yet in store for them. A few hours enabled the newcomers to spread forth some of the supplies which their commissariat had provided; and once more the luxuries of wheaten bread, fresh butter, oranges, and other articles (which are not luxuries save to those unable to obtain them) were distributed; and then came the still greater enjoyment afforded by the arrival of several "cart-loads" of letters and newspapers from England. So long debarred as the occupants of the residency had been from all communication with the outer world, the intelligence thus conveyed to them was looked to with painful anxiety. The post-

office was besieged with earnest inquirers; and the newly-resumed duties of the post-master were, for some time, anything but a sinecure.

In the journal of Lady Inglis, recording many incidents of the siege, this period of Lucknow life is described as follows:—

“To-day (18th of November) we have had a quantity of English letters, the first we have had for six months. The very sight of them made us feel quite bewildered; and I have not yet been able to read more than one. I need not say how much I have thought of you all—how many, many, sad hearts and homes there must be in England just now: and really, at present, one cannot see an end to our troubles. The whole of Bengal is in such an unsettled state, that no one can tell when or where a fresh disturbance may break out. Sir Colin is much liked; he is living now exactly as a private soldier; takes his rations and lies down wherever he can to rest. This the men like; and he is a fine soldier.”

It was not the intention of the commander-in-chief to remain at Lucknow longer time than was necessary to rest his troops, and remove the people dependent upon them for protection. Meanwhile, he remained with his army in occupation of the positions they had taken outside, and once only visited the intrenchments, where he was welcomed with the acclaim due to a conqueror and a liberator. On the evening of his arrival, it was announced that every European was to leave Lucknow, and, for the present, retire to Cawnpore. The intelligence was received by many with a feeling of disappointment; for they had expected the immediate restoration of British authority in the place, and that the staff-officers and civilians would resume their former duties under their accustomed easy conditions. Such a pleasant transition had not, however, entered into the strategical arrangements of Sir Colin Campbell, who had fought his way to Lucknow expressly to liberate them from the foes that surrounded it, and not to maintain them there at a daily cost of valuable lives; seeing that the enemy—who notwithstanding the enormous losses sustained, still numbered 50,000 fighting-men in and near the city—showed no intention to retreat, but rather a determination to defend the portions of the place still in their hands, street by street and house by house. To

attack such an army with a force originally not more than a tenth part of their numbers, and already much reduced, would have been a wanton sacrifice of brave men, and might have risked the necessity for a third relief; it was, therefore, not to be thought of, while it could possibly be avoided. An order was consequently issued, not only that all were to depart, but to depart at once. The sick and wounded were to be removed directly from the residency to the Dil Koosha, a distance of four miles in a straight line, but over six by the circuitous route necessary to be taken to avoid the enemy. The women and children were to proceed to the same halting-place on the following day, and the bulk of the soldiers were to leave the position when all else had safely departed. An encampment was formed in the Dil Koosha park, with such necessaries and comforts as could be hastily brought together for the sick and wounded, during the brief sojourn necessary for organising a convoy to Cawnpore. As only a small amount of baggage was allowed for each person, most of the property of the residents was necessarily left behind; and, according to the description of the affair by Mr. Rees, “such a scene as the residency then presented was really sad to behold. Women’s apparel, children’s clothes, rich dresses, men’s clothing, cooking-utensils, plate, and china-ware; all sorts of merchandise and household furniture, coverings, bedding, &c.—each and everything was left behind. Anything might be had merely for the taking of it; and everywhere were seen soldiers and civilians helping themselves to what but the day before only large sums could have purchased from the owners. It was really annoying to think that the insurgents would, after all, obtain what we could not take away. Fortunately, our European articles of dress could be of little use to them.”*

Preparatory to the abandonment of the residency, the guns were removed from the batteries, and great caution was necessary to avoid exciting suspicion of the intended movement: the stores and the Company’s treasure, amounting to twenty-three lacs of rupees, which had been safely preserved through all the perils of the past six months, were also to be removed to the Dil Koosha, with the non-combatants and state prisoners; the latter being placed under a guard of civilians.

* Rees’ *Personal Narrative*, p. 342.

At length, the *exodus* commenced. Many ladies in delicate health, unprovided with means of conveyance, were compelled to walk as they best could over five or six miles of very rough ground, exposed at three different points to the constant fire of the enemy's musketry; but happily without injury to more than one person, who was wounded in the leg. Lady Inglis, in her journal, relates the occurrences of this departure as follows:—

"About 4 o'clock P.M. we made a start, and left the place where we had passed so many anxious hours. We were obliged to walk, having no carriage-horses; five of our horses were turned loose at the commencement of the siege. The road was quite safe except in three places, where it was overlooked by the enemy's position, and we had to run; one poor woman was wounded in one of these places. We arrived at Secunderbagh about six, and found every one assembled there, awaiting an escort and dhoolies to carry us on. When I tell you that upwards of 2,000 men had been hastily buried there the day before, you can fancy what a place it was: however, we met many friends, and were regaled with tea, and plenty of milk and bread and butter—luxuries we had not enjoyed since the commencement of our troubles. At ten o'clock we recommenced our journey; most of the ladies were in palanquins; but we had a covered cart, drawn by two obstinate bullocks. We had a force of infantry and cavalry with us; but we had not proceeded half a mile when the column was halted, and an order sent back for reinforcements. Some noise was heard, and it was feared we might be attacked. However, it proved a false alarm; and after two disagreeable and rather anxious hours, we arrived safely at this place (Dil Koosha), and were quartered in some tents prepared for our reception. To-day we have pitched our tent; and Mrs. Case, her sister, I and the children, occupy the half, having given the other to a poor sick lady. We are very comfortable, though rather pressed for room, and most thankful to breathe the fresh air once again."

Another passage relating to this migration from the residency, may be quoted from the *Lady's Diary*, the authoress of which, with two other ladies, had secured a carriage for the occasion; and thus describes their journey:—

"We had a pair of starved horses of Mr. Gubbins' to drag us; but the wretched animals had been on siege fare so long that they had forgotten the use of their legs, and had no strength, so came to a standstill every five minutes, invariably choosing the most dangerous parts of the road for their halt. At one place we were under so hot a fire that we got out and ran for our lives, leaving the vehicle to its fate; and two poor natives, who were helping to push it on behind, were shot. At the Fureed Buksh we had to wait a long time, as the carriage could not be got through a gateway till some stores were cleared away. Some officers of the 90th invited us inside, and gave us wine and water, which was very refreshing. We walked, after that, every step of the way to Secunderbagh, where we all had to wait several hours till dhoolies arrived to take on all the women; and we proceeded, under a strong escort, to Dil Koosha. The road to Secunderbagh was frightfully dangerous in places. In one spot we were passing a 24-pounder, manned by some sailors of the naval brigade; they all called out to us to bend low, and run as fast as we could. We had hardly done so when a volley of grape whizzed over our heads and struck a wall beyond. At Secunderbagh we found the place overflowing with women and children of the Lucknow garrison. About 9 P.M. we started again in dhoolies. The crowd and confusion were excessive, the enemy hovering round, and firing occasional shots, and we were only borne along in the most solemn silence. The only sounds were the tramp, tramp, tramp, of the dhooly bearers, and the screaming of the jackals. It was an awful time. One felt as if one's life hung in a balance with the fate we had so long dreaded; but our Merciful Father, who has protected us through so many and great dangers, brought us in safety to Dil Koosha, where we arrived about two o'clock in the morning."

Leaving the wounded and non-combatants encamped in the park of Dil Koosha, we must return to the garrison yet holding possession of the residency, the future disposal of which now became an object of consideration; and as the opinion of Sir James Outram, the civil commissioner of Oude, who viewed the question in a political light, and of the commander-in-chief, who simply looked to the military bearing of the subject, did not accord, the

following communication was forwarded by telegraph on the 20th November, from Sir Colin to the governor-general in council, that his decision might be obtained for the guidance of both authorities:—

“The garrison of Lucknow has been relieved, and I am now engaged in carrying the women and wounded to the rear. I propose to move the whole force to an open position outside the town, without further loss of life. Sir James Outram, on the contrary, desires that an attack on the Kaiserbagh should be made, and then to continue to hold the position in the town. He thinks that two strong brigades of 600 men would suffice to hold the town after the Kaiserbagh had fallen. But I am of opinion, that at least the same force would be necessary to preserve the communication now mentioned by me, to the Alumbagh, and constantly under the fire of the enemy; that is to say, four strong brigades would be required, unless it is wished that the garrison should be again besieged.

“I have always been of opinion that the position taken up by the lamented Sir Henry Lawrence was a false one; and after becoming acquainted with the ground, and worked my troops upon it to relieve the garrison, that opinion is confirmed. I therefore submit, that to commit another garrison in this immense city, is to repeat a military error, and I cannot consent to it.

“I conceive that a strong movable division outside the town, with field and heavy artillery in a good military position, is the real manner of holding the city of Lucknow in check, according to our practice with the other great cities of India. Such a division would aid in subduing the country hereafter, and its position would be quite sufficient evidence of our intention not to abandon the province of Oude.

“Such are the general grounds for my opinion. The more special ones are, the want of means, particularly infantry, field and musket ammunition for prolonged operations, owing to circumstances beyond my control, and the state of our communications in the North-West Provinces. The first of these is, of course, unanswerable; the second appears to me an insuperable objection to the leaving of more troops in Oude than such a division as I have mentioned, as evidence of the intentions of government. In the meantime, I await the instructions of your lordship in the position I have taken up.

“Owing to the expression of opinion by the political authority in the country, I have delayed further movement till I shall receive your lordship’s reply.”

The view taken by the commander-in-chief met with the immediate approval of the governor-general in council, who by telegram, on the following day, expressed his concurrence as follows:—

“I have received your message of yesterday. The one step to be avoided, is a total withdrawal of the British forces from Oude. Your proposal to leave a strong movable division with heavy artillery outside the city, and so to hold the city in check, will answer every purpose of policy.”

Pending this correspondence, the garrison was not idle. On the 20th, Captain Peel, aided by General Havelock’s batteries in the palaces, breached the Kaiserbagh, and continued to throw shells into the king’s palace throughout the day. This practice was continued on the 21st and 22nd, up to the moment appointed for the evacuation of the residency and its outposts by the whole garrison. The effect of the bombardment was evidently very destructive, as the fire of the enemy in return, which at first was brisk and continuous, gradually slackened, and at last ceased altogether.

Many things remained to be done within the residency enclosure before the troops of Inglis and Havelock could follow the steps of the non-combatants, and leave the position they had so long and so gallantly maintained. As many of the stores as were yet remaining had to be carried away or destroyed: they had still many of their wounded companions to escort and protect through the ranks of the enemy, and, at the same time, to cover their ultimate object by keeping up the bombardment of the Kaiserbagh, and thereby deceive the rebels, whose attention was now centred upon that position, and who expected an attack as soon as the bombardment should cease.

At length the preconcerted hour arrived when the evacuation was to commence; and nothing being left to chance, the movement was carried out with success. At midnight on the 22nd of November, the last man of the rear-guard of the retiring garrison marched out of the residency quietly and cautiously, leaving the lights and fires burning, and the general aspect of the place such as to avoid exciting the suspicion of the enemy, who occupied themselves as usual, by keeping up a desultory fire of

matchlocks and musketry upon the enclosure; on emerging from which, the old, or Inglis's "garrison" was the first to pass through the lines occupied by the British troops, "each exterior line then retiring through its supporters"—the extreme posts on the left making their way by a road which had been explored for them, as soon as the commander-in-chief considered the time had arrived when, with due regard to the safety of the whole, their posts should be evacuated. It may be observed, that had the retiring movement been discovered, and the insurgents had ventured to attack the troops, the brigade under the command of Brigadier Adrian Hope was in readiness to repel them. So far, however, from this being necessary, the enemy, completely deceived, continued firing into the enclosure for two hours after the troops had left it. The commander-in-chief accompanied the last line of infantry and guns, and thus satisfied himself of the safety of all that preceded him.

The event was announced to government by the following telegram from the commander-in-chief:—

"Lucknow, 23rd Nov. Last Night.

"I caused the garrison of Lucknow to execute its retreat from the residency, covered by the relieving force, which then fell back on Dil Koosha, in the presence of the whole force of Oude. The women, wounded, and state prisoners, the king's treasure, and twenty-three lacs of rupees, with all the guns worth taking away, are in my camp. A great many guns were destroyed before the residency was given up; those that were worth bringing, having been transported with much labour, and made available for our own purposes. The state prisoners were brought with us."

The desertion of a post that had been maintained so long and so nobly in the face of innumerable difficulties, was not accomplished without many incidents of extraordinary and almost romantic interest; and among them, a circumstance connected with the fortunate escape of one officer, deserves special mention. Captain Waterman, of the 13th native infantry, who had been wounded in the siege, having, late in the evening, gone to his bed in a retired corner of the brigade mess-house, was forgotten by his men in the moment of departure, and over-slept himself. At two in the morning, two hours after the last of his comrades had left the position, he awoke,

and found, to his horror, that he was alone in that abode of desolation. He dared not believe that all had left the enclosure; but, hoping against hope, he wandered from post to post, and found all deserted—all silent! The truth flashed across his brain. He was the only living man in that open intrenchment, with 50,000 relentless enemies panting for slaughter around him. His situation became too horrible to contemplate, but his presence of mind did not forsake him. He determined to attempt to follow the rear-guard, and so escape from the terrible loneliness that prevailed around him, and from the death that awaited him should the enemy discover him alone in that vast charnel-house. He fled, at his utmost speed, through the intricate and slimy passages of the Terre Kothee, the Fureed Buksh, the Chuttur Munzil, and the Motee Mahal, frequently slipping along the gory pavements, or stumbling over the festering carcasses that lay scattered in his path. He reached the Secunderbagh, which seething with human decomposition, was poisoned by the horrible odour of 2,000 corpses; and passed the outer walls into the open ground towards the Martinière, scarcely breathing, lest, in the darkness, he should arouse a lurking patrol of the murderous host around him. Again, through the dreadful silence and desolation, he sped with almost maddened excitement, and at length came up with the rear-guard of the British troops, and was saved. The horror consequent on his position was too much for his nerves to sustain; and, for a time, his intellect was affected.*

The removal of the women and children has already been described; and the following extract from the letter of an officer, will give an idea of the retreat, as it concerned the soldiers. The writer says—"An anxious night, indeed, it was. We left at twelve o'clock, having withdrawn all our guns from position, so that if the scoundrels had only come on, we should have had to fight every inch of our way while retiring; but the hand of Providence, which had held the little garrison for so long a time, never left it to the last. The eye of the wicked was blinded while we marched breathlessly, with beating hearts, from our post, and, forming into line, walked through the narrow defiles and trenches leading from the ever-memorable Bailey Guard. Out we went while the

* Rees' *Personal Narrative*, p. 347.

enemy's guns still pounded the old wall, and while the bullets still whistled over the buildings; and after a six miles' walk in ankle-deep sand, we were halted in a field, and told to make ourselves comfortable for the night. Here we were in a pretty plight—nothing to cover ourselves, while the cold was intense; so we lay down like so many sheep huddled together, to keep ourselves warm; and so lay till the morning, when we arose cold and stiff, with a pretty prospect of the chance of finding our servants in a camp of 9,000 men." (This included the camp-followers.)

The commander-in-chief allowed the men one day's rest at Dil Koosha; and, on the 23rd, they encamped in the park. For the first time in six months, many of them enjoyed the comfort of a good dinner.

On the 21st of the month, the following general orders were issued to the troops, from the head-quarters of the commander-in-chief at the Shah Nujeeff:—

"Although the commander-in-chief has not yet had time to peruse the detailed report of Brigadier Inglis respecting the defence made by the slender garrison under his command, his excellency desires to lose no time in recording his opinion of the magnificent defence made by the remnant of a British regiment (her majesty's 32nd), a company of British artillery, and a few hundred sepoy, whose very presence was a subject of distrust, against all the force of Oude, until the arrival of the reinforcement under Major-general Sir James Outram, G.C.B., and Sir H. Havelock, K.C.B. The persevering constancy of this small garrison, under the watchful command of the brigadier, has, under Providence, been the means of adding to the *prestige* of the British army, and of preserving the honour and lives of our countrywomen. There can be no greater reward than such a reflection; and the commander-in-chief heartily congratulates Brigadier Inglis and his devoted garrison on that reflection belonging to them.

"The position occupied by the garrison was an open intrenchment; the numbers were not sufficient to man the defences, and the supply of artillerymen for the guns was most inadequate. In spite of these difficult circumstances, the brigadier and his garrison held on; and it will be a great pleasure to the commander-in-chief, to bring to the notice of the government of India, the names of all the officers and soldiers who have distinguished themselves during the great trial to which they have been exposed.

"The commander-in-chief congratulates Sir James Outram and Sir Henry Havelock on having been the first to aid Brigadier Inglis. The governor-general in council has already expressed his opinion on the splendid feat of arms by which that aid was accomplished."

On the following day, the subjoined addition was made to the preceding order:—

"Head-quarters, Shah Nujeeff, 22nd November, 1857.

"When the commander-in-chief issued his order

of yesterday, with regard to the old garrison of Lucknow, his excellency was unaware of the important part taken, in aid of the soldiers, by the civil functionaries who happened to be at the residency when it was shut in by the enemy. His excellency congratulates them very heartily on the honour they have won in conjunction with their military comrades. This is only another instance that, in danger and difficulty, all Englishmen behave alike, whatever their profession."

The following completes the series of general orders issued by the commander-in-chief upon this memorable occasion:—

"Head-quarters, La Martinière, Lucknow,
23rd November, 1857.

"The commander-in-chief has reason to be thankful to the force he conducted for the relief of the garrison of Lucknow. Hastily assembled, fatigued by forced marches, but animated by a common feeling of determination to accomplish the duty before them, all ranks of this force have compensated for their small number, in the execution of a most difficult duty, by unceasing exertions.

"From the morning of the 16th, till last night, the whole force has been one outlying picket, never out of fire, and covering an immense extent of ground, to permit the garrison to retire scathless and in safety, covered by the whole of the relieving force. That ground was won by fighting as hard as it ever fell to the lot of the commander-in-chief to witness, it being necessary to bring up the same men over and over again to fresh attacks; and it is with the greatest gratification that his excellency declares he never saw men behave better.

"The storming of the Secunderbagh and the Shah Nujeeff has never been surpassed in daring, and the success of it was most brilliant and complete. The movement of retreat of last night, by which the final rescue of the garrison was effected, was a model of discipline and exactness. The consequence was that the enemy was completely deceived, and the force retired by a narrow tortuous lane—the only line of retreat open in the face of 50,000 enemies—without molestation.

"The commander-in-chief offers his sincere thanks to Major-general Sir James Outram, G.C.B., for the happy manner in which he planned and carried out his arrangements for the evacuation of the residency of Lucknow.—By order of his excellency the commander-in-chief.

"W. MAYHEW, Major, D.A.G."

At the time the British troops were thus withdrawn from the residency, it was suspected, but not positively known, that several English prisoners were in the hands of the rebel leaders, in the Kaiserbagh; and this surmise unhappily turned out to be a fact. The unfortunates were eight in number—namely, Sir Mountstuart Jackson and his sister; Captain Orr, his wife and child; Lieutenant Barnes, Sergeant Martin, a little girl named Christian, and, it was believed, also another lady, a Mrs. O. Greene. Of the original intentions of the rebels towards these individuals, there are no means of judging; but of the ultimate

fate of most of them no doubt exists. The English troops following the women and children, the treasure and the state prisoners, had yet scarcely reached the Dil Koosha park, before the *ruse* by which the retreat had been accomplished was discovered by the insurgents, who rushed into the deserted enclosure, and in their rage at having been baffled, sought to gratify their hatred and revenge by the wanton destruction of whatever had been left by the Europeans: they then rushed to the Kaiserbagh, and demanded that the English prisoners should be given up to them. To the honour of womanhood, the demand was imperatively refused by the begum, so far as the females were concerned, and they were immediately taken under her care in the zenana of the palace. With the men it was different. They were given up to the furious and disappointed soldiery; who, without allowing them a moment for preparation, tied them to guns, and blew them into fragments. The victims of this atrocious act of vengeance, were Sir Mountstuart Jackson, Captain Orr, Lieutenant Barnes, and Sergeant Martin. Of the ladies, no tidings were heard for several months; but most of them were ultimately restored to their friends.

In a supplementary despatch of Sir James Outram, dated from Alumbagh, November 25th, that officer, in enumerating the successes of the troops under his command, writes of the defences of the residency enclosure as follows:—

“I am aware of no parallel to our series of mines in modern war; twenty-one shafts, aggregating 200 feet in depth, and 3,291 feet of gallery, have been executed. The enemy advanced twenty mines against the palaces and outposts: of these they exploded three, which caused us loss of life; and two which did no injury: seven have been blown-in; and out of seven others the enemy have been driven, and their galleries taken possession of by our miners—results of which the engineer department may well be proud. The reports and plans forwarded by Sir Henry Havelock, K.C.B., “and now submitted to his excellency, will explain how a line of gardens, courts, and dwelling-houses, without fortified *enceinte*, without flanking defences, and closely connected with the buildings of a city, has been maintained for eight weeks in a certain degree of security; and notwithstanding the close and constant musketry fire

from loopholed walls and windows, often within thirty yards, and from every lofty building within rifle range; and notwithstanding a frequent though desultory fire of round shot and grape, from guns posted at various distances from 70 to 500 yards. This result has been obtained by the skill and courage of the engineer and quartermaster-general’s departments, zealously aided by the brave officers and soldiers, who have displayed the same cool determination and cheerful alacrity in the toils of the trench, and amidst the concealed dangers of the mine, that they had previously exhibited when forcing their way into Lucknow at the point of the bayonet, and amidst the most murderous fire.”

In the same despatch, the major-general, while eulogising several individuals of the garrison by name, says—“From the Rev. J. P. Harris, chaplain of the garrison, the sick and wounded received the most marked and personal kindness. His spiritual ministrations in the hospitals were incessant; his Christian zeal, and earnest philanthropy, I have had constant opportunities of observing since my arrival in Lucknow; and but one testimony is borne to his exertions during the siege, and to the personal bravery he displayed in hastening from house to house in pursuit of his sacred calling, under the heaviest fire. Daily he had to read the funeral service over numbers of the garrison, exposed to shot, shell, and musketry.” The major-general then proceeds as follows:—“I cannot conclude this report without expressing to his excellency my intense admiration of the noble spirit displayed by all ranks and grades of the force since we entered Lucknow. Themselves placed in a state of siege—suddenly reduced to scanty and unsavoury rations—denied all the little luxuries (such as tea, sugar, rum, and tobacco) which, by constant use, had become to them almost necessaries of life—smitten in many cases by the same scorbutic affections, and other evidences of debility which prevailed among the original garrison—compelled to engage in laborious operations—exposed to constant danger, and kept ever on the alert—their spirits and cheerfulness, and zeal and discipline, seemed to rise with the occasion. Never could there have been a force more free from grumblers, more cheerful, more willing, or more earnest. Amongst the sick and wounded, this glorious spirit was, if possible, still more conspicuous than

amongst those fit for duty. It was a painful sight to see so many noble fellows maimed, suffering, and denied those comforts of which they stood so much in need. But it was truly delightful, and made one proud of his countrymen, to observe the heroic fortitude and hearty cheerfulness with which all was borne."

The ink that traced the foregoing generous recognition of endurance and valour was not yet dry, ere the camp was stricken by a calamity irreparable and unexpected. Overcome by fatigue and over-strained excitement, the good and gallant Havelock had suddenly closed his victorious career, and, on the 25th of November, at Dil Koosha, succumbed to an attack of dysentery, that in a few hours numbered him with the dead. But one feeling pervaded the army he had so often led in the path of glory—but one sentiment animated his countrymen throughout India, when the tidings spread abroad that the Christian soldier, for whom an admiring country was preparing its honours and its thanks, was beyond the reach of its gratitude; and that the shouts of welcome with which all Europe was prepared to greet his return to the land of his forefathers, would fall echoless upon the ear of death.

Major-general Sir Henry Havelock, Bart., K.C.B.—who thus died in the zenith of his fame, and who has bequeathed to his countrymen a name that will long be kept as a household word in the homes of England and of India—was a native of Bishopswearmouth, near Sunderland, where he was born on the 5th of April, 1795. He was the second of four sons of William Havelock, Esq., of Ingress-park, near Greenhithe, Kent, the descendant and representative of a family that had long flourished near Great Grimsby, in Lincolnshire. Educated at the Charter-house, at the period when that school was in the full tide of its prosperity, under the head-mastership of Dr. Russell, young Havelock numbered among his schoolfellows many whose names were destined, like his own, to shed lustre

* The following anecdote of this young officer is recorded in Napier's *Peninsular War*, vol. vi., p. 265:—"The Spaniards stopped, and though the adventurer Downie, now a Spanish general, encouraged them with his voice, and they kept their ranks, they seemed irresolute, and did not advance. There happened to be present an officer of the 43rd regiment, named Havelock, who being attached to General Alten's staff, was sent to ascertain Giron's progress. His fiery temper could not brook the check. He took off his hat, called the Spaniards to

upon the annals of their country. A *soubriquet*, "philosopher," by which he was distinguished among his companions, was applied in consequence of his gentle meditative disposition, and quiet manner—seldom taking part in the boisterous pastimes of the playground, but ever ready, with friendly offices and kind words, to sooth down the asperities of his more excitable and impulsive companions. In course of time, the appellation diminished to "Phlos," and occasionally he was addressed as "Old Phlos." Few, perhaps, who thus knew that thoughtful, unobtrusive boy, would have believed it possible that, in the "Old Phlos" of the Charter-house, they beheld the future hero of Cawnpore and Lucknow—the noble victor of unnumbered fields.

While young Havelock was still at the Charter-house, a change came over the fortune of his family, that rendered his withdrawal from that establishment a measure of prudence. After a short interval, the youth was entered as a student at the Middle Temple, it being supposed that the law held out for him the fairest prospect of advancement. Here he attended the lectures of Chitty, the eminent pleader, and formed an intimate friendship with the no less eminent Talfourd. But the profession chosen for him was not to the taste of his noble nature, which could not be moulded to any affinity with a lifelong career of sophistry and chicane, and to a sense of honour that could be regulated by the amount of a fee. Moreover, though mild in disposition, an in-door occupation did not accord with his temper. He pined for a life of action and enterprise; and, in a short time, he could exultingly say with Norval—

"Heaven soon granted what my sire denied."

The elder brother of Henry Havelock, who was in the army, had gained distinction in the Peninsula, and was mentioned in the despatches of his illustrious chief as even then, in his mere youth, "one of the most chivalrous officers in the service."* This officer was wounded at Waterloo, where he follow him, and putting spurs to his horse, at one bound cleared the *abatiss*, and went headlong among the enemy. Then the soldiers, shouting for '*El chico blanco*' (the fair boy)—so they called him, for he was very young, and had light hair—with one shock broke through the French ranks." This noble youth terminated a career of honour by a soldier's death, falling at the head of his regiment, the 14th light dragoons, in a desperate but victorious charge on the Sikhs, at the battle of Ramnuggur, November 22nd, 1848.

acted as aide-de-camp to General Baron Alten; and he possessed sufficient interest and influence to obtain a commission for his brother; and, within a few weeks after Waterloo was won, had the satisfaction of seeing him gazetted to a second-lieutenancy in the rifle brigade. Unfortunately for the aspirations of the young soldier, peace supervened, and the prospect of active military employment in Europe was obscured. For eight years young Havelock, as a subaltern, was obliged to endure a life of mere military routine in various stations of the United Kingdom.

At length, in 1823, an opportunity was afforded him to exchange into the 13th light infantry, a regiment under orders for Indian service. The necessary steps for effecting this were taken, and Henry Havelock landed at Calcutta towards the close of that year. In 1824, the first Burmese war broke out, and he served in the campaign against the "Sovereign of the Golden Foot," as deputy assistant-adjutant-general to the forces, under Sir Archibald Campbell, and was present at the actions of Napadee, Patnagoa, and Paghan. Upon the conclusion of the war he was associated with Captain Lumsden and Dr. Knox, in a mission to the court of Ava, and had an audience of the king when the treaty of Yandaboo was signed. In 1827, he was appointed by Lord Combermere to the post of adjutant of the military depôt at Chinsurah, on the breaking up of which he returned to his regiment. Shortly after this he visited Calcutta, and, having passed the examination in languages at Fort William, was appointed adjutant of his regiment by Lord William Bentinck. The corps, at that time, was under the command of Colonel (afterwards General Sir Robert) Sale. In 1838, after twenty-three years of service as a subaltern, Lieutenant Havelock was promoted to a company, and attended Sir Willoughby Cotton as one of his staff in the invasion of Afghanistan. He served through the Afghan campaign with increased distinction, and was present with Sir John Keane at the storming of Ghuznee in 1839.

After a short leave of absence, Captain Havelock was sent to the Punjab in charge of a detachment, and was placed on the staff of General Elphinstone, as Persian interpreter. He next served in Cabul, under Sir Robert Sale, and was present at the forcing of the Khoord-Cabul Pass, the

action of Tezeen, and all the other engagements of that force until it reached Jellalabad. In conjunction with Major McGregor and Captain Broadfoot, he had, under Sale, the chief direction of the memorable defence of that place. For his services in Cabul he obtained his brevet majority, and was made a companion of the Bath.

Having accompanied Generals Pollock and Gough, as Persian interpreter, on one or two expeditions of minor importance in 1843, we find Major Havelock with the troops at Gwalior, and at the battle of Maharajpore: shortly after which, he obtained the brevet rank of lieutenant-colonel; and, in 1845, he proceeded with Lord Hardinge and Lord Gough to the Sutlej; and was actively engaged at the battles of Moodkee, Ferozeshah, and Sobraon. In the first of those engagements he had two horses shot under him, and a third at Sobraon, but himself escaped without a wound. On the conclusion of the Sikh war, he was appointed deputy-adjutant-general of the Queen's troops at Bombay, and had scarcely received tidings of the appointment when the second Sikh war commenced. His own regiment, the 53rd, was ordered up from Bombay to take the field, and had proceeded as far as Indore (nearly 400 miles), when the order was countermanded, and he returned to the duties of his staff appointment. Lieutenant-colonel Havelock took advantage of a temporary lull in the discordant elements of Asiatic policy, and obtained leave of absence, on sick certificate, to England, where he spent two years, recruiting the health weakened by twenty-six years' continuous service, and returning to India in 1851. Upon his arrival, through the interest of Lord Hardinge, who had watched his career with admiration, and by whose side he had fought in the three great battles of the Sutlej, he was appointed first, quarter-master-general, and afterwards adjutant-general, of the Queen's forces in India, which latter post he held until the war with Persia broke out at the close of 1856. On the dispatch of the expedition against Persia, Colonel Havelock was nominated to the command of the second division of the army, and led the troops at Mohammerah. The glory of the action, however, such as it was, was reserved for the naval force employed in the expedition, as the Persian troops ignominiously deserted the field before a gun was fired. Upon the conclusion of peace with the government to whom such

warriors belonged, Colonel Havelock returned to India, and was wrecked off Ceylon, in the *Erin*, on his passage to Calcutta, in April, 1857. An interesting incident of his life is connected with this disaster. When the vessel struck between twelve and one o'clock in the morning, half a gale of wind blowing, Colonel Havelock sprung upon the deck, and seeing some confusion, said in that sharp military tone that always commands attention, "Men, be steady, and all may be saved: but, if we have confusion, all may be lost. Obey your orders, and think of nothing else." They did so; and behaved in the most exemplary manner. The lives of all on board were saved, and on the following day all were landed, together with the mails and specie. Immediately afterwards, Colonel Havelock mustered the men on the shore, and said, "Now, my men, let us return thanks to Almighty God for the great mercy He has just vouchsafed to us." They all knelt down: he uttered a short prayer of thanksgiving; and then, rising from his knees and looking benignantly upon the companions of his misfortune, he walked away as coolly as if leaving an ordinary parade.*

Upon his arrival at Calcutta, almost the first news that met him was a report of the mutinous outbreak at Meerut and Delhi. Colonel Havelock was not a man to be passed over in the emergency that had arisen, and he was immediately sent up to Allahabad as brigadier, to command the movable column employed against the rebel force under Nana Sahib. His subsequent victories over the Nana's troops, including several pitched battles with numbers far superior to his own, crowned by the action of July 16th, at Cawnpore, and his continuous successes until his arrival at Lucknow, have been recorded in the preceding pages.

For his first exploits in the early summer of 1857, Brigadier-general Havelock was re-

* At a meeting of the Hibernian Bible Society, held at Belfast in the summer of 1857, the Rev. Mr. Graham, of Bonn, repeated the following anecdote as one he had heard from the lips of Lady Havelock:—"When General Havelock, as colonel of his regiment, was travelling through India, he always took with him a Bethel tent, in which he preached the gospel; and when Sunday came, in India, he usually hoisted the Bethel flag, and invited all men to come and hear the gospel; in fact, he even baptized some. He was reported for this at the head-quarters, for acting in a non-military and disorderly manner; and the commander-in-

warded with a good-service pension of £100 a-year, all that the commander-in-chief then had in his power to bestow. The gallant officer was subsequently raised to the rank of general, and honours fell thick upon him. By his sovereign, the distinction of knight commander of the Bath was awarded. The houses of parliament voted him a pension of £1,000 per annum for two lives. The colonelcy of the 3rd Buffs was conferred upon him; and the *London Gazette*, of the 26th of November, announced that her majesty had been pleased to elevate him to the baronetcy, as Sir Henry Havelock of Lucknow. On the day preceding this announcement, the much and deservedly honoured subject of it had passed away from all consciousness of human distinction. In consequence of his demise the day previous to the notification of the baronetcy, a question arose—whether, not having been in actual possession, the title could pass to his descendants? The difficulty was, however, removed by the gracious act of the sovereign; and the *Gazette* of the 19th of January, 1858, announced that her majesty had been pleased to grant the dignity of a baronet to Captain Henry Marshman Havelock, son of the late Major-general Havelock; and had also ordained that the widow of the gallant general should "have, hold, and enjoy the same style, title, place, and precedence to which she would have been entitled had her husband survived and been created a baronet." Captain Sir Henry Havelock was promoted to a majority; and the admiration of the public for his deceased parent was expressed by a monument, to be erected by voluntary subscriptions; and a provision for the surviving daughters of the hero of Lucknow, whose bust was placed, by the citizens of London, in the council-chamber of their Guildhall.

General Havelock married, in 1827, the youngest daughter of the Rev. Dr. Marshman, of Serampore, by whom he had a chief, General Lord Gough, entertained the charge; but, with the true spirit of a generous military man, he caused the state of Colonel Havelock's regiment to be examined. The reports descriptive of the moral state of various regiments throughout the presidencies, were obtained and laid before him. These were severally referred to for some time back, and he found that Colonel Havelock's stood at the head of the list: there was less drunkenness, less flogging, less imprisonment in it, than in any other. When that was done, the commander-in-chief said—"Go and tell Colonel Havelock, with my compliments, to baptize the whole army."

family of three sons and three daughters; the eldest of whom, now Major Sir Henry Marshman Havelock, was born in 1830.

Sir Colin Campbell, like all around him, mourned the loss of his gallant coadjutor; but there was little time to indulge in grief for the dead, while the safety of the living demanded every thought, and called for instant effort. The march from Dil Koosha to the Alumbagh, and from thence to Cawnpore, had yet to be effected. The women, children, and sick and wounded soldiers had to be preserved, the state prisoners guarded, and the treasure and stores conveyed beyond the reach of the rebel forces. These were objects that required all the consideration and energy of the commander-in-chief, and of the gallant men by whom he was surrounded; and in the bustle of a camp so circumstanced, private griefs could expect but silent sympathy.

The entire British force in Oude was now separated into two divisions: the one under Brigadier Hope Grant to form an escort from the Dil Koosha to the Alumbagh; the other, under General Outram, to keep the enemy at bay until the convoy was safely on its road. The distance to the Alumbagh was about four miles of very rough road; and on the 24th of November the convoy began to move towards it. On that and the following day the whole intermediate distance was covered by a continuous stream of bullock-carriages, palanquins, carts, camels, elephants, guns, ammunition, and store-waggons, soldiers, sailors of the naval brigade, and the non-combatants and prisoners. The stoppages were frequent in the comparatively trifling distance, and the fatigue endured, distressing and dispiriting; but by the evening of the 25th all eventually rested their weary limbs under the shelter of the Alumbagh, so far safe from the enemy.

It had been intended by Sir Colin Campbell to allow the troops and their convoy several days' halt at this place, for the purpose of repose, and to regain strength; but, on the 27th, a heavy and continuous firing was heard in the direction of Cawnpore. As no news from that place had reached the commander-in-chief for several days, the unexpected noise of artillery rendered him apprehensive of new dangers in that quarter, and he determined to push forward his troops and the convoy as rapidly as possible. Leaving General Outram in command of part of the force at Alumbagh, and

placing the rest under the immediate command of Brigadier Hope Grant, he resumed his march for Cawnpore at nine o'clock on the morning of the 28th. One of the individuals who had been liberated from the residency, and was now proceeding with the convoy, says of this unwelcome movement—"We left Alumbagh suddenly on the receipt, by Sir Colin, of some important message from the direction of Cawnpore, and never shall I forget that long, long, weary, weary march. To walk fifteen miles continuously, scarcely interrupted by a short ride on the back of a camel, or on the top of a primitive hackery—to arrive at a camping-ground tired to exhaustion (for, after our long sojourn in Lucknow, none of us could boast of a strong constitution), without knowing where to lay one's head, was bad enough for a man; but for a delicate lady it must have been terrible indeed. But we were not long allowed to remain at our second encamping-ground. A few hours, and another still longer march was begun. On, on we went, in one long, long line—certainly not less than seven or eight miles in length, and over a distance of more than thirty miles, till we arrived a very short way from the Cawnpore bridge of boats. Some bad news had reached the general, and the booming of cannon was distinctly heard across the river. A large fire, too, was visible; and as we approached we found ourselves again in the midst of war."

The message referred to in the preceding extract, told the commander-in-chief of a serious reverse sustained by General Windham (who had been left in charge of Cawnpore), through a daring attack of the mutineers from Gwalior. Sir Colin hurried forward the convoy with its escort; but himself and a few officers at once galloped off for the scene of disaster, where he arrived on the evening of the 28th. He then found that General Windham had been defeated; that a great quantity of stores and ammunition had been destroyed by the enemy; and that the entire of Cawnpore, to the north and east of the canal, was in the possession of a large army composed of the Gwalior and other rebels, headed by Nana Sahib, Kocr Sing, and other insurgent leaders. Orders were immediately sent back to the approaching escort for the heavy guns to hurry on, and take up such a position as would prevent the enemy from destroying or attacking the bridge; while

a mixed force of infantry, cavalry, and horse artillery was directed to cross with all speed, and command the Cawnpore end of the communication across the Ganges; and, fortunately, this was effected just in time. When the passage was thus rendered safe, the artillery, the remaining troops, and the non-combatants, were ordered to file over the bridge; which they did, occupying it in an unbroken line for thirty-nine hours, unmolested by the enemy's guns, which, owing to the prompt and judicious movement of Sir Colin, could not be brought within range of the boats. Had it been otherwise, and the bridge occupied or destroyed by the enemy, the convoy, cut off from all communication with the English force on the opposite side of the river—having, at the same time, an enemy in the front and another in the rear—would have been desperately situated indeed.

All having, however, safely crossed from Oude, the troops forming the escort encamped around the ruined intrenchment, rendered memorable by the heroism and wretched fate of Sir Hugh Wheeler and his hapless companions; while the women and children, with the sick and wounded they had brought with them, were placed temporarily in occupation of the old foot artillery lines. All communication with the town was cut off; and it was for some time difficult for the great number of people in their new location to obtain provisions. Their speedy removal from Cawnpore consequently became an object of necessity. The commander-in-chief found he could accomplish little in active military operations while his movements continued to be fettered by the crowd of helpless beings that were now depending on him for protection; and the stay of those among them who, from age, sex, or sickness, could render no active service, was rendered as brief as possible. Vehicles, animals, provisions, and stores, were speedily collected; and, on the 3rd of December, notice was issued that, in two hours, the convoy would commence its march towards Allahabad. The escort consisted only of 500 men of the 34th regiment; but by making long forced marches, the whole party escaped injury on the road, and ultimately arrived in safety at Allahabad, where they met with an enthusiastic reception. From thence, proceeding by steamer down the Ganges to Calcutta, their approach to the capital of British India was announced to

the public by the following notification of the governor-general, published in a Calcutta gazette extraordinary:—

“Fort William, Home Department,
January 6th, 1858.

“Within the next few days, the river steamer *Madras*, conveying the first of the ladies and children, and of the sick and wounded officers of the Lucknow garrison, will reach Calcutta.

“No one will wish to obtrude upon those who are under bereavement or sickness, any show of ceremony which shall impose fatigue or pain. The best welcome which can be tendered upon such an occasion, is one which shall break in as little as possible upon privacy and rest.

“But the rescue of these sufferers is a victory beyond all price; and, in testimony of the public joy with which it is hailed, and of the admiration with which their heroic endurance and courage have been viewed, the right honourable the governor-general in council directs that, upon the approach of the *Madras* to Prinsep's Ghaut, a royal salute shall be fired from the ramparts of Fort William.

“The governor-general in council further directs, that all ships of war in the river shall be dressed in honour of the day. Officers will be appointed to conduct the passengers on shore, and the state barges of the governor-general will be in attendance.

“As soon as the telegraph shall announce that the *Madras* has passed Atcheepore, two signal guns will be fired from the fort.—By order, &c.—CECIL BEADON,

“Secretary to the Government of India.”

At length the *Madras*, with its interesting freight, arrived off the landing-place, and the passengers were brought on shore amidst the homage and admiration of the thousands that had assembled to offer them welcome and sympathy.

It is to be remembered, that although, for a season, Sir Colin Campbell had abandoned Lucknow to the rebel forces, he did not relinquish the Alumbagh to them. This post being a compact quadrangular enclosure, capable of defence on each side, would, he considered, if retained, afford an important base for future operations. He therefore left General Outram, with from three to four thousand men, to hold the position against all comers; furnishing him with as large a supply as possible of provisions and stores. The garrison consisted of all the available companies of her majesty's

5th, 78th, 84th, and 90th foot; the Madras Europeans, the Ferozepore Sikhs, three field batteries, some heavy guns, two squadrons of the military train acting as dragoons, and a body of irregular cavalry; and with this force, while the enemy were busily engaged in refortifying the city, and rendering it more formidable than ever, Sir James Outram, on his part, was employed in making the Alumbagh impreg-

nable to attack. The position he occupied now included not only the Alumbagh itself, but a standing camp some three-quarters of a mile distant, and the bridge of Bunnee, which was held for him by 400 Madras sepoy, with two guns.

And thus, for the present, we leave the British troops in Oude, that we may trace the progress of affairs in the Lower Provinces of Bengal.

CHAPTER IV.

EXCITEMENT IN THE LOWER PROVINCES; OUTBREAK AT PATNA; MURDER OF DR. LYELL; REPORTS OF THE COMMISSIONER; THE NATIVE REGIMENTS AT DINAPORE MUTINY AND DESERT; INEFFECTUAL PURSUIT; THE REBELS OCCUPY ARRAH; HEROIC DEFENCE BY MESSRS. BOYLE AND WAKE; RENEWED PURSUIT OF THE DINAPORE MUTINEERS; AN AMBUSCADE; DEFEAT OF THE ENGLISH TROOPS; REPORTS OF LIEUTENANT WALLER AND MAJOR-GENERAL LLOYD; KOER SING IN THE FIELD; DEFEATED BY MAJOR EYRE; DESPATCHES; GENERAL LLOYD'S OBJECTIONS; PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE; GENERAL LLOYD SUPERSEDED; HIS EXPLANATION; FATAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE 10TH EUROPEAN REGIMENT AND SOME LOYAL SEPOYS; SECOND DEFEAT OF KOER SING AT JUGDESPORE; JUTOWRA DESTROYED BY MAJOR EYRE; MUTINY AND MURDER AT SEGOWLIE; MARTIAL LAW DECLARED IN BENGAL.

RETURNING to the earlier scenes of active rebellion in Bengal proper, it will be seen, that the effect of the outbreak in the North-Western Provinces, began very soon to exercise a dangerous influence over the troops and populations of the Lower Provinces of that presidency; and the lieutenant-governor, with a view to be kept well-informed of the state of feeling throughout the country, about the latter end of May, required the local commissioners to report direct to the government on the circumstances of their respective districts. During the early part of June, much excitement was reported to prevail in the province of Behar, in consequence of a belief inculcated by designing persons, that the government contemplated an active interference with the religion of the people; but no open demonstration of ill-feeling, or any overt acts of revolt, occurred before the middle of the month. The various magistrates throughout the division reported the existence of general tranquillity; but stated their belief, "that the safety of the province depended on the fidelity of the native corps at Dinapore—a military station about ten miles west from Patna; that the Mohammedan population was thoroughly disaffected; and that, in the event of any

disturbance occurring at the head-quarters of the division, they feared the rapid extension of the revolt, and its inevitable result, throughout the province." Precautionary measures were consequently adopted by adding to the police force; by carefully watching and regulating the ghauts; by guarding the frontiers of the neighbouring disaffected districts; and, in some stations, by appointing places of rendezvous for the European residents—so that, in the event of disturbances, they might have a known and combined plan of action. The treasure at Arrah and Chuprah was removed to Patna, where a volunteer guard of Europeans was formed; and the station was further strengthened by several companies of the Sikh police battalion from Sooree. Towards the middle of the month, a panic prevailed in Chuprah and Arrah, consequent on the occurrences at Ghazee-pore, Azimgurh, and other places adjacent, and most of the European residents and persons connected with the railway took refuge in Dinapore.* Confidence was, however, restored by the judicious conduct of the magistrates and other officials; and many of the fugitives returned to their proper abodes. Simultaneously with this supposed groundless

* See vol. i., p. 440.

alarm, three sepoy of the Behar station-guard presented themselves to the commissioner of Patna, and handed to him a letter received by them from sepoys at Dinapore; in which the Behar guards were urged to mutiny, and to seize the treasure at Patna before the arrival of the Sikhs. For this act of fidelity, performed at a critical moment, the men were handsomely rewarded in the presence of their own corps and the Sikhs, and necessary precautions were taken to render abortive any attack upon the treasure at the station.

The first event of importance in this direction, was an attempt at insurrection in the city of Patna,* on the night of the 3rd of July; in the course of which, Dr. Lyell, the principal assistant to the opium agent, was murdered. The occurrence is thus described in the report forwarded to the lieutenant-governor:—

“On the evening of the 3rd, a number of persons, amounting to about 200, assembled at the house of one Peer Ali Khan, a bookseller in the town; and, according to a plan which appeared to have been concerted some few days previously, issued into the streets with two large flags, and a drum beating: the cry of ‘Ali! Ali! Deen!’ was immediately raised; and the party proceeded at once to the Roman Catholic mission-house, with the declared intention of murdering the priest. He, however, had fortunately escaped before their arrival; and they left the house, reiterating their cries, and calling on the people to join them. Mr. J. M. Lewis, the magistrate at Patna, had by this time been informed of the outbreak; and, obtaining a guard of a hundred men of the Sikh police battalion, and accompanied by Captain Rattray, Lieutenant Campbell, and the assistant-magistrate (Mr. Mangles), proceeded to the scene of disturbance—on their way to which, they were informed that Dr. R. Lyell, the

principal assistant to the opium agent of Behar, had been murdered; and that a conflict had afterwards ensued, in which a darogah was killed, and one of the sowars wounded. A reinforcement of fifty men was then sent for; and, while waiting its arrival, the magistrate was informed that, on intelligence of the attack upon the mission-house reaching the opium godown, Dr. Lyell, attended by fifty of the Nujeeb guard, a subahdar, and eight Sikhs, went to meet the insurgents. By the time the doctor and his party came in sight of them, they had left the mission premises, and taken their stand on the chowk, where they planted their flags, and were shouting their religious watchwords. Dr. Lyell, it is supposed, with a design to expostulate with the rioters, advanced in front of his party, notwithstanding the entreaties of his friends that he would not so expose himself. The result of this fatal temerity was soon apparent. As he approached the rioters, a volley was discharged at him, and he fell to the ground; and, at the instant, several of the fanatics rushed forward, and ‘hacked the dying man’s face with their swords.’ The Nujeebs then fired upon the murderers: one man only was killed, but several were wounded; and they then dispersed. Upon the arrival of the reinforcement, Mr. Lewis and his escort proceeded to the place where Dr. Lyell had fallen, and where the eight Sikhs who accompanied him were still standing. Passing on, they came up with a darogah who had encountered the rebels, by whom he was desperately wounded; as, after firing and killing one of them, his servant had deserted him, carrying off his sword and ammunition, and leaving his master nothing to defend himself with but his discharged piece. A police sowar went to his assistance, and severely wounded one of the rioters, named Imam-ood-deen, who was

* Patna is situated on the southern bank of the Ganges, about 155 miles east of Benares. It is considered one of the largest cities of Hindostan, extending about four miles along the sacred stream. Some writers have supposed it to be the ancient Palibrotha. It contains numerous mosques and temples; but, excepting in the suburb of Bankipore, which is the quarter of the English residents, the houses are chiefly mud-built. In this quarter the most conspicuous object is a building in the form of a beehive, nearly a hundred feet in height, with walls twenty feet in thickness at the base. An exterior double flight of steps leads to the summit, to which, it is related, the late Earl of Munster on one occasion ascended on horseback. The building was

erected about the beginning of the present century, as one of a series of immense granaries to provide against famine or scarcity; but many causes operated to make this first attempt the last also; one of them being the fact, that large as was the building, it would not contain a week’s consumption of grain for so immense a province as that in which it was situated: another objection arose from the liability of its contents to ferment and blow it up, notwithstanding its massiveness; and finally, the doors from which the grain was to issue, were made to open inwards instead of outwards. The edifice has consequently been appropriated to other purposes, but still remains a monument of the folly that designed it.

taken prisoner: and, with the exception of those two men, none of the police would face the rebels, or make any effort to check their proceedings. Some gentlemen belonging to the opium factory then came up; and, as the rioters had gone off, they were enabled to raise and carry away the remains of Dr. Lyell without molestation. Meantime the alarm had spread among the European residents, who hastily resorted to the commissioner's house, which had been fortified in case of an emergency: guards were posted at the bridges which connected the parade-ground with the streets; and all necessary precautions were taken to prevent surprise. The affair, however, then passed off without further attempt at violence."

The scene of the disturbance being seven miles distant from the residence of Mr. W. Tayler, the commissioner of Patna, it was nearly two hours after the outbreak before that functionary received any reliable intelligence of it. Mr. Tayler says, in his report—"About ten o'clock, Mr. Anderson, an assistant in the opium department, galloped up to the house with a drawn sword, and, asking for me, exclaimed, 'The city is up! the Sikhs have retired! Dr. Lyell is shot dead; we were too few!' It was not very easy to obtain from him any accurate information; but on hearing this, I sent an express to the general for assistance. Before it arrived, however, we had received accounts from the spot that all was over, and the rioters had dispersed. Previous to Dr. Lyell's death, the khotegusht darogah had encountered the rebels, and cut down one of them, who was a prisoner, and I ordered him to be brought to my house, in the hope of eliciting some information from him. He, however, was not then disposed to be communicative. On the following day, the man, whose name was Imam-ood-deen, expressed his willingness to disclose what he knew of the affair; and on my going to him, he stated that he had been engaged by Peer Ali Khan, and, with many others, had been receiving pay for the last three months, on the understanding that when the time arrived, and he was called upon, he should fight for 'deen' and the padishah of Delhi. He named several of his accomplices, and gave other items of intelligence. Meanwhile the house of Peer Ali Khan, the bookseller, had been searched, and a quantity of arms, and some letters of importance, were found. Peer Ali had escaped, but was tracked and

captured, after some resistance, on the following evening. Thirty-six persons were afterwards arrested and tried by the magistrates and myself, under the commission, on the 7th instant. Sixteen were sentenced to death; fourteen were hanged within three hours after sentence—two being reprieved for some hours, with a hope of obtaining information from them; two others were transported for life; one sentence was deferred, and seventeen men were imprisoned for various terms. Some of the men who were hanged, exhibited the feelings of men who believe themselves martyrs; but the majority were silent and undemonstrative. On the 6th of July, a police jemadar, named Waris Ali, who had been detected in possession of some treasonable correspondence, was also tried under the commission, and capitally sentenced. He was executed the same day, and his last words were to ask if no Mussulman would assist him. Both this man and Peer Ali, at the time of their execution, requested that the money they had about them might be given to a fakir; but the application was refused. Waris Ali was said to be related to the royal family of Delhi. I postponed his trial for two or three days after his arrival, and had several private interviews with him, hoping, by such means, to elicit information; but he was evidently not in the secrets of the leaders, as he could tell me nothing more than what I already knew from other sources; and he was in such excessive alarm and despair, that I am convinced he would have done anything to save his life. When speaking in private with me, he implored me to tell him whether there was any way in which his life could be spared. I said, 'yes;' and his eyes opened with unmistakable delight; and when he asked again what the way was, his countenance was a picture of anxiety, hope, and terror. I told him, 'I will make a bargain with you; give me three lives, and I will give you your's.' He then told me all the names that I already knew, but could disclose nothing further. He was evidently not clever enough to be a confidant."

The khotegusht darogah, who recovered from his wounds, was rewarded with a present of 300 rupees, and promotion as a supernumerary from the third to the second grade. Peer Ali, who was proved to have been the principal in the riot, was defiant to the last; and in character, appearance, and manners, was described by the commissioner as a brutal but brave fanatic. His house was razed to

the ground, and a post placed on the site, with an inscription, telling of the crime and fate of the owner and his accomplices.

In a report on the 21st of the month, Mr. Tayler stated that, since the conviction of the rioters mentioned in his former communication, he had obtained information from the wounded prisoner, Imam-ood-deen, that had induced him to order the arrest of some fifty other individuals, upon a charge of complicity in the disturbance. This prisoner having received a promise of his life, and being apparently grateful for the care and treatment of his wounds, made many important communications in further elucidation of the plot; and, among other revelations, it was stated by him that the Dinapore sepoy had consented to the conspiracy, but that there was a difference of opinion between them and the townspeople as to the day; the sepoy wishing for Sunday—the townsfolk preferring Friday, which is the sacred day of the Mohammedans. The design, however, was ultimately abandoned; and the magistrate of Patna had reported, on the 18th of July, that the city appeared perfectly quiet, the shops were open, and the inhabitants, if possible, more respectful in demeanour than usual.

The proceedings at Patna, and in the adjacent districts, were not without damaging influence upon the native troops in cantonments at Dinapore, the distance between the two cities being so trifling. The barracks of the European troops at Dinapore were situated in a large square westward of the native town: beyond this were the native lines; and, still more westward, was the magazine in which the percussion-caps were stored. Major-general Lloyd, commander of the station and of a large military district called the "Dinapore division," was a man well advanced in years, infirm, and unable to mount his horse without assistance. That such a man, however gallant and high-spirited in his effective days, should have been left in possession of so important a command at such a crisis, was the fault of his superiors rather than of himself. He had, besides the physical infirmity which incapacitated him from active exertion, a strong leaven of the prejudice entertained by many of the old officers of the Company in favour of the sepoy. He was proud of them, and persisted in trusting them until it was too late to rectify the error. Thus, when the Calcutta people petitioned the governor-general to disarm

the native regiments at Dinapore, and the officers of the Queen's regiments at that station advocated a similar measure, Lord Canning, unfortunately, left the matter to the discretion of Major-general Lloyd; and the result was, that the favourable moment for accomplishing the object was neglected: and when at length, on the 25th of July, the appearance of affairs induced the confiding officer to feel less than his wonted reliance upon the native regiments, he shrank from disarming them, and sought to render them less dangerous by quietly removing the percussion-caps from the magazines. With the consequences that followed we shall presently be acquainted.

For some time prior to the actual outbreak at Dinapore, the European residents were exposed to continued anxiety from an undefined sense of impending mischief. The native troops at the station consisted of the 7th, 8th, and 40th regiments of Bengal infantry; but a portion of her majesty's 10th regiment, and two companies of the 37th, with a field battery of six guns, were also there: the whole, as we have seen, under the command of Major-general Lloyd; and there was not a British officer at the station, with the exception of the general himself, that doubted the possibility of disarming and controlling the whole native force, had an order been issued to that effect at the proper time. Occurrences at Azimgurh, Benares, and other stations, at length appeared to General Lloyd to warrant some precautionary measures, that his favourite sepoy might be prevented from committing themselves; and he reluctantly gave an order to remove the percussion-caps from the magazine: those caps, unfortunately, had to be brought in front of the entire length of the sepoy lines, on their way to the English artillery barracks. Early on the morning of the 25th of July, two hackeries went down to the magazine, under charge of an officer's guard: the caps were quietly placed in them, and the carts were drawn some distance towards their destination—the sepoy looking sullenly on. At length a cry was raised by the men of the 7th and 8th regiments—"They are taking away our ammunition! Stop it! Kill the sahibs!"—and the excitement of the two corps became formidable. The men of the 40th regiment being, however, yet faithful, and showing a disposition to prevent any attempt to get possession of the caps, the latter were safely conveyed to their destination. This demon-

stration being reported to General Lloyd, he determined to deprive the whole of the men of the fifteen caps each, reserved to them ; and at 10 A.M., an order was issued that they should be collected by the native officers, and placed in store by one o'clock of the same day—thus allowing three hours for the men to consider whether to surrender them or not. They evidently determined upon the latter alternative, and occupied the interval by filling their pouches with cartridges, and quietly moving themselves, with their arms, out of the lines. The fact of their desertion was not known until half-past two o'clock, by which time the whole of the three regiments had withdrawn from the cantonments. The alarm was then given by a gun at the outpost of the European hospital. Some time elapsed before the facts of this wholesale desertion could be comprehended ; and a delay then occurred before any guns were dispatched in pursuit. At length, these having proceeded about a mile, and fired some round shot (which had no effect), they returned to the cantonments, as it was impossible for them to follow the route taken by the deserters, on their way to cross the Soane at Arrah—a station about twenty-five miles distant. The brigadier-general, who was incapacitated by gout from walking, considered he could render more effectual service by following the track of the mutineers, which, he assumed, would be along the river-bank ; and, with that view, he placed himself on board a steamer, which, keeping close abreast with the guns and Europeans sent in pursuit, would enable him to direct their operations. This arrangement was rendered futile, in consequence of the deserters avoiding the anticipated route, and taking to the swampy fields and across a nullah, which rendered pursuit by artillery impracticable. Upon the return of the column, the steamer, with the general on board, also returned to the station. The same evening, as fears were entertained for the safety of Patna, two guns, and a detachment of the 10th and 37th regiments, were sent thither ; and the following morning, on it being reported that the mutineers were about to cross the river to Arrah, a detachment of the 37th regiment, with Enfield rifles, was sent up the Soane in an armed steamer, which, after proceeding about twelve miles, got aground, and, after a detention of several hours, returned in the evening to Dinapore, without having been able to reach the vicinity of the

mutinous force, which, meanwhile, had succeeded in crossing the river, and had then destroyed the bridge.

Early in the morning of Monday, the 27th of July, the rebels marched into Arrah—proceeding immediately to the gaol, where they released the prisoners. About 400 of the latter, with the gaol guard, and several hundreds of armed deserters and men on leave, that flocked in from the surrounding country, joined the mutineers ; and, together, formed a body of about 3,000 men, the greater part of whom were disciplined soldiers. This force was presently augmented by an equal number of armed men belonging to Koer Sing, a native chief of large property and influence in the neighbourhood ; and the united rebels at once took possession of the government treasury and public edifices, which they plundered, preparatory to committing deplorable outrages upon the persons and property of all who ventured to oppose their lawless proceedings.

Fortunately for the safety of the Europeans at this place, the acting magistrate, Mr. H. C. Wake, was a man of energy and judgment, and was equal to the crisis that had arrived. He was admirably seconded by Mr. Boyle, district engineer to the railway company ; who, having anticipated the possibility of a visit from some of the predatory bands that were scattered over the country, had made timely preparation for the protection and defence of the community, by fortifying a detached two-storey house, fifty feet square, with a flat roof, which stood in the same compound with his private residence. This building Mr. Boyle had well provisioned and armed, to withstand a siege or attack ; and within its shelter, on the evening of Sunday, the 26th of July, the civil magistrate, and the whole of the European residents at the station, took refuge from the storm that had gathered around them.

The spirit and determination with which the little garrison maintained their position during seven days' incessant attack, is well described in the following statement of Mr. Boyle, dated the 15th of August. He says—"On Sunday, the 26th, we heard that the mutinous sepoys were crossing the river Soane in large numbers, at a point eight miles from Arrah, and were on their march towards us. One of the government officers and I rode out half-way, but could not get any positive account or intelligence of their numbers ; and, as the despatches

sent from Dinapore to warn us had been intercepted, we did not know whether one, two, or three native regiments had mutinied; and we hoped, but vainly, that they would immediately be pursued. We had fifty Sikh soldiers in Arrah, and, being sixteen ourselves, resolved to make a stand. Accordingly, on Sunday night we occupied the bungalow; and the mutincers, after securing the treasure on Monday, attacked us about nine o'clock A.M. Most of the Europeans, besides revolvers and hog-spears, had two double-barrelled guns, or a gun and a rifle, with abundance of ammunition, and, providentially, a large surplus; from which, when the Sikhs' supplies began to run short, we made some thousand cartridges. To describe the repeated attacks, the almost incessant firing, and the hairbreadth escapes we sustained until Sunday, the 2nd of August, at sunset, would form a lengthy narrative; and, as I have by me a copy of an official description of it, it occurs to me that the perusal of it will interest you, and save the time it would take me to write more at length. On Sunday afternoon (August 2nd) we saw an evident commotion among our assailants, and soon after heard faintly the firing of cannon at a distance to the westward. This afterwards proved to be a relieving force, which had marched from Buxar to our assistance, and which the main body of the insurgents went out to meet; but the latter being wholly defeated, we passed Sunday night unmolested, and next morning marched out of our shattered but still strong little fort triumphant, but I hope not vainglorious, in having kept at bay for a week a hundred times our number. Our miraculous preservation should be ever a continual cause of the deepest thankfulness to us all; for, excepting some scratches and bruises not worth mentioning, but one of our little garrison (a Sikh) was dangerously wounded. Numbers of the enemy were killed around us; and in my own dwelling-house, which was gutted, and afterwards partially burnt, everything of value was either destroyed or carried away by the back approach, which we could not command. What we were most apprehensive of for some days, was disease from the odour of dead bodies; and four or five of our own horses (including my best Arab riding-horse) were shot, and in a state of decomposition within fifty yards of us; but neither was this allowed seriously to affect us. I should now tell you of the terrible disaster

which befel a force of nearly 500 men sent from Dinapore to our relief during the middle of the siege. They had on Wednesday night (July 29th) incautiously approached Arrah, and fell into an ambush; and there, and in the retreat to the Ganges, lost one-third of their number killed, and a large proportion badly wounded, there being but a very few who escaped unscathed. When we heard from our fort (not a mile off) the sudden and heavy volleys about dark midnight, we guessed too truly what had occurred; and I believe there were few among us who did not feel far more deeply the reverse which (as the firing grew fainter) we knew must have befallen our countrymen, than that by their defeat we had lost our best and almost only hope of succour.

"The nightly treacherous harangues made to us by the mutineers from the cover of my dwelling-house, sixty yards off, were answered only by us when there was a pause, by a volley of bullets directed towards the speaker's hiding-place. It was agreed no other answer should ever be given them; and I do not believe there was a man among us who would have allowed himself, if possible, to fall into their hands alive. When water ran short, the Sikhs commenced digging a well under the house, and continued their labour until they came to a spring; and when all was happily ended, they asked me, and I have promised, to build the well into a permanent one, as a memento of their services, and that our fort shall have affixed upon it the name of 'Putteghur,' or 'House of Victory.' For some days after we had been relieved, I was engaged in erecting some bridges that had been broken down by the mutineers, and restoring the main lines of communication, as field-engineer to Major Eyre's force, when, in returning to Arrah, I received a severe kick from a vicious horse belonging to one of our party. Luckily, no bone was broken; but I was laid up for two days, and, on the force preparing to leave Arrah, I had to be carried into Dinapore. I am now able to go about a little; so that, in another week, I hope to be as well as ever."

The official report of Mr. Wake, the magistrate in charge of the district, to the commissioner of the Patna division, is dated the 3rd of August, and states as follows:—

"I have the honour to forward, for the information of his honour the lieutenant-governor, the following narrative of our

extraordinary defence and providential escape. On the evening of Saturday, July the 25th, I received an express from Dinapore, warning us that a disturbance was apprehended on that day, but giving us no other information. On the morning of the 26th of July, a sowar whom I had at Koelwar Ghaut, on the Soane, came in and reported that numbers of sepoy had crossed, and that many more were crossing. I found that Mr. Palin, the railway engineer stationed at Koelwar, had contented himself with sending over for the boats to the Arrah side the night before; but, when leaving, had failed to destroy them as he had promised to do. The police, I imagine, bolted at the first alarm. All efforts to ascertain the amount of the force of the rebels were unavailing; and the police left the city on Sunday, the 26th. Thinking it highly inadvisable to abandon the station when the rebels might be few, and having fifty Sikhs on the spot, and finding the rest of the officers of the station of the same opinion, and that the few residents of the district who had come in were willing to remain, we, on the night of Sunday, the 26th, went into a small bungalow previously fortified by Mr. Boyle, the district engineer of the railway company. Our force consisted of one jemadar and two havildars, two naiks, forty-five privates, a bhisti and cook, of Captain Rattray's Sikh police battalion; Mr. Littledale, judge; Mr. Combe, officiating collector; Mr. Wake, magistrate; Mr. Colvin, assistant; Dr. Halls, civil assistant-surgeon; Mr. Field, sub-deputy opium agent; Mr. Anderson, his assistant; Mr. Boyle, district engineer to the railway company; Synd Azim-oo-deen H. Khan, deputy-collector; Mr. Dacosta, moonsiff; Mr. Godfrey, schoolmaster; Mr. Cock, officiating head clerk of the collectorate; Mr. Tait, secretary to Mr. Boyle; Messrs. Delpeiron and Hoyle, railway inspectors; and Mr. De Souza. We had enough ottah and grain for some days of short allowance, and a good deal of water for ourselves; but owing to the shortness of our notice, nothing but the barest necessaries could be brought in, and the Sikhs had only a few days' water; but as we expected the rebels to be followed up immediately, we had not much anxiety on that score.

"On Monday, the 27th of July, about 8 A.M., the insurgent sepoy, and the whole of the 7th, 8th, and 40th native infantry,

arrived in the station; and having first released the prisoners, rushed to the collectorate, where they were at once joined by the Nujeebs, and looted the treasure, amounting to 85,000 rupees. This did not take long, and they then charged our bungalow from every side; but being met with a steady and well-directed fire, they changed their tactics, and, hiding behind the trees with which the compound is filled, and occupying the outhouses and Mr. Boyle's residence, which was unfortunately within sixty yards of our fortification, they kept up an incessant and galling fire on us during the whole day. They were joined by numbers of Koer Sing's men, and the sepoy repeatedly declared they were acting under his express orders; and, after a short time, he was seen on the parade, and remained during the siege. Every endeavour was made by the rebels to induce the Sikhs to abandon us; heavy bribes were offered to them, and their own countrymen employed as mediators. They treated every offer with derision, showing perfect obedience and discipline.

"On the 28th, two small cannon were brought to play on our bungalow, one throwing 4lb. shot; and they were daily shifted to what the rebels thought our weakest spots. Finally, the largest was placed on the roof of Mr. Boyle's dwelling-house, completely commanding the inside of our bungalow; and the smallest behind it, at a distance of twenty yards. Nothing but cowardice, want of unanimity, and only the ignorance of our enemies, prevented our fortification being brought down about our ears. During the entire siege, which lasted seven days, every possible stratagem was practised against us. The cannons were fired as frequently as they could prepare shot, with which they were at first unprovided, and incessant assaults were made upon the bungalow. Not only did our Sikhs behave with perfect coolness and patience, but their untiring labour met and prevented every threatened disaster. Water began to run short; a well of eighteen feet by four was instantly dug in less than twelve hours. The rebels raised a barricade on the top of the opposite house; ours grew in the same proportion. A shot shook a weak place in our defence; the place was made twice as strong as before. We began to feel the want of animal food, and the short allowance of grain: a sally was made at night, and four sheep brought in:

and, finally, we ascertained beyond a doubt that the enemy were undermining us; a countermine was quickly dug. On the 30th, troops sent to our relief from Dinapore, were attacked and beaten back close to the entrance of the town. On the next day the rebels returned; and, telling us that they had annihilated our relief, offered the Sikhs and the women and children (of which there were none with us) their lives and liberty if they would give up the government officers. On the 1st of August we were all offered our lives, and leave to go to Calcutta, if we would give up our arms. On the 2nd, the greater part of the scpoys went out to meet Major Eyre's field force; and, on their being soundly thrashed, the rest of them abandoned the station: and that night we went out, and found their mine had reached our foundations; and a canvassed tube, filled with gunpowder, was lying handy to blow us up—in which, however, I do not think they could have succeeded, as their powder was bad, and another stroke of the pick would have broken into our countermine. We also brought in the gun which they had left on the top of the opposite house. During the whole siege, only one man (a Sikh) was severely wounded, though two or three got scratches and blows from splinters of bricks. Everybody in the garrison behaved well: but I should be neglecting a duty did I omit to mention specially Mr. Boyle, to whose engineering skill and untiring exertions we in a great measure owe our preservation; and Mr. Colvin, who rendered the most valuable assistance, and who rested neither night nor day, and took on himself far more than his share of every disagreeable duty. In conclusion, I must earnestly beg that his honour the lieutenant-governor will signally reward the whole of our gallant little detachment of Sikhs, whose service and fidelity cannot be overrated. The jemadar should be at once made a subahdar. Many of the rest are fit for promotion; and, when required, I will submit a list with details.—I have, &c.,

“H. C. WAKE, Magistrate.”

The report was transmitted by Mr. Tayler to the secretary to the government of Bengal, on the 8th of August, with the following letter:—

“Patna, August 8th, 1857.

“Herewith I have the honour to forward a copy of a very interesting report from Mr. Wake, reporting officially the events

that occurred at Arrah since the mutiny. The conduct of the garrison is most creditable, and the gallantry and fidelity of the Sikhs beyond all praise. I have no time at present to make any lengthened remarks on the subject, but will submit a full report hereafter. Meanwhile, I beg to recommend that the thanks of government be conveyed to all who held the garrison, and especially to Mr. Wake and Mr. Boyle; that the native officers of the Sikhs be immediately promoted, and that twelve months' pay be given to all the soldiers concerned.—I have, &c.,

“W. TAYLER, Commissioner, &c.”

On the 15th of the month, the report of Mr. H. C. Wake, with the letter accompanying it, was transmitted by the lieutenant-governor of Bengal to the governor-general in council; the lieutenant-governor observing, he had no doubt that his lordship would read the report with the same interest that he had himself felt; and he desired to express his sense of the excellent conduct of the officers and gentlemen concerned, as well as of the courage and loyalty evinced by the Sikhs, which, in his opinion, called for the most marked approbation and acknowledgments of the government.

To this honourable testimony from the local government of Bengal, his excellency the governor-general in council directed the following response to be forwarded by the secretary to the government of India:—

“August 20th, 1857.

“Sir,—I am desired to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 1,330, dated the 15th inst., with enclosure, describing the gallant defence made by the officers of the station of Arrah, and other gentlemen, and aided by a detachment of the Sikh police battalion, against the men of the three mutinous regiments from Dinapore, and a large number of insurgents, under the rebel Koer Sing, of Jugdespore.

“The right honourable the governor-general in council cordially joins the honourable the lieutenant-governor in acknowledging the admirable conduct of the officers and gentlemen who were engaged in this affair, and the courage and fidelity of the Sikh officers and soldiers who composed the guard. I am directed to request that these sentiments of his lordship in council may be made known to all concerned.

“His lordship in council sanctions the promotion of such of the native officers and men of the Sikh police corps as may be

recommended by the magistrate, and the grant of a gratuity of twelve months' pay to the whole of the officers and men of the detachment.—I have, &c.—C. BEADON.”

Returning to the operations carried on at Dinapore for the pursuit of the rebels and the relief of Arrah, it appears that, on the evening of Monday, the 27th of July, a force consisting of a detachment of the 37th regiment and fifty Sikhs, was dispatched by the steamer *Horungotta* to Buhira Ghaut, on the Ganges, eight miles from Arrah. The unfortunate vessel took the ground after three hours' steaming, without any prospect of getting off unless by a rise of the river; and the object of this expedition was frustrated. At length, on the evening of the 28th, the steamer *Bombay* arrived off the station, on her downward passage, and the brigadier-general determined to send up on her, and the flat attached, 250 men of the 37th, with the head-quarters of the 10th regiment, to be joined by the detachment yet on board the *Horungotta*; this united force, under the command of Colonel Fenwick, being directed afterwards to proceed to the Buhira Ghaut, and there disembark. Part of this plan was, however, abandoned, in consequence of the commander of the *Bombay*, when the time for embarking the troops arrived, objecting to tug both flats; and as means were deficient for sending up more than 150 men, a detachment, reduced to that number, was placed under the command of Captain Dunbar, of the 10th regiment. This officer, as senior, eventually assumed command of the entire party destined for Arrah; and the result is thus described by the general and the surviving officers of the party.

On the 30th of July, General Lloyd reported, by telegraph, to the commander-in-chief as follows:—

“Dinapore, 4.20 P.M. (30th.)

“The result of the expedition to Arrah has been, I regret to say, very disastrous, owing entirely to the mismanagement of the officer in command, the late Captain Dunbar, of her majesty's 10th regiment. They arrived at the point of debarkation at 3 P.M. yesterday: landing, three hours and a-half. They marched off for Arrah at 7 P.M., having the moon for some hours: this was all right. They met with scarcely any opposition till they reached a bridge near Arrah: here Captain Harris, second in command, advised Captain Dunbar to halt till daylight; but he, trusting to false reports made to the magistrate, decided on proceeding in

the dark, and fell into an ambuscade close to the city. Here he is supposed to have fallen, and many men also. The column broke in confusion. After struggling some distance, the men rallied and reformed 400 yards distant: awaited daybreak, when retreat was commenced. The men were hungry and exhausted; the rebels, in large bodies, pursued them hotly to the ghaut; latterly, their fire slackened for want of ammunition. At the ghaut the Europeans became uncontrollable, and rushed to the boats, drawing on themselves a heavy fire, by which they suffered greatly, and one boat was burnt. The retreat seems to have been a hurried flight.”

The report of Lieutenant Waller, of the 40th native infantry, to the assistant-adjutant-general, Dinapore, dated the 31st of July, describes the affair thus:—

“I have the honour to report, for the information of the major-general commanding the station, that hearing, on the evening of the 29th, that a party of her majesty's 10th regiment was ordered to proceed to Arrah, I volunteered to accompany them. We started from here (Dinapore) at daylight on the 30th, in the steamer *Bombay*, and proceeded up the river to where the flat attached to the government steamer *Horungotta* was, and took her in tow, with a party of her majesty's 37th regiment, and fifty Sikhs of Captain Rattray's police corps, on board—the *Horungotta* being aground. We then proceeded to Buhira Ghaut, and anchored. Lieutenant Ingilby, 7th native infantry, then gave me command of the fifty Sikhs; Ensign Anderson, 22nd native infantry, and Ensign Venour, of my own regiment, volunteering to do duty with me.

“Lieutenant Ingilby then proceeded with fifteen men (Sikhs of the 7th and 8th native infantry, whom he had taken from Dinapore with him) to a nullah about two miles off, for the purpose of seizing the boats to cross the detachment. About twenty minutes after Lieutenant Ingilby had left, I heard shots in the direction of the nullah, and immediately started with my fifty men; but when I got up to the place the firing had ceased, except a few shots which were fired to stop a boat that was sailing up the river. Although desired to stop, Lieutenant Ingilby then crossed the nullah with his fifteen men, leaving me on the other side.

“I then sent off one of my men to Captain Dunbar, to tell him we needed no assistance, hoping I should be in time to prevent his

coming with his detachment, who were cooking when I left; but they had got about half-way before my messenger reached them. Upon the arrival of the 10th and 37th regiments at the nullah, the order was given to cross, which took up a long time, as the current of the river was very strong, and the boats large and heavy: we had finished crossing by 6 o'clock P.M., and then commenced our march. Except that the road was dreadfully uneven, and very distressing to the feet, we had no difficulties of any kind: it was a moonlight night, and the only armed men we saw from the time we left the steamer until our arrival at Arrah, were the few men who fired at Lieutenant Ingilby, and who were left (so the villagers said) by Baboo Koer Sing, to give him news as soon as we arrived; which showed, with what occurred afterwards, that they were well aware of the party having been sent against them. We arrived in Arrah about eleven o'clock; it was then quite dark, as the moon had gone down; and were proceeding quickly through the outskirts of the town, in the following order:—Lieutenant Ingilby a short way ahead of the column with his fifteen men; then her majesty's 10th, followed by my Sikhs; and her majesty's 37th brought up the rear: when in going by a large tope of mango trees, which Lieutenant Ingilby had passed without seeing or hearing anything, we received a most dreadfully severe fire, which I heard killed a good number of our men, who, not being prepared, and the fire being so heavy and so very close to us, ran off the road into the fields on the other side, and from thence commenced firing on the tope. I lost on the road the native officer, a first-rate fellow, who was shot close to me, and also some men, but how many I do not know, as we did not go near the place again. The men were dreadfully scattered, and there was great difficulty in collecting them; some did not join us till next day, and others were dropping in all night. We then retreated to another road, and lay down behind a small 'bund,' which rose along both sides of the road facing the tope in which the rebels were, and which afforded a capital shelter from the fire, which was kept up at short intervals all night. It was after retreating to this bund that Ensign Anderson was killed; poor fellow! he was shot dead through the heart. We remained here during the whole night, and at daylight started back for the steamer, a distance

of about thirteen miles. We were followed in large numbers by the rebels: the main body would not come within range, but they sent out a great number of sepoys (picked shots, I fancy) right and left, who took advantage of every tree and inequality of the ground the whole way, and kept up, without the least cessation, a most severe fire on our column the whole march—nearly all, or a great part, of their shot telling on us; whereas they were so much scattered, and so well covered, that they did not suffer much loss: however, although we lost a great number of men, we arrived at the ghaut with comparatively very little loss to what we expected.

“When we arrived at the nullah we found a number of large boats on this side, into which the men immediately rushed, and commenced trying to shove the boats across; but most of them were aground, and the others were so large that the men could not manage them, and all the boatmen had been driven away by the sepoys: every time a man showed himself outside a boat he was fired at from the village, which was close by, and at last the men gave up altogether the idea of getting across in boats, and, taking off all their clothes, those that could, swam across. Upon getting down to the nullah, Ensign Venour and I got into a boat with some of the men, and, while I was shoving out the boat, we tried with a rifle to shoot some of the fellows who were making a mark of me. He knocked over one, but, unfortunately, got shot himself immediately after through the thigh, and dropped. I tied up his leg as well as I could, and, getting some more help, I succeeded in getting the boat off; but the fire was so hot, as they saw a chance of our getting away from them, that I and four men left the boat and swam ashore, being fired at the whole way across. Ensign Venour also left the boat a short time afterwards, and, although wounded, managed to swim ashore; the fire from the village the whole time was most severe, killing and wounding a great number.

“After those who could swim got away, the sepoys first opened a most severe fire on the few who remained in the boats that were aground, and, after wounding most of the men in them, they all rushed down and set fire to the roofs. It was here that poor Lieutenant Ingilby was killed; and a great number of wounded, who had been carried so far, were obliged to be left; a few escaped

in a small boat in which some Sikhs took some wounded officers across (Ensign Erskine amongst others), whom they brought for above five miles on a bed, procured in a village. They returned a second time with the boat, in despite of the fire.

“Nothing could be better than the way in which the Sikhs behaved from the time I got command of them; they made themselves extremely useful in every way, and were always cool, steady, and under perfect control.—I am, &c.,

“H. WALLER, Lieutenant,
“40th Regiment Native Infantry.”

The report of Captain Harrison to the assistant-adjutant-general is as follows;—

“Dinapore, July 31st, 1857.

“Sir,—It is with much concern that I have to report, for the information of the major-general commanding division, on the following occurrence connected with the expedition to Arrah, for the purpose of relieving the European inhabitants at that station. At three o'clock P.M., of the 29th instant, the steamer carrying detachments as per margin,* arrived off the point of debarkation, about three miles from the mainland. The party of Sikhs were detached, and shortly afterwards reached the shore for the purpose of seizing boats to enable the detachments to pass over: on arriving there under the command of Lieutenant Ingilby, 7th native infantry, the party were fired upon by some of the rebels posted on the spot to prevent the seizure of the boats by us; there, however, we landed after some shots were fired in that direction, and, after about three hours and a-half, the passage was accomplished.

“Having formed, the detachments commenced their march towards Arrah at seven o'clock P.M., and, with the exception of a few shots being fired at the Sikhs thrown out on our flanks, we reached, without opposition, a bridge distant from Arrah about one mile and a-half: this was the place where I had represented to Captain Dunbar the expediency of halting until daylight; to which he replied, he had heard from the magistrate of the improbability of our meeting with any opposition—he thought it was preferable to push on. After advancing from the bridge about half-an-hour, we were assailed from the embankment of a wood on the right of the road, by a large body of the

rebels firing, about thirty yards' distance, on the flank of the column, which at once did severe execution, and was followed up by a continued running fire that caused great destruction amongst officers and men: here I believe Captain Dunbar fell. The men endeavoured to gain shelter on the other side of the road, but, it being quite dark, they fell down a steep embankment (about six feet), and many men lost their firelocks: after straggling some distance, the officers succeeded in re-forming the men in a field some four hundred yards from the ambuscade, and took up a position for the night (it was then about midnight and very dark) in a field adjoining, which seemed to afford some protection. Here we remained until daylight, the rebels keeping up a fire during the night on our position. We then commenced our retreat towards the steamer, twelve miles distant: in consequence of the men of both regiments having fasted such a long time, they were too exhausted and tired to act as skirmishers; however, our rear-guard and files on the flanks frequently kept up a fire until all their ammunition was expended, by which time we arrived at the bank of the river: we were compelled to march in column, the rebels pursuing us in large bodies the whole distance to the ghauts, both on flank and rear; but their fire visibly slackened the last two miles: the rebels, it was supposed, were running short of ammunition, and wished to reserve it. On our arriving at the ghauts, notwithstanding the efforts of the officers, the men made a rush to the boats, immediately upon which the rebels advanced upon us, and commenced a heavy fire of musketry and two guns upon the boats, which were forsaken by the boatmen: this caused great loss; and one fired one of the boats. The remnants of the detachment gained the steamer, which I immediately ordered to Dinapore, to gain assistance for the wounded. The loss we inflicted on the rebels I believe to be small on account of the darkness, and the men being too exhausted to fire. The people of the country turned out against us.

“I have, &c.—R. P. HARRISON,

“Captain, commanding Detachment of
Her Majesty's 37th Regiment.”

Appended to the above report, is a return of killed and wounded; showing of the former 135, of the latter 60, as the cost of this most unfortunate affair.

These reports were transmitted by Major-general Lloyd, to the deputy-adjutant-gen-

* Her majesty's 10th regiment—three officers, 150 men; ditto 37th regiment—seven officers, 190 men; Sikhs—one officer, 65 men: total, 405.

eral of the army, on the 1st of August. After briefly referring to the circumstances attending the embarkation, and the result, the major-general observes—"The report of Captain Harrison, the senior surviving officer of the party, will put his excellency the commander-in-chief in possession of the very untoward events which attended the subsequent progress of the expedition. From what is apparent on the face of the report, and from information I have derived, it seems to me that this disastrous affair may be attributed, 1st, To the men commencing the land journey without previously taking food; which evidently much impaired their efficiency during the harassing circumstances in which they were placed. 2ndly, From the late commanding officer of the detachment, when in the immediate vicinity of the mutineers, and with the knowledge that his movements were watched (two sowars being seen in the distance on landing, who disappeared in the direction of Arrah), pushing on in the dark against the strong representation of the second in command, and others of the party, and thus allowing himself to be entrapped in an ambuscade, the effects of which quite disheartened and demoralised the troops, and, combined with their physical exhaustion, led to a complete rout, defying the endeavours of the officers to restore order in their progress back to the ghaut."

On the 2nd of August, the major-general reported, by telegraph, to the commander-in-chief as follows:—

"Troops here inadequate to cope with Koer Sing and mutineers in Arrah. One hundred and sixty of 5th fusiliers, and three guns, under Major Eyre, landed at Buxar, and were supposed to be in its neighbourhood. Koer Sing said to have mustered strongly on his own account; sometimes said to meditate an attack on Patna, but real intentions not known. All the boats on the Soane are in his possession."

In reference to the above telegram, it appears that Major Eyre, of the artillery, with a force consisting of 150 men of the 5th fusiliers and three guns, left Buxar on the 30th of July, *en route* for Patna; and, on reaching Shawpore, distant about twenty-eight miles, received intelligence of the occurrences at Dinapore and Arrah. Changing his route, he arrived near the latter station on the 3rd of August, and found himself in front of the enemy, between 2,000 and 2,500 strong, besides a

large number of irregulars belonging to Koer Sing, who commanded the whole force in person. After a sharp engagement, in which Major Eyre was gallantly supported by a reinforcement from Dinapore, under the command of Captain L'Estrange, the enemy, signally defeated, fled panic-stricken in all directions; and the heroic band that preserved Arrah was relieved. The following are the official details:—

"Major Vincent Eyre to the Assistant Adjutant-general at Dinapore.

"Camp near Arrah, August 3rd, 1857.

"Sir,—I have much pleasure in reporting, for the information of Major-general Lloyd, commanding Dinapore division, the safe arrival here of the field force under my command, and the relief of the party defending themselves at Arrah, with whom I have just opened a satisfactory communication; and have received your letter, dated the 31st ult., from which I exceedingly regret to learn the severe loss sustained by the detachment co-operating with us on the Dinapore side; but I venture to affirm confidently, that no such disaster would have been likely to occur had that detachment advanced less precipitately, so as to have allowed full time for my force to approach direct from the opposite side; for the rebels would then have been hemmed in between the two opposing forces, and must have been utterly routed.*

"My former letters of the 30th ultimo and 1st instant, will, I hope, have informed you of my advance from Buxar on the evening of the first-named date: we pushed on with all practicable speed to Shawpore, distant twenty-eight miles, where rumours of the Dinapore disaster reached us. Hearing that the enemy designed to destroy the bridges *en route*, we again pushed on at 2 P.M., as far as Bullootee, where we found the bridge just cut through. An hour's halt sufficed to repair it, which we employed also in burning the villages on either side, since we had caught their inhabitants in the act of destruction. Arriving at Goojerajunge by nightfall, I was delighted to find the bridge entire, where we bivouacked for the night, and at day-break next morning resumed our march; but had only proceeded about a mile beyond Goojerajunge, when we discovered the enemy in great force in possession of the

* This view of the case was objected to by General Lloyd.

woods to our front and flanks. The road by which we had to reach the wood in our front was bounded by inundated paddy-fields on either side. I halted to observe the best course to pursue; and finding that the enemy were weakening their front, to take us on both flanks, I boldly pushed forward, throwing out skirmishers in every direction. The Enfield rifles kept our foes at a distance, and we succeeded in forcing the wood, beyond which, as far as Beebeegunge, it lay across an open swamp, which greatly befriended us. Meanwhile, the baffled enemy were observed hurrying round to oppose us at Beebeegunge, which is situated on the opposite side of a bridge, by which we had hoped to cross the river. There I again halted, to refresh the troops and to reconnoitre.

"Finding the bridge had been destroyed, extensive earthen breastworks raised on the other side, flanking the bridge, and the mutinous regiments in force occupying the houses in the village, I determined on making a detour to the right as far as the railway earthworks, about a mile off. I masked this movement for a time by the fire of my guns; but no sooner did the enemy discover our purpose, than they hurried with their entire strength to intercept us at a wood which it was necessary for us to pass: a portion of them followed us up in the rear, and, by the time we reached the wood, we found quite as much on our hands as we could manage.

"They mustered some 2,000 to 2,500 strong in sepoy alone, besides Rajah Koer Sing's irregular forces, of whom, however, we made little account. The rajah was apparently present in person; and, for upwards of an hour, we were compelled to act solely on the defensive. The sepoy, apparently emboldened by their recent success beyond Arrah, advanced to the assault with a vigour quite unexpected; and twice, with their bugles sounding first the 'assembly,' then the 'advance' and the 'double,' made determined rushes upon the guns; but were, on both occasions, repulsed with showers of grape. Meanwhile, Captain L'Estrange, with the gallant 5th, was not idle, as will be seen by his own report, hereto appended. Finding, at length, that the enemy grew emboldened by the superiority of their numbers and the advantage of their positions, I determined on trying the effect of a general charge of the infantry, and sent Captain the Hon. E. P.

Hastings to Captain L'Estrange, with orders to that effect. Promptly and gallantly he obeyed the order; the skirmishers on the right turned their flank; the guns, with grape and shrapnel, drove in the centre; and the troops advancing on all sides, drove the enemy panic-struck in all directions. Thus our road was cleared; all beyond the country was open, and we proceeded without further interruption to within four miles of Arrah, when we were suddenly brought up by an impassable river, and have since been employed in attempting to bridge it over.* In this work, the railway engineers, headed by Mr. Kelly, have rendered the most valuable aid. Meanwhile, most of the rebels returned to Arrah; but precipitately left it during the night. Rajah Koer Sing accompanied them to save his family. Their loss is reported to have been severe. We hear that not a sepoy now remains in Arrah, and that the mass have gone off towards Rhotas, or scattered themselves in various directions.

"I have now to commend to the notice of the major-general the gallant conduct of the officers and troops whom I had the honour to command on this occasion: under circumstances of great peril and difficulty they have exhibited those soldierly qualities which seldom fail to ensure success. To Captains L'Estrange and Scott, of her majesty's 5th fusiliers, my special thanks are due, for the prompt and gallant way in which they seconded my efforts, more particularly in the final charge, which was executed against twenty times their number of brave and disciplined troops. Captain L'Estrange reports highly of Ensigns Oldfield, Lewis, and Mason. To Captain the Hon. E. P. Hastings, staff-officer of this force, much of the success of this expedition may be attributed; whether on the march, or in action with the enemy, he was everywhere to be found, at the right time and in the right place, to aid us with his energy in overcoming all difficulties. Of the others who especially distinguished themselves, I feel bound to make honourable mention of Messrs. Kelly, Barber, Burroughs, Nicholl, and Hughes, of the Buxar gentlemen volunteers, who rendered excellent service under their gallant leader, Lieutenant Jackson, 12th native infantry. Assistant-surgeon Eteson, in charge of the field hospital, and Staff-sergeant Melville, of the 1st company 5th battalion of artil-

* The guns crossed safely at 11 A.M.



